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Terms of reference 
I, IAN CAMPBELL, Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 
and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998, hereby refer Workers’ 
Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Frameworks to the 
Commission for inquiry and report by 30 November 2003 or within 12 months of 
receipt of the reference, whichever is the later. 
Background 
2.  In 1994 and 1995, the then Industry Commission conducted comprehensive 
inquiries into Australia's workers’ compensation and OHS arrangements - Report 
No. 36 Workers’ Compensation in Australia (4 February 1994) and Report No. 47 
Work, Health and Safety (11 September 1995). In doing so, the Commission made a 
number of recommendations addressing national arrangements for both workers’ 
compensation and OHS. 
3.  Since the Industry Commission inquiries there have been a number of 
developments bearing on Australia's workers’ compensation and OHS programmes. 
Most States and Territories (States) have made a significant number of legislative 
and operational changes to their programmes that have primarily focused on local 
conditions. The coverage of employees under workers’ compensation and OHS 
programmes appears to have declined due to changes in the composition of the 
workforce and working arrangements. 
4.  There have also been a number of other developments that relate to, or may 
have a direct impact on future, workers’ compensation and OHS arrangements, 
including: 
•  the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment and 
Workplace Relations inquiry into Aspects of Workers’ Compensation is 
expected to report in early 2003; 
•  the HIH Royal Commission, scheduled to report in 2003, is expected to, inter 
alia, report on the adequacy and appropriateness of arrangements for the 
regulation and prudential supervision of general insurance, including workers’ 
compensation; 
•  the response by governments to the report by joint Commonwealth and States 
panel on the law of negligence (the Ipp Report) and the Australian Health 
Ministers’ Advisory Council work on legal process reform;     
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•  the response by governments to the withdrawal of reinsurance for injuries 
resulting from terrorist attacks; and 
•  report in 2003 is expected to, inter alia, report on OHS in that industry. 
5.  Workplace injury and illness impose significant social and economic costs on 
injured workers and their families, employers and the wider community. The lack of 
a nationally consistent approach appears to have imposed significant compliance 
costs on business and may have lead to inequities for injured workers in terms of 
benefits payable and entitlement to benefits. 
6.  There is a need to examine whether the establishment of national frameworks 
can deliver comprehensive and consistent workers’ compensation and OHS 
programmes across Australia. More broadly, there is a need to consider whether any 
alternative systems to the existing arrangements may be appropriate to support 
employees and others who may suffer a workplace injury or disease. The 
frameworks/models should also deliver better outcomes for businesses of different 
sizes, employees and the general community, while recognising the differing 
economic characteristics of the States. 
7.  A key goal of any new model would be to facilitate improved workplace safety 
and provide adequate compensation to injured employees while offering a more 
effective continuum of early intervention, rehabilitation and return to work 
assistance for those injured in the workplace. 
8.  Ideally, a national framework for workers’ compensation and OHS would 
encompass a cooperative approach between the Commonwealth and State 
governments while still leaving primary responsibility for these systems with the 
States. Moreover, any national frameworks would provide the States with adequate 
flexibility to address local conditions, encourage competition and facilitate 
competitive neutrality. 
Scope of the Inquiry 
9.  Drawing on the Industry Commission recommendations in Report No. 36 and 
No. 47, the Commission should assess possible models for establishing national 
frameworks for workers’ compensation and OHS arrangements. In doing so, the 
Commission should identify and report on, but not be limited to the following: 
(a)  a consistent definition of employer, employee, workplace and work-related 
injury/illness and fatalities relevant to both workers’ compensation and OHS 
that could be adopted consistently across Australia;     
  TERMS OF REFERENCE  IX
 
(b)  a consistent benefits structures that provides adequate levels of compensation, 
including income replacement and medical and related costs, for injured 
workers and their families; 
(c)  the implications of retaining, limiting or removing access to common law 
damages for work-related injuries/illness and fatalities on the models 
identified; 
(d)  the most appropriate workplace based injury management approaches and/or 
incentives to achieve early intervention, rehabilitation and return to work 
assistance to injured workers and to care for the long-term and permanently 
incapacitated, including the opportunities for re-employment or new 
employment of people with a compensable injury, and the incentives and 
disincentives for employers with regard to the employment of workers who 
have suffered a compensable injury; 
(e)  effective mechanisms to manage and resolve disputes in workers’ 
compensation matters that: 
(i)  encourage the development of internal dispute resolution processes by 
employers;  
(ii)  encourage the involvement of the employer, the employee, and 
insurers/schemes; 
(iii)  encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution including mediation 
and conciliation; and 
(iv)  retain an appropriate appellate structure for employers and employees. 
(f)  the premium setting principles necessary to maintain fully funded schemes 
while delivering to employers equity, stability and simplicity. In doing so, the 
Commission is asked to identify models that provide incentives for 
employers to reduce the incidence of injury and improve safety in the 
workplace; 
(g)  regulatory framework which would allow suitably qualified employers to 
obtain national self-insurance coverage that is recognised by all schemes; 
(h)  a regulatory framework which would allow licensed insurers to provide 
coverage under all schemes. In doing so, the Commission should identify and 
assess the likely impact on employers, employees and the wider community 
from the introduction of competition, including on the level of premiums; 
(i)  options to reduce the regulatory burden and compliance costs imposed on 
businesses of different sizes across Australia by the existing legislative 
structures for workers’ compensation and OHS, within the context of the 
national objective to improve the workplace health and safety of workers. In 
doing so, the Commission should examine the interrelation between the     
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workers’ compensation and OHS legislative frameworks with other statutory 
regimes in place; 
(j)  the appropriate boundaries of responsibility for the cost of work-related 
injury/illness and fatalities between the employer, employees and the 
community. In doing so, the Commission is asked to report on the current 
level of employee coverage by the workers’ compensation schemes and the 
current sharing of costs and to identify under any national framework model 
for workers’ compensation, an appropriate sharing of costs for work-related 
injury/illness and fatalities; 
(k)  the costs to the community of complementing or supplementing the coverage 
of existing workers’ compensation arrangements, such as income support and 
Medicare benefits that may be paid to injured persons; and 
(l)  the national and State and Territory infrastructure and relative costs necessary 
to support the models identified in establishing national frameworks for 
workers’ compensation and OHS. 
10. The Commission should take into account any substantive studies/or inquiries 
undertaken elsewhere. It should also take into account such policy and legislative 
changes in the Commonwealth and States in the areas of general insurance, public 
liability, common law negligence, and the calculation of damages and settlements 
that may assist it to provide advice on this Reference. 
11. In undertaking the inquiry, the Commission is to advertise nationally inviting 
submissions, hold public hearings, consult with key interest groups and affected 
parties, and produce an interim report for consultative purposes and a final report by 
30 November 2003 or within 12 months of receipt of the reference, whichever is the 
later. 
12.  The Commonwealth Government will consider the Commission's 
recommendations, and the Government's response will be announced, as soon as 
possible after the receipt of the Commission's report. 
  
IAN CAMPBELL 
13 MAR 2003  
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The Australian Government welcomes the Productivity Commission’s interim 
report on the inquiry into National Workers’ compensation and Occupational Health 
and Safety Frameworks released on 21 October 2003. 
 
I am writing on behalf of the Government to request that the Commission examine, 
and include in its final report, the impact on small business of any proposed national 
workers’ compensation and occupational health and safety arrangements. 
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OVERVIEW     








•  With a total economic cost in excess of $31 billion annually, work-related fatalities, 
injuries and illnesses impose significant costs on individuals, businesses the 
community and the economy as a whole. Injured workers and their families face 
varying degrees of pain and suffering.  
•  There is a common objective underlying the 10 principal Occupational Health and 
Safety (OHS) statutes in Australia — to prevent workplace injury and illness. National 
uniformity in OHS regulation should be a priority.  
•  OHS uniformity should be driven by a reformed national body appointed on the basis 
of expertise and skills, which consults with employer and employee representatives 
and reports to all jurisdictions through the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council. 
The jurisdictions should agree to adopt, without modification, the legislation and 
regulations proposed by the national body and approved by the Council. 
•  There are also common core objectives to the 10 principal workers’ compensation 
schemes: adequate financial compensation; appropriate rehabilitation and return to 
work; affordable premiums; and full funding by employers. However, significant 
differences exist between them and multi-state employers face significant 
compliance burdens and costs from having to deal with multiple workers’ 
compensation schemes and OHS regimes. Mobile workers are also affected. In 
addition, all workers, employers and the economy more generally suffer from 
inefficiencies in each of the current schemes. 
•  Governments should address these compliance burdens, costs and inefficiencies. 
The Australian Government can take steps immediately by allowing qualifying 
employers to self-insure under its Comcare scheme and be covered by the 
Australian Government’s OHS regime. The Australian Government should, at the 
same time, commence the development of an alternative national self-insurance 
scheme (and extend its OHS regime) for all employers who so wish, and who meet 
appropriate standards.  
•  A final step could be an alternative national workers’ compensation scheme which 
provides privately underwritten insurance as well as self-insurance, together with 
coverage under the national OHS regime.  
•  States and Territories would continue to administer their own workers’ compensation 
schemes and OHS regimes. The impact of the Commission’s recommended initial 
steps on their schemes is likely to be minimal, as would be the likely impact on small 
business. If there was widespread uptake of a future alternative national insurance 
scheme, the impact on existing schemes is potentially greater.  
•  National consistency in workers’ compensation would be enhanced by the 
establishment, now, of a national body charged with developing reform proposals for 
consideration by the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council. Reform of the schemes 
would be to benefit workers and employers who operate within, as well as across, 
jurisdictions.  
 
     




The Australian, State and Territory governments each administer their own Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) regulatory regimes and workers’ compensation schemes. The 
Commission has been requested to develop and assess possible models for establishing 
national frameworks for them. In doing so, the Commission has examined the various 
elements of all the arrangements, but has not undertaken a detailed comparative review. It 
has accepted the case for some form of government intervention to enhance OHS and 
workers’ compensation outcomes. 
For OHS, the Commission considers that national uniformity in OHS regulation should be 
established as a matter of priority. In essence, all jurisdictions agree with the fundamental 
principle of ‘duty of care’. It is the foundation stone of OHS regulation and has been found 
to be sufficiently robust to accommodate the wide range of circumstances and changes 
facing the various jurisdictions. There are no compelling arguments against a single 
national OHS regime, and there are significant benefits from a national approach, 
particularly for multi-state employers and for the increasingly mobile workforce. 
For workers’ compensation, each scheme reflects community norms, evolving workplace 
arrangements and the legal and medical practices of that particular jurisdiction. However, 
this leads to compliance and cost issues for multi-state employers that should, and can, be 
addressed. The solution is the progressive expansion of a scheme offering alternative 
national coverage, which would operate alongside those of the individual jurisdictions. 
Such an alternative national scheme would also partially address the concerns of an 
increasingly mobile workforce. In addition, all jurisdictions should collectively pursue 
improvements to workers’ compensation by establishing a formal review mechanism 
similar to that already in place for OHS. This should lead to an increasing level of national 
consistency (and perhaps for some scheme elements, national uniformity) over time. The 
resulting improvement in scheme performance would be to the benefit of all workers, 
employers and the economy more generally.      







Size and scope of the issues 
Work-related fatalities, injuries and illnesses impose significant costs on individuals, their 
families, businesses, the community and the economy as a whole. In 2001-02, the various 
workers’ compensation schemes compensated the families of some 300 fatalities as a result 
of workplace injury and disease. Compensated injuries and diseases resulting in one week 
or more off work amounted to 10.2 cases per million hours worked. The actual number of 
work-related injuries and illnesses would be considerably higher. A recent survey by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics found that many individuals who experienced a work-
related injury or illness did not apply for workers’ compensation. In most cases this was 
because the injury was considered to be minor, but other reasons included: a lack of 
awareness of eligibility or the availability of benefits; the negative impact on employment; 
the effort of making a claim; or the employer agreeing to pay the cost outside a workers’ 
compensation scheme. 
The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) estimates that the 
total economic cost of workplace accidents to workers, employers and the community 
more generally is in excess of $31 billion annually, or some 4.3 per cent of Gross Domestic 
Product. The varying degrees of pain, suffering and changed life circumstances of workers 
and their families are immeasurable.  
Many changes have occurred in the decade since the Industry Commission reported on 
OHS and workers’ compensation. There has been a continued decline in the proportion of 
the workforce employed under traditional ‘contracts of service’ as new working 
arrangements have emerged. This has reduced workers’ compensation coverage. 
Jurisdictions have responded by modifying their definitions of ‘employees’ and by 
deeming a range of contractors and others to be employees for the purposes of coverage 
under their schemes.  
Also, there has been an overall ageing of the population and of the workforce — with 
implications ranging from the attribution of age-related illness and injury to the workplace, 
the time taken for medical recovery, to options for reskilling as part of return to work. 
Overall, the number of workers’ compensation claims has declined over the last decade, 
although there have been increases in claims for occupational overuse syndrome, stress and 
disease. Offsetting this, the average number of days of paid compensation has risen, from 
52 in 1998-99 to 57 in 2002-03. The nominal cost of claims has also increased, from an 
average of $7532 to $10 102 over the same period. Thus, despite the fall in the number of 
claims, premiums have continued to rise.     
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Nationally, workers’ compensation schemes collected $5.81  billion in premiums from 
employers (excluding GST) in 2001-02, paying out $3.43  billion to injured workers, 
$1.26  billion in medical and other costs, and $1.23  billion for administration. Publicly 
underwritten schemes (inclusive of the New South Wales scheme) account for 85 per cent 
of the premium revenue.  
Investment returns on premium revenue set aside for future claims costs have swung from 
the high real returns of the mid 1990s, to negative returns until recently. This has 
contributed to a situation where all but one of the publicly underwritten schemes now have 
significant unfunded liabilities. There has also been significant insurance industry 
consolidation, affecting the availability and cost of insurance to employers in those 
schemes where there is private underwriting.  
Governmental responses to the changed environment 
Governments have responded to these changes in ways that both reflect, and oftentimes 
reinforce, the uniqueness of their own schemes and regulatory regimes, while learning 
from the innovations of others. Each scheme is the product of a long history of negotiation 
and compromise between governments, employers, unions, lawyers, insurers and others. 
Workers’ compensation is very much a package of inter-related measures, and one element 
cannot easily be assessed in isolation, nor amended without affecting other elements.  
Frequent reviews have been a feature of the landscape, as have the consequent 
administrative and legislative amendments. For workers’ compensation, governments have 
changed their statutory benefits and access to common law, tightened eligibility 
requirements, formalised rehabilitation and return-to-work provisions, and introduced 
alternative dispute resolution procedures.  
Pressures for national frameworks 
In relation to workers’ compensation, the Commission has found that, with the multiplicity 
of schemes, differences between their elements and changes to them impose a significant 
compliance load and cost on multi-state employers. Not surprisingly, these firms have been 
a driving force for a national approach to workers’ compensation and OHS. They employ 
over a quarter of Australian employees and the costs to them of meeting the requirements 
of the various jurisdictions, rather than those of a single national scheme, can be in the 
order of millions of dollars a year (box 1). The goals of these multi-state employers are to 
reduce their compliance burden, develop common procedures and cultures across their 
various worksites, and offer their workers in different jurisdictions the same workplace 
conditions. In pursuit of these goals, some have attempted to self-insure under the 
Australian Government’s Comcare scheme.      







Box 1  Some estimates of the direct costs of multiple schemes 
Optus (sub. 57) estimated that, if it received a single national self-insurance licence, it 
would expect savings of up to $2 million per annum of its $6 million annual workers’ 
compensation costs. It estimated (sub. 134) that the cost of complying with multiple 
workers’ compensation and OHS arrangements adds about 5 to 10 per cent to the cost 
of workers’ compensation premiums. 
CSR (sub.  109) estimated the cost of maintaining and renewing five self-insurance 
licences at over $700 000 per annum, compared to $200 000 for a single licence. 
Insurance Australia Group (sub. 89) estimated that the existence of multiple schemes 
added $10.1 million to the (once-off) cost of setting up a single national IT platform. In 
total, it estimated that having to comply with multiple jurisdictions adds about 
$1.7 million to IT costs annually. Further, it estimated that a national scheme could 
offer overall operating cost savings to the group of $1.2 million per annum and reduce 
actuarial costs by $400 000 per annum. 
BHP Billiton (sub. 110) commented that it cost in the vicinity of $50 000 to purchase a 
system to manage and supply information for each of the jurisdictions. 
Skilled Engineering, (IRsub. 177) estimated that the annual cost saving from operating 
under a single set of national OHS and workers’ compensation rules would be in 




Scheme differences also provide difficulties for workers who operate across jurisdictions. 
Differences in the definition of ‘employee’ may mean that a worker is covered by one 
scheme, but not by another. Accordingly, working temporarily inter-state may leave them 
uncovered. Recent initiatives on cross-border coverage by Queensland, followed by New 
South Wales and Victoria provide a partial, but incomplete, solution to this latter problem. 
Some have argued for a uniform national regime for workers’ compensation on the basis 
that the schedule of benefits should be the same for all workers across all schemes. Under 
current arrangements, benefit schedules differ across the various jurisdictions. However, 
variations in benefits are only one element of the many differences among jurisdictions in 
their workers’ compensation schemes. Employees also have different degrees of access to 
common law and journey to work claims, are subject to different work-related tests, and 
have to comply with different rehabilitation and return-to-work requirements. In this 
respect, a relative disadvantage in one element of a scheme may be offset, to varying 
degrees, by advantages in other elements. Accordingly, the Commission does not accept 
that equality of benefits, assessed in isolation from other scheme elements, is in itself a 
compelling argument for a uniform national workers’ compensation scheme. There are 
advantages, however, in progressively adopting uniform elements of the schemes, such as 
common definitions of employee and wages.      
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In OHS, changes in response to external factors have been more gradual than have been the 
case with workers’ compensation, and these changes have occurred with some degree of 
national consistency. This is due, in part, to the universal support for the duty of care 
principle, for a reduction in work-related injury and illness, and to there being a national 
institutional process, administered by the NOHSC, which addresses common issues. 
It is true, however, that in terms of achieving national uniformity of OHS regulation, 
progress has been slow and the process unwieldy. The compliance burdens and costs 
imposed by multiple regimes, regulations, administration and enforcement, compounded 
by regular amendment, are a feature of OHS across the jurisdictions, although not to the 
same degree as with workers’ compensation. 
Occupational health and safety  
There are ten principal OHS statutes across Australia — six State, two Territory and two 
Australian Government (one relating to Australian Government employees and the other 
relating to seafarers). The essential objective underlying each OHS regime is to prevent 
workplace injury and illness. 
There is strong support for government intervention through regulation of OHS and this 
question is not revisited in this inquiry. All jurisdictions have drawn on the 1972 Robens 
approach to regulation. This involves a general duty of care imposed on those having 
control over aspects of the workplace, backed by detailed regulations and codes of 
practice. All jurisdictions agreed to the establishment, in 1985, of NOHSC, a tripartite 
body comprising the Australian Government, States and Territories, employers and trade 
unions, which reports to the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (WRMC). 
In the early 1990s, NOHSC pursued national uniformity in OHS regulation. This has been 
replaced by a process aimed at achieving greater consistency across jurisdictions, by which 
NOHSC develops national standards and codes of practice which are forwarded to the 
individual jurisdictions for implementation. Typically, there is then further tripartite 
consideration within each jurisdiction, where the proposals may be accepted in total, 
accepted with modifications on the grounds of unique jurisdictional circumstances, or 
rejected. Of the seven priority national standards agreed over a decade ago, only one (on 
certification) has been fully adopted, although a few of the major elements of most of the 
others have now been adopted in most jurisdictions. 
In 2002, NOHSC formulated a National Occupational Health and Safety Strategy 2002–
2012.  The strategy was signed by the Ministers of all States and Territories and the 
Australian Government, and was adopted by the peak employer and union bodies that are 
parties to NOHSC. It sets out nine national targets and priorities. One element that it seeks 
to achieve is a nationally consistent regulatory framework. However, implementation of     






the strategy rests with the individual jurisdictions and their action plans lack uniformity in 
both content and pace. 
National framework issues 
The Commission considers it essential that the existing broad agreement on OHS 
regulation should be taken further to develop, adopt and enforce uniform national 
legislation and regulations. Outcome-based regulations and codes of practice can 
accommodate valid differences in jurisdictional circumstances in the same way as current 
regimes accommodate regional variation within each individual jurisdiction.  
A uniform national regime would make it much more efficient for multi-state employers to 
ensure that their management and employees understand the one set of requirements and 
any changes to it. Also, equipment could be moved interstate and not be in contravention 
of local regulations. Employers could establish a single safety culture, with common 
associated manuals and procedures, throughout their organisations. Employees could be 
trained in, and understand, the one set of OHS requirements, irrespective of the locality in 
which they work. 
As concluded by the Cole Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry 
‘... there would be no more salutary reform to occupational health and safety law and 
regulation than a single national scheme comprehensively regulating occupational health 
and safety in Australia’. However, as Cole also concluded, such an outcome does not seem 
imminent under current arrangements.  
National framework proposals 
The Commission is proposing two broad approaches, to operate in parallel, for the reform 
of OHS with the clear intent of achieving national uniformity in legislation and regulation 
within a reasonable time frame.  
The first approach is to strengthen the cooperative national institutional structure to drive 
uniformity. The second approach, additional to and independent of the first, is to provide 
nation-wide coverage under an alternative single regime. This latter approach involves 
progressively opening up access to the existing Australian Government’s OHS regime (in 
conjunction with the Commission’s proposals for workers’ compensation).  
Reform of the national standards setting body 
The challenge of introducing uniform national standards and the associated institutional 
structures has been tackled in other areas of the Australian economy, such as in transport     
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and food standards. They involve quite different organisational structures from that of the 
current NOHSC, and more formal standard making and adoption processes.  
The Commission’s proposed reform model to drive national uniformity would have the 
following features:  
•  a smaller NOHSC with members appointed on the basis of their expertise and skills by 
the relevant Australian Government portfolio minister with the approval of the WRMC;  
•  the objective of achieving uniform national OHS legislation and regulations to be 
specified clearly in the legislation;  
•  an agreement (similar to the Food Regulation Agreement 2002) that all jurisdictions 
adopt the draft legislation, acts and regulations as approved by the WRMC without 
variation; 
•  the NOHSC would have the ability to appoint advisory bodies, given the importance of 
consulting with employers, unions and all jurisdictions in the development of OHS 
regulation;  
•  specified timetables (similar to that in food standards) for WRMC review of proposals 
from NOHSC — the process to be prescribed in the legislation; and 
•  funding for NOHSC to be provided by the Australian Government, States and 
Territories similar to the National Transport Commission, with a commitment to fund 
the research and data collection necessary to ensure the development of best practice 
OHS.  
The proposed model recognises that the prevention of injury and illness is a matter for the 
individual factories, offices, shops and other workplaces across Australia and that to be 
effective, it is at this level that OHS regulation should influence outcomes. Accordingly, 
consultation with employer and employee bodies is an important feature of the NOHSC 
process. Importantly also, the model recognises State and Territory commitment to, and 
ownership of, the regulatory process and policy outcomes. The model also retains the 
benefits of innovation and learning. 
This is not to suggest that simply changing institutional structures or the wording of acts or 
memoranda will result immediately in improved or more timely outcomes. The 
experiences in both the transport and food standards areas demonstrate the magnitude of 
the task. The achievement of national frameworks in any area is challenging within a 
federal structure, even where there is strong agreement with the ultimate objectives.  
Access to the existing Australian Government’s OHS regime  
In the area of workers’ compensation, the Commission is proposing that a progressively 
expanding number of employers could apply for coverage under an alternative national     






scheme, restricted to self-insurers in the first instance. The Commission considers that 
these same employers should be able to opt for coverage under a single national OHS 
regime — the Australian Government’s OHS regime.  
The Australian Government Solicitor has advised that national OHS coverage could be 
achieved constitutionally, principally under the corporations head of power. Such coverage 
would require legislation. Similarly, the Australian Government’s OHS regime could be 
extended to cover all industries, such as mining. In the interim, the individual State and 
Territory regimes would apply, as they do now, to areas not covered by the Australian 
Government’s regime.  
Small business 
Most small businesses would be unlikely to seek access to the alternative national OHS 
regime proposed, as they operate within a single jurisdiction where they are covered for 
workers’ compensation and where an existing OHS regime applies. However, the 
Commission’s proposed strengthening of the cooperative national institutional structure to 
drive uniformity should benefit all workers and businesses, including small business, by 
encouraging the more timely development and uptake of ‘best practice’ workplace safety 
procedures. Further, greater uniformity would assist those small to medium enterprises that 
wish to expand beyond their state or territory boundaries. 
Workers’ compensation 
As with OHS, there are multiple State and Territory workers’ compensation schemes: eight 
State and Territory schemes; two Australian Government schemes (for employees of 
existing and former Australian Government authorities (including ACT government 
employees) and seafarers); as well as a small number of industry-specific schemes (such as 
for the coal industry in New South Wales).  
The underlying objectives of each jurisdiction’s workers’ compensation scheme are 
essentially the same: 
•  to provide adequate financial compensation in the event of workplace fatality, injury or 
illness; 
•  to provide an appropriate injury management continuum of early intervention, 
rehabilitation and return-to-work assistance; and 
•  to ensure that employer contributions fully cover the cost of scheme liabilities arising 
from current employment, in an affordable manner.      
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There is also an inter-related objective — to provide feedback to employers on the 
prevention of workplace injury and illness through costs, incentives and data analysis. 
Employers are obliged to pay premiums to a public or private insurer, or otherwise self-
insure, to cover their liability for work-related fatality, injury or illness. Monies collected 
by insurers are used for compensation, rehabilitation and administration. Employers can 
self-insure if they meet certain prudential and other requirements. The various elements of 
each scheme have been the subject of intense and regular negotiation and form complex 
wholes which have often proven to be relatively unstable. Publicly underwritten schemes 
dominate Australia’s workers’ compensation. 
Each jurisdiction operates a no-fault compensation scheme, but there are jurisdictional 
differences between their various elements, relating to: 
•  access and coverage, involving definitions of employee and work-relatedness, the 
inclusion of journeys to and from work, and recess breaks; 
•  benefit structures, step downs and commutation; 
•  injury management processes involving early intervention, rehabilitation and return to 
work;  
•  the role of private and public insurers, and approaches to premium setting; and  
•  access to common law settlements.  
Existing national coordinating mechanisms governing workers’ compensation comprise the 
WRMC and the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities (HWCA). The latter does 
not have a legislated set of roles and responsibilities for workers’ compensation, unlike 
those applying to NOHSC for OHS. Nonetheless, in 1997, the HWCA explored the issues 
of `national consistency in some depth, publishing Promoting Excellence: National 
Consistency in Australian Workers’ Compensation. 
National framework issues 
The most significant issue arising from the differences in the schemes is the compliance 
burdens and costs for multi-state employers. Areas of cost, as illustrated earlier in box 1, 
include the employment of additional staff in the personnel units (together with their on-
going retraining to maintain currency with the many changes to each scheme) and the 
development and maintenance of multiple IT programs.  
Self-insured employers must comply with different prudential requirements, variations in 
the statutory benefits payable to their employees and differences in common law 
requirements. Premiums, for those employers who insure, are calculated according to 
different and complex rules of coverage of employees and definitions of remuneration in     






each of the jurisdictions. There are further variations in injury management and dispute 
resolution procedures. 
Problems also arise for the increasingly mobile workforce, for example from differences in 
coverage and the allocation of liability for degenerative injuries and illnesses of long 
latency. The lack of uniformity of benefits, however, must be considered within the 
broader framework of all elements of each scheme. 
The lack of jurisdictional uniformity can spill over to several Australian Government 
programs. Ignorance or confusion about eligibility for coverage, because of the differences 
in definitions of an employee, can mean an injured worker becomes the responsibility of 
the Australian Government (under its Medicare or social security programs). Purposeful 
action by one of the parties, say to avoid recording an injury or to lodging a claim, could 
have the same effect. (ABS data suggest significant under-reporting of work-related injury 
and illness.) Conversely, employers can end up meeting some costs of injuries and 
illnesses that are not primarily work-related.  
Injured or ill workers may also resort to Australian Government programs in those 
jurisdictions where the benefit structures do not include long-tail claims. In Victoria, for 
example, payments for some end at 104 weeks and, in Queensland, all benefits cease at 
five years. Premature exhaustion of lump sum compensation can leave no alternative than 
to fall back on the Australian Government’s social security programs. 
National framework reform proposals 
Existing national coordinating mechanisms have proven ineffective in resolving the 
compliance complexities and costs for multi-state employers. Over the last five years, 
HWCA’s primary output has been the provision of comparative information about the 
schemes. The WRMC, whilst also generating comparative performance monitoring 
information, has been primarily concerned with industrial relations matters. 
The Commission, in its initial issues paper, set out six possible models of national 
frameworks for workers’ compensation arrangements. Following feedback from 
participants and its own analysis, the Commission refined its preferred strategy to four 
models, with the first three to be introduced consecutively and the fourth to be 
implemented independently.  
A.  The Australian Government offers to license employers who qualify under the current 
competition test to self-insure under the Comcare scheme, subject to their meeting the 
scheme’s requirements as to prudential matters, claims management, OHS and other 
matters.     
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B.  The Australian Government establishes, for all corporate employers, an alternative 
national scheme of workers’ compensation self-insurance to operate in parallel to 
existing State or Territory schemes. Again, approval of applicants would be subject to 
employers meeting the scheme’s requirements as to prudential matters, claims 
management and other matters.  
C.  The Australian Government considers, at a later date, an alternative national premium-
paying insurance scheme for all corporate employers who wish to join, to operate in 
parallel to existing schemes. It would be privately underwritten and incorporate the 
self-insurance arrangements of model B.  
D.  The Australian Government, States and Territories establish a national workers’ 
compensation body that would be charged with such functions as developing nationally 
consistent scheme elements for adoption by individual jurisdictions.  
The Commission also explored the scope for mutual recognition among the jurisdictions to 
provide national frameworks that address the cost and compliance concerns of multi-state 
employers. However, this model is not pursued further as it would require jurisdictions to 
be indifferent to underlying differences among schemes — and they would face added 
administration and enforcement costs. Importantly, it would add complexity and confusion, 
with potentially many different procedural requirements applying to various employers and 
employees within the one jurisdiction (notwithstanding that Australian Government OHS 
and workers’ compensation currently coexist with the local schemes in the States and 
Territories). It is noted, however, that a form of mutual recognition has already been 
agreed to, where workers from one jurisdiction are working temporarily in another — 
essentially cross-border recognition of coverage under the ‘home’ compensation scheme. 
There is also scope for cost savings from greater coordination among the jurisdictions by 
mutual recognition in some areas of the schemes, such as the approval of rehabilitation 
providers.  
The Commission has no evidence of support by the States and Territories for a single 
uniform national workers’ compensation scheme. Many of the stakeholders at the 
individual jurisdiction level have suggested that concessions won in hard fought 
negotiations would not be willingly surrendered for the sake of national uniformity. 
Importantly, the Commission does not support national uniformity of workers’ 
compensation for its own sake. In arriving at this view, the Commission recognises that the 
vast majority of employers (who are predominantly small to medium enterprises) and their 
employees operate only within a single jurisdiction. To them, national uniformity has little 
relevance. Further, it is not apparent that there is any single perfect or best scheme. Best 
practice can be reflected in a number of different ways. Innovation and learning should be 
encouraged, with the consequent reforms benefiting workers and employers.      






Australian Government development of a national scheme to operate in 
conjunction with existing State and Territory schemes 
Step 1:  Actively encourage self-insurance applications under Comcare (model A) 
Currently, the Australian Government’s Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, 
which establishes the Comcare scheme, enables private employers to apply for a licence to 
self-insure. The Minister has discretionary power to declare as ‘eligible’, employers who 
are ‘carrying on a business in competition with a Commonwealth authority or with another 
corporation that was previously a Commonwealth authority’. This test could potentially 
apply to the banking, telecommunications, air transport, defence, broadcasting and postal 
sectors. The granting of a licence is then subject to approval by the Safety Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Commission (SRCC) under certain prudential and other criteria.  
Four public policy principles that guide the Minister in exercising discretion are the 
impacts of the grant of a licence on: employees; the employer; the integrity of the Comcare 
scheme; and the operations of State and Territory schemes.  
Employees would become eligible for benefits as provided under Comcare. Employers will 
self-select, but will need to comply with the rigorous prudential and other requirements. 
Of direct concern to the Australian Government is the risk to itself associated with granting 
a self-insurance licence to a company which is subsequently declared bankrupt or is 
otherwise unable to meet its workers’ compensation liabilities. On the basis of advice 
sought by the Commission, the Australian Government Actuary proposed specific 
prudential requirements that would reduce the residual risk to the Government. The 
Commission proposes that the cost of any residual risk be internalised to self-insurers by a 
post-event levy, as has been recommended for insurance by the HIH Royal Commission. 
The Commission has also proposed that the existing regulatory framework provided by the 
SRC Act be modified and developed progressively to support the expansion of national 
insurance under this and the subsequent steps, with the SRCC being developed as a stand-
alone regulator.  
Actuarial advice to the Commission is that the impact on the State and Territory schemes is 
unlikely to be significant. Many of the employers eligible for self-insurance under the 
proposed national scheme are likely to be self-insured under existing State and Territory 
arrangements and are thus already outside the premium pools in those jurisdictions. 
However, the national scheme would extend to some employers who currently pay into 
some premium pools for various reasons, such as not meeting minimum employee criteria 
for self-insurance of particular jurisdictions. Queensland’s threshold of 2000 local 
employees is a case in point.     
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Strong concern was expressed by some participants that small businesses, in particular, 
could be disadvantaged by the loss of premiums from their risk pools by large firms self-
insuring. The concerns related to the effects that the loss of premiums could have on the 
viability of some risk pools and on the ability to provide cross-subsidies from within a 
scheme. There could be some changes in premiums for those remaining if risk pools were 
to be reformulated, but, of itself, this would be unlikely to systematically increase (or 
decrease) premiums.  
In privately underwritten schemes, the nature and extent of any existing cross-subsidies is 
likely to be limited by commercial considerations and competition between licensed 
insurers. Accordingly, the loss of premiums from large employers would have little, if any, 
effect on the premiums of those remaining. For publicly underwritten schemes, and 
notwithstanding policies to minimise the extent of cross-subsidies, actuarial advice was 
that any increase in average premiums on remaining employers would be very small, even 
if those employers who were to exit were providing quite large cross-subsidies.  
Once the Minister is satisfied on each of the four policy principles, the Australian 
Government could encourage applications under existing legislation. The outcome would 
be competitively neutral between private and Australian Government (or former Australian 
Government) employers. Such a move could also motivate States and Territories to 
develop greater consistency across their own schemes.  
Without further legislation, private employers self-insured under the Comcare scheme 
would continue to operate under State and Territory OHS arrangements. The Australian 
Government Solicitor has advised that the Australian Government, drawing on its 
constitutional heads of power, could enact legislation which enabled all employers self-
insured under the Comcare scheme to elect to be covered by Australian Government OHS 
legislation. The Australian Government could extend its current OHS inspection and 
enforcement arrangements (including cooperation of the States and Territories) to this 
wider group of employers. Matters not covered by Australian Government OHS would 
continue to be regulated by the State and Territory OHS regimes.  
Step 2:  Establish an alternative national self-insurance scheme (model B) 
The Australian Government could also commence, at the same time, the drafting of 
legislation to establish an alternative national self-insurance scheme (administered by the 
SRCC) for all employers who so wish and who meet certain prudential and other 
requirements. The Australian Government Solicitor has advised the Commission that this 
could be covered under the Commonwealth’s corporations power under the Constitution.  
In terms of scheme design, the Australian Government could offer the current Comcare 
arrangements, or redesign particular elements of the scheme, such as the current long-tail     






benefit structure and the dispute resolution procedures. Actuarial advice, as noted earlier, is 
that this step is also likely to have little impact on existing schemes as the relevant 
employers are predominantly self-insurers. The initiative may pick up the smaller premium 
paying State or Territory offices of some firms. 
Again, as with step 1, employers opting into this scheme could be covered by Australian 
Government OHS legislation. 
Step 3:  Establish an alternative national premium-paying insurance scheme 
(model C) 
Following consideration of the success achieved under steps 1 and 2, and the outcome of 
cooperative institutional reform (model  D, below), the Australian Government could 
extend its alternative national scheme to be available to all corporate employers, involving 
both self-insurance and premium-paying insurance. As with the previous step, it would 
require the exercise of the Commonwealth’s constitutional powers and the passage of new 
legislation.  
In the Commission’s view, private underwriting of this expanded scheme would be 
desirable. Although research into the relative merits of public and private underwriting 
suggests that sound management can be more important than the form of underwriting, the 
characteristics of private underwriting are nevertheless attractive. These include: the 
capital risk being accepted by the capital markets; competition in the marketplace, with 
incentives for efficiency and innovation; and greater transparency of any governmental 
influence over premiums. 
Employers covered by the national insurance scheme would also be eligible for coverage 
by Australian Government OHS legislation.  
The opening up of an alternative national insurance scheme to all corporate employers 
could have potentially significant impacts on existing State and Territory schemes, if there 
was widespread uptake. Those public schemes with large unfunded liabilities may need to 
impose appropriate ‘exit’ arrangements. Some of the smaller schemes may ultimately 
become unviable on a stand-alone basis if a significant number of employers switch to the 
national scheme. Nevertheless, the operation of a number of private underwriters in small 
jurisdictions such as Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory 
attests to the capacity of insurers to operate with small premium pools for any one class of 
insurance. Further, if introduced in the staged form recommended, then it is unlikely that 
the changes would occur at a pace that precluded the steady rationalisation of existing 
arrangements. To the extent that such a scheme adopted improved practices, it could 
provide an added incentive for State and Territory schemes to reform.      
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National cooperative institutional reform (model D) 
Independent of and in parallel to the Australian Government’s own initiatives as set out 
above, the Commission is proposing that the States and Territories join with the Australian 
Government to strengthen and upgrade the national institutional infrastructure relating to 
workers’ compensation. This model centres on formalising cooperation between the 
jurisdictions as follows: 
•  A national body would be established by Australian Government legislation. It would 
have a board of five to nine members with relevant expertise and skills in workers’ 
compensation matters appointed by the relevant Australian Government portfolio 
Minister with the approval of the WRMC.  
•  The WRMC would determine the priority areas requiring attention by the national body 
and make decisions on its recommendations.  
•  The national body’s main functions would be to develop nationally consistent scheme 
elements for consideration by the WRMC, collect data and undertake/coordinate 
analysis and research, and monitor and report on the performance of workers’ 
compensation arrangements. It would have the ability to appoint advisory bodies, given 
the importance of stakeholder concerns and operational matters to maintaining the 
contemporary relevance of existing schemes. It is envisaged that the current WRMC 
performance monitoring role would be transferred to it. 
•  The Australian Government, States and Territories would retain responsibility for 
implementation, with a view to improving the performance of their respective schemes 
and, over time, achieving greater national consistency. 
•  Funding of the national body would be shared by the jurisdictions. 
Initially, the body could focus on developing standards over which there is common 
agreement or where agreement is possible (for example, definitions of employee, employer 
and wages/remuneration), rather than on more intractable matters (for example, access to 
common law settlements and private underwriting). The progressive reform of the various 
schemes would be to the benefit of all workers, employers and the performance of the 
economy more generally.  
The Commission envisages that the two bodies responsible for progressing national 
frameworks for OHS and workers’ compensation would cooperate in relevant areas. 
Small business 
The impacts on small business of the models for national workers’ compensation proposed 
by the Commission depend largely on their effects on the risk pools into which small 
business pays premiums for the coverage provided to their workers. Model D is unlikely to     






have any direct impact initially and over the longer term should provide benefits to all 
employers as greater operational efficiencies are achieved by all schemes through 
improved cooperation between them.  
There is some evidence, however, that small business benefits currently from cross-
subsidies built into some schemes, although most jurisdictions have policies to reduce or 
minimise such cross-subsidies over time. Under models A and B, the exit of larger non-
self-insuring businesses from premium paying schemes into national self-insurance has the 
limited potential to change the premiums faced by the remaining employers, including 
small business. However, empirical analysis using a wide range of values for uptake by 
larger employers of national self-insurance and of levels for cross-subsidies reveals that 
any increases on average premiums are likely to be very small.  
Under model C, the impact could be quite variable. On the one hand, the availability of an 
alternative national insurance could add greater competition to the provision of workers’ 
compensation insurance, with benefits for small business. On the other, it could also erode 
any special benefits provided for small business under current arrangements. Any erosion, 
however, is likely to result in more appropriate pricing of the risks that small businesses 
bring to the schemes.  
Other matters 
In the course of this inquiry and as requested, the Commission has considered a range of 
other matters relating predominantly to particular elements of workers’ compensation 
schemes. The results of these considerations are detailed in the Report. In brief, the 
Commission does not support such elements as:  
•  access to common law, on the grounds that any benefits are outweighed by the negative 
effects on early rehabilitation and the high legal costs; and  
•  coverage for journeys to and from work on the grounds of limited employer control and 
the availability of Compulsory Third Party coverage for most events. 
The Commission favours:  
•  a narrow definition of work-relatedness that emphasises the significant causation of the 
work environment; 
•  premium setting principles which encourage full funding and which do not distort price 
signals to employers as to the importance of occupational health, safety and 
rehabilitation; and  
•  injury management procedures which encourage early intervention  and return to work.      
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The Commission is mindful, however, that any changes made to individual elements of an 
existing scheme must maintain or improve the overall integrity of that particular scheme to 
the benefit of workers and employers. Changes to a scheme should also be approached 
cautiously, with due prior assessment, as they can also have far reaching and unexpected 
impacts on scheme outcomes. In this respect, actuaries suggest that it can take up to five 
years for the outcomes of scheme changes to become fully apparent.  
Care for the catastrophically injured 
In workers’ compensation schemes, the catastrophically injured account for a small 
proportion of claims but a larger proportion of scheme costs. Claims relating to such events 
can have a significant impact on employers and on the financial performance of those 
schemes that do not shift a proportion of these costs to the Australian Government.  
There is wide community concern about the care of catastrophically injured persons and it 
has been the subject of discussion at Ministerial meetings on insurance issues. The 
majority (61 per cent) of catastrophic injuries result from motor vehicle accidents, with 
workplace accidents contributing a further 13  per cent. The cost of caring for 
catastrophically injured persons varies considerably and depends on injuries sustained. 
Invariably it is large. The funding available from insurance depends on the cause of the 
injury and its adequacy for meeting the cost of caring varies considerably. Most cases 
eventually involve Australian Government funding. 
The Commission considers that a national approach could ensure an appropriate standard 
of care is provided to the catastrophically injured, irrespective of cause of accident, and 
supports a review to this end.  
     







National frameworks for occupational health and safety (chapter 4) 
The Commission recommends that the following features be included in a cooperative 
occupational health and safety national framework model in Australia:  
•  a National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) of five to 
nine members appointed by the Minister on the basis of their expertise and 
skills, the appointment to be approved by the Workplace Relations Ministers’ 
Council (the Council);  
•  clear specification of the objective of achieving uniform national occupational 
health and safety legislation and regulation in all jurisdictions in the NOHSC 
enabling legislation;  
•  agreement by all jurisdictions to adopt, without variation, the legislation and 
regulations proposed by NOHSC and approved by the Council;  
•  NOHSC have the ability to appoint advisory bodies, noting the importance of 
consulting with employers, unions and all jurisdictions;  
•  specified timetables for Council review of proposals from NOHSC, similar to 
those applying in relation to food standards — the process to be prescribed in 
the legislation; and  
•  funding of NOHSC shared by the jurisdictions, together with a commitment to 
funding the research and data collection necessary to ensure the development 
of a best practice national occupational health and safety system.  
The Commission recommends that the Australian Government amend the Occupational 
Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991, to enable those employers 
who are licensed to self-insure under the Australian Government’s workers’ 
compensation scheme to elect to be covered by the Australian Government’s 
occupational health and safety legislation. This legislation would be extended to cover 
those insuring under any future alternative national premium-paying insurance scheme. 
National frameworks for workers’ compensation (chapter 5) 
The Commission recommends that the Australian Government develop an alternative 
national workers’ compensation scheme to operate in parallel to existing State and 
Territory schemes by taking the following steps progressively: 
•  step 1 — immediately encourage self-insurance applications from employers 
who meet the current competition test to self-insure under the Comcare     
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scheme, subject to meeting its prudential, claims management, occupational 
health and safety and other requirements; 
•  step  2 — commence, at the same time, the development of an alternative 
national self-insurance scheme for corporate employers who wish to join such 
a scheme, and who meet prudential, claims management and other 
requirements; and 
•  step  3 — in the longer term, consider the establishment of an alternative 
national premium-paying insurance scheme for corporate employers who so 
wish, including small to medium enterprises, which would be competitively 
underwritten by private insurers and incorporate the national self-insurance 
scheme established under step 2. 
The Commission recommends that the current regulatory framework for the oversight of 
the Australian Government’s workers’ compensation schemes and occupational health 
and safety regimes be strengthened by progressively developing the Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation (SRC) Commission as a stand-alone regulator. The 
SRC Commission to: 
•  be controlled by a board of independent directors appointed for a fixed term on 
the basis of their expertise and skills; 
•  have a full-time director appointed as chairperson; and  
•  be provided with its own staff and funding. 
The Commission recommends that, independent of, and operating in parallel to, the 
progressive development of a national workers’ compensation scheme, the States and 
Territories join with the Australian Government to establish immediately a new national 
body for workers’ compensation having the following features: 
•  establishment by Australian Government legislation with an independent board 
of five to nine members appointed by the Minister on the basis of their relevant 
expertise and skills, the appointment to be approved by the Workplace Relations 
Ministers’ Council (the Council);  
•  it would develop nationally consistent scheme elements for consideration and 
approval by the Council, collect data and undertake/coordinate analysis of 
research, and monitor and report on the performance of workers’ 
compensation schemes. It would take over the current performance monitoring 
role of the Council; 
•  its priority work areas would be determined by the Council; 
•  it would have the ability to appoint advisory bodies, noting the importance of 
stakeholder concerns and operational matters to maintaining the contemporary 
relevance of workers’ compensation schemes; and  
•  its funding would be shared by the jurisdictions.      






The Australian, State and Territory governments would retain responsibility for 
implementation, with a view to improving the performance of their respective schemes 
and, over time, achieving national consistency. 
Defining access and coverage (chapter 6) 
The Commission recommends the following as principles to use when defining an 
employee, to determine coverage under compulsory workers’ compensation schemes:  
•  employer control, recognising that the common law ‘contract of service’ 
provides a solid basis for defining an employee in most situations; 
•  certainty and clarity, as coverage under workers’ compensation should be clear 
to both workers and employers at the commencement of the work relationship. 
For certain groups of workers and types of work relationships, deeming may be 
necessary; 
•  administrative simplicity, to reduce the costs of administration and 
enforcement;  
•  consistency with other legislation, to capture significant informational benefits 
and cost savings; and  
•  durability and flexibility, to deal with a wide variety of work arrangements.  
The Commission recommends the following as principles to use when defining work-
related fatality, injury and illness under compulsory workers’ compensation schemes:  
•  definition of injury and illness to be comprehensive in terms of coverage of 
medical injuries and illnesses and include aggravation, acceleration, 
deterioration, exacerbation or recurrence of a medical condition;  
•  definition of work-relatedness to be in terms of ‘arising out of or in the course 
of employment’, as used by nearly all jurisdictions; 
•  definition of attribution, ‘a significant contributing factor’, which is used in a 
number of jurisdictions, to be a minimum benchmark, while ‘the major 
contributing factor’ would add greater clarity;  
•  coverage for journeys to and from work not to be provided, on the basis of lack 
of employer control, availability of alternative cover in most instances and the 
ability to be dealt with under enterprise bargaining; and  
•  coverage for recess breaks and work-related events to be restricted, on the basis 
of lack of employer control, to those at workplaces and at employer sanctioned 
events.     
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Injury management (chapter 7) 
The Commission recommends the following as principles to facilitate durable return to 
work: 
•  early intervention, including the early notification of claims and the 
provisional assignment of liability; 
•  workplace-based rehabilitation where possible, at the pre-injury workplace, 
noting the various schemes aimed at overcoming the particular difficulties 
faced by small to medium enterprises in this respect; and 
•  return to work programs developed and implemented by a committed 
partnership of the employer, employee and treating doctor, drawing on the 
services of a rehabilitation coordinator and allied health professionals as 
required.  
Common law access (chapter 8) 
The Commission recommends that common law should not be included in a national 
framework for workers’ compensation on the grounds that it: 
•  does not offer stronger incentives for accident reduction than a statutory, no-
fault scheme; 
•  can provide lump sum compensation which may prove inadequate to the longer 
term needs of seriously injured workers; 
•  may over-compensate less seriously injured workers who, in the normal course 
of events, could be expected to rehabilitate and return to work; 
•  delays rehabilitation and return to work (if there are psychological benefits to 
be derived from receiving a lump sum, these could be obtained through 
statutory benefits); and 
•  is a more expensive compensation mechanism than statutory workers’ 
compensation. 
If common law is to be included in a national framework, then access should be 
restricted to: 
•  the most seriously injured workers (subject to meeting an impairment 
threshold); and 
•  non-economic loss only. 
Where common law access is retained, jurisdictions might give consideration to: 
•    imposing restrictions on plaintiff legal fees (including incentives for early 
settlement);     






•  mandatory settlement conferences (which include an exchange of offers); and 
•  legislative provision to encourage early rehabilitation by plaintiffs.  
Statutory benefit structures (chapter 9) 
The Commission recommends the following principles be used in the development of 
nationally consistent benefit structures: 
•  the provision of sufficient incentives for injured or ill employees to participate 
in rehabilitation. Benefit step-downs and caps are generally the most 
appropriate mechanisms for providing these incentives; 
•  benefits not to be so ‘low’ as to result in workers bearing an unacceptably high 
burden of workplace injury or illness. Employers to face appropriate incentives 
to promote workplace safety. Income replacement to be related to pre-injury 
average weekly earnings, including any regularly received overtime; 
•  all reasonable medical and rehabilitation expenses to be reimbursed by the 
scheme; 
•  access to lump sum payments, which are intended to compensate those 
suffering a permanent impairment, to be based on meeting minimum 
impairment thresholds, while minimising the extent to which the availability of 
such payments delays rehabilitation and return to work; and 
•  such structures, and health and income support schemes, to minimise the 
extent of any cost-shifting.  
Premium setting (chapter 10) 
The Commission recommends the following be used as premium setting principles to 
meet the objectives of: the full funding of schemes; incentives to prevent workplace 
fatality, injury and illness and to promote rehabilitation and return to work; stability; 
and administrative simplicity for employers:  
•  no cross-subsidisation between employers through premiums as it distorts 
pricing signals. If cross-subsidisation is to exist, it should be minimal and 
transparent;  
•  premiums be set efficiently. In essence, premiums for large employers to be 
based on experience rating. Premiums for small to medium employers to be 
based on industry class rating (where the classes reflect common risk profiles) 
accompanied by experience rating to the degree appropriate, and by explicit, 
cost-effective financial incentives for preventing workplace fatality, injury and 
illness, and for promoting rehabilitation and return to work;      
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•  compliance by private insurers with relevant requirements under the Insurance 
Act 1973 (particularly the prudential standard governing liability valuation for 
general insurers), to ensure full funding of schemes. There should be separate 
but light-handed regulatory monitoring of the premiums set by private insurers; 
and 
•  premiums be set by public insurers so as to achieve full funding, with 
independent monitoring by a separate body to ensure transparency of any 
differences between appropriate and actual premiums.  
The role of private insurers (chapter 11)  
The Commission recommends the following regulatory framework which would allow 
licensed insurers to provide coverage under all schemes:  
•  in privately underwritten schemes, it should be sufficient for insurer licensing 
requirements to rely on Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
authorisation under the Insurance Act 1973 as evidence that prudential 
concerns are satisfied;  
•  in publicly underwritten schemes, competitive outsourcing to appropriately 
skilled and resourced service providers to be supported by carefully designed 
and monitored contracts; and 
•  were the Australian Government to establish a national insurance scheme as 
an alternative to existing schemes, it should be privately underwritten by 
insurers authorised by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority under the 
Insurance Act 1973.  
Self-insurance (chapter 12)  
The Commission recommends the following principles be used for assessing self-
insurance licence applications under the national self-insurance scheme:  
•  self-insurers to demonstrate appropriate prudential and claims management 
requirements, to ensure that they can adequately fund and manage claims;  
•  prudential requirements to be based on financial capability (including actuarial 
evaluation of claims liability), bank guarantees and reinsurance policies;  
•  remaining risks to be reduced further by making provision for a post-event 
levy; 
•  occupational health and safety requirements to apply equally to all employers; 
and 
•  there to be no explicit minimum employee requirement as it adds no prudential 
or operational value.     






Self-insurers under the national scheme should withdraw from, rather than be 
recognised under, any or all other schemes. 
Dispute resolution in workers’ compensation (chapter 13) 
The Commission recommends the following features of mechanisms to manage and 
resolve disputes about claims in an equitable and effective manner:  
•  be tailored to deal with the disputes arising from the specific workers’ 
compensation scheme that it supports and the broader dispute resolution 
culture of the jurisdiction within which it operates;  
•  be supported by claims handling methods that minimise the likelihood of 
disputes arising in the first place. These include:  
–  the provision of information about the scheme to stakeholders which explain their 
benefits and rights;  
–  informed initial claims decisions based on an early exchange of all available 
information; and 
–  use of provisional liability/payments for a limited period; and  
•  applications to be screened, using the least invasive methods first. These 
include: 
–  a requirement for claims managers to provide for, and injured workers to first 
use, internal review procedures;  
–  use of alternative dispute resolution procedures involving mediation/ conciliation 
and arbitration, with incentives for the use of the least invasive; 
–  identification and, as appropriate, rectification of informational and power 
imbalances; 
–  appeals allowable to a suitable court on points of law; and  
–  use of independent medical panels to provide final and binding determinations on 
questions of medical opinion.  
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1 About  the  inquiry 
Work-related fatalities, injuries and illnesses result in significant human suffering and 
impose large costs on individuals and the economy as a whole. Occupational health and 
safety (OHS) arrangements are aimed at preventing them. Workers’ compensation schemes 
provide injury management and compensation for injured and ill workers, as well as 
compensation for their dependents in the event of a fatality. Workers’ compensation 
insurance (including self-insurance) in Australia is compulsory and benefits are provided 
regardless of fault. Some jurisdictions also provide limited access to common law.  
The Australian, State and Territory governments each have responsibility for OHS and 
workers’ compensation arrangements within their own jurisdictions. There have been 
attempts to coordinate these arrangements across jurisdictions, including: the National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC); the Workplace Relations 
Ministers’ Council (WRMC); and the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities 
(HWCA). Coordination has been more successful in providing consistency across 
Australia in the area of OHS than it has been in workers’ compensation. There are key 
differences in the latter, such as in: access to common law; benefit structures; and the 
public or private underwriting of workers’ compensation insurance. 
1.1  Background to the inquiry 
Since the time of the Industry Commission’s reports on OHS and workers’ compensation 
(IC 1994, 1995), there has been a steady decline in the number of compensable work-
related fatalities and in the frequency of compensable occupational injuries and illnesses. 
Figure 1.1 indicates that compensated fatalities resulting from injury and disease declined 
from 403 in 1997-98 to 297 in 2001-02. Similarly, figure 1.2 indicates that the frequency 
rate of compensated occupational fatality, injury and disease claims for wage and salary 
earners declined from 13.4 cases per million hours worked in 1996-97 to 10.2 cases per 
million hours in 2001-02.      
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a These statistics are drawn from claims data collected by workers’ compensation schemes. They exclude 
injuries and diseases not covered by workers’ compensation schemes (chapter 5), defence force claims and 
journey claims. The data are based on the year in which a claim was lodged, which may not be the year in 
which the fatality occurred. With disease fatalities, considerable time could elapse between diagnosis and 
claim lodgement and death. Occupational disease are defined as all employment-related diseases which 
result from repeated or long-term exposure to an agent(s) or event(s) or which are the result of a single 
traumatic event where there was a long latency period. 
Source: WRMC (2003, p. 30).  
Figures  1.1 and  1.2 also show injury and poisoning claims separately as there are 
considerable problems with the accuracy of data for disease. This is because of the 
difficulty of attributing long latency diseases to the correct year given the lag involved and 
the difficulty of determining the work-relatedness of some diseases. It should also be noted 
that, as these statistics are drawn from claims data, they do not include data on workers not 
covered by workers’ compensation schemes, such as the self-employed, and data on work-
related injury and illness not claimed for.  
The decline in fatalities, injuries and illnesses is the result of many factors. These include 
safer workplaces, safer work practices and changes to the nature of work, such as a decline 
in the relative importance of manufacturing and manual labouring jobs.  
The nature of reported injuries and illnesses has also been changing. Whereas there have 
been declines in most categories, there have been increases in the incidence of     
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occupational over use syndrome and stress claims, and there is some evidence of an 
increase in permanent disabilities.  
Figure 1.2  Frequency rate of compensated fatalities and injuries, 1996-97 
to 2001-02 a 
number of occupational fatality and injury cases per million hours worked by wage 
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Injury, poisoning and disease
Injury and poisoning
 
a Includes poisoning and fatalities resulting from injury, poisoning and diseases resulting in a successful 
workers’ compensation claim, but does not include journey claims. These statistics represent all claims made 
under the Australian, State and Territory workers’ compensation schemes which resulted in a fatality, 
permanent disability or a temporary disability resulting in an absence from work of five days or more, (with the 
exception of Victoria that has provided data on the basis of cases involving more than 10 working days lost 
from work) as well as claims for fatalities and for permanent disabilities which may involve less than five days 
time lost time. Data for the Australian Capital Territory were unavailable. Cases which are pending, in dispute, 
withdrawn or rejected are excluded.  
Source: NOHSC, pers. com.  
The duration of rehabilitation has tended to increase in recent years as the average number 
of days of paid compensation has risen from 52 in 1998-99 to 57 in 2002-03 (HWSCA 
2003). Associated with this has been an increase in the average nominal cost of claims 
from $7532 to $10  102, although jurisdictions that privately underwrote insurance 
experienced a decrease in claims costs (ACCC 2002b).  
Claims data could substantially understate the incidence of work-related injury and illness. 
A recent ABS survey (ABS 2001b) has shown that 5 per cent of those that worked during 
the survey period suffered a work-related injury or illness. Of those that were injured, only 
four out of ten reported receiving workers’ compensation. For the balance, the main reason 
given for not receiving workers’ compensation was that the injury or illness was minor.     
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However, some stated that they were not covered, were not aware of their entitlements or 
thought that reporting the injury would have a negative impact on their employment. 
Interpretation of the available work-related injury and illness data is discussed further in 
chapters 3 and 6, where participants’ comments are also given. 
An important feature of the growth and development of the labour market over the past 20 
years that has influenced the development of workers’ compensation schemes, in 
particular, has been the shift away from traditional employer-employee, full-time work 
arrangements as contract, casual and part-time work arrangements have increased. There is 
growing evidence that this has adversely affected OHS outcomes and reduced the 
likelihood of workers lodging claims. Also influencing the development of workers’ 
compensation schemes more recently have been the rapid escalation in medical and legal 
costs, changes in investment returns and more general developments in the insurance 
industry, such as the commercial failure of HIH and the tightening of the reinsurance 
market. In addition, most publicly underwritten schemes have large unfunded liabilities.  
Responses to these developments by governments have included: 
•  changing access and coverage provisions; 
•  altering statutory benefits and tightening eligibility conditions; 
•  further restricting access to common law settlements; 
•  strengthening early intervention, rehabilitation and return-to-work provisions; and  
•  reforming dispute resolution arrangements to give greater emphasis to alternative 
procedures that provide quicker and cheaper settlements.  
1.2 Current  arrangements 
Occupational health and safety 
There are ten principal OHS statutes — six State, two Territory and two for the Australian 
Government (one relating to Australian Government employees and the other relating to 
the maritime industry).  
To varying degrees, all jurisdictions have drawn on the approach to regulating for safer 
workplaces espoused by the Robens Committee in 1972, involving codifying a general 
duty of care to avoid risks to health and safety (Robens 1972).      
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Recognition of the need for greater consistency between the jurisdictions led to the 
establishment of NOHSC in 1985 (through the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 1985). NOHSC is a tripartite body with an 18 member board comprising 
representatives from Australian, State and Territory governments, employers and trade 
unions. The Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission are appointed 
by the Australian Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations. Funding is provided 
by the Australian Government and NOHSC reports to the WRMC.  
NOHSC develops national standards and codes of practice which are forwarded to the 
individual jurisdictions for implementation. Typically, this involves further reconsideration 
by tripartite bodies in each of the States and Territories and subsequent acceptance, 
modification or rejection.  
Workers’ compensation 
As with OHS, there are multiple State and Territory workers’ compensation schemes — 
eight State and Territory schemes; one Australian Government scheme (for employees of 
existing and former Australian Government authorities, and for employees of the 
Australian Capital Territory Government), as well as a small number of industry-specific 
schemes (for example, the Australian Government’s military compensation scheme and 
seafarers scheme, and the New South Wales coal industry scheme).  
Basically, each scheme operates as a compulsory, no-fault insurance arrangement. 
Employers are obliged to pay premiums to a public or private insurer, or otherwise self-
insure, to cover their liability for all work-related fatality, injury and illness. Premiums are 
used to compensate and/or rehabilitate workers with work-related injuries or illnesses, or 
their dependants in the case of fatalities. Employers can self-insure if they meet certain 
requirements (for example, in relation to prudential matters, employment size, claims 
management and OHS).  
To varying degrees, the schemes contain provisions covering eligibility for income support 
and rehabilitation (through definitions of employee and work-related injury and illness), 
injury management (claims processes, rehabilitation and return-to-work requirements), 
statutory benefits (provisions for compensation for medical costs, periodic payments and 
commutations), licensing requirements for insurers and self-insurers, premium setting 
arrangements and dispute resolution processes. 
There are several areas of difference between the schemes including: 
•  the role of private and public insurers and approaches to premium setting; 
•  access and coverage, including definitions of employee and work-relatedness 
(including journeys to and from work);     
6    
 
•  the benefit structures, step downs and commutations; 
•  injury management processes involving early intervention, rehabilitation and return to 
work; and 
•  access to common law settlements, with thresholds for impairment and timing.  
Existing national coordinating mechanisms for workers’ compensation comprise the 
WRMC and HWCA. The WRMC is a council of Australian, State and Territory ministers 
responsible for inter-jurisdictional discussion of all matters affecting workplace relations. 
OHS and workers’ compensation are only two of the policy areas they cover. The HWCA 
consist of chief executives (or their representatives) of the peak bodies responsible for 
OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements. They consider operational issues, 
exchange experiences and provide expert advice to WRMC, and other ministerial councils, 
on the operation of existing schemes. 
Scheme design, as well as workers not lodging claims for various reasons, can lead to the 
Australian Government’s Medicare or social security programs meeting some of the costs 
of work-related injury or illness. Conversely, employers can end up meeting some costs of 
injury or illness that are not work related. There are also interactions between workers’ 
compensation arrangements and other government programs, such as the taxation system 
and transport accident schemes in the various jurisdictions. 
1.3  Terms of reference 
The Australian Government has asked the Commission to assess possible models for 
establishing national frameworks for OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements. The 
Government has signalled that, ideally, these models should encompass a cooperative 
approach between the Australian, State and Territory governments, while still leaving 
primary responsibility with each jurisdiction. In addition to identifying and assessing 
suitable models, the Commission has been asked to identify and report on various elements 
of OHS regulatory regimes and workers’ compensation schemes.  
On 30 January 2004, the Commission received a letter from the Treasurer asking it to 
‘examine, and include in its final report, the impact on small business of any proposed 
national workers’ compensation and occupational health and safety arrangements’. The 
letter, together with the terms of reference, are reproduced at the front of this report.  
1.4  The Commission’s approach 
This inquiry is not a comprehensive review of the existing arrangements for OHS and 
workers’ compensation in each jurisdiction. In keeping with the terms of reference, it     
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focuses on the need for, and possible models of, national frameworks. While the 
Commission has also been asked to look at specific elements of the arrangements and has 
undertaken a review of them, it has not sought to design the perfect set of arrangements. 
Instead, it has considered how the specific elements could support better national 
frameworks and advocated principles for selecting them.  
In considering suitable national frameworks, the Commission has taken an economy-wide 
view. That is, as in all of its inquiries, it has sought to identify arrangements that would 
advance the interests of the Australian community as a whole rather than just those of 
employers, employees or insurers.  
The inquiry process 
In preparing this report, the Commission provided the opportunity for all interested parties 
to contribute to its deliberations. It advertised the commencement of the inquiry in the 
national press and invited public submissions. To help those preparing submissions, it 
released an issues paper in April 2003. It also established a website 
(http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/workerscomp) on which it placed relevant inquiry material, 
submissions from interested parties and transcripts from the public hearings.  
The Commission commenced informal discussions with interested parties soon after the 
inquiry was announced. The Commission spoke to 120 organisations and individuals in all 
jurisdictions, representing a range of interests, including: Australian, State and Territory 
government agencies; injured workers and injured worker support groups; unions; 
employers and employer associations; insurers and insurer associations; self-insurers and 
self-insurer associations; academics; medical and allied health professionals; safety 
professionals; lawyers; and actuaries.  
The Commission held initial public hearings in all the capital cities during June 2003, 
providing interested parties with an opportunity to present and discuss their submissions.  
The Commission released its Interim Report in October 2003. Interested parties had the 
opportunity to comment on the preliminary analyses and findings in this report through 
written submissions and by participation in public hearings held in December 2003. 
The Commission received 177 written submissions prior to the release of the Interim 
Report and 262 by the end of February 2004. The submissions were from organisations 
and individuals covering a wide spectrum of interests. Some raised selected matters of 
particular concern and others commented on a broader range of issues. 
More detail on the inquiry process is provided in appendix A, including a list of all those 
the Commission has met, all who have made submissions and all who have participated in     
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the public hearings. The Commission wishes to record its appreciation for their 
contributions. 
Other relevant analysis 
In preparing this report, the Commission has had regard to recent reports examining OHS 
and workers’ compensation in Australia and overseas. Australian reports include, but are 
not limited to: 
•  the Industry Commission reports on OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements 
(IC 1994, 1995); 
•  the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment and Workplace 
Relations inquiry into Aspects of Workers’ Compensation (HoR 2003); 
•  the HIH Royal Commission (2003) report, which included information on the adequacy 
and appropriateness of arrangements for the regulation and prudential supervision of 
general insurance, including workers’ compensation; 
•  the report by a joint Australian and States panel on the law of negligence (the Ipp 
Report) (Treasury, Law of Negligence Review Panel 2002); 
•  the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council’s work on legal process reform 
(Department of Health and Aging, Medical Indemnity Policy Review Panel 2003);  
•  the (Cole) Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry (RCBC 
2003a) which reported on OHS and workers’ compensation in that industry, among 
other things; and 
•  the many reports of each jurisdiction’s reviews of their OHS and workers’ 
compensation arrangements. 
In addition, the Commission sought advice on various implications of its proposals for 
national frameworks from:  
•  the Australian Government Actuary (appendix B);  
•  the Australian Government Solicitor (appendix C); and 
•  consulting actuaries (appendix D). 
1.5 Report  structure   
The remainder of this report is structured as follows:      
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Chapter 2 sets out the broad rationales for developing national frameworks for OHS and 
workers’ compensation in Australia, as well as identifying arguments against this change. 
It also sets out criteria for selecting national framework models.  
Chapter 3 outlines features of the existing OHS regulatory regimes in the jurisdictions.  
Chapter 4 considers appropriate arrangements for developing better national frameworks 
for OHS.  
Chapter  5 describes appropriate models for a national framework for workers’ 
compensation, as well as assesses the models and presents the Commission’s proposals for 
a national framework for workers’ compensation. It is supported by an appendix 
(appendix  E) which provides details of the institutional arrangements for workers’ 
compensation national frameworks. 
The subsequent chapters deal with specific elements of workers’ compensation schemes 
that the Commission has been asked to identify and report on. Each chapter concludes with 
a discussion of national framework issues and recommended principles.  
Chapter  6 examines who and what is covered by workers’ compensation arrangement. 
Discussed are definitions of employee, employer, workplace and work-related fatality, 
injury and illness.  
Chapter  7 looks at arrangements for injury management, including early intervention, 
rehabilitation and return to work.  
Chapter 8 examines access to common law damages for work-related fatalities, injuries 
and illnesses which may provide an alternative to compensation from statutory benefits.  
Chapter 9  considers  statutory  benefit structures in workers’ compensation legislation, 
including: income replacement, medical benefits, lump sum payments and cost-shifting 
issues.  
Chapter  10 considers approaches to premium setting in the workers’ compensation 
schemes.  
Chapter 11 looks at the role of private insurers in workers’ compensation schemes and the 
regulatory arrangements they are subject to.  
Chapter  12 examines requirements for employer self-insurance with the employers 
themselves financing and managing their own workers’ compensation claims rather than a 
third party insurer.      
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Chapter  13 examines the causes of disputes and their resolution under workers’ 
compensation schemes. It is supported by an appendix (appendix F) giving details of the 
operation of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  
Additional information and supporting analyses are contained in appendices to the report.  
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2 National  frameworks 
The inquiry is charged with the identification and assessment of models for establishing 
national frameworks for occupational health and safety (OHS) and workers’ compensation 
arrangements across Australia. The terms of reference specify that: 
•  there is a need to examine whether the establishment of national frameworks can 
deliver comprehensive and consistent OHS and workers’ compensation programs 
across Australia; 
•  a key goal of any new model would be to facilitate improved workplace safety and 
provide adequate compensation to injured employees while offering a more effective 
continuum of early intervention, rehabilitation and return to work assistance for those 
injured in the workplace; 
•  ideally, a national framework would encompass a cooperative approach between the 
Commonwealth and State governments while still leaving primary responsibility for 
these systems with the States; and 
•  any national frameworks would provide the States with adequate flexibility to address 
local conditions, encourage competition and facilitate competitive neutrality (paras 6–
8). 
This chapter looks at the broad rationales for developing national frameworks for OHS and 
workers’ compensation in Australia and at the case for individual jurisdictions tailoring 
arrangements to suit their particular needs. The criteria for selecting models of national 
frameworks and the models the Commission considers to be the most appropriate are then 
reviewed. The Commission’s proposals for national frameworks for OHS and workers’ 
compensation are dealt with in chapters 4 and 5 respectively, while subsequent chapters 
look at particular elements of workers’ compensation arrangements. 
The review of national framework issues and options is not intended to establish any 
particular level of workplace safety nor identify the ideal workers’ compensation scheme. 
It is intended to improve the procedures involved in establishing OHS regulation and 
workers’ compensation arrangements throughout Australia, eliminating unnecessary 
differences, and establishing a system where best-practice features can be developed and 
implemented in a timely manner in all jurisdictions thereby improving workplace safety 
and the provision of workers’ compensation.     
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The debate about greater national consistency or uniformity is not new, nor is it unique to 
OHS and workers’ compensation. In 1985, the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission (NOHSC) was set up with an objective of achieving greater consistency 
between jurisdictions in OHS legislation, regulation and enforcement. National 
coordination has been the underpinning of the Heads of Workers’ Compensation 
Authorities (HWCA), comprising chief executives (or their representatives) of the peak 
bodies responsible for the regulation of workers’ compensation in each of the jurisdictions. 
In other areas of the economy, mechanisms have also been established to promote national 
uniformity. In the areas of transport (the National Transport Commission (NTC)) and food 
standards (Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ)), this same objective has been 
paramount.  
2.1 Previous  reviews 
The Industry Commission (IC) in 1994 with reference to workers’ compensation, and in 
1995 with reference to OHS, examined the issue of greater national consistency and in 
both cases concluded that this was desirable, and in the case of OHS that national 
uniformity was the preferred objective. The IC, in its 1995 OHS report, noted: 
National employers have to work within multiple OHS jurisdictions. Multiple regimes 
mean additional costs whenever systems of work are changed or staff are moved 
between regimes. They also raise the cost of internal monitoring of compliance by their 
operations. 
… The problem of multiple jurisdictions is compounded by the plethora of legal 
instruments that national employers must have regard for when conducting their 
business. … 
This volume of legislation impedes the efficient functioning of national markets, places 
even higher costs on those employers operating in multiple jurisdictions and detracts 
from competitive neutrality.  
The Commission surveyed the members of the Business Council of Australia … Two 
thirds of respondents (26 out of 42) consider that non-uniformity imposes costs on their 
operation, but only three were able to quantify the costs. (pp. 148–9)  
In its 1994 workers’ compensation report, the IC noted: 
A focus beyond the specific concerns of individual jurisdictions is required. Greater 
national consistency in a range of areas is needed, particularly for the level of and 
access to compensation. To achieve this end, the preferred route is via agreement 
among jurisdictions. A nationally available scheme is also warranted, to enhance 
competitive pressures for ongoing improvements in scheme performance and to 
facilitate consistency in key areas (eg in the definition of a worker). A nationally 
available scheme would also provide a way for firms to avoid inconsistencies between 
jurisdictions. (p. 221)     
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In 1997, the Labour Ministers’ Council, in adopting a strategy for continuing workers’ 
compensation reform nationally, noted five key principles put forward by HWCA as 
providing a suitable reference point for Australian workers’ compensation design 
(box 2.1). The last principle said that inter-jurisdictional competition should be maintained 
on the basis that it provides opportunity for best practice benchmarking. 
 
Box 2.1 Key  principles  of  workers’ compensation scheme design 
outlined by the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities 
•  Workers’ compensation systems must reinforce the primacy of the 
employer/employee relationship in preventing and managing workplace injuries and 
ensuring that injured workers are returned to meaningful work. 
•  Schemes throughout Australia should be consistent and predictable in terms of 
employers’ liabilities and workers’ entitlements. 
•  Allocation of the costs of workplace injuries must be equitable in relation to 
employers, workers and the community. 
•  Prevention and return-to-work objectives must be supported by the delivery of high 
quality claims management, medical, rehabilitation and other services, according to 
clearly defined criteria designed to promote scheme outcomes. 
•  Inter-jurisdictional competition predicated on service delivery should be maintained 
on the basis that this provides the best opportunity for continuous improvement 
based on best practice benchmarking and, combined with national consistency in 
important aspects of scheme design, enables regulators to focus on the standards 
of service necessary to achieve scheme outcomes. 
Source: HWCA (1997, p. 3). 
 
 
The recent review of the Building and Construction Industry strongly supported national 
uniformity in OHS legislation. In its discussion paper, the Cole Royal Commission 
commented: 
The arguments in favour of one set of national OHS laws for Australia are clear. At 
present there are at least 11 separate statutory regimes applying throughout the country, 
each with its attendant regulations and codes of practice. The conventional arguments 
in favour of conformity are that it will lead to more equitable outcomes in that 
employees will be protected by the same standards wherever they work and that 
economic efficiency will be promoted because employers, employees, and other duty-
holders will have only one set of laws with which to comply. (RCBC 2002, p. 7) 
In the final report, the Cole Royal Commission concluded:  
From the perspective of the building and construction industry, there could be no more 
salutary reform to occupational health and safety law and regulation than a single 
national scheme comprehensively regulating occupational health and safety throughout 
Australia. (RCBC 2003a, p. 15)     
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and: 
It is therefore not surprising that there is strong — indeed, overwhelming support in the 
building and construction industry for a national system to regulate workplace health 
and safety in the industry. (RCBC 2003a, p. 16) 
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment and Workplace 
Relations 2003, considered that it was timely for the States, Territories and the 
Commonwealth to consider jointly the feasibility, benefits and disadvantages of greater 
national consistency in workers’ compensation, saying:  
While the Committee believes that the primary responsibility for workers’ 
compensation and occupational health and safety should stay within the respective 
Commonwealth, State and Territory jurisdictions, there is significant capacity for 
increased national consistency and cooperation. (p. xxix) 
The Committee also commented that there is a need to ensure that injured workers are not 
falling through the gaps when they are working in more than one jurisdiction. Similarly, 
the employer should not have to obtain cover for a particular worker in more than one 
jurisdiction. 
2.2  The case for national frameworks 
The differences between jurisdictions 
There are many differences in OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements between the 
jurisdictions in Australia. These cover the principal legislation in each jurisdiction, the 
regulations and codes, and differences in the style and extent of enforcement. Some of the 
differences are quite marked, while some are more subtle. Reasonably fulsome 
descriptions of each workers’ compensation scheme are presented annually in a 
consolidated form by HWCA (see HWCA 2002), providing extensive instances of those 
differences. A similar description of OHS arrangements in each jurisdiction are presented 
bi-annually by the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (see WRMC 2002b).  
A number of participants specifically mentioned some of the more problematic differences, 
principally in relation to workers’ compensation. For example, the Association of Payroll 
Specialists (sub. 15, p. 20, and IRsub. 227, pp. 3–4), the National Australia Bank, (sub. 42, 
pp. 1–5), Aon (sub. 73, pp. 1–2), the Insurance Council of Australia (sub. 74, appendices 2 
and 3), Westpac (sub. 75) and in relation to self-insurance, the National Meat Association 
of Australia (sub. 82, p. 15), and Insurance Australia Group (sub. 89, appendices 1 to 3). 
Key areas that were identified include:  
•  definitions of employee and employer differ;     
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•  definitions of injury differ markedly; 
•  levels and layers of compensation vary — for instance, an employee injured in Albury 
will not receive the same benefit as one injured in Wodonga, even though they may live 
next door to each other; 
•  each system defines earnings or weekly amounts in a different manner; 
•  access to common law exists in some systems, but not in others; 
•  there are different excess payments required;  
•  different approaches to claims management exist — some are privately operated while 
others are not, with each system providing an unique set of problems; 
•  the mediation and appellate processes differ; 
•  there are different rules and regulations in relation to rehabilitation programs; and 
•  premiums for employers are calculated differently, including differences in the way in 
which payroll is calculated for premium collection. 
As a result, employers face uncertainties in relation to: 
•  knowing if a worker is really an employee as these definitions are not consistent 
throughout Australia, a problem that is particularly marked when managing contractors;  
•  ensuring that they have the appropriate cover — Aon (sub. 73) has advised several 
clients who have had to pay the premium for their workers’ compensation insurance 
and then had to pay the benefit to the worker due to a loophole in one jurisdiction’s 
legislation; 
•  knowing if employees are covered during recess breaks and in what circumstances, and 
if they are covered when travelling overseas; and 
•  ensuring they have cover in all jurisdictions where their employees work, not just the 
jurisdiction in which their business is based.  
The National Australia Bank commented: 
The current state based systems result in the National dealing with eight different 
legislations which provide, eight different levels of benefits, eight different definitions 
of injury, eight different claim forms, eight different requirements for self insurance, 
eight different reporting requirements and so on. There is very little consistency 
between the different jurisdictions. (sub. 42, p. 1)  
In many instances, participants could not see good reason for these differences. For 
example, the Insurance Australia Group commented: 
It is difficult to provide a rational explanation as to why the median cost of sprain or 
strain injuries is more than twice as much in Victoria ($990) than South Australia     
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($339) or median costs of knee injuries are almost five times as much ($1915 v $355). 
(sub. 89, p. 9) 
The Victorian Government considered that the differences between jurisdictions in their 
OHS regimes has been overstated, saying that: 
The performance-based nature of OHS standards and an outcome-oriented regulatory 
system has meant that superficial differences in the wording and structure of legislation 
and regulation have been mistakenly perceived as major differences between the States 
and Territories. (IRsub. 256, p. 31) 
While in a general sense there is greater commonality in OHS provisions, closer analysis 
of OHS legislation reveals that differences in their wording can have significant 
consequences. In a recent study of the legal concept of work-related injury and disease in 
Australian OHS and workers’ compensation systems, Clayton looked at a range of 
provisions in the various OHS statutes, commenting: 
Once again, although a common pattern is discernible amongst most of the reporting 
requirements in the OHS jurisdictions, closer analysis of the precise wording of the 
provisions shows that there are significant differences in their wording, which 
undermine comparisons of reported incidents from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. (Clayton 
et al., 2002, p. 39) 
Some examples identified by Clayton relating to reporting requirements and differences in 
some key definitions are presented in box 2.2. 
Such wording differences open up the scope for differences in interpretation, adding to the 
cost and contributing confusion for businesses operating in multiple jurisdictions. It is not 
clear to the Commission why there is a need for each jurisdiction to draft its legislation in 
different ways to that used elsewhere in Australia, particularly as there is such a high level 
of agreement on the objectives that such legislation seeks to achieve.     
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Box 2.2  Examples of differences in the wording of OHS legislation 
In a recent study of the legal concept of work-related injury and disease in Australian 
OHS and workers’ compensation systems, Clayton identified a wide range of 
differences in the wording of the legislation between jurisdictions. In relation to 
reporting requirements, for example; 
•  differences in reporting requirements resulting from such things as the requirement 
to immediately notify work-related injuries and fatalities to ‘employees’ in some 
jurisdictions and to ‘persons’ in others (p. 35); and 
•  differences in the ‘workplace’ involving wording such as ‘work-related’, ‘at a 
workplace’, ‘at or in relation to the place of work’, ‘at or near the workplace’, ‘out of 
the conduct of the undertaking or out of work preformed by an employee in 
conjunction with the undertaking’. (pp. 38–9). 
In relation to the general duties and regulations, Clayton identified differences in the 
wording of the workplace covered in relation to the duty to employees, noting a range 
of wording: ‘working environment’ (WA); ‘working environment at a workplace’ (NT); 
‘while at work’ (SA and Tas); ‘at work’ (Australian Govt., NSW, Qld and ACT). 
In relation to the duty to others, wording differences include: ‘the conduct of an 
undertaking’ (most eastern states), ‘work-relatedness’ defined by reference to work 
undertaken by the duty holder (SA and WA); ‘work carried out at a workplace’ (Tas), 
(p. 43). The duty in NSW, the Australian Government and the ACT however, differs 
from that in Victoria and Queensland in that the former restrict the duty to persons ‘at 
or near the workplace under the employer’s control.  
Clayton concluded: 
Any attempt to identify a particular notion of ‘work-relatedness’ characteristic of worker’ 
compensation regimes is an illusory hunt for an elusive quarry since there are many (at least 
seven) different notions of ‘work-relatedness’, the resort to which varies over time and in 
respect of context. There are similar difficulties in attempting to isolate the concept of work-
relatedness in the OHS statutes. (p. 45) 
Source: Clayton et al. (2002). 
 
 
Problems of multiple arrangements 
The multiplicity of OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements, their divergent 
elements and their constant change impose a significant compliance burden and cost, 
particularly on multi-state employers. They also present problems for an increasingly 
mobile workforce. 
While multi-state businesses make up less than 1 per cent of businesses, they are typically 
larger firms and account for almost 30 per cent of employment (table 2.1).      
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Table 2.1  Single and multi-state businesses: number and employment, 
1998 
















  No. No. No. No.  %  % 
< 200  886 147  3 868 395  6 725  245 842  0.8  6.0 
200 to < 300  641  153 328  308  74 847  32.5  32.8 
300 to < 400  341  116 576  209  72 008  38.0  38.2 
400 to < 500  191  84 764  146  65 438  43.3  43.6 
500 +  609  1 002 257  651  1 621 268  51.7  61.8 
All  887 929  5 225 320  8 039  2 079 403  0.9  28.5 
Source: Unpublished ABS data based on ABS Business Register. 
For multi-state employers, there is the burden of meeting different jurisdictions’ 
requirements. For those that pay a premium to an insurer, the requirements that cause 
particular compliance difficulties include definitions of eligibility (who is covered and for 
what) and injury management (such as claims management procedures and return to work 
requirements). For self-insured employers, the compliance concerns become much broader, 
extending, for example, to benefit structures and access to common law damages. More 
detailed reviews of access to common law, benefits structures, and self-insurance are 
presented in chapters 8, 9 and 12, respectively. 
Problems with differences between arrangements also arise for workers who operate across 
jurisdictions. Differences in the definition of employee may mean that a worker is covered 
in one jurisdiction but not in another. If unaware of such differences, there is the possibility 
that an injured worker may find him or herself without workers’ compensation cover. 
Issues also arise regarding the appropriate allocation of responsibility for injuries and 
illnesses that are carried from one jurisdiction into another, particularly where there is 
progressive degeneration. Hearing loss and back strain are but two examples. For mobile 
workers, there is also a need to be trained in the particular OHS requirement of each 
jurisdiction. 
The failure to resolve such problems can result in cost-shifting to the Australian 
Government and to individuals. Gaps in coverage due to differences in definitions of 
employee, for example, could mean that injured workers become the responsibility of the 
Australian Government under its social security and Medicare schemes.  
The range of problems that participants face as a result of multiple jurisdictions essentially 
relate to: 
•  the increased costs of compliance;     
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•  inequity in treatment of employers and employees; 
•  the increased risk of errors and fraud; and 
•  inadequate coverage because of ‘gaps’ between schemes. 
The costs of compliance 
The costs for multi-state employers of complying with multiple arrangements can be 
considerable, sometimes amounting to millions of dollars a year. Although most employers 
were not able to give precise estimates of the cost they faced, a few provided estimates 
relating to particular cost elements. 
Insurance Australia Group (IAG) (sub. 89, p. 10) estimated that the existence of multiple 
arrangements added $10.1 million to the (once off) cost of setting up a single national IT 
platform. In total, IAG estimated that having to comply with multiple jurisdictions adds 
about $1.7 million to its information technology costs annually. It further estimated that a 
national workers’ compensation scheme could offer overall operating cost savings to the 
group of $1.2 million per annum and a reduction in its actuarial costs of $400 000 a year. 
IAG estimated total direct savings from a single national workers compensation scheme of 
some $4  million per annum, but said that the potential savings could be considerably 
greater: 
While significant in its own right, these [$4 million] savings may well be dwarfed by 
the impact on claims costs, liability development and therefore premiums through more 
timely and relevant data collection and better reporting systems. The above savings do 
not include staff costs associated with collecting data and reporting to multiple 
workers’ compensation regulators. This is because we believe these resources can be 
put to much more effective use in benchmarking and performance measurement under 
a national framework. 
Insurance Australia Group’s workers’ compensation staff in total manage more than 
$5  billion in liabilities for the company and for state monopolies. A data-driven 
10 per cent improvement in scheme efficiency, reflected in better targeting of resources 
and claims management strategies, better health outcomes and improved return to work 
rates, would over time reduce these liabilities by $500 million. Savings forecasts of this 
magnitude are both conservative and achievable. (sub. 89, p. 11) 
Optus estimated that the cost of complying with multiple OHS and workers’ compensation 
arrangements adds about 5 to 10 per cent to workers’ compensation premiums (sub. 134, 
p. 2). 
BHP Billiton (sub. 110, p. 5) commented that it cost in the vicinity of $50 000 just to 
purchase a system to manage and supply information for each of the jurisdictions. 
Skilled Engineering, a labour hire company operating in all eight States and Territories, 
estimated that the annual cost savings from operating under a single set of national OHS     
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and workers’ compensation rules would be in excess of $2.5 million (15 per cent of the 
company’s estimated OHS and workers’ compensation annual costs). Skilled Engineering 
commented: 
Workers’ Compensation and OH&S legislation is becoming increasingly complex as 
regulation increases. This has the effect of: 
•  Consuming resources due to the degree of staff specialisation required for each set of 
regulations. These resources could otherwise be directed toward accident prevention. 
•  Prevents the establishment of national best practice, reducing the effectiveness of 
internal systems. 
•  Increases the risk to the company of non-compliance. 
•  Adds costs to the company. (sub. 177, p. 6) 
Costs for multi-state self-insurers 
Multi-state employers which self-insure in more than one jurisdiction are required to 
comply with the differing prudential requirements of each of those jurisdictions. This 
involves the replication of costs of meeting the different financial capability requirements, 
bank guarantees and reinsurance policies, both initially and on an on-going basis.  
Some multi-state employers have estimated the costs that could be avoided if there were 
uniform requirements or they were able to take out one self-insurance licence covering all 
their workers. CSR said that it costs over $700 000 per annum to maintain and renew five 
self-insurance licences, whereas the cost for one self-insurance licence would be $200 000, 
a saving of $500 000 (sub. 109, p. 6). According to CSR, the cost savings are achieved by 
a:  
•  Reduction in administration staff 
•  Reduction in administration fees 
•  Reduction in reporting costs 
A component of this is removing the necessity to report at different times in different 
formats to different regulators. The extra cost of reporting to five different regulators is 
estimated for CSR Limited at in excess of $60,000 per annum. 
Cost savings to CSR of implementing an effective single scheme, single licence claims 
management service is estimated at $150,000 pa. (sub. 109, pp. 6–7) 
CSR further commented that: 
These savings are in addition to those estimated for licence administration. 
Each state regulator expects that a self-insurer will write and maintain a set of self-
insurer operating procedures.     
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CSR Limited has about 30 operational procedures of which ten are common to all 
states. The remaining 20 are continually updated to take account of both the legislation 
and the changes in regulator guidelines for self-insurers. 
The extra cost to CSR of making changes to more than one set of procedures is 
estimated to be $30,000 per annum.  
The cost to the 5 regulators reviewing these changes and approving them is probably of 
the order of $50,000 per annum. (sub. 109, p. 7) 
Woolworths conservatively estimated that it could save up to 50  per cent of the costs 
associated with the self-insurance licensing process (sub. 156, p. 3). This included avoiding 
the costs of obtaining multiple actuarial reports and bank guarantees. Further, it could save 
approximately $400 000 per annum if it could maintain a single OHS management system 
(sub. 156, p. 3). Pacific National estimated that it could save 50 to 70 per cent of recurrent 
financial costs alone if insurance was available on a national basis (sub. 169, p. 6). Optus 
estimated that it could save up to $2  million of their total $6  million annual workers’ 
compensation costs if it were able to take out one self-insurance licence under the Comcare 
scheme (trans., p. 292).  
Other costs 
In addition to the costs imposed by the current multiple arrangements, the need to focus on 
complying with the differences between jurisdictions was seen as a distraction for 
management, away from a preferable focus on developing a company-wide culture of 
preventing injury and illness. Pacific National stated that:  
Rather than being proactive and developing better prevention and implementation 
strategies, internal safety management staff must spend time training and researching 
jurisdictional differences. (sub. 169, p. 7) 
Similar views were expressed by Skilled Engineering (IRsub. 202, p. 6). Some caution 
should be exercised in assessing whether the resources saved would be redirected to other 
areas of OHS rather than to the company’s bottom line. Nonetheless, to the extent that 
companies must pay a certain level of attention to OHS matters, this would be better 
directed towards outcomes rather than managing unnecessary differences between 
jurisdictions. In this way, employees of multi-state firms could benefit from a common 
culture of safety, compensation and rehabilitation throughout the company. 
As well as generating costs of compliance, scheme differences can also result in different 
premium levels for apparently similar businesses. For example, Group Training Australia 
commented that: 
These jurisdictional anomalies can mean that a GTO [group training organization] in 
NSW can be paying twice as much, or more, in workers’ compensation premiums as a 
GTO in Victoria of similar size and operating across similar industries. (sub. 65, p. 12)     
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Similarly, BHP Billiton highlighted the differences in premiums that can arise between 
jurisdictions: 
At present BHP Billiton pays in the vicinity of $16,000,000 per annum in insurance 
premiums to cover approximately 1,000 coal miners, that is, approximately $16,000 per 
year per employee. This compares with approximately $3,000 per employee in our self 
insured Queensland coal operations. The cost is in the vicinity of 14% of wages for 
NSW employees compared to 3% in our Queensland operations. Due to improved 
safety performance, BHP Billiton has experienced a significant decline in the number 
and incidence of claims in NSW. Despite this, premiums have tripled over the last three 
years. Common law claims from past employees, coupled with the unfunded liability of 
Coal Mines Insurance, have had a significant impact on these costs. (sub. 110, p. 6) 
Coal Services Pty Ltd commented that the actual cost to BHP was lower and had declined 
in 2003, saying: 
The actual figure paid by BHP Billiton in the year referred to was $11,269 per person. 
Furthermore, for the calendar year 2003 the amount paid by BHP was $8,834 per 
person. (IRsub. 232, p. 4)  
While the precise figures may vary, there is nonetheless a significant difference between 
New South Wales and Queensland. However, some caution needs to be exercised in 
looking at such premium differences. Some of the differences represent different benefit 
structures or other elements of the scheme, which may or may not be justified in particular 
jurisdictions. Other differences may reflect the differences in risk patterns, such as the 
higher accident risk in the form of mining undertaken in New South Wales compared with 
that in Queensland. 
Inequities in treatment 
Some participants have argued that one of the problems presented by multiple 
arrangements is that it results in unequal benefits to workers. Aon said that: 
The current system is not equitable on employees either. There are different benefit 
levels across the states with seriously injured workers not being compensated equitably. 
A clear example of this is shown by reviewing the benefit levels payable for death – 
surely one life is not worth more in economic terms than another, simply based on the 
state where a claim is made. (sub. 73, p. 3) 
Aon (p. 3) reported that death compensation varied from $266 800 in New South Wales to 
$103 514 in the Australian Capital Territory, and differed in all jurisdictions. Similarly, the 
Australian Physiotherapy Association commented that: 
Differences also result in differential outcomes for injured workers: workers with the 
same injury in different jurisdictions can be entitled to different treatment and 
compensation. The APA contends that this system is inequitable and unsustainable. 
(sub. 20, p. 2)     
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Injured or ill employees may receive different benefits for the same type and severity of 
injury depending on the jurisdiction involved. However, they are also subject to different 
work-relatedness tests, have different levels of access to common law or journey to work 
coverage, and may have alternative sources of benefits, such as employer paid journey 
insurance, or particular payment conditions negotiated as part of industrial relations 
bargaining. Thus, a relative disadvantage in one element may be offset, to varying degrees, 
by other elements. Accordingly, the Commission does not consider that equality of 
benefits, assessed in isolation from other scheme elements, necessarily represents a 
disadvantage of multiple jurisdictions. 
An increased risk of errors and fraud 
The cost of compliance extends beyond simply the additional administration and financial 
cost of meeting the requirements of the various arrangements. Even a single OHS regime, 
or a single workers’ compensation scheme is complex, and subject to regular change. A 
number of participants noted that, with multiple schemes with different requirements, the 
chance of making errors is greatly increased. For example, the Housing Industry 
Association noted: 
The main problems with the failure to have a consistent workers’ compensation system 
across Australia is a cost to all contractors who undertake business in more than one 
State or Territory in understanding and complying with the various laws. A contractor 
who subcontracts work may not need to cover the subcontractor in one state yet be 
liable as that subcontractor’s employer in a different State. This may lead to extra costs 
in having double insurance in place to ensure that there is coverage and compliance 
with the law or a situation where a law is inadvertently broken due to confusion as to 
when a subcontractor is covered. (sub. 35, p. 6) 
Pacific Terminals (Australia) Pty Ltd (sub.  85, p.  1) identified the increased risk of 
overlooking or misinterpreting a requirement as a result of the differences in state 
legislative framework. It also commented that small to medium sized enterprises are 
required to spend a disproportionate amount of time on OHS and workers’ compensation 
administration. Similarly, the Association of Payroll Specialists said that, when a business 
operates in more than one jurisdiction, the difficulty in ensuring the accuracy of the 
information being provided to the insurer increases substantially, and that these 
differences, and many others, lead to the likelihood of payments and calculations being 
incorrect (sub. 15, p. 1). In their submission following the interim report, the Association 
said that the errors in wage declarations for workers’ compensation could be as high as the 
90 per cent error rate estimated for the different payroll tax calculations in the different 
jurisdictions (IRsub. 227, p. 5). 
The Australian Government Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 
(DEWR), in its submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Employment and Workplace Relations, commented that the:     
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… complexities within the different workers’ compensation schemes (particularly 
regarding coverage) in Australia and the inconsistencies across those schemes give rise 
to situations that are or may be considered fraudulent. The structural arrangements can 
and often do contribute to the incidence of fraud and the level of non-compliance. A 
further contributing factor is the inflexibility of the schemes to respond to changing 
working arrangements. There is abundant evidence to show that the Australian 
workforce is highly mobile and that more and more employers are choosing to operate 
in more than one jurisdiction. (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Employment and Workplace Relations 2002, trans., p. 14)  
The Department said that the implementation of a single national framework for workers’ 
compensation coverage has the potential to remove the complexity that exists under the 
plethora of existing legislation and lessen confusion, non-compliance and the potential for 
fraud.  
Gaps in coverage and cross-border issues 
A particular problem generated by multiple arrangements relates to the interactions 
between them as workers move between jurisdictions, particularly for short periods of 
employment. This presents coverage problems for workers and can involve additional costs 
for employers (box 2.3). 
Aon identified additional costs faced by employers as a result of the failure of the 
jurisdictions to reach agreement on the treatment of workers from other jurisdictions: 
There are a significant number of “nominal” policies in place in most schemes that are 
there simply because of the potential uninsured risk employers have when their staff 
travel outside the normal state of business.  
… The cross border arrangements being considered should address this issue but the 
various jurisdictions have been working on this for a number of years and the problem 
is still not resolved. Nominal policies are required in all states except SA and Qld. 
Again a confusion for employers. If you consider the number of contracts involved the 
unnecessary costs are enormous. (sub. 73, p. 4) 
Similarly, the Australian Physiotherapy Association identified costs for practitioners 
moving between jurisdictions saying: 
The difference between the systems makes it more difficult than it should be for 
members to re-establish themselves in another jurisdiction.  
At a policy level the different systems do not encourage the development of consistent, 
evidence based OHS standards or practices. In practice development and research 
activities are duplicated and resources are wasted. (sub. 20 p. 2)     
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Box 2.3  Examples of cross-border problems and gaps in coverage 
Aon identified gaps in coverage resulting from multiple arrangements, saying: 
We have encountered a number of companies who have found themselves uninsured even 
when they have taken out cover in all states. The particular problem is with the common law 
provisions and their application. The legislation in each State provides protection for 
statutory cover only. One of our large clients has found themselves in the situation of having 
to pay the damages component of a common law claim in Queensland. The problem has 
arisen, not because the client was uninsured, but due to the mis-matching of cover between 
NT and Qld. The client had cover in both states, the injured worker worked out of Qld, but 
was temporally employed in the NT when the injury occurred. The worker claimed in Qld and 
sued for damages. WorkCover has refused to provide indemnity to the client on the basis 
that the injury occurred in the NT. The client cannot claim under their NT policy as there is 
no common law in the NT and the worker has not claimed in the NT so their insurance policy 
will not respond. The common law claim, if successful is not covered by an insurance policy 
due to the inadequacies of the multiple jurisdictions. (sub. 73, p. 4) 
Similarly, Green Triangle Injured Persons Support Group, noted: 
It [national uniformity] would also help the anomalous situation that we have in our region 
where, if a worker does not earn at least 10% of their annual income in South Australia, then 
they cannot claim for compensation in South Australia. You then have the ridiculous 
situation where Victoria refused compensation, because the injury happened across the 
border in South Australia. 
It would appear that while reciprocal agreements are in place between Victoria and New 
South Wales, none exists, at least to the same degree, between Victoria and South 
Australia. Whilst this is a simplistic overview of the situation, and that other factors do impact 
upon that scenario, nevertheless it does cause major problems for meatworkers, vineyard 
workers, shearers and others. (sub. 21, p. 3) 
 
 
Cross-border problems are an issue currently being addressed by the States and Territories. 
The Tasmanian Government noted: 
One issue which has been of concern for a number of years is the “cross border” 
situation where workers are required to work in more than one State, leading to 
confusion and uncertainty about workers’ entitlements, and employers’ obligations. It 
is noted that the States and Territories have been working towards addressing workers 
compensation cross border issues through uniform legislation which is intended to be 
implemented in all States and Territories this year. Tasmania has always supported the 
concept of cross border legislation and intends to implement the proposed legislation as 
soon as practicable. (sub. 135, p. 2) 
After a significant period of inter-governmental debate, Queensland unilaterally enacted a 
form of mutual recognition legislation in this area, followed by New South Wales and 
Victoria. The other jurisdictions are now at different stages in considering and 
implementing cross-border legislation which would recognise the coverage of workers who 
are temporarily working in their State or Territory. The Queensland Government said:     
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Queensland along with New South Wales and Victoria have reached agreement to 
address cross border issues associated with workers working temporarily interstate. The 
agreement which has been given legislative effect in Queensland commenced on 1 July 
2003. The agreement seeks to: 
•  eliminate the need for employers to obtain workers’ compensation coverage for a 
worker or deemed worker in more than one jurisdiction and enable employers to 
readily determine the state in which to obtain that insurance; 
•  ensure that workers and deemed workers temporarily working in another jurisdiction 
only have access to workers’ compensation entitlements available in their “home” 
jurisdiction; 
•  provide certainty for workers about their workers’ compensation entitlements; 
•  eliminate forum shopping; and 
•  ensure that each worker is connected to one jurisdiction or another. 
The cross border agreement is presently being considered by other States and 
Territories for implementation through the Heads of Workers’ Compensation 
Authorities (HWCA). HWCA members at the 29 July 2003 meeting agreed to progress 
implementation of the cross border agreement throughout Australia. (sub. 154, p. 13)  
The Australian Capital Territory, in September 2003, introduced legislation to the 
Assembly which includes changes to cover cross-border arrangements for workers’ 
compensation. 
However, the time taken for jurisdictions to act on this matter came in for some criticism. 
The Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry (sub. 66, p. 6) noted that 
the problems were identified in Industry Commission reports on workers compensation 
and OHS in 1994 and 1995 respectively. The National Farmers Federation said: 
While it is understood that work is currently underway in an aim to simplify and clarify 
the problems with cross border recognition, it is an issue that has been on the table for 
far too long and is causing significant concern to those farmers affected because 
presently an employer is required to have multiple workers’ compensation policies for 
those workers working in other states which results in additional administrative and 
compliance costs. (sub. 94, p. 20)  
The Housing Industry Association noted the changes that were occurring, but said that 
problems would, nonetheless, remain: 
HIA notes recent moves among the eastern States to develop systems allowing workers 
to work for a limited time in each other’s jurisdictions while remaining covered for 
workers’ compensation in their home State. This is a very desirable development and 
reflects credit on those States which have embraced it. However, HIA notes that so 
long as there is significant differences between the States and Territories over the 
nature and extent of coverage, mutual recognition will remain difficult to implement. 
(sub. 35, p. 7)     
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Despite the agreement between the eastern states, some degree of uncertainty remains. For 
example, Jim Pearson Transport commented: 
… both states [NSW and Qld] have similar tests however the wording is different and 
the interpretation could leave an employer operating in two states open to claims from 
both jurisdictions. … This means that an employer will still require policies in both 
states. (IRsub. 224, p. 1) 
Similarly, NatRoad Limited (the National Association of Road Freight Operators) 
highlighted particular difficulties for their members who regularly operate in multiple 
jurisdictions. The Association commented: 
Operators contact NatRoad on a daily basis regarding interjurisdictional OHS issues, 
many of whom express their frustration about the additional burden that having to be 
aware of so many different regimes creates. Despite their genuine desire to provide a 
safe workplace for their employees, many operators are simply overwhelmed by the 
unnecessary duplication that exists. (IRsub. 236, p. 2) 
Whether, in practice, cross-border problems arise in any numbers is, in some ways, a 
secondary issue. The fact is that subtle differences in wording open the opportunity for 
different interpretations and adds confusion and uncertainty for business. Why there is any 
need for such wording differences is unclear, but it highlights the inherent problem of 
pursuing ‘consistency’ rather than ‘uniformity’ in OHS provisions within Australia. 
Advantages of multiple arrangements 
A number of arguments have been put forward for individual jurisdictions to tailor 
arrangements to their particular needs. In general, these arguments have focused on 
workers’ compensation arrangements. In OHS, greater standardisation is seen by all parties 
as desirable.  
The Australian Psychological Society recommended that the inquiry ‘... supports and 
commends, as broad goals, restructuring those [OHS and workers’ compensation] systems 
over time into a single national system...’ (sub. 38, p. 9). Nevertheless, it identified the 
following benefits arising from separate systems: 
•  a greater sense of ownership of and influence in the separate systems by their various 
stakeholders, including and especially State and Territory governments, that might be 
lost with a national system. 
•  a strong likelihood that the positive features of the separate systems will be lost in a 
national system, by such processes as “averaging” or “using the lowest common 
denominator”, and/or that negative features may be too readily introduced without the 
“checks and balances” inherent in separate, loosely-linked systems. 
•  a single system will be too readily controlled by whichever political party is in office 
in Canberra.     
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•  separate systems provide a natural laboratory for trying different variants of WC or 
OHS schemes or projects and evaluating their outcomes, such as the Self Managed 
Employer Network in South Australia, which the State’s workcover authority and the 
Stanley Report have recommended be closed down after evaluation revealed a poor set 
of outcomes. (See Stanley Report Vol. 2.) 
•  beneficial competition is provided by separate systems in terms of relative WC 
premiums charged to employers and associated benefits to injured workers. 
•  jobs and careers will be lost, particularly in specialised fields such as in the OHS area, 
leading to loss of important expertise and organisational effectiveness. (sub. 38, p. 14) 
A number of participants, particularly State and Territory governments, unions and the 
legal profession argued strongly for retaining control over workers’ compensation 
arrangements at the State and Territory level. The Queensland Government said: 
Queensland does not support the adoption of a national workers’ compensation scheme 
or national self-insurance. These would add significant complexity to the existing 
arrangements, in effect adding a new layer of regulation where the Commonwealth 
would be required to impose and monitor a range of legislative requirements including 
workers’ compensation benefit levels, solvency and coverage without the surety of any 
benefit to scheme members. ... A co-operative approach to achieve national consistency 
for workers’ compensation, based on the model used for occupational health and safety 
through the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission is the preferred 
model of the Queensland Government. (sub. 154, pp. 2–3)  
The Community and Public Sector Union and the State Public Services Federation Group 
said: 
We submit that the best and most appropriate place to formulate law and policy in 
respect to OH&S and workers’ compensation remains the State governments. These 
legislators are closer to the day-to-day concerns of workers and their families than the 
Federal government can ever be. ... These legislators are more accessible to 
organisations, including unions, that represent the employment based interests of their 
members. (sub. 52, p. 2) 
The Law Council of Australia expressed the view that, in relation to OHS, as for workers’ 
compensation, there is no need for national legislation, and that the States and Territories 
should be able to tailor things to their own needs (sub. 62, p. 1). The NSW Bar Association 
(sub.  64) and the Australian Plaintiff Lawyers’ Association (APLA) expressed similar 
views, with the latter saying that: 
APLA concedes that, in the case of national employers, there may be some perceived 
problems with multiple jurisdiction-based regimes. It could not be said that these 
regimes have any real impact on employers that operate within the confines of 
particular state schemes. The only possible issue touching upon the latter category 
involves interstate accidents which are catered for within the legislative structures 
of multi-state schemes.     
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... On the assumption that the only reasonably affected employers, by operation 
of multiple jurisdiction-based regimes throughout Australia, are national employers, 
APLA is firmly of the view that to provide a national framework simply for 
ease of convenience, when one has regard to the disparities in the current state 
schemes, would operate as a severe injustice to many workers in the country. (sub. 69, 
pp. 5–7) 
The APLA was particularly concerned about the possibility of restricted access to common 
law under any national scheme. 
In relation to OHS, the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection of Western 
Australia argued for the continuation of flexibility at the local level, saying: 
In general terms, the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection supports 
moves toward national consistency of arrangements. Not-withstanding it is considered 
important to retain some flexibility at the local level in order to respond to local issues 
or local imperatives. To this extent, it is considered the report pays insufficient regard 
to the positive aspects of localised arrangements and tends to overemphasise the value 
of a ‘one size fits all’ approach. (IRsub. 219, p. 1) 
To a large degree, the debate about local flexibility is one of degree, and about the areas 
where this is most appropriate, rather than whether local flexibility should be allowed or 
not. At its most fundamental level, the duty of care concept, together with performance-
based standards, seeks to allow, and even encourage different approaches to complying 
with the duty and with meeting the performance standards set. These differences can be at 
the local, industry or even individual firm level. 
Economic and other differences between jurisdictions 
A number of participants argued that there was a need to tailor both OHS and workers’ 
compensation to reflect different attitudes to risk and differing work or business 
arrangements in the various jurisdictions. The existing arrangements are the product of a 
long history of negotiation and compromise between governments, employers, unions, 
lawyers, insurers and others, resulting in differences between jurisdictions which range 
from significant to the trivial. 
The Tasmanian Government commented: 
The Government believes that there are some advantages to having multiple 
jurisdiction-based regimes. States and Territories have different needs and conditions, 
and individual regimes allow them the flexibility to provide for those specific needs. 
Another advantage is that the States and Territories benefit from and build upon each 
other’s experience and initiatives leading to overall improvement in the schemes. 
(sub. 135, p. 2)     
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Certainly, there is a range of economic, social, workplace, legal, medical and other 
differences between jurisdictions within Australia. However, these need to be put into 
context. Some of these differences, such as firm size and industry concentration, also differ 
markedly within jurisdictions, and yet the States and Territories have been able to 
accommodate them within their single regulatory regime. A single OHS standard can 
include the spectrum of conditions faced from the tropics to cooler climes while 
maintaining it’s integrity. Various of the jurisdictional differences, however, weigh more 
heavily on the workers’ compensation schemes. 
Risk of lowest common denominator 
Some participants expressed concern that the compromises necessary to move to a single 
national scheme would result in the choice of the ‘lowest common denominator’. For 
example, the Labor Council of New South Wales commented: 
The Labor Council supports the approach towards national consistency and 
harmonisation across workers compensation and occupational health schemes, and the 
greater integration of both. The Council, however, is deeply concerned that in trying to 
obtain national consistency there would be a move towards adopting the lowest 
common denominator and the weakest aspects of the State schemes and therefore, on 
this basis, we are extremely sceptical about any national consistency approach, which 
fails to utilise the strengths and advantages of the state jurisdictions. 
The unions are of the view that multiple jurisdiction-based schemes are the best option 
for Australia. The USA and Canada have multiple jurisdiction-based schemes. Some of 
the schemes in the United States are privately underwritten where others are 
Government managed Funds.  
Moreover, the Union movement is sceptical that the multi-jurisdictional approach is as 
difficult to manage as is claimed. The majority of employers are not national 
corporations or entities. (sub. 147, pp. 4–8) 
The Australian Nursing Federation (sub. 70, p. 1), the National Tertiary Education Industry 
Union (sub.  68, p.  4), and the Australian Plaintiff Lawyers’ Association (sub.  69, p.  5) 
expressed similar views. 
The risk of arriving at a lowest common denominator depends in part on the process 
involved, and will differ in the two areas being considered in this inquiry. In relation to 
OHS, there is considerable agreement on both the objectives and the broad method of 
achieving them. The focus appears to be on achieving an appropriate common 
denominator. 
Achieving consensus will be more difficult in the area of workers’ compensation, where 
the positions of the stakeholders are more divergent, where the existing differences can be 
significant, and where the various elements of each scheme interact as part of a complex 
whole. Nevertheless, it is not clear that changes over time within the States and Territories,     
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and moves towards greater consistency are leading to a lowest common denominator. 
Some benefits and conditions for coverage have been tightened, but these appear to be 
principally a reaction to cost increases. On the other hand, the scope of workers’ 
compensation coverage has increased, now extending well beyond the traditional area of 
injury resulting from a discrete accident at work. 
Innovation from federation 
Learning from the experience of other jurisdictions has been a feature of the Australian 
federal system. It allows, whether intentionally or not, for trial arrangements to be 
introduced and observed while containing any negative impact that could result if the 
change is unsuccessful. The Queensland Government commented:  
... the existence of the various state-based models and industry-based approaches within 
each State enables a range of regulatory responses to be introduced and evaluated to 
inform and continually improve health and safety outcomes across Australia. In effect, 
States “learn” from each other’s best practice models. (sub. 154, p. 8) 
Similarly, the IC in its 1995 OHS report said that innovation in the design and execution of 
regulatory instruments is a key element in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulatory regimes, such as that for OHS, and that some inconsistency between 
jurisdictions may allow greater innovation. The IC nevertheless recommended uniformity 
of OHS arrangements through template legislation for core elements and the adoption of 
national standards. 
Moves to greater national consistency carry the risk of reducing the scope for regulatory 
innovation. The risk is greatest with national uniformity. If regulatory innovations require 
the agreement of all or most governments, the scope for experimentation is likely to be less 
than would otherwise be the case. It is recognised that industry, the labour market and 
other influences on both OHS and workers’ compensation will continue to change over 
time. Research, responsiveness and innovation are important. Model design for national 
frameworks needs to retain these attributes. 
There is also the ability to learn from the experience of other countries in their application 
of OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements. In many ways there is a greater variety 
internationally than there is within Australia. Because Australia is a small relatively open 
economy, there are strong incentives to move towards best-practice arrangements. 
Competitive federalism 
Capital and labour are, to an extent, mobile and have, at the margin, the potential to move 
to the jurisdiction with the ‘best’ set of regulatory arrangements. Indeed, State and 
Territory governments have publicised aspects of their schemes, particularly their workers’     
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compensation premiums, as a means of competing for investment. Aon commented on the 
use of workers’ compensation arrangement to attract business to a State saying: 
It has been recognised for some time that the States are interested in maintaining their 
control over the workers’ compensation arrangements for employers and employees in 
their State. It has been used by some States for marketing the benefits of moving to that 
State – “Come to this State, we have the lowest workers’ compensation premiums in 
Australia”. (sub. 73, p. 2) 
This policy, however, has not been without criticism and not without some adverse effects 
for the financial health of the various workers’ compensation arrangements in Australia. It 
is also an issue that is being faced in other parts of the world, whether federal in structure 
or seeking greater integration of nation states. For example, Esy and Geradin commented: 
Should trade liberalisation and economic integration between states or nations be 
accompanied by a degree of regulatory cooperation or coordination? Or should states or 
nations remain free to maintain their own approaches to economic, social and 
environmental issues? The former strategy, promoting a degree of regulatory 
harmonisation, aims to minimise market failures caused by interjurisdictional spillovers 
and strategic standard setting that might trigger a welfare-reducing regulatory ‘race 
towards the bottom’ as jurisdictions seek to advance the competitiveness of their 
industries through lax regulation. The latter approach, encouraging regulatory 
competition, sees a benefit in variations in approaches and standards across 
jurisdictions as a mechanisms for testing and refining alternative policies, disciplining 
overreaching governments, and creating incentives for bureaucratic efficiency. (2001, 
p. 1) 
A source of market failure for workers’ compensation which has an impact on the extent to 
which competitive federalism is desirable is that the beneficiary of the ‘insurance product’, 
the worker, is not the one facing the cost, while the party facing the cost, the employer, is 
not the one receiving the benefit. Importantly, the decision to locate or re-locate investment 
lies with the employer. Further, neither party sets the benefit level nor, at times, the costs 
— this being a consequence of both insurance risk ‘pooling’ and various forms of 
government involvement in premium setting. Thus, no party faces the correct set of 
incentives to arrive at an appropriate mix of cost and benefit. 
There is the added competitive element of shifting costs to the Australian Government. 
Limiting benefits, either by making early access difficult (thus placing costs onto 
Medicare) or by limiting the time over which compensation is paid (thus shifting costs to 
social security), allows States and Territories to offer lower premiums. The extent of cost 
shifting can be extensive. In its 1995 OHS report, the IC estimated that annually, some 
$200  million of costs were being shifted to the Australian Government from workers’ 
compensation schemes.     
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DEWR commented that an increasing proportion of the cost of work-related injury and 
illness was being shifted to others, primarily due to policy decisions of State and Territory 
governments. In particular, DEWR noted that: 
A recent national survey revealed that in the preceding twelve months, some 60,000 
workers who suffered a workplace injury sought assistance from taxpayer funded 
programs. (sub. 166, p. 27) 
The Australian Government Department of Family and Community Services estimated that 
the Australian Government paid out $180 million in social security payments to people 
affected by workers compensation payments (sub. 167, p. 1). 
Basic provisions for dealing with social dislocation, injury and illness are provided by the 
general social security and health systems. These are jointly provided by all Australian 
governments. However, where injuries and illnesses are demonstrably work-related, it is 
appropriate that the cost be attributed to employment.  
In some cases, the attribution of cost may not be clear. This can occur where the work-
relatedness of the injury or illness is itself problematic — there was some debate in this 
inquiry about the inappropriate attribution of injuries and illness to workplace causes, in 
part because for some conditions, this is difficult to do accurately. For injuries of a very 
minor nature, coverage under workers’ compensation may not be cost-effective — a 
situation reflected in the existence of arrangements where employers absorb initial low 
levels of claim costs, and ‘excess’ arrangement. There is, however, the separate question of 
comprehensive data collection and sound workplace safety. 
The Commission’s view on the case for national frameworks 
The majority of employers and employees operate within a single State or Territory and 
therefore deal with only one OHS regime and one workers’ compensation scheme. 
However, multi-state employers, who employ over a quarter of the workforce, face costs 
associated with dealing with the differing requirements in the various jurisdictions. These 
can be significant as set out earlier in this chapter. There are also problems facing 
employees and other organisations dealing with the differing jurisdictional requirements. 
With increasing mobility in the workforce, and within firms, the number of affected 
employees is growing. 
The case for national frameworks aimed at promoting greater national consistency, and 
even uniformity, in OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements does, however, differ 
between the two.  
In the case of OHS, while it is arguable that the costs imposed by differences between the 
jurisdictions are less than in the area of workers’ compensation, the differences are also     
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less fundamental (in part because of the existence of a formal mechanism via NOHSC for 
coordination in the former area), and thus the cost of achieving the benefits of national 
uniformity in OHS is more justifiable. In addition, there is a more widely held belief that 
national uniformity is both desirable and achievable. 
At the same time, the ‘duty of care’ nature of OHS legislation, and the use of outcome-
based regulations and codes, reduces the risk that national uniformity will stifle innovation. 
Prescriptive regulation, with its potential to limit innovation, should be limited to a small 
number of clearly agreed areas, such as dealing with hazardous waste or toxic chemicals. 
National frameworks for OHS and workers’ compensation, nonetheless, need to 
incorporate mechanisms for evaluating both the costs and benefits of any proposed new or 
amended standards so as to avoid rigid and inappropriate rules. Governments already 
provide some mechanisms in this area. Regulation Impact Statement procedures involve 
the review of new legislation and regulations and have the potential to be useful if well 
operated. However, having procedures in place at the development stage to ensure well 
developed legislation and regulation is preferable to the need for modifications as the result 
of subsequent review.  
In the case of workers’ compensation, the cost imposed by differences between 
jurisdictions is greater, and the differences are also more fundamental. Consequently, 
achieving national uniformity would be a much more costly exercise. In addition, there is 
no clear consensus that national uniformity in workers’ compensation arrangements is the 
best outcome, nor is there any consensus on the elements of an ideal model. Greater 
consistency between the jurisdictions is, however, widely seen as desirable. 
In relation to compliance costs, lack of uniformity does not affect the majority of 
employers or employees as they operate within a single jurisdiction. The costs of 
differences between workers’ compensation arrangements within Australia are 
predominantly born by multi-state employers, and there are significant benefits to them 
from being able to operate within a single nationally-available scheme. A national 
framework needs to primarily address the problems faced by multi-state employers. Their 
employees could also benefit from improved whole-of-company workplace safety, 
compensation and rehabilitation processes. There are also benefits for the nationally 
mobile workforce.  
The impacts on the current State and Territory schemes of multi-state employers moving to 
a national scheme are explored in chapter  5, and are not considered to be large. The 
innovative benefits of competitive federalism can be retained in various ways through 
appropriate model design as is explored in the following section. 
While there are links between OHS and workers’ compensation, particularly in the area of 
information, their objectives differ significantly, and their current position in relation to a 
nationally consistent set of rules is quite different. Consequently, the Commission is     
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treating the development of options for national frameworks for OHS and workers’ 
compensation separately. 
Because Australia is a small open economy, there are likely to be strong incentives to 
adopt practices that raise the competitiveness of local firms relative to counterpart 
producers overseas. The cost-related evidence submitted in this inquiry suggests that a 
national framework would provide a suitable vehicle for achieving a reduction in 
compliance burdens and costs, while continuing to promote organisational innovation and 
associated improvements in competitiveness.  
2.3  Criteria for model selection 
There are three broad design parameters to take into account when developing models of 
national frameworks for OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements:  
•  consistency with the commonly agreed objectives of existing arrangements;  
•  capacity to effectively target deficiencies in having multiple arrangements; and 
•  acceptability to stakeholders.  
By way of background, there are political and constitutional issues that arise from 
Australia’s federal structure.1 The States and Territories have had a long history — in 
some cases, over one hundred years2 — of policy involvement in, and responsibility for, 
OHS and workers’ compensation matters. Their arrangements, particularly for workers’ 
compensation, reflect that history of consultation and compromise between governments, 
employers, trade unions, workers, lawyers, insurers and others. Each workers’ 
compensation scheme is very much a package of inter-related measures, individual 
components of which cannot easily be changed in isolation. The differences between 
individual workers’ compensation schemes, including their degree of financial health, can 
be quite marked — a situation that is not the case with OHS regimes.  
                                                 
1 There is no express reference to OHS and workers’ compensation in sections 51 and 52 of the 
Constitution, which specify the Commonwealth’s concurrent and exclusive powers to make laws. 
But constitutional intent may not fully explain the current dominant role of the States and 
Territories. For example, the Insurance Australia Group considered that it: 
  ... is not the result of a deliberate distribution of powers at federation since workers’ compensation at that 
point was still essentially a common law matter. Rather, it simply reflects the fact that the primary focus 
through most of the 20
th century was on the development of personal injury and industrial relations law at 
state level rather than the creation of an efficient market for workers’ compensation insurance, which is 
essentially a Commonwealth responsibility. (sub. 89, pp. 5–6) 
2 Workers’ compensation legislation was first enacted in the States and Territories as follows: 
Queensland (1886); Western Australia (1894); South Australia and, possibly, the Northern 
Territory (1900); Tasmania (1910); Northern Territory (1910); Victoria (1914); New South 
Wales (1926); and the Australian Capital Territory (1946).     
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Most OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements have already been subject to frequent 
review and change. Such changes, and the inevitability of further change, creates a climate 
of complexity and uncertainty for all stakeholders. 
In reviewing the issues associated with developing national OHS and workers’ 
compensation frameworks, the Commission has only briefly reviewed the rationale for 
government intervention in this area. The matter has been addressed extensively in the 
literature and in previous reports, and the Commission does not intend to revisit the 
arguments in any detail.  
In brief, the essential reasons for government intervention is the observation that the 
private market does not, for a variety of reasons, adequately account for the costs of 
workplace fatalities, injuries and illnesses, nor apportion those costs to the appropriate 
party. The reasons for intervention in OHS and workers’ compensation are essentially 
similar, each addressing different, though related, aspects of the limitations of private 
markets. The reasons include: 
•  limited information about, and understanding of, workplace risk. The evidence 
suggests that people tend to over-assess low-probability events such as fatalities, and 
under-assess high probability events. Several studies have identified systematic 
shortcomings in the way people learn about risk and incorporate risk into their 
decisions;  
•  as a consequence of poor risk perception, and asymmetric information on the level of 
risks in individual workplaces (where employers know more about risks than 
prospective workers), it cannot be argued that differential wages accurately reflect 
different levels of risk. Such differentials would allow workers to take out their own 
insurance, but this appears not to be the case, and employers avoid some of the costs 
associated with the risk generated by their activity; 
•  the common law is inadequate in sending signals to employers about the need for 
appropriate levels of workplace safety. While claims can be made under the common 
law for negligence or breach of contract, they can involve high legal and other costs 
and do not provide timely compensation in an equitable or effective manner. Any 
awarded compensation may fail to be delivered as some employers may not take out 
insurance to adequately cover their liability to employees. Moreover, the adversarial 
nature of common law actions does not necessarily encourage early return to work;  
•  governments may also intervene when there is a lack of information about the risks of 
some hazards, and where the cost, if the wrong assessment is made, is particularly high. 
For example, some cancers may only arise after a period of 20 to 40 years, and the cost 
to individuals can be very high. Contemporary practice is to be prudent in protecting 
against exposures to such substances;      
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•  external costs are imposed on taxpayers if injured workers use the social security and 
(subsidised) health care systems for work-related injury, rather than the workers’ 
compensation system. To the extent that this occurs, there is less incentive to provide 
an appropriate level of safety; and 
•  there is an element of a ‘public good’ where an employer, at their private expense, 
develops safe workplace practices and these practices are appropriated by others. 
In the light of these inadequacies, employers do not necessarily have sufficient incentives 
to prevent, and compensate for, work-related fatalities, injuries and illnesses in the absence 
of explicit government intervention.  
Consistency with current objectives 
Existing OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements have related but different 
objectives. OHS arrangements seek to prevent fatality, injury and illness in the workplace. 
Workers’ compensation arrangements are primarily intended to: 
•  provide adequate financial compensation in the event of workplace fatality, injury or 
illness;  
•  provide an appropriate injury management continuum of early intervention, 
rehabilitation and return-to-work assistance; and 
•  ensure that employers’ contributions fully cover the cost of scheme liabilities arising 
from current employment, in an affordable manner. 
There is also an inter-related objective — to provide feedback to employers on the 
prevention of workplace fatalities, injuries and illnesses through costs, incentives and data 
analysis. 
The goal for national frameworks for OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements, 
referred to in the terms of reference for this inquiry: 
… would be to facilitate improved workplace safety and provide adequate 
compensation to injured employees while offering a more effective continuum of early 
intervention, rehabilitation and return to work assistance for those injured in the 
workplace. (para. 7) 
This goal is, in its essence, already reflected in existing arrangements. A model design 
parameter, therefore, is to work within the current broadly-based objectives of existing 
arrangements, while overcoming demonstrable deficiencies in having multiple 
arrangements.      
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Acceptability of the models 
A key model design parameter for any national framework is that it must be capable of 
implementation in a timely manner. Indeed, there may be a need to trade-off a conceptually 
superior framework with one that is able to be implemented. 
Implementation is affected by the institutional history of, and stakeholder interests in, each 
scheme as well as the complex interaction of the various scheme elements. Acceptability of 
a national framework to those stakeholders in individual jurisdictions with an interest, or 
who are empowered to enact changes, is thus an important aspect of implementation. 
A national framework may also need to be implemented in a staged manner to enable 
stakeholders to assess and adjust to the impacts on an incremental basis. 
2.4  Formulation of the models 
Early in the inquiry, the Commission identified six possible models of national frameworks 
for OHS and workers’ compensation — a cooperative model for workers’ compensation, a 
mutual recognition model, an expanded Comcare model, a uniform template legislation 
model, an extended financial sector regulation model and a new national workers’ 
compensation scheme or OHS regime (PC 2003,   
pp. 7–8).  
In response to participants’ comments, the Commission no longer considers the following 
two models to be feasible for workers’ compensation.  
•  A mutual recognition model. For a national framework, there would need to be 
agreement amongst all jurisdictions to pass the necessary legislation enabling mutual 
recognition. As it would require jurisdictions to be indifferent to underlying differences 
among schemes, this is highly unlikely. Moreover, there would be practical difficulties 
for jurisdictions in implementing mutual recognition given the many diverse 
requirements, except where workers from one jurisdiction are working temporarily in 
another (cross-border recognition). As the Northern Territory Government said, 
‘dealing with a multiplicity of different workers’ compensation and OH&S schemes 
would be unwieldy’ (sub. 144, p. 14). 
•  A model involving a single national workers’ compensation scheme. As noted, the 
majority of employers (who are predominantly small to medium enterprises) and their 
employees operate only within a single jurisdiction. It is also not clear that there is any 
single perfect or best scheme. Best practice can be reflected in a number of different 
ways, and schemes must adapt to the wider socio-economic environments within which 
they operate. In addition, the benefits of choice of scheme and the scope to learn from 
the experience in other jurisdictions would be lost. On the other hand, there are     
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compelling arguments for national uniformity in OHS arrangements through a single 
national regime. This particular option is considered further in chapter 4.  
Chapter 4 looks briefly at the following models for a national OHS framework: 
•  a single national OHS scheme; 
•  an alternative national OHS scheme; 
•  template legislation, regulations and codes of practice; 
•  mutual recognition; and 
•  strengthening the existing cooperative approach. 
This is followed by the development of the Commission’s preferred approach based around 
an alternative national OHS scheme (linked to the recommendations for expanding 
national workers’ compensation arrangements), and an amalgamation of the template 
legislation model with proposals to strengthen the existing cooperative approach.  
Chapter 5 develops the following models for worker’s compensation in more detail: 
•  self-insurance under the Australian Governments’ Comcare scheme (model A); 
•  an alternative national self-insurance scheme (model B); 
•  an alternative national insurance scheme (model C); and 
•  a new national cooperative body (model D);  
The workers’ compensation models could be combined, and/or be implemented in a 
sequence of steps. Models A through to C are largely matters for Australian Government 
consideration, and their implementation could be phased, with progressively greater 
impacts on State and Territory schemes. Indeed, Model C may not eventuate depending on 
the degree of parallel harmonisation by the States and Territories. Model D requires the 
full cooperation of all jurisdictions, and could be commenced immediately, and could 
operate concurrently with Model A and, when developed, any subsequent model. These 
models and any linkages between them are explored in more detail in chapter 5.  
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3  Current occupational health and 
safety regimes 
This chapter summarises the existing arrangements for occupational health and safety 
(OHS) in Australia. The following chapter looks at the development of national OHS 
frameworks.  
3.1  The incidence of injury and illness 
Regulation of OHS aims at prevention — to safeguard the health, safety and welfare of 
workers, as well as to protect others from risk at work sites, thereby controlling the 
personal and economic costs that arise from work-related fatalities, injury and illness. In 
2001-02, preliminary data indicated that there were 297 compensated fatalities which 
occurred as a consequence of workplace activity. Of these, 198 were due to injury and 
poisoning and the remaining 99 were due to disease. A further 78 fatalities occurred on 
journeys to and from work. There were almost 139 000 accepted workers’ compensation 
cases which resulted in a fatality, permanent disability or a temporary disability which 
resulted in an absence from work of one or more working weeks (NOHSC 2003b, p. x).  
Data based on workers’ compensation claims must be treated with some caution. The   
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) noted that:  
The available evidence suggests, however, that the total number of workplace injuries 
and diseases in Australia may be much higher than the number eligible for 
compensation. A survey by the Australian Bureau of Statistics found that over a twelve 
month period, five percent of the workforce or 477,800 workers experienced a work-
relate injury or illness. This equates to an incidence of injury rate of 49.3 per thousand 
employees, compared to an incidence rate of 15.2 per thousand employees that the 
workers’ compensation schemes actually reported. (sub. 166, p. 3) 
The ACTU, in their submission and at the hearings noted a considerable underreporting of 
work related deaths from disease. They referred to the recent conference ‘Australian OHS 
Regulation for the 21
st Century’ in July 2003, which made reference to Australian 
estimates for deaths from diseases of almost 2300 per year (Kerr et al. 1996), and Finish 
estimates (Nurminen & Karjalainen 2001) that 7 per cent of all deaths are work related. 
The Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union also referred to work presented at the 
conference saying:     
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According to the ILO, it is estimated that the toll from accidents is ¼ of ALL work-
place related ill health.1 Using the same methodology as Finnish research he estimates 
that the real Australian toll is close to 7,000 deaths per year. Mr. Tukaala also noted 
that maybe 32% of all work related deaths are due to occupational cancer e.g. 
exposures to asbestos, passive smoking, radiation etc., … (IRsub. 231, p. 1) 
The National OHS Strategy document noted that: 
Although no reliable data exist on deaths arising from occupational disease, it has been 
estimated that over 2,000 people die per year from past occupational exposures to 
hazardous substances. (NOHSC 2002c, p. 1)  
Estimating the contribution of work-related factors to deaths from disease and similar long 
latency conditions is difficult. There is both a lack of agreement on the appropriate 
methodology and limited access to data. This situation has been reviewed by NOHSC with 
particular reference to data sources in Australia (NOHSC 2000; 2002e), and with reference 
to means by which this data could be improved. 
NOHSC has also commissioned Access Economics to review the current estimate of the 
economic cost of work-related injury and disease based on an examination of the 
international literature and the NOHSC/Industry Commission modelling. Initial estimates 
incorporating the Access Economics recommendations on modifications to the 
methodology indicate the final estimate of the total cost of work-related injury and disease 
to the Australian economy will exceed the $31 billion supplied by NOHSC in its original 
submission to the Productivity Commission in 20032. 
While the cost is and remains high, the frequency of compensated work-related fatalities, 
injury and disease (number per million hours worked has declined from 13.4 in 1996-97 to 
10.2 by 2001-02. The level of compensated work-related fatalities has declined from 403 
in 1996-97 to 297 in 2001-02 (chapter 1). 
DEWR noted that a number of factors might be influencing the level of reported injury: 
They include the underreporting of minor injuries; the structural changes by workers’ 
compensation schemes in respect of coverage and entitlement to injuries; changes to 
the composition of the workforce; and a shift in employment from high risk industries 
to industries of lower risk, reflecting the Australian economy’s change from a 
manufacturing sector to the services sector. (sub. 166, p. 9) 
                                                 
1 Mr. Jukka Tukaala, International Labour Organisation speaking at NOHSC Conference 
“Australian OHS Regulation for the 21
st Century”, Queensland, July 2003. 
2 This compares to an estimate of $20 billion contained in the Industry Commission’s 1995 review 
relating to the year 1992-93. The IC estimated that employers bear 40 per cent, injured workers 
30 per cent and the community 30 per cent of this cost.     
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All parties acknowledge that the incidence of work-related fatalities, injury and illness 
significantly exceeds that reported through workers’ compensation claims but, as reported 
by NOHSC and the individual schemes, the incidence is in decline. Notwithstanding this 
decline, a number of developed countries, particularly the United Kingdom and 
Scandinavia are acknowledged to have a better OHS performance than Australia. The 
room for improvement in Australia is reflected in the recent National OHS Strategy 2002-
2012 which has been endorsed by the Australian, State and Territory Governments. It aims 
for a 20 per cent reduction in work-related fatalities and a 40 per cent reduction in the 
incidence of workplace injury by 30 June 2012 (NOHSC 2002c, p. iii). 
3.2  Current OHS arrangements 
Under the Australian Constitution, the power to legislate for OHS was not explicitly 
referred to the Australian Government (in contrast to the referral of a broader corporations 
power). Consequently, ten principal OHS statutes have been developed — six State, two 
Territory and two Commonwealth (one relating to Australian Government workers and the 
other relating to the maritime industry). 
To varying degrees, all jurisdictions have drawn on the approach to regulating for safer 
workplaces espoused by the Robens Committee in the United Kingdom in 1972. This 
involves a principal OHS Act that codifies the duties of care that are owed under the 
common law. The expression ‘duty of care’ has been defined as the obligation owed to 
anyone whom it is reasonably foreseeable would be injured by the lack of care of that 
person (CCH 2003a, p. 118). 
This duty is imposed on employers, the self employed, owners, occupiers of premises and 
suppliers. The duty is owed to both employees and others (workers other than employees, 
customers and visitors) who may be affected by the worksite, activity or equipment. 
Workers have obligations not to put others at risk and to obey the reasonable instructions 
of their employer in relation to OHS (box 3.1). 
Regulations 
All OHS Acts provide for the making of regulations. These set out in detail the carrying 
out of some aspects the more general duties outlined in the Acts. They cover such matters 
as working in confined spaces, plant design and use, electrical hazards, manual handling, 
risk management, consultation and training. Failure to comply is a breach of the relevant 
OHS Act and may result in a penalty being imposed.     
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Box 3.1  Who has a duty to whom? 
The Cole Royal Commission summarised the obligations as follows: 
With some variations in detail and emphasis between jurisdictions, the various Acts impose 
duties on the following parties: 
–  Employers, for the benefit of employees; 
–  Employers, for the benefit of non-employees; 
– Self-employed  persons; 
– Employees; 
–  Occupiers of premises; and 
–  Manufacturers and suppliers of plant and substances, erectors and installers of structures in 
workplaces. 
The Australian courts have generally construed the general duty provisions in accordance 
with the intent of the Robens report. Thus they have been interpreted broadly so as to 
maximise the protection of employees and others whose safety may be affected adversely 
by work-related activities. (RCBC 2002, pp. 69–70) 
An essential element of the duties is that they are intended to encourage ‘pro-active’ 
rather than ‘reactive’ behaviour on the part of the duty holder. The Cole Royal 
Commission referred to State Rail Authority v Workcover (2000) 102 IR 219 at 230 
(Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales in Court Session), reporting: 
This case is yet another illustration of the need for employers to exercise abundant caution, 
maintain constant vigilance and take all practical precautions to ensure safety in the 
workplace. It is essential that the approach be a pro-active one and not a re-active one; 
employers should be on the offensive to search for, detect and eliminate, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, any possible areas of risk to safety, health and welfare which may 
exist or occur from time to time in the workplace. (RCBC 2002, p. 72) 
 
 
The Cole Royal Commission, when commenting on regulations under OHS Acts, noted: 
The debate has largely been resolved in favour of a move away from detailed 
prescriptive laws to laws that are ‘performance-based’ in that they identify the statutory 
standards to be reached but not the means by which they must be reached. ... OHS 
regulations made during the last two decades in Australia have tended to focus on 
processes to be followed by duty-holders in meeting their general duty requirements. 
(RCBC 2002, p. 17)  
However, Laing, in his review of the Western Australian OHS arrangements noted that 
comments from industry on the practical extent of performance-based regulation reflected 
a view that a gradual process of re-regulation is taking place. Laing reported the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia as saying: 
... while on the surface it may appear that there has been a substantial move towards 
performance-based regulation of occupational safety and health, at a fundamental level 
this is not the case. In fact, the body of law relating to occupational safety and health is 
actually increasing and the inherently desirable aspects of self-regulation are gradually 
being lost rather than enhanced. (Laing 2002, p. 221)     
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Codes of practice 
Many of the regulations are supported by codes of practice. These explain the processes 
that will achieve the outcomes required by the regulations, with practical examples and 
references to relevant Australian Standards.  
Compliance with the codes and standards referred to in the codes is not mandatory. If a 
person can show compliance with the duties under the OHS Act (that is, an appropriate 
process of hazard identification, risk assessment, and control to a practicable level), then 
compliance with the Code of Practice and any standard referred to in the Code is not 
required. 
The codes of practice represent evidence of industry knowledge of risk and risk control. 
They therefore may be evidence of what is practicable in the circumstances and may 
provide, in effect, a reverse onus of proof, requiring the person not following the code to 
demonstrate that compliance with the Act or regulations was achieved by other means 
(CCH 2003a, p. 74). 
Workplace systems, policies and procedures are the means of implementing and 
monitoring compliance with duties under OHS Acts and regulations. As outlined by CCH: 
An employer or a person who owes a duty under the relevant OHS Act and regulations 
will be in a better position to be found to have met that particular obligation if a 
carefully developed workplace system is in place. This is the case even if a failure 
within the system occurs. A lack of proper workplace systems, or ill-considered and 
inappropriate systems will expose the employer to liability. (2003a, p. 77) 
Such an approach, however, can have its limitations. In relation to the construction 
industry, the Cole Royal Commission noted: 
Implementation of risk management initiatives has, thus far, been more to document 
compliance than to achieve real change. It appears that the application of risk 
management techniques is often perceived as a way of demonstrating compliance, 
rather than as an effective preventive strategy. There has been considerable recent 
progress in more effective use of risk management approaches, in particular in 
Queensland and NSW. (RCBC 2002, p. 9) 
OHS representatives and committees 
All Australian OHS legislation makes provision for worker representation in OHS matters. 
Generally, the legislation provides for the election of employee OHS representatives and 
for the establishment and conduct of OHS committees if requested by employees. OHS 
representatives and committees have two primary functions. First, they act as a conduit 
between the employer and employees in respect of decisions affecting health, safety and     
46    
 
welfare at the workplace. Second, they play a role in monitoring, maintaining and 
improving workplace health and safety. 
Despite this commonality of purpose, the National Research Centre for Occupational 
Health and Safety Regulation (NRCOHSR 2003, p.  5) noted that the provisions vary 
markedly between the jurisdictions. For example, some jurisdictions allow OHS 
representatives or committees to issue provisional improvement notices while some do not. 
Some jurisdictions empower representatives to direct the cessation of dangerous work 
while some do not (WRMC 2002b, pp. 74–87). 
NRCOHSR commented that the available data suggests that the introduction of 
representatives has caused major changes in OHS attitudes and practices, saying: 
They worked best when the OHS legislation gives them a significant role, and when 
management adopted a positive attitude to OHS, and gave representatives enough time 
to perform their duties. A further factor in the success of the representative provisions 
is union support. (NRCOHSR 2003, p. 6) 
Enforcement 
All Australian OHS Acts give inspectors from the relevant OHS administrative body broad 
powers to issue improvement and prohibition notices, and to prosecute duty holders found 
to be in breach of the legislation.  
An improvement notice can be issued to persons contravening the relevant OHS Act and 
regulations, requiring that the notice be complied with within a specified period of time. A 
failure to comply is an offence under the relevant OHS Act. 
Prohibition notices are issued where there is an immediate risk to health and safety. 
Essentially, a prohibition notice requires that an activity which poses an immediate risk 
ceases until the identified hazard is controlled. 
Inspectors also have an important informational and advisory role. Box 3.2 provides an 
example of the hierarchy of enforcement policies in South Australia. All jurisdictions 
operate a similar hierarchy.     
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Box 3.2  Enforcement policy in South Australia 
Workplace Services’ enforcement policy reflects a deliberate strategy based on 
motivation of employers to achieve healthy workplaces by: 
•  Providing information and education. This may be achieved through information 
sheets and other guidance material. This strongly preventative first-step approach 
acknowledges the primacy of preventing any injury or sickness, minimising the need 
for the Act to be enforced by inspectors. An example is the Major Workplace 
Hazards Strategy which has identified and addressed the six major recurring 
workplace hazards that exist in South Australian industry. 
•  Providing verbal directives where a risk is identified. This requires an inspector to 
identify risks and make a request for immediate rectification, and suggest a very 
practical approach to achieve the desired outcome. It should be noted that identified 
risks would be considered to be of a less serious nature. 
•  Issuing improvement notices where action has not been taken to achieve 
compliance. This may address a risk that does not present an immediate threat to 
safety, but may develop into a more serious threat if the risk is not remedied. An 
improvement notice may also be issued when there is a perception that safety may 
be further contravened. 
•  Issuing prohibition notices to address serious breaches. This strategy would be 
adopted where a serious and immediate risk is identified, and the only option is to 
eliminate the risk by prohibiting the operation of, or access to, the site. 
•  Prosecution where serious breaches have occurred and/or resolution has not been 
achieved via other means. 
Other mechanisms adopted by Inspectors include letters of warning and letters of 
statutory obligation. These are designed to draw attention to the obligations under the 
legislation. Letters of warning may function as a precursor to prosecution, or support 
for prosecution, where a breach has been detected and action has not been taken to 
address the risk. 
Source: Stanley et al. (2002, vol. 3, pp. 88–9). 
 
 
Penalties under OHS Acts 
All of the OHS Acts provide for fines to be the principal penalty for offences. The 
maximum fines vary considerably by jurisdiction, ranging from $125 000 in the Northern 
Territory, to $550 000 in New South Wales ($825 000 for repeat offences). In New South 
Wales, sanctions also include adverse publicity court orders, and a court order that requires 
the offender to participate in an OHS-related project (NRCOHSR 2003, pp. 4–5). 
In the recent review of OHS arrangements in Western Australia, Laing commented:     
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The penalties presently in the WA Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 are out of 
step with those applying in other jurisdictions and should be amended. The 
comparatively low maximum penalties and the even lower actual penalties [maximum 
fine levied so far in the case of a workplace fatality is $35 000 (p. 133)] imposed by the 
Courts have contributed to an undermining of the authority of the Act. It is imperative 
that notional and actual enforcement penalties be strong enough to act as an effective 
deterrent against failing to meet acceptable occupational safety and health standards. 
(Laing 2002, p. 135) 
Similarly, in Queensland, the issues paper published in association with the recent review 
of OHS arrangements in that State commented on the low average level of penalty, saying: 
... the averages represent approximately 6% of the applicable maximum for individuals 
and corporations [Section 28(1)]. The highest fine imposed for a breach of this section 
was $40 000 in two cases where the breaches caused death. The penalty of $40 000 
represents just 13% of the maximum. ... The size and nature of the penalties are so low 
that the whole court process must be seriously questioned. (Department of Industrial 
Relations (Queensland) 2001, pp. 19–20) 
and: 
The reasons for the low penalties are well documented in the enforcement literature and 
include the following: 
•  Industrial Magistrates do not see many breaches of workplace health and safety 
obligation cases, and if they do it is usually the obligation holder’s first offence; 
•  the Courts tend to view health and safety breaches as quasi-criminal in nature and 
therefore somewhat of a lesser crime than other offences; 
•  the obligation holders usually plead mitigation by showing remorse and demonstrating 
any steps they may have taken to prevent such occurrences from happening again; 
•  the nature of the offence ‘is transformed, decontextualised, and individualised so that 
the emphasis on systems of work is lost’ (Johnstone 1994, p. 79); and  
•  the defence adopt isolation techniques such as blameshifting to the worker, the 
inspector, and the manufacturer to mitigate the obligation holder’s role in 
contravention. (Department of Industrial Relations (Qld) 2001, p. 20) 
The ACTU, in this inquiry, noted that recent reviews had recognised the need to broaden 
the scope and range of penalties. It went on to advocate: 
•  increasing actual penalties imposed for OHS breaches by corporations and individual 
employers; 
•  imposition of criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, for corporate recklessness or 
negligence; 
•  establishing and enforcing the accountability of corporations, their directors and senior 
officers; 
•  prosecution of government agencies;     
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•  increased sanctions for repeat offenders; 
•  prosecution of both host and agency employers; 
•  non-monetary penalties, such as removal of licences; and 
•  public exposure, including requiring employers to publicise breaches. (sub.  133, 
pp. 14–15). 
A number of commentators have noted an increase in the enforcement activities of 
inspectors, and in the level of penalties. CCH noted: 
While traditionally the penalties for breaches of OHS obligations have generally been 
monetary and relatively small, it appears that this is changing. Provisions for criminal 
proceedings against individuals, particularly directors and executive officers of 
companies, appear much more likely. Throughout the various States and Territories, the 
maximum penalties and average penalties are creeping upwards. (2003a, p. 134) 
Consistent with this perspective from CCH, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry noted: 
A review of the compliance and enforcement data reveals that there has been an 
increase in the issue of improvement and prohibition notices by the jurisdictions with a 
resultant increase in prosecutions, convictions and fines awarded by the courts. This 
trend over the past four years clearly demonstrates that the jurisdictional focus is on 
regulation, compliance and enforcement. This strategy has not been effective as an 
incentive or motivator for employers and is not supported by hard evidence.  
A more personalised non-threatening approach to small business is required to bring 
about improved OHS performance. (sub. 81, pp. 14, 16)  
In this inquiry, and in the wider debate on OHS, there is considerable divergence of views 
on whether greater information, assistance and persuasion will be more productive than a 
greater emphasis on penalties and enforcement. The Commission notes that the balance 
between enforcement and education has gone through long cycles in the various 
jurisdictions. There have been, and should continue to be, differing emphases between the 
two approaches in response to the particular circumstances facing a jurisdiction, the 
differing behaviours and levels of risks between industries and the different capacities of 
firms, particularly small and medium enterprises, to effectively identify and manage those 
risks.  
The Cole Royal Commission came to a similar view when it concluded that: 
Most experts in regulatory theory now agree that the answer to the punish or persuade 
debate lies in a judicious mix of the two approaches. The challenge is to develop 
enforcement strategies that punish the worst offenders, while at the same time 
encouraging and helping employers to comply voluntarily [attributed to Richard 
Johnstone 2001, Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Statutes: Issues and 
Future Directions]. (RCBC 2002, p. 20)     
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Organisational arrangements 
Under the Australian Government and in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, responsibility for OHS and 
workers’ compensation are administered together under one authority. In Queensland and 
Western Australia, separate organisations are responsible for each (table 3.1). The South 
Australian system is more complicated involving the separation of enforcement 
responsibilities. 
Views on the linkages between OHS and workers’ compensation arrangements varied 
markedly. Some participants argued for much closer linkages than currently exist, while 
others argued for clear separation. There was general support for some coordination and 
for feedback links between the two areas to be strong. For example, the Labor Council of 
New South Wales said: 
Clearly, Workers Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety should be treated 
as interrelated fields. After all, failures to act in relation to OHS directly lead to 
outcomes with regard to workers’ compensation for the affected worker. For these 
reasons there is a great deal of merit in combining the areas of OHS and workers’ 
compensation into one framework.  
WorkCover in NSW has combined OH&S and Workers’ Compensation. This has 
proved to be a very effective module. In the past workers’ compensation and OHS were 
dealt with by two separate organisations. This impeded proactive prevention as the 
Inspectorate only focused on major industrial accidents and never used Workers’ 
Compensation data. The NSW WorkCover inspectorate uses workers’ compensation 
data to target and assist poor performing employers. They have a number of industry 
programs in place. (sub. 147, p. 25) 
While there was support for continuing links between OHS and workers’ compensation 
arrangements, in particular for cooperation between the agencies involved in each area, 
other participants argued that the two arrangements have different objectives, and thus 
should remain essentially separate. 
The South Australian review of the occupational health, safety and welfare arrangements 
referred to comments by Johnstone in a paper presented to the Queensland Enforcement 
Forum in 2002: 
On the other hand, support for having separate administration of occupational health 
and safety and workers’ compensation comes from the perception that there is at least a 
potential conflict of interest in having both these functions administered by the same 
body and, more specifically, a fear that the insurance perspective of the workers’ 
compensation part of the agency will come to dominate the occupational health and 
safety section. Along with loss of independence such dominance, and a perceived 
greater closeness of the insurance section to employer rather than worker interests, is 
seen to carry with it a real risk of dilution of the compliance function in favour of     
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consensus resolution of occupational health and safety issues. (Stanley et al. 2002, 
vol. 3, p. 18) 
Table 3.1  OHS administering organisations 
Jurisdiction  Administering organisation and its accountability 
Commonwealth  SRCC/Comcare [WC and OHS].  
Responsible to the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations 
Seafarers  Seacare Authority [WC and OHS]. 
Reports to the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations 
New South Wales  WorkCover Authority of NSW (WorkCover NSW) [WC and OHS].  
Responsible to the Minister for Commerce. 
Victoria  Victorian WorkCover Authority [WC and OHS]. WorkSafe Victoria is the 
VWA’s OHS arm. 
Responsible to the Minister for WorkCover who is also the Minister for 
Industrial Relations (Department of Industry and Regional Development). 
Queensland  Division of Workplace Health and Safety [OHS] – a division of the 
Department of Industrial Relations.  
Responsible to the Minister for Industrial Relations. 
Western Australia  WorkSafe Division [OHS] of the Department of Consumer and 
Employment Protection (IR is included in the portfolio).  
Responsible to the Minister for Consumer and Employment Protection. 
South Australia  WorkCover Corporation [WC and OHS]. 
Responsible to the Minister for Industrial Relations.  
Enforcement by Workplace Services [OHS] division of the Department of 
Administrative and Information Services (Workplace [industrial] Relations 
is included in the portfolio).  
Tasmania  WorkCover Tasmania [WC and OHS].  
Responsible to the Minister for Infrastructure (Industrial Relations is 
included in the portfolio).  
Enforcement is by Workplace Standards Tasmania [OHS] within the 
Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources. 
ACT  ACT WorkCover [WC and OHS].  
Responsible to the Minister for Industrial Relations. 
Northern Territory  Northern Territory Work Health Authority [WC and OHS]. NT WorkSafe is 
the OHS arm of the Authority. 
Responsible to the Minister for Employment Education and Training 
Note:  Abbreviations used: WC: workers’ compensation; OHS: occupational health and safety; IR: industrial 
relations. 
Sources: WRMC (2002b, p. 54), and information from the respective websites. 
The Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission (Western Australia) (WCRC) 
commented that: 
There is consensus within the WCRC that the primary aim of a workers’ compensation 
system (as distinct from an OHS authority) is injury and claims management, rather 
than prevention, and the Commission supports separate structures on this basis.     
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Notwithstanding the formal separation, the WCRC supports cooperation between the 
workers’ compensation and health and safety agencies in the pursuit of accident 
prevention through appropriate data sharing arrangements. (sub. 111, p. 5) 
Similarly, the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection (Western Australia) – 
WorkSafe Division said: 
WorkSafe sounds a word of caution in that there are very different objectives of 
various systems and the ramifications of moving away from concepts embodied in 
individual statutes would be extensive. (sub. 58, p. 2) 
The Housing Industry Association (sub. 35, pp. 4, 6) and Australia Meat Holdings (sub. 96, 
p.  10) argued that workers’ compensation and OHS should be separate as they cover 
different issues, while the Minerals Council of Australia (sub. 141, p. 6) urged caution 
when seeking to integrate workers’ compensation and OHS arrangements and the relevant 
regulators. 
The Commission’s recommendations in relation to the administration of the Australian 
Government’s OHS regime and workers’ compensation arrangements are presented in 
chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
Changing working arrangements 
One of the issues facing Australian OHS regulators is the changing composition of the 
Australian labour market. In pursuit of more flexible working arrangements, many firms 
have increasingly resorted to management decentralisation, subcontracting, outsourcing, 
franchising, home-based work and downsizing, leading to more casual, part-time and 
contingent forms of work, self-employment and small business. The Department of 
Industrial Relations in Queensland noted: 
There is increasing evidence that labour market changes and new forms of work 
organisation are having detrimental effects on the health and safety of workers ... For 
example, the competitive pressures that induce businesses to turn to outsourcing also 
encourage sub-contractors to cut costs by underbidding on contracts, using cheaper or 
inadequately maintained equipment, reducing staffing levels, speeding up production or 
working longer hours. Organisational forms relying on sub-contracting create fractured, 
complex and disorganised work processes, weaker chains of responsibility and ‘risk-
passing’, and a lack of specific job knowledge (including knowledge about health and 
safety) among workers moving from job to job. (Department of Industrial Relations 
(Qld) 2001, pp. 4–5) 
The issue was also identified in the issues paper relating to the South Australian review 
(Government of South Australia 2002, pp.  26, 29), and in the final report. The South 
Australian final report noted:     
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... overall, available scientific evidence indicates that the growth of precarious labour 
negatively affects injury and illness, reporting propensity, treatment and rehabilitation, 
and requires adjustment in regulatory regimes and the use of different preventative 
strategies. (Stanley et al. 2002, vol. 3, p. 43) 
The National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation noted that 
there: 
.... is the need for OHS regulators to pay greater attention to work relations outside the 
traditional employment relationship. With the dramatic changes that are taking place in 
the Australian labour market, mirroring changes taking place elsewhere in the world, 
regulators need to develop standards, guidance material, inspection programs and 
enforcement strategies that accommodate subcontracting, labour hire, home-based 
work and franchise arrangements. Particularly important is the need to think more 
flexibly about health and safety representatives. Currently the provisions are limited to 
employees, and exclude sub-contractors and the like. European development in relation 
to regional health and safety representatives should be examined. (NRCOHSR 2003, 
p. 6) 
After a literature search of international experience, and an analysis of workers’ 
compensation claims in Victoria, Underhill (2002) found that labour hire employees were 
more likely to be injured than direct employees, their injuries appear more severe, and that 
this matches the international evidence. Labour hire workers were found to be more 
concentrated in semi-/unskilled high risk occupations and younger workers were 
disproportionately represented.  
The reasons for the higher rate of injuries was attributed to: 
•  the intensity of tasks in unfamiliar settings; 
•  insufficient experience, training and supervision for the tasks performed; 
•  insufficient information exchange between employer, client and employees; 
•  lack of discretion in the way tasks are performed; and 
•  the potential offloading of high-risk tasks to labour hire employees. 
Quinlan (sub. 93) has undertaken research into the effect of changing work arrangements 
on OHS. This included a review of 188  Australian and international studies, with almost 
90 per cent finding non-traditional work arrangements, referred to as precarious 
employment, resulted in inferior OHS outcomes like higher injury rates, hazard exposures, 
disease and stress. Quinlan stated that: 
The evidence collected in the report … indicated that precarious employment and job 
insecurity were creating serious problems for existing OHS regulatory regimes in 
Australia. (sub. 93, p. 13)     
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Quinlan pointed to the following issues associated with non-traditional work arrangements 
as contributing to poorer OHS outcomes: 
... lower knowledge of or compliance with legislative requirements amongst 
subcontractors, temporary workers and those engaging them and less willingness to 
raise OHS issues … 
Subcontracting … , labour leasing and much home-based work … introduce third 
parties in the work arrangement as opposed to the relatively simple and direct 
employer/employee relationship that have been the overwhelming focus of OHS 
regulatory regimes in the past. … the introduction of third parties creates more 
complicated and potentially attenuated webs of legal responsibility that place heavier 
logistical demands on the inspectorate. 
… growth of these work arrangements increases the potential risk of ignorance or 
misunderstandings in terms of meeting legislative requirements.  
… existing laws and guidance material on worker involvement largely presume a 
permanent work arrangement between employer and employees … (sub. 93, p. 12) 
Laing, in the review of the Western Australian OHS arrangements, made the comment 
that: 
In general the Act is able to address the changing work environment because the 
general duties of care and consultative processes under the Act are not dependent upon 
any particular workplace structure or set of technologies. (Laing 2002, p. 54) 
but: 
The increase in non-traditional forms of employment, particularly those associated with 
the trend towards the use of contracting, sub-contracting and out-sourcing within 
workplaces may well impact on the future effectiveness of the Act. (Laing 2002, p. 55)  
OHS and industrial relations 
Two issues have arisen concerning the links between OHS and industrial relations. The 
first relates to the inclusion of OHS provisions in awards or similar agreements between 
workers and employers, with the consequent involvement of industrial relations tribunals 
in dispute settlements on OHS issues. The second relates to the abuse of OHS provisions 
relating to work stoppages. 
The inclusion of OHS conditions in awards has been raised in earlier inquiries. For 
example, the Review of OHS arrangements in Western Australia noted that: 
... the existing legislative proscription in the Industrial Relations Act 1979 preventing 
the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission (WAIRC) from hearing 
matters arising out of safety and health has been repealed. This will enable the WAIRC 
as necessary to again deal with industrial disputes arising from safety and health 
matters. (Laing 2002, p. 105)     
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The review also noted that this development made redundant the earlier recommendation 
to permit disputes over OHS matters to go before the Western Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, and that a number of employers and employer associations 
objected strongly to that earlier recommendation (Laing 2002, p. 108). 
Under the current duty of care system, firms and industries are free to meet their duty in 
the fashion that is most appropriate to their circumstances, so long as the duty is met and 
any mandatory requirements under the relevant OHS act are adhered to. Even where more 
prescriptive regulations are in force, they are, in effect, a set of minimum standards and 
firms are able to operate with a higher set of standards consistent with those legislated. 
Employers and employees are free to reach agreements on the processes by which 
performance-based regulations are met. Including OHS provisions in arrangements with 
workers, is simply one way in which a firm or industry formalises its OHS arrangements 
and, so long as it is not used to undermine obligations under OHS legislation, this 
behaviour is quite consistent with the broad structure of the OHS system in Australia.  
The matter of the abuse of OHS issues in industrial relations disputes is more complex. In 
relation to the construction industry, the Cole Royal Commission noted that a substantial 
number of submissions to it said that: 
... health and safety is frequently used as an industrial relations tool. Much evidence has 
been given that unions have either manufactured or exaggerated safety issues, or linked 
the resolution of a genuine safety issue to industrial relations questions. (RCBC 2002, 
p. 37) 
One factor that encourages the misuse of OHS is that workers continue to be paid for 
stoppages over OHS matters, while stoppages in relation to an industrial dispute are 
unpaid. Cole recommended changes to dispute settlement and payment arrangements to try 
to address this problem. 
Similarly, the Review of OHS arrangements in Western Australia said that  
It was submitted that in the construction industry in particular, occupational safety and 
health is regularly used as leverage for industrial campaigns. Examples were given of 
workplace stoppages for allegedly unsafe work. However, when other issues were 
resolved, it is argued that the safety issues often evaporated and work recommenced. 
(Laing 2002, p. 108) 
Laing recommended: 
... that the Commission investigate and develop recommendations to Government to 
remove the use of occupational safety and health as a bargaining instrument in relation 
to other industrial claims. (2002, p. 109) 
These are clearly important issues. While the inappropriate use of OHS matters in 
industrial disputes is undesirable, such situations are difficult to identify or legislate     
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effectively against without threatening the legitimate right of workers to negotiate over 
OHS matters or to react to workplace safety risks. 
3.3 National  coordination 
Recognition of the common issues in OHS faced by all jurisdictions, and the benefits of 
greater consistency between the jurisdictions, led to the establishment of NOHSC in 1985 
(National Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985). It is an Australian Government 
statutory authority with an 18 member board comprising representatives of Australian, 
State and Territory governments, employers and trade unions (box 3.3). The chairperson 
and the chief executive officer are appointed by the Australian Government Minister for 
Employment and Workplace Relations. Funding is provided by the Australian 
Government. NOHSC reports to the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (WRMC). 
 
Box 3.3  Membership of National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission 
The Commission has 18 members: 
•  an independent chairperson, the chief executive officer, and one representative 
nominated by the Australian Government Minister for Employment and Workplace 
Relations; 
•  one representative nominated by the Australian Government Minister for Health and 
Ageing; 
•  one representative nominated by each State and Territory government; 
•  three representatives nominated by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry; and  
•  three representatives nominated by the Australian Council of Trade Unions. 
Members are appointed for up to three years and the chief executive officer for up to 
five years. 
The Commission was supported by a staff of 89 and a budget of $16.2 million in 
2002-03. 
Sources: http://www.NOHSC.gov.au/AboutNOHSC/OrganisationalStructure and NOHSC (2003c). 
 
 
Essentially, NOHSC develops national standards and codes of practice which are 
forwarded to the individual jurisdictions for implementation. Typically, this then involves 
consideration by further tripartite bodies in each of the States and Territories where they 
may be accepted in total (rarely), accepted with modifications (ranging from significant to 
trivial) relating to individual State and Territory circumstances, or rejected. 
The objects of NOHSC, as set out in section 7 of the Act, are:     
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•  the development among the members of the community of an awareness of issues 
relevant to OHS matters and the facilitation of public debate and discussion on such 
issues; 
•  the provision, in the public interest, of a forum by which representatives of the 
governments, employers and employees may consult together in, and participate in, the 
development and formulation of policies and strategies relating to OHS matters; and 
•  the provision of a national focus for activities relating to OHS. 
The NOHSC Act sets out 28 functions for the Commission. They include formulating 
workplace health and safety strategies, recommending actions to facilitate cooperation 
between jurisdictions, acting as a means of liaison with other countries on occupational 
health and safety matters, publishing reports, assisting training, assisting research and 
encouraging the use of research results. In this role, NOHSC has given priority to 
developing nationally consistent regulation of occupational health and safety through 
developing and declaring model advisory standards and codes of practice. NOHSC also 
acts as a forum for consultation with employers, the trade unions, and the States and 
Territories. 
NOHSC has issued 13 national standards and 18 codes of practice. They are intended to 
provide a foundation for national consistency and best practice in Australian OHS 
arrangements. National standards need to be adopted by State and Territory governments 
before they have any legal force. Of the seven priority areas (involving 11 standards and 15 
codes) agreed over a decade ago (table 3.2) only one (on certification) has been fully 
adopted, although some of the major elements of most of the others have now been 
adopted in most jurisdictions. 
Participants commented on the inconsistent uptake of draft national standards and codes, 
and on the resulting variation in provisions between jurisdictions. Levels of inconsistency 
vary, however. The RiskNet Group commented that regulatory consistency has been 
achieved in manual handling, noise, hazardous substances, asbestos etc, but that there is a 
high degree of jurisdictional inconsistency in relation to penalties and in relation to the use 
of plant (sub. 120, p. 8).     
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Table 3.2  Status of adoption of priority National Standards, June 2002 
Extent of adoption by jurisdictionab   
National Standard  NSW Vic Qld  WA SA  Tas  ACT NT  Cwlth
Manual  handling  Y M Y M M Y M M Y
Occupational  noise  Y M M Y P M N M Y
Plant  M M N M Y Y P M  M
Certification  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y
Major  Hazard  Facilities  N Y Y N N N N N  N
Hazardous substancesc  M M M M M M N M Y
Dangerous  goods  N Y Y N N N N N  N
a Adoption is assessed against key elements of the national standard (which are defined as aspects of the 
standard for which national consistency is considered important). b Y: the key elements have been fully 
adopted. M: most of the key elements have been adopted. P: only a proportion of the key elements have been 
adopted. N: the key elements have not been adopted.  c There are 5 national standards in relation to 
hazardous substances. 
Source: NOHSC (2002b, p. 39). 
The Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association (PACIA) provided several case studies 
in inconsistent adoption of national standards. That relating to the Dangerous Goods 
Storage and Handling National Standard is set out in box 3.4. In the case of the 1996 
NOHSC Major Hazard Facilities (MHF) National Standard, (which took five years to 
develop by a tripartite NOHSC committee and a formal public comment processes), 
PACIA stated that: 
... in June 2003, seven years after the National Standard was declared, there are still 
only two jurisdictions (Victoria and Queensland) which have adopted the 1996 NOHSC 
standard into regulations. Clearly those very long delays in adoption by the 
jurisdictions (after lengthy expert, consultative development processes through 
NOHSC) will not achieve the safety outcomes sought by industry, unions and the 
community. (sub. 114, p. 8) 
PACIA also said that differences exist between the MHF Regulations in Victoria and 
Queensland (and the legislation currently being drafted in New South Wales and Western 
Australia) — differences as fundamental as the definition of what is a MHF and also the 
scope of the regulations. 
National OHS Strategy 2002–2012 
In April 2002, NOHSC agreed to the National Occupational Health and Safety Strategy 
2002–2012 (NOHSC 2002c) which establishes minimum national targets for reducing the 
incidence of work-related fatalities and injuries over its ten year period of operation. The 
strategy was endorsed by the WRMC in May 2002.     
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Box 3.4  Adoption of the 2001 NOHSC Dangerous Goods Storage and 
Handling National Standard by jurisdictions 
The Plastics and Chemical Industries Association made the following comments on the 
adoption of the national standard for dangerous goods storage and handling. 
The NOHSC process of developing the National Standard for the Storage and Handling of 
Workplace Dangerous Goods took place over a ten year period. This new performance-
based standard was a major shift in the approach to regulation of dangerous goods, and 
was endorsed by the NOHSC stakeholders and declared in March 2001. However, despite 
this very lengthy tripartite development process, we have seen delays in implementation of 
the standard by the jurisdictions, and also inconsistencies in application of the standard. 
Delays in adoption by the jurisdictions 
Despite commitments given by WRMC to consistent adoption of the DG [dangerous goods] 
National Standard, in June 2003, only two jurisdictions (Victoria and Queensland) have 
adopted the standard. Currently, in both NSW and WA there are consultative working groups 
set up by the relevant agency to develop state DG regulations. These parallel and sequential 
national and state processes are costly, lead to delays in implementing legislation and also 
lead to inconsistencies at the jurisdictional level. 
Inconsistency in adoption 
While both Victoria and Queensland have developed new DG regulations which are 
performance based and broadly consistent with the National Standard, the actual 
implementation and administration is quite different. Victoria is implementing the 
performance based regulations through WorkSafe. On the other hand, Queensland is 
implementing the DG regulations through 125 local councils in a more prescriptive manner, 
often not consistent with the national standard. 
NOHSC, through its Dangerous Goods Implementation Reference Group, has developed a 
number of initiatives to support and facilitate consistent implementation in the jurisdictions (a 
series of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and a Dangerous Goods Ready Reckoner). 
Sadly, both these initiatives have been undermined to an extent by the inconsistency either 
currently in place, or anticipated by the jurisdictions. NOHSC has had to focus its FAQs to a 
generic set of questions relating to the National Standard, leaving specific FAQs to the 
states and territories to develop. Further, the Dangerous Goods Ready Reckoner prototype, 
rather than being developed for use across Australia, is having to be developed as a core by 
NOHSC, for the jurisdictions to vary at the state level, to reflect the specific state regulatory 
requirements. 
This complexity of requirements across Australia adds unnecessary costs to business and 
makes compliance with the different requirements more challenging. 
Source: Plastics and Chemical Industries Association (sub. 114, pp. 8–9). 
 
 
The national targets are: 
•  to sustain a significant continual reduction in the incidence of work-related fatalities, 
with a reduction of at least 20 per cent by 30 June 2012, and with a reduction of 10 per 
cent being achieved by 30 June 2007; and 
•  to reduce the incidence of workplace injury by at least 40 per cent by 30 June 2012 
(with a reduction of 20 per cent by 30 June 2007 (NOHSC 2002b, p. 11).     
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Implementation of action to achieve these targets rests with the individual jurisdictions. 
The NOHSC is to report annually on progress. 
The Strategy involves five priorities (box 3.5). In addition to these five priority areas, a 10 
year framework established in 1999 identified nine areas where national action is required 
to underpin improvement (box 3.6).  
 
Box 3.5  The five priorities under the National Occupational Health and 
Safety Strategy 2002–2012 
Reduce high incidence/severity risks involving:  
•  the better use of data and research to improve jurisdictions’ targeting of high risk 
situations; 
•  identification of national priority hazards, injuries, industries or occupations; and 
•  more effective use of targeted enforcement and incentives; 
Develop the capacity of business operators and workers to manage OHS effectively, 
involving; 
•  building the motivation and ability of employers to manage OHS risks and of 
workers to work more safely and participate in OHS consultations; 
Prevent occupational disease more effectively, involving; 
•  the development of the capacity of authorities, employers, workers and other 
interested parties to identify risks to occupational health and to take practical action 
to eliminate or otherwise control them; 
Eliminate hazards at the design stage involving; 
•  building awareness and observance of this approach and giving people the practical 
skills to recognise design issues and ensure safe outcomes [NOHSC Safe Design 
Action Plan]; and 
Strengthen the capacity of government to influence OHS outcomes, involving; 
•  sharpening the effectiveness of governments in securing better OHS outcomes (for 
example, through procurement procedures) and providing examples of good 
practice. 
Source: NOHSC (2002c, p. 5). 
 
 
The third national action area (box 3.6) is ‘a nationally consistent regulatory framework’. It 
involves: 
•  monitoring adoption of national standards; 
•  reviewing national standards and codes; 
•  developing new national standards where need is demonstrated; and     
    61
 
•  repealing superseded regulations. 
The Commission considers that this third national action area should focus on developing a 
nationally uniform regulatory framework. 
 
Box 3.6  Areas for national action 
The nine areas for national action are: 
•  comprehensive OHS data collection (consistent definitions, timely reporting); 
•  a coordinated research effort (priorities, partnerships and communication); 
•  a nationally consistent regulatory framework; 
•  strategic enforcement; 
•  effective incentives; 
•  compliance support; 
•  practical guidance; 
•  OHS awareness; and 
•  OHS skills development. 
Source: NOHSC (2002c, pp. 10–12). 
 
 
Recent reviews of State and Territory OHS arrangements have identified a number of 
features that may contribute to poor OHS performance. In particular, they have focussed 
on information-related problems. For example, the recent Western Australian review noted 
that: 
... the failure to consult in respect of occupational health and safety issues under Part III 
of the Act and the failure to appoint and to develop safety and health representatives 
and committees has resulted in a less effective system than should be the case. They are 
important in improving safety and health in the workplace and in part help to explain 
why many organisations have failed to identify hazards, reduce risk, and develop 
workplace safety and health policy and safe work systems. The small and medium size 
business sectors in particular have been slow to take up these issues. (Laing 2002, 
p. 27) 
The Cole Royal Commission drew on the final report of the Queensland Building and 
Construction Industry (Workplace Health and Safety Taskforce), reporting: 
One of the key reasons for non-compliance identified by the Taskforce was the lack of 
understanding among obligation holders in relation to their health and safety 
obligations. There are a number of reasons that contribute to this general lack of 
understanding. Foremost is the complexity of the health and safety obligations and 
information already discussed. The second reason concerns the lack of formal 
mandatory training for every obligation holder. (RCBC 2002, p. 33)     
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The Cole Royal Commission also noted that the Safety Building New South Wales, 2001 
identified similar issues: 
Training among subcontractors’ supervisors tasked with OHS&R responsibility was 
identified as poor. Research indicated improvement in this key area was essential to 
safer work practices. (RCBC 2002, p. 34) 
The 2002 report into the South Australian OHS arrangements identified that getting small 
business involved in OHS was a particular challenge: 
Submissions and consultation suggest that SMEs [small to medium enterprises] are less 
likely to have access to OHSW [occupational health, safety and welfare] information, 
less likely to engage OHSW expertise, and less likely to have an on-site Health and 
Safety Representative. (Stanley et al. 2002, vol. 3, p. 35) 
The South Australian report proposed that SafeWork South Australia Authority focus on 
providing information on OHS matters to small business. 
It is not only the employers who are unaware of their full duty of care. There is also strong 
evidence that employees are not in a position to fully assess the risks that may be 
associated with accepting a particular job. The RiskNet Group said that: 
... approximately 30 per cent of employers are unaware of their legal responsibility to 
provide a safe place of work. Training in safe work practices is only given to 54 per 
cent of new employees and supervisors in 40 per cent of workplaces did not receive any 
health and safety training. (sub. 120, p. 9) 
3.4  Some definitional issues 
The terms of reference ask the Commission to identify and report on definitions of 
employer, employee, workplace and work-related injury and illness relevant to both 
workers’ compensation and OHS that could be adopted consistently across Australia. As a 
generalisation, definitions of employee, workplace and the work-relatedness of injuries, 
illnesses and fatalities are not as critical in the OHS area as they are in workers’ 
compensation. In view of their importance to workers’ compensation, definitions for that 
purpose are discussed separately in chapter 6. 
The various OHS Acts are couched in terms of employers, and others in control of aspects 
of the work environment, and their duties to employees and other people who may be 
affected on or near a worksite. Cole noted in the recent construction industry review that, 
in relation to the Victorian Act, there is an obligation on employers and the self employed 
to: 
... ensure so far as is practicable that persons (other than the employees of the employer 
or self-employed person) are not exposed to risks to their health or safety arising from     
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the conduct of the undertaking of the employer or self-employed person. (RCBC 2002, 
p. 15) 
Cole commented that: 
Categories of people protected by section 22 in the context of a building or construction 
site include: 
•  sub-contractors and their employees; 
•  suppliers; and 
•  visitors and passers-by. (RCBC 2002, p. 16) 
While the problem of definition of worker has not been seen as a fundamental problem 
with OHS legislation, largely because of the broadness of the duty to others who are not 
employees, recent reviews have, nonetheless, suggested that definitional changes could be 
considered. For example, in an issues paper for the review of the Queensland Workplace 
Health and Safety Act, the Queensland Department of Industrial Relations (2001) noted: 
One possible solution to avoid the complexity of ‘deeming’ and any associated issues is 
to abolish the concept of imposing an obligation on an ‘employer’ and substitute 
instead the notion of placing an obligation on all ‘persons’ to ensure the health and 
safety of the person’s workers [more broadly defined] in the conduction of the person’s 
undertaking. (p. 7) 
Similarly, Laing (WA) noted: 
A reasonable question arising from all the foregoing is perhaps why each category of 
person (employee, contractor, employee of contractor, etc) needs to be referred to at all 
when it is intended that all those in the workplace be protected. By specifying each 
category of person it leaves open the possibility for the creation of other (work) 
arrangements, which could be entered into in order to avoid the obligation. It seems the 
most effective course is to protect everyone and provide them with duties to protect 
themselves and others at the workplace. In that regard the employer might be specified 
as the co-ordinating agency or principal. (2002, p. 89) 
The various State reviews, however, did not go so far as to recommend changes of this 
magnitude. 
The duty of care specified in OHS legislation is broadly defined, and rightly so, to go well 
beyond simply a duty to employees. It would be highly undesirable if the definitions 
developed for the compensation of injured workers had the effect of diminishing or 
restricting the duty that those in charge of workplaces have to all who could reasonably be 
expected to be affected.  
Clayton et al. provided a comprehensive review of the various provisions in OHS 
legislation in Australia which refer to employees and workplaces (2002,   
pp. 33–45). While these definitions do not appear to undermine the essentially broad nature     
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of the duties under OHS legislation there were, nonetheless significant differences in detail 
between jurisdictions. This resulted, in particular, in different ‘boundaries’ to the general 
duties (particularly to those other than employees) and differences in the information 
collected on work-related injury and disease. 
For example Clayton et al. said;  
In summary, the Victorian and Queensland duties to persons other than employees are 
far-reaching, whereas the NSW, Commonwealth and ACT provisions are limited to 
persons at the workplace in NSW, and at or near the workplace in the ACT. (2002 
p. 44) 
The provisions in South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania also appear to be 
narrow. In the case of South Australia, the duty refers to ‘at work’, in Western Australia, 
when work is actually being performed; and in Tasmania, in relation to ‘work being carried 
on at a workplace’. The NRCOHSR also commented on aspects of the differences between 
jurisdictions (box 3.7). 
 
Box 3.7  National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety 
Regulation: Comment on differences between jurisdictions 
The NRCOHSR said: 
The recent Stanley Review of OHS and Workers Compensation in South Australia, in 
examining the “general duties to non-employees” canvassed both the Victorian (section 22 
of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985) and the New South Wales provisions 
(sections 8(2) and 9 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW)). These 
provisions are essentially the same except that the New South Wales provisions are far 
narrower because they limit the scope of what is otherwise a significant and extensive duty 
to persons who are “at the employer’s place of work.” The South Australian Review 
suggested a combination of these duties which, as the description of the duties suggests, is 
not really possible, and might show a misconception of the scope of the duties. In any event 
the provision in the recently released South Australian Occupational Health, Safety and 
Welfare (SafeWork SA) Amendment Bill 2003 reproduces neither of the Victorian or New 
South Wales provisions, but appears, in paragraph 22(2)(a), to be a paraphrase of sections 
8(2) and 9 of the OHSA (NSW) and, in paragraph (b), to paraphrase section 22 of the OHSA 
(Vic), although in a way that seems to reduce the scope of the latter duty. As a result the 
South Australian Bill produces a provision which resembles provisions in two other State 
OHS statutes, but which is uniquely worded, quite distinct and difficult to interpret. 
Source: NRCOHSR (sub. 22, pp. 3–4). 
 
 
The recent review of the South Australian legislation recommended strengthening the 
employer’s duties to others at the workplace, saying that ‘Section 22 of the Act be 
amended to reflect a combination of s8 of the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 
2000 and s21 of the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 in order to better 
protect others at the workplace’ (Stanley et al. 2002, vol. 3, p. 48).     
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The recent Western Australian review noted that the narrow application of the WA 
provision was not originally the intention of the legislation and recommended that the duty 
to non-employees ‘…extends to all aspects of work including systems of work, and hazard 
arising after direct work activity has ceased’ (Laing 2002, pp. 77,79). 
An important factor in the ‘boundary’ issue is that OHS legislation simply codifies, in one 
particular area, the general duty of care that all persons have to all other persons under 
common law in the relevant circumstances. If a situation falls outside the boundaries of the 
OHS statute, it does not mean that no duty of care applies. Instead, it means that action 
would need to be taken under common law, at the expense of the plaintiff, rather than by 
an OHS inspectorate at the expense of the taxpayer or other funding agency. 
The Issues Paper for the review of the Queensland legislation questioned the role of 
obligations to ‘others’ in OHS legislation, saying: 
The primary focus of the legislation is to set out the obligations of employers toward 
workers at a workplace. While there is widespread agreement that third parties must be 
protected from workplace activities, there is less agreement when workplace activities 
cannot be easily separated from the provision of services to members of the public. ... 
The threat is that by extending the scope, the overall effectiveness and impact of the 
legislation is reduced. The resources required to enforce legislation are already 
stretched without broadening the scope to include peripheral matters beyond the core 
purpose of the legislation. The major employer groups and peak councils of employees 
strongly support the main focus on workers at the workplace and are generally reluctant 
to commit resources for the exclusive application to protecting the health and safety of 
members of the public. (Department of Industrial Relations (Qld) 2001, p.10) 
The issue was also raised in the issues paper prepared for the recent South Australian 
review, which asked whether the Act is adequate in achieving this goal [public safety], and 
how far it is appropriate for it to do so (Government of South Australia 2002, p. 42). The 
WA review noted that ‘ ... there is real potential for confusion between public and 
occupational safety’ (Laing 2002, p. 52). 
The National Research Centre for OH&S Regulation was of the view that the broader 
provisions in Victoria and Queensland ‘… should be the national model in this regard’ 
(sub.  22, p.  2). This view is widely held. Both the review of the South Australian 
legislation (Stanley et al. 2002) and the review of the Western Australian legislation (Laing 
2002) recommended that the provisions in their states be modelled on those in New South 
Wales and Queensland. 
In the area of reporting of incidents, Clayton et al., noted that: 
Much of the work of the inspectorates is reactive, principally in relation to reports, 
incidents and complaints about unsafe conditions from workers and others. Aggregated 
statistics from incident reports also provide OHS agencies with data to guide their     
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inspection and enforcement programs. Hence these statutory reporting requirements are 
an important component of the ‘discovery systems’ of the inspectorates. (2002, p. 34) 
Clayton et al. also noted that the definition of employee also impinges on reporting 
requirements, identifying South Australia as limiting immediate notification of work-
related injuries and fatalities to those suffered by ‘employees’. Similarly, Western 
Australia only requires injuries or diseases suffered by ‘employees’ to be reported. Other 
jurisdictions refer more broadly to ‘persons’ or do not qualify the reporting requirements.  
The Commission considers that it would be highly desirable that all jurisdictions mandate 
the same set of reporting requirements and that all work-related injuries, fatalities, disease 
and ‘dangerous occurrences’ should be reported to the relevant authorities and that this 
information should not be restricted to ‘employees’.  
In this inquiry, an issue raised by a number of participants related to clarifying who has 
duties to whom, and in what particular circumstances is that duty owed. For example, there 
is debate over the duty that labour hire companies have to the people they place into a 
workplace over which they have no effective control. For example, BDS Recruit, a labour 
hire company operating in all states, said that: 
All OH&S legislation places obligation for workplace safety on employers. One problem 
this imposed on labour hire companies is that while we are employers, as defined, we 
lack any great control over the workplace and what happens in it. …. 
In recent years labour hire companies have been correspondents in a number of WHS 
prosecutions and have received fines up 40% of the total for failure to meet OH&S 
obligations at host companies' workplaces. While not wishing simply to avoid fines and 
obligations it is hard to justify fining a company that does not have full control over the 
workplace. (IRsub. 213, pp. 3–4) 
BDS Recruit suggested that: 
Provisions to be included in these definitions for labour hire companies to meet their 
obligations for safety at a host workplace by the use of an audit tool such as safety 
map in conjunction with workplace inspection prior to placement and employee 
feedback following placement. (IRsub. 213, p. 4) 
The Stanley review of the South Australian OHS legislation noted that: 
The growth of labour hire and ‘contracting out’ may in part be due to the perception 
amongst businesses that their responsibility for occupational health, safety and welfare 
is also ‘contracted out’. (Stanley et al. 2002, vol. 3, p. 45) 
The review recommended that the OHSW Act references to ‘employee’ be amended to 
provide a broader definition consistent with the definitions proposed in the reviews of the 
Workers’ Compensation System and the Industrial Relations System (Stanley et al. vol. 3, 
p. 48). In relation to labour hire companies the proposed standard definition states:     
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An employment agency which contracts to supply the labour of a person (the worker) 
to another party (the client) is to be deemed to be that person’s employer, except where 
this results in a direct contract between the worker and the client. (Stanley et al. vol. 2, 
p. 14) 
The issue is not whether a labour hire company has a duty of care for those it places into 
employment, even into an area where the labour hire company has little or any control. 
Rather, it is a question of what are the reasonable and practicable steps that the labour hire 
company can take to meet its duty. In a situation where control is limited, it would seem 
reasonable to expect labour hire companies to undertake reviews of the type mentioned by 
BDS Recruit, which noted that: 
To meet our OH&S obligations in all states meant BDS Recruit, and all other compliant 
labour hire companies, conducted full safety audits of host companies to: 
•  Ensure their compliance with state OH&S legislation. 
•  Conduct hazard identification on the work site. 
•  Inform our employees (Casual Workers) of these hazards. 
•  Not supply or withdraw our employees from sites that did not comply or changed their 
procedures until we could reassess them. 
This has led in some cases to our company losing business and clients because we do the 
right thing. (IRsub. 213, p. 3) 
The Commission considers that definitions of employer, employee, and workplace are not 
presenting significant problems in the OHS area. Certainly differences between 
jurisdictions create some difficulties for multi-state firms and problems for data collection. 
However, these matters can be resolved in the review of legislation proposed earlier in this 
chapter as part of the recommended program for achieving national uniformity. 
 
     




     
    69
 
4  National occupational health and 
safety frameworks 
This chapter develops a national framework for occupational health and safety (OHS). It 
identifies and assesses suitable models and presents the Commission’s recommendations.  
4.1  Issues for developing a national framework 
There was a general view among participants that there could, and should, be a much 
greater degree of consistency in OHS regulation between jurisdictions within Australia, 
and that many of the existing differences are unnecessary. The Victorian Employers’ 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry was one of many to say: 
The existence of multiple jurisdictions in Australia for both Worker's Compensation 
arrangements and Occupational Health and Safety law is becoming increasingly absurd 
in a globally focused business economy. (sub. 66, p. 6) 
The Housing Industry Association (sub.  35, p.  7), Woolworths (sub.  98, p.  3) and the 
Business Council of Australia (sub. 143, p. 7) saw no need for any divergence between 
acceptable OHS standards, arguing that the same general classes of risks apply to most 
workplaces and working environments across Australia, and that an unsafe practice in one 
State would also be unsafe in another. The Business Council considered that there is no 
evidence that industrial conditions or risks vary so much across Australia that occupational 
health and safety standards need to be tailored to suit local conditions. 
At the same time, participants considered that the current mechanism for achieving greater 
consistency within Australia has not been a success. The Housing Industry Association 
(sub.  35), Westpac Banking Corporation (sub.  75, p.  9), The Master Builders Australia 
(sub. 79, p. 6), the Business Council of Australia (sub. 143), and the Association of Road 
Freight Operators (IRsub. 236) expressed the view that the current cooperative OHS model 
has failed to achieve uniformity of work practice throughout the country. The Business 
Council commented: 
Over the last 20 years there have been a number of attempts to develop and implement 
national standards on the basis of cooperation between the Commonwealth, States and 
Territories. None of these have been fully successful. This is itself a compelling reason 
for the adoption of a national regulatory scheme. (sub. 143, p. 1)     
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Similarly the Master Builders Australia said: 
From the outset, we reject the idea that the current form of “co-operative” federalism 
will advance OH&S. A better model based on a new level of co-operation will advance 
OH&S. The necessary consistency and reduced complexity that would follow if the 
Commonwealth and the States determined to regulate via one set of consistent rules, far 
exceeds any progress that would occur under any current model. ... This does not mean 
that improvement cannot occur within the current framework – merely that 
improvements will be less than optimal. (sub. 79, p. 6)  
The view that the current arrangements have failed to deliver significantly greater 
uniformity of workplace safety regulation is not unique to this inquiry. The Cole Royal 
Commission reported the Australian Government as submitting to its inquiry that:  
Despite agreement in 1991 by the Heads of Australian Governments to implement 
nationally uniform safety standards (National Standards), in practice the adoption of 
standards by the jurisdictions remains inconsistent in manner, content and progress. 
(RCBC 2003a, vol. 6, p. 28) 
The Royal Commission commented: 
Since at least 1984, attempts have been made to achieve national uniformity, and then 
national consistency, in the laws or regulations governing occupational health and 
safety generally. ... It must be accepted that those attempts have so far been a failure. 
(RCBC 2003a, vol. 6, pp. 19–20) 
Changes to National Occupational Health and Safety Commission’s (NOHSC’s) role, from 
early pursuit of national uniformity to one of seeking ‘consistency’ between jurisdictions, 
and to its level of funding, were the source of criticism by participants. These changes 
were seen as contributing to the failure to achieve national uniformity, and the slow 
progress towards achieving greater consistency in OHS regulation. The National Research 
Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation made the following observations on 
progress towards national uniformity, saying: 
A notable development in standard setting in Australia during the 1990s was the 
movement towards national uniformity in standards in regulations and codes of 
practice. The process was overseen by NOHSC, which in 1991 established a tripartite 
National Uniformity Taskforce, which identified several key first order priorities for 
achieving national uniformity ... The national uniformity process was not complete 
when the Howard government came to power in 1996, and that government has 
significantly down-sized NOHSC, with the result that the move towards national 
uniformity has slowed dramatically since mid-1996. Lack of uniformity in Australian 
standards remains a significant problem. (NRCOHSR 2003, p. 4) 
The ACTU was also critical of the changes made in the late 1990s saying that: 
Following the decisions of the Federal Government and the WRMC [1997], NOHSC 
moved from a national focus to a jurisdictional, optional approach to adoption or 
variation of these standards and codes of practice. The ACTU and ACCI opposed that     
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decision. The ACTU supported completion and declaration of all those standards and 
codes of practice. The tragedy of these decisions is manifest in the construction 
industry. 
The ACTU has continued to advocate national standards and codes of practice, which 
should be adopted by governments in a consistent way, within a defined time frame. 
(sub. 133, pp. 8–9) 
There have been many independent reviews of various jurisdictions’ OHS regimes over the 
years. However, these have not lead to a common national framework of regulation or 
enforcement, nor have they addressed the compliance concerns and associated costs of 
multi-state employers. DEWR commented that the States have continued to frame the 
design of their regulatory regimes in isolation, with an emphasis on perceived local issues 
or on fostering State-focussed policy objectives of the government of the day (sub. 166, 
p. iv). 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the inconsistencies between jurisdictions impose a number of 
costs on business, particularly multi-state businesses. These costs arise from: 
•  the need to ensure that all appropriate personnel have a working understanding of the 
regulatory regimes of all relevant jurisdictions and of their regular changes; 
•  the accommodation of different inspection regimes and hierarchies of penalties; 
•  providing those staff who move to a different jurisdiction with training specific to that 
new location; and 
•  difficulties in moving equipment between jurisdictions where regulations and codes 
vary. 
It is arguable that the costs imposed by differences between the jurisdictions in the area of 
OHS is less than for workers’ compensation. The Victorian Government considered that 
the differences between jurisdictions in their OHS regimes has been overstated, saying that 
a high level of consistency already prevails and that: 
The performance-based nature of OHS standards and an outcome-oriented regulatory 
system has meant that superficial differences in the wording and structure of legislation 
and regulation have been mistakenly perceived as major differences between the States 
and Territories. (IRsub. 256 p. 31) 
To the extent that this is accurate, particularly in relation to the fundamental structures and 
objective underlying OHS regulation in Australia, the differences between jurisdictions are 
considerably less fundamental than those in the workers’ compensation area. 
Consequently, the hurdles faced in moving to gain the benefits of national uniformity are 
easier to overcome and thus the desired outcome should be more readily achievable. In 
addition, there is a more widely held belief that a single national regime is desirable. The 
Law Council of Australia stated that:     
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…there is greater likelihood for achieving commonality in relation to occupational 
health and safety than in relation to workers’ compensation; and that commonality in 
OHS does not depend on commonality in workers’ compensation. (IRsub. 250, p. 3) 
4.2  National framework models  
The Commission has assessed a number of possible models for establishing national 
frameworks for OHS, recognising that the almost universal support for common OHS 
regulation across Australia was expressed in several ways. The spectrum included: calls for 
a single national regime administered by the Australian Government; a uniform set of rules 
applying, by way of template legislation, equally in all jurisdictions; and a greater effort 
under the current institutional arrangements to improve the consistency of regulations 
enacted and administered by each jurisdiction. 
Even those participants who opposed a nationally uniform scheme, and argued for the right 
of each jurisdiction to determine standards on a case-by-case basis, supported a national 
body, such as NOHSC, to provide advice based on best-practice models and to encourage 
greater consistency in the approach to OHS regulation.  
The Commission has assessed five models, or approaches, to developing a national 
framework for OHS regulation in Australia. These are: 
•  a single national OHS regime to replace those operated by the States and Territories; 
•  an alternative national regime operating in parallel with State and Territory regimes; 
•  template legislation and regulation; 
•  mutual recognition; and 
•  progressive development of national uniformity through strengthening aspects of the 
existing cooperative approach. 
While national uniformity is desirable it should not be achieved at the expense of 
workplace safety levels. Indeed, a national framework should set the foundation for 
improved outcomes through more coordinated and speedier mechanisms for best-practice 
standards and methods to be adopted nationwide. 
A single national OHS regime to replace State and Territory regimes 
There was considerable support among the larger, multi-state firms and some business 
organisations for a single national regime. For example, the Business Council of Australia 
indicated that it:     
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… strongly supports the adoption of national legislation regulating occupational health 
and safety and workers’ compensation (with universal application). As an alternative, 
the BCA supports enactment of uniform legislation in each State and Territory. 
(sub. 143, p. 1) 
A number of individual firms, (Woolworths (sub. 98, p. 3), the Master Builders Australia 
Inc (sub. 79, p. 6), Optus (sub. 57, p. 4), and Centennial Coal Company (sub. 145, p. 9)), 
called for the establishment of a single national OHS regime administered by the 
Australian Government. The Self Insurers’ Association of Victoria conducted a survey of 
its members, and reported that a majority supported OHS administration at a national level 
(sub. 163, p. 15). 
The Commission notes that the recent Royal Commission into the Building and 
Construction industry concluded that a single national regime would be the best outcome 
saying that: 
From the perspective of the building and construction industry, there could be no more 
salutary reform to occupational health and safety law and regulation than a single 
national scheme comprehensively regulating occupational health and safety throughout 
Australia. (RCBC 2003a, p. 15) 
However, the Commission notes that a single national regime was not supported by all 
participants. State and Territory governments and a range of unions were of the view that 
OHS legislation and regulation should be managed at the State and Territory level, 
responding to the individual needs of their own jurisdiction. This position was restated 
following the Interim Report, although they recognised the benefits from greater 
consistency and the national development of best-practice models.  
If the Australian Government was to consider that a single national OHS regime is worth 
establishing, an important consideration is the extent to which it would have the 
constitutional power to act in relation to the matter. This is by no means certain. For 
example, the Cole Royal Commission considered it would take an imaginative use of the 
trade and commerce, corporations, external affairs and incidental powers of the 
constitution for the Australian Government to create a single national OHS regime. It did, 
however, note that there were ways in which the existing constitutional limitations could 
be overcome, saying: 
Any limitations that may exist would, in all likelihood, be remedied by the ratification 
by the Commonwealth government of International Labour Organisation Convention 
No. 155 (Occupational Safety and Health Convention) and the subsequent enactment of 
legislation relying on the external power section 51(29) of the constitution. 
… Another means by which federal parliament could be clothed with sufficient 
constitutional power to enact comprehensive national laws would be a transfer by the 
States of their powers pursuant to section 51(37) of the Constitution. In 1996, the 
Victorian parliament transferred the bulk of Victoria’s powers in respect of industrial     
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relations to the Commonwealth although no other State has done so since. (RCBC 
2002, p. 25) 
The Cole Royal Commission assessed the prospects of referral as remote, saying: 
There is no prospect that all of the States would voluntarily co-operate in creating a 
single national scheme. ... The Queensland Government, for example, categorically told 
me that it ‘is not prepared to cede the legislative responsibility for health and safety and 
workers’ compensation to the Commonwealth’. This attitude puts paid to any hope of a 
voluntary national scheme. Other States were not so frank as Queensland, but I do not 
doubt that some of them have similar attitudes. (RCBC 2003a, p. 21) 
In this inquiry, the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations was of the view 
that the Constitution of the Commonwealth provides the Australian Government with the 
heads of power necessary to enact a single workers’ compensation scheme and OHS 
scheme (sub. 166, p. 18). 
To assist its understanding of this issue, the Commission requested the advice of the 
Australian Government Solicitor (appendix  C). The Australian Government Solicitor 
advised that the corporations head of power would be sufficient to enable the Australian 
Government to cover most businesses, saying: 
The corporations power in paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution would, in our view, 
provide scope for ... Commonwealth occupational health and safety laws to extend to 
trading or financial corporations. (appendix C) 
However, the Australian Government Solicitor noted that: 
... it is likely that, even with a combination of powers, legislation implementing the 
options could not be comprehensive in scope (that is, in terms of the categories of 
employers and employees to whom the options would apply). For example, the 
legislation could not extend to all individual (that is, non-corporate) employers or 
partnerships that carry on businesses only within States. A reference by the States 
under paragraph 51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution would probably be necessary for this 
purpose. (appendix C) 
The Australian Government Solicitor also noted that ratification of ILO conventions could 
support Commonwealth legislation but noted that: 
The Conventions [including ILO 121 on workers’ compensation] appear unlikely to 
provide any particular constitutional assistance in relation to Options 1 or 2 beyond that 
already provided by the corporations or insurance powers, unless some more 
comprehensive coverage was desired. (appendix C) 
An additional consideration in introducing a single national regime is the extent to which 
differences between the States and Territories could be accommodated within a single 
national regime. This need not be an insurmountable problem. General duties of care and 
performance-based regulations underpin OHS regimes in all jurisdictions, leaving, in most     
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cases, flexibility on how this is achieved to the individual duty holder. Differences between 
States and Territories in industry structures or workplace relationships could well be 
accommodated within any national legislation, regulations or codes of practice, in much 
the same way that their own codes currently accommodate regional variation within their 
jurisdiction. In particular, the ability to respond to local conditions would be retained 
through the continued use of a wide range of voluntary codes of practice, and of guidance 
material that can be adapted and modified as required by particular circumstances.  
The Commission’s view 
A single national regime established and administered by the Australian Government, 
overriding and replacing those currently run by the States and Territories, would be the 
most direct way of achieving national uniformity in OHS arrangements. It would eliminate 
the costs, complexities, inefficiencies and inequities resulting from different regimes in 
each jurisdiction. It was the approach adopted by the United States Government, through 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, which established federal control of OHS 
regulation. 
However, the Commission considers that it would be unlikely that a single national OHS 
regime to replace those operated by the States and Territories, whatever its merits, could be 
achieved in any realistic timeframe. A process of referral of powers would be the most 
comprehensive means of ensuring complete national coverage, but this is unlikely given 
the States’ and Territories’ continuing protection of their power to act in relation to 
workplace safety. A national regime without such referral runs the risk of providing 
incomplete coverage, requiring residual State and Territory legislation, which would 
undermine some of the benefits envisaged by a national regime. 
Further, the Commission holds that effective implementation of OHS relies on a significant 
level of grass roots acceptance and cooperation — between the administering authority, 
employers, employees and others to whom the employer or owner of a workplace has a 
duty of care. The Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry noted that: 
VECCI has always expressed a concern that there was considerable distance between 
the floor of the panel beating shop and the state authority developing and 
implementing legislation, regulation and guidance material. The distance between the 
shop floor and a national authority would be even greater. OHS compliance falls 
mainly to those without expertise in the area. Legislation and information therefore 
must be geared to that audience. World best practice legislation is of little benefit if 
it is largely technically precise and not translatable by those it is aimed at. (sub. 66, 
p. 8) 
In the Commission’s view, the cooperation and participation of the States and Territories is 
essential in the process of developing effective national frameworks. The imposition of 
overriding national OHS legislation to replace the current State and Territory     
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arrangements, in the face of opposition from those jurisdictions, and from some significant 
stakeholders, would be an undesirable option to pursue. 
An alternative national OHS regime 
An alternative model would involve establishing a national OHS regime which would 
operate in parallel to those administered by the States and Territories, with firms having 
the choice of the national regime or continuing under their state regime. It would be 
particularly beneficial for multi-state firms which could operate under one set of national 
rules, thereby avoiding the costs of operating under different regimes in different 
jurisdictions. In addition, the choice of regime, albeit a limited one, would introduce a 
greater degree of competition into the OHS system in Australia. 
Developing an alternative national OHS regime does, however, require three particular 
matters to be addressed. These are: 
•  constitutional limitations; 
•  managing parallel OHS rules; and 
•  ensuring full coverage by the national regime. 
Constitutional matters  
As mentioned in the previous section, establishing an alternative national regime would 
require the Australian Government to use its various powers under the constitution to 
extend its activity into an area currently administered by the States and Territories. The 
degree of uncertainty as to the extent of these powers, and the coverage of firms involved, 
was set out above — the Australian Government Solicitor (appendix  C) advising the 
Commission that the legislation could not extend to all individual (non-corporate) 
employers or partnerships that carry on businesses only within States. However, unlike the 
preceding option of a national regime to replace those in the States and Territories, the 
existing OHS regimes in those jurisdictions would remain for those businesses not eligible 
for coverage under, or choosing not to join, the national arrangements. 
Managing parallel OHS rules 
The second issue is a more practical one. This involves managing situations where 
different firms are operating under different OHS regimes within the one jurisdiction — 
one firm operating under the Australian Government’s OHS regime and another firm 
operating under a State or Territory regime. A number of participants were concerned by 
such a possibility. For example, the ACTU commented:     
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Health and safety protection would be undermined if different employees at a worksite 
or related worksites in the same state or territory are subject to different legislative 
provisions of different governments. The Royal Commission into the Building and 
Construction Industry argued that: “the confusion that inevitably would arise from 
having two systems on one site would compromise and undermine safety on that site”. 
(Final Report, vol. 6, p. 22) 
Such different regimes would escalate the complexity as well as undermining the 
effectiveness of OHS arrangements. Under doubled regimes, for example: 
•  different employers interacting at the same workplace would have responsibilities 
under different regimes; 
•  different employers would be prosecuted under different regimes for offences 
associated with the same OHS failure; and  
•  workers would be subject to different legislative regimes at different times, and to 
different legislation to others in the same workplace. (IRsub. 86, pp. 9–10) 
Similarly, the Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia (CME) noted: 
In general, CME is supportive of the introduction of a system whereby organisations 
which operate in more than one jurisdiction can consider obtaining coverage under a 
national system. However, concern is expressed regarding the proposal to create 
circumstances whereby there is the option for national coverage in addition to state 
specific requirements. Rather than streamlining systems, this may result in the potential 
for added complexity and confusion, with different procedural requirements applying to 
various employers and employees on one site given the extensive use of contractors in 
the resources industry. (IRsub 237, p. 1) 
CME further commented that: 
An additional area in which this recommendation introduces complexity is that of 
enforcement. CME considers that on worksites where potentially both state and 
commonwealth statutes apply under the proposed new system, confusion will exist over 
which legislation is being enforced by which regulators. Clarification needs to be 
provided on the scope and jurisdiction of the inspectors from both the state and 
commonwealth schemes to prevent uncertainty and any misunderstandings. (IRsub 237, 
p. 4) 
Having different firms operating under different OHS regimes and operating alongside 
each other already exists in relation to Australian Government employees, Australian 
Government authorities and members of the Australian Defence Force. Much of this 
employment is located in the various States and Territories, resulting in overlap with the 
operation of firms under a State or Territory regime.  
Comcare has advised the Commission that the OHS laws which apply to employees of the 
Australian Government or Australian Government authorities at work in a State or 
Territory are:     
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•  the  Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991 
(OHS(CE) Act), the OHS(CE) Regulations 1991 and the OHS(CE) (National 
Standards) Regulations 1994; and 
•  except where directly inconsistent with any of the foregoing or another applicable 
Commonwealth law, the OHS laws of the relevant State or Territory (except where 
those laws apply to State employees only). 
These apply irrespective of the ownership and occupation of the premises at which the 
employee is working. 
Enforcement of Australian Government OHS legislation is currently undertaken by 
Comcare’s own inspectors. Comcare also uses contract investigators, both by way of 
memorandum of understandings with State or Territory OHS regulatory authorities for the 
use of their inspectors, and through the engagement of private consultants who are 
appointed as investigators. In addition, a State or Territory OHS regulator can seek to enter 
Australian Government sites (with appropriate agreement from the Australian 
Government) to investigate the activity of contractors to the Australian Government where 
those contractors are covered by the relevant State or Territory OHS legislation. 
Comcare has advised that cross-jurisdictional issues may arise where an 
employer/employee owes different OHS obligations under different regimes. Although this 
can present legal difficulties in relation to investigations and prosecutions, these issues 
have largely been managed administratively. Memoranda of Understanding between 
Comcare and the State OHS authorities provide for, or facilitate, cooperation over issues 
where both regulators have an interest. 
Comcare further noted that these cross-jurisdictional issues would remain the same with an 
extension of the Australian Government’s scheme. Although the issues may arise more 
frequently if more employers were covered by the OHS(CE) Act, the current systems 
would continue to apply. 
Developing comprehensive industry coverage under the national regime 
The third issue relates to the coverage of the existing Australian Government OHS regime. 
Concern was expressed that, having been developed primarily to cover government 
employees in the services sector, it is not comprehensive in industry coverage, notably in 
areas such as mining. 
The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia (IRsub. 237) and the CFMEU 
Mining and Energy (IRsub. 257) noted that a number of jurisdictions maintain mining-
specific legislation governing health and safety requirements, rather than including them 
under the scope of the principal OHS statutes. The CFMEU made the point that generalist     
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Australian Government OHS legislation was never developed to regulate the mining 
industry and is incapable of safely doing so (IRsub 257, p. 2). It said that: 
While CFMEU Mining and Energy admits that this [some mechanism by which the 
federal law could integrate or refer to the more-developed State law in this area] is 
theoretically possible, we do not know of a mechanism by which that can be readily 
achieved and we doubt that it can be done in the near future in a manner that does not 
result in a degradation of mine safety. (IRsub. 257, p. 4) 
Under existing arrangements, there would be no gap in coverage of workplace safety 
requirements. In this respect, Comcare has advised the Commission that there are a number 
of areas of OHS regulation which are not addressed in detail by the Australian Government 
legislation. For example, in relation to Major Hazard Facilities, Dangerous Goods and 
electrical safety, the State OHS laws apply to Australian Government employers and 
employees as the only applicable detailed legislation. Essentially, the current OHS laws of 
the State or Territory would continue to apply, unless they were directly inconsistent with 
Australian Government law. 
The NSW Minerals Council took a different view to that of the CFMEU, saying: 
A new national piece of OHS legislation would need to be created as an overarching 
standard for all companies in Australia to operate under. Regulations from that 
legislation would then need to be created to address industry specific requirements, 
such as coal mining, etc. to regulate the additional criteria for that industry to comply 
with. … In general, coal companies seek access to modern, mainstream, outcomes 
based OHS legislation and believe coal mines can be effectively regulated under 
mainstream provisions just like any other heavy industry. (IRsub. 235, p. 3) 
The Council considered that it would not be difficult for the Australian Government to 
develop OHS standards in areas where they do not now operate. This would involve 
establishing what was considered best practice in other jurisdictions and tailoring it for 
national legislation (IRsub. 235, p. 4). 
The Commission’s Interim Report proposal 
In the Interim Report, the Commission proposed a progressive introduction of an 
alternative national OHS system. That is, that the Australian Government provide to those 
employers who are accepted into a national workers’ compensation scheme (chapter 5), the 
choice of being covered by the Australian Government’s OHS legislation, or remaining 
with the individual State or Territory regime.  
A number of participants, principally businesses and business groups (the Institute of 
Actuaries of Australia, (IRsub.  182); Sing Tel Optus Pty Ltd, (sub.  189); the Housing 
Industry Association, (IRsub.  193), ACCI, (IRsub.  196); Skilled Engineering, 
(IRsub.  202); the National Insurance Brokers Association, (IRsub.  204); and Australian     
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Industry Group (IRsub. 240)) supported the interim report proposals for a national scheme 
for both workers’ compensation and OHS. For example, ACCI said: 
The suggestion to allow self-insurers under the Commonwealth workers compensation 
laws to elect to be covered by the extending the Occupational Health & Safety 
(Commonwealth Employment) Act is, in principle, a sensible one, which will help to 
achieve national consistency at least amongst some self-insurers with consequent cost 
and efficiency benefits. The recommendations need further explanation and expansion 
to address a number of issues including: 
•  The position of national companies, which are not eligible to elect the Commonwealth 
OHS option. 
•  Complications of interpretation and lack of consistency where businesses are operating 
on the same site but are subject to different OHS regulatory frameworks. … 
Whilst this would increase the number of workplaces covered by Commonwealth OHS 
regulations vs state/territory based regulations in any one jurisdiction, the number 
would actually be quite small as we are talking of a relatively small number of major 
corporations spread across Australia. (IRsub. 196, p. 10)  
As mentioned earlier, the ACTU opposed the introduction of a choice of a national OHS 
regime for multi-state firms, for the practical reasons outlined above and because they 
consider that it is inconsistent with the objective of leaving responsibility for OHS with the 
states (IRsub. 186, p. 8). The Queensland Council of Unions (IRsub. 241, p. 12), expressed 
concern that allowing companies the choice of a national or state OHS regime would result 
in firms choosing the lowest imposition option.  
Template legislation and regulations 
A third model involves pursuing uniformity in workplace safety regimes within Australia 
through the development of template legislation and regulations for adoption in each of the 
jurisdictions. The template legislation and regulations would be drawn up by a national 
body (a successor to NOHSC), and adopted without modification. Template legislation has 
been used in several other policy areas including the regulation of non-bank financial 
institutions, consumer credit and, until recently, companies and securities. It is a model 
being proposed for the regulation of cooperatives. Such a system has also been developed 
in relation to transport and food standards. 
In the road transport area for example, the National Road Transport Commission 
developed template legislation which was submitted to the Australian Transport Council. A 
related intergovernmental agreement specified that, once accepted by the Council, the 
template legislation would be adopted by all the jurisdictions. The particular mechanism 
involved agreed legislation being passed in one jurisdiction (the ACT), with the other 
jurisdictions passing legislation via reference to the template legislation. Administration of 
template legislation rests with individual jurisdictions.      
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The 2002 review of the National Road Transport Commission Act 1991, recommended a 
move away from template legislation saying: 
The method of delivery of reforms in future should be through ‘model legislation’ 
rather than ‘template legislation’ which has been the NRTC’s legislation since 1991 
and has proved unworkable. ‘Template’ legislation requires referencing in 
Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation (rarely done), while model legislation 
allows jurisdictions to enact the substance of reforms, or to reference if they choose. 
(ATC 2002, p. 12) 
The recommendations of the review were endorsed by the Australian Transport Council in 
February 2003. 
In the area of food standards, Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) is 
responsible for developing and maintaining uniform food standards for adoption in 
Australia and New Zealand. It reports to the Australia New Zealand Food Regulation 
Ministerial Council. Once a standard is accepted by the Council, it must be gazetted. Under 
the Food Regulation Agreement 2002, the States and Territories will take such legislative 
or other steps as are necessary to adopt or incorporate the agreed standard into the food 
legislation of the State and Territory without variation. This remains the situation in this 
area of interstate cooperation. 
In its 1995 report into Work Health and Safety, the Industry Commission recommended 
the development of template legislation for the core elements of OHS legislation, together 
with consistency in enforcement across jurisdictions (IC 1995, vol. 1, pp. 162–6). 
In this inquiry, the National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety 
Regulation said that template legislation had the most potential for achieving national 
consistency, saying: 
There are three key strategies for achieving genuine consistency: template legislation, 
national legislation and referral of state/territory powers to the Commonwealth. We 
consider that the strategy with the most potential for achieving national consistency is 
template legislation. ... In other areas there are successful examples of template 
legislation, for example the nationally consistent road transport legislation and uniform 
companies and securities legislation. (sub. 22, pp. 4, 5) 
The Centre gave specific examples of preferred template models (box 4.1). 
Similar support for template legislation was included in the submission of the Plastics and 
Chemical Industries Association (sub. 114, p. 9), which considered that it would result in 
improved OHS performance and safety outcomes, improved compliance, and reduced costs 
to government, industry and unions. The Association also pointed to examples in the 
transport sector where template legislations has been successfully adopted (pp.  6–7). 
Similarly, the Housing Industry Association supported national uniformity in OHS 
standards developed by NOHSC, that, ‘… once adopted, are automatically picked up by     
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the States in the same manner as the Building Code and the State building laws’ (sub. 35, 
p. 4). 
The Business Council of Australia (sub. 143), and Westpac Banking Corporation (sub. 75, 
p. 12), expressed concern that a national framework based on template legislation enacted 
at the State and Territory level would still allow the development of differences between 
jurisdictions. For example, the Business Council said: 
There is, for example, a risk that States and Territories would make ad hoc changes to 
legislation, thereby compromising national uniformity. It is also likely that the States 
and Territories would adopt different approaches to administration and enforcement of 
legislation, even if there was general agreement on common approaches. (sub. 143, 
p. 12) 
 
Box 4.1  National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety 
Regulation: suggested template 
In developing a template model for uniform OHS Regulation in Australia, we suggest 
that a starting point be a model OHS statute that adopts the best provisions from 
current OHS statutes (ie a “race to the top”). Anticipating the obvious question begged 
by this suggestion, this would, in our opinion, entail adopting: 
•  The employer’s duty to employees in sections 26, 28, 29B and 37 of the 
Queensland Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995, supplemented by section 
21(4)(c) of the Victorian Act (which requires employers to engage persons with OHS 
expertise); 
•  The duty to non-employees in section 22 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
1985 (Vic) (perhaps bolstered by section 29A of the Queensland Act, and adopting 
the Queensland approach to absolute duties with specific defences (ie section 37 of 
the Queensland Act)); 
•  Section 10 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW); and 
•  The duties on designers, suppliers etc in the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
1985 (Vic) and/or Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA); 
•  The Victorian provisions for workplace arrangements (ie Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 1985 (Vic), sections 26, 29 to 37 and 54); 
•  And the New South Wales inspection and enforcement provisions. 
This composite Act would provide a starting point for the template statute. Gaps and 
inconsistencies could then be identified, and filled by thoughtful drafting and/or 
adoption of provisions which have been shown to work well elsewhere. 
Source: Sub. 22, pp. 6–7. 
 
 
The Victorian Government considered that template legislation would be an inflexible and 
inefficient means of achieving consistency, saying:     
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Structural flaws undermine the timely introduction of template legislation. For 
example: 
•  there is no capacity to adapt an overarching legislative framework to the local 
conditions of the different States and Territories; and 
•  gaining stakeholder agreement to the detailed wording of template provision is 
significantly more challenging than gaining agreement on ‘common essential 
requirements’. (IRsub. 256, p. 32) 
The NSW Government (IRsub.  255) also indicated that it does not support the use of 
template legislation in relation to OHS regulation, arguing for the need to tailor any 
national frameworks to suit local conditions and protect the socio-economic interests of 
New South Wales employers and workers. 
Despite the apparent problems of enacting template legislation, it remains the most robust 
vehicle for achieving uniformity, as distinct from consistency, within Australia’s federal 
structure, short of the overriding national approach. The ‘duty of care’ foundation of the 
legislation, together with the performance-based nature of much of the regulations, means 
that regional variations can be accomodated within a uniform system. As outlined in 
relation to food standards, the template model can be successfully followed over the longer 
term with the cooperation of the parties involved. Workplace safety warrants such a level 
of commitment. 
Mutual recognition  
Mutual recognition is a model that has been widely used to overcome the costs of differing 
regulations or standards between jurisdictions within Australia, without the need to 
establish national legislation.  
Current mutual recognition arrangements cover regulation of the sale of goods and the 
registration of occupations, but exclude regulations affecting the nature of delivery of a 
service, or manner of sale. For example, the qualifications of a nurse would be recognised 
in all jurisdictions (the qualifications are mutually recognised), but the nurse must operate 
in any particular jurisdiction according to the procedural rules of that jurisdiction — the 
procedural rules are not mutually recognised. 
Extending mutual recognition to cover OHS regulation would go further than the current 
Mutual Recognition Agreements in that it would, in effect, involve the ‘nature of delivery 
of the service’ as OHS is primarily about workplace practices and procedures.  
The key advantages of mutual recognition of OHS regulations are that:     
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•  it would allow multi-state firms to choose a single set of OHS legislation and 
regulations under which to operate, and under which to train its staff and OHS 
personnel, throughout the country; and 
•  it would introduce a significant degree of competition between jurisdictions in the 
regulations they introduce, and likely limit the extent to which the States and 
Territories diverge in their OHS regimes. 
Mutual recognition would involve each jurisdiction passing legislation to allow recognition 
and could include the option of progressive introduction. That is, rather than having 
widespread recognition across all activities, it may be useful to begin with a form of 
modified mutual recognition involving: 
•  agreement on a category of activities (or particular industries) that would be open to 
mutual recognition; 
•  limiting the option to choose the OHS regime to multi-state firms, requiring them to 
choose the OHS regime of one of their existing facilities and applying this to their 
whole business (the option to pick and choose different regimes for different branches 
of the business would not be offered);  
•  a ‘safety valve’ option involving the jurisdiction invoking a temporary exemption 
clause where a particular problem arises (such as where the chosen OHS regime does 
not cover a situation particular to the state, or where the boundaries of responsibility are 
unclear); and 
•  inspection being the responsibility of the inspectorate of the State of the chosen OHS 
regime, with the cost of inspection in another jurisdiction being on a cost recovery basis 
levied on the firms involved. This would avoid the need for each jurisdictions 
inspectorates to be trained in and familiar with nine different sets of rules, but, by 
increasing the geographical spread of inspections, it would increase enforcement costs. 
There are, however, various potential problems. Mutual recognition of differing OHS 
regimes would lead to different worksites within a jurisdiction operating under different 
OHS rules and regulations. This issue has been covered in the preceding section and, while 
this situation appears to be manageable with two parallel regimes, the problems would 
multiply considerably if there were eight different sets of rules within the one jurisdiction. 
The introduction of such a model would involve considerable legislative and 
administrative effort by all jurisdictions, both in establishing mutual recognition and in 
administering it over time. While it would be possible for a smaller number of jurisdictions 
to negotiate bilateral agreements, for a national framework, it would require the agreement 
of all States and Territories to pass the necessary mutual recognition legislation. If the 
necessary support were to be available to introduce such a system, the Commission 
considers that such support would be better harnessed promoting other options towards 
national frameworks that do not involve the same degree of implementation and     
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administration costs, and do not result in the same level of jurisdictional complexity and 
overlap. 
Strengthening the existing cooperative approach 
Under the current cooperative model, responsibility for legislation, regulation and 
enforcement rests with the States and Territories. National consistency is pursued through 
the tripartite NOHSC process, providing draft standards and codes to the jurisdictions via 
the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council. Central to the success of this model in 
developing consistent workplace safety requirements is the role and effectiveness of 
NOHSC, both in developing relevant best-practice standards and codes in a timely manner, 
together with their adoption by jurisdictions with minimal modification. 
The role of State and Territory governments in OHS legislation and administration was 
acknowledged in the terms of reference for this inquiry, which said that: 
Ideally, a national framework for workers’ compensation and OHS would encompass a 
cooperative approach between the Commonwealth and State governments while still 
leaving primary responsibility for these systems with the States. Moreover, any national 
frameworks would provide the States with adequate flexibility to address local 
conditions, encourage competition and facilitate competitive neutrality. 
In part, this reflects the current division of responsibilities between the Australian 
Government and the States and Territories, while acknowledging that there are benefits 
from a greater degree of national coordination of OHS arrangements. 
The voluntary, cooperative nature of this model is reflected in the tripartite structure of 
NOHSC, comprising representatives of the States and Territories, the Australian 
Government, employers and unions. The individual jurisdictions are free to implement, not 
implement or modify any national standards and codes developed by NOHSC as they see 
fit. 
The current regime received support from particular groups of participants as a model to 
progress a national framework for OHS regulation in Australia. This was particularly 
evident among the State and Territory Governments, the union movement and some 
sections of the business community. This is not to say that there were no criticisms of the 
current arrangements, with the Victorian Government commenting: 
Victoria continues to support the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
(NOHSC) in its current terms, form and role. Victoria continues to maintain that the 
following is needed: 
•  better funding by the Commonwealth to allow it to assume a stronger role in the 
development of National Standards to deal with a range of key hazards;     
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•  better drafting of National Standards by NOHSC to enable jurisdictions to incorporate 
these Standards into state-based legislation and regulation; and 
•  a higher level of commitment by jurisdictions to adopt National Standards consistently 
and within a reasonable period of time. (IRsub. 256, p. 30) 
Similarly, the SA Minister for Industrial Relations, the Hon Michael Wright MP, 
commented that: 
The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1986 (the Act) should 
be strengthened to leave States and Territories less room to amend national standards 
within their own jurisdictions once they have be approved by the WRMC. (IRsub. 233, 
p. 2) 
ACCI noted that the pursuit of greater consistency could extend beyond the current focus 
on regulations and codes into the area of basic legislation, saying: 
The one key issue not addressed in the NOHSC review or in the ACCI proposed 
packaged approach is the subject of the individual jurisdictional OHS Acts. The OHS 
Acts are different in each jurisdiction and ACCI would prefer to see consistency in this 
area also but recognises that there are political and states rights issues and difficulties. 
Whilst their considerations are real-politic, it is important to recognise that the concept 
of ‘competitive federalism’ has very little, if any, role to play in competitive OHS 
systems between jurisdictions. (IRsub. 196, p. 7) 
Funding of NOHSC 
A number of other participants (the ACTU, (sub. 133); the Labor Council of New South 
Wales, (sub. 147); the Australian Nursing Federation, (sub. 70); the Hon Michael Wright 
MP, (IRsub 233); and the ACT Government, (IRsub. 234); among others) also supported 
the national body, seeing a need to strengthen the processes involved and, in particular, 
seeing a need for a greater commitment to funding by the Australian Government. The 
Labor Council of New South Wales commented: 
The Commission has produced excellent standards, which have all been adopted by all 
of the States in their legislation in relation to plant, noise, hazardous substances etc. 
However, the Federal Government reduced funding, resources and ultimately the 
Commission’s capacity to fulfil its role of providing a proper and consistent national 
framework. (sub. 147, p. 17) 
The Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (sub. 117, p. 11) commented that the 
NOHSC budget had been cut by $6.6 million and argued that funding should be restored. 
The ACTU (sub.  133) and the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (sub 119) 
expressed similar concerns about the reduction in funding. The funding of NOHSC in 
recent years is presented in table 4.1.     
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22.0 21.7 21.4 14.3 18.5 15.7 18.6 22.1 18.6 14.5
a In 2000-01 NOHSC secured an increase of $3 million to help fund the relocation from Sydney to Canberra. 
The increase is to be repaid through reductions in NOHSC appropriations of $1.2 million in 2001-02, 
$1.1 million in 2002-03, and $0.8 million in 2003-04. 
Source: NOHSC, Annual Reports, (various issues). 
While much of the reduction in funding was manifest in a reduction in staff costs, another 
significant area of declining spending was in the area of grants, principally research 
funding (table 4.2).  
























Research  0.8 1.2 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.1  --  --  --  -- 
Total  2.9 3.2 2.9 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3  --  -- 
Source: NOHSC Annual Reports, (various issues). 
This reduction in research funding attracted criticism, both outside and within this inquiry. 
Quinlan commented: 
Since 1996 there has been a substantial and sustained decline in research activity 
undertaken directly or indirectly (through grant funding) by the National Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC). This decline has now reached a point where 
it is arguable whether, with some minor exceptions, the agency has any capacity left to 
undertake meaningful research ... . (Quinlan 2000, p. 213) 
At the same time, there is a general view that statistics in the area of OHS, particularly 
national data on OHS incidents, have been, and remain, inadequate, and that data based on 
workers’ compensation claims were not an adequate substitute in the OHS field. For 
example, the Labor Council of New South Wales commented: 
A continuing frustration with current occupational health and safety and workers’ 
compensation schemes is the inadequacy of data collection. All three national inquiries 
noted that data collection is inadequate in all state and federal territory jurisdictions. 
Further inquiries into NSW Workers Compensation and OHS Schemes have found that 
there are great inadequacies in the data.     
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… Inadequate data collection results in inadequate data on which to base research that 
might lead to improved occupational health and safety outcomes. It clearly makes 
identifying trends impossible and it is likely that many issues are simply missed. For 
instance, the Labor Council is aware of a number of accidents to fingers (including 
fingers being cut off) in the film industry in the past three years caused by removing 
guards when working with electric saws, none of which are reflected in WorkCover 
data. Many of the incidents involved sub-contractors. Whether lodgement of a workers’ 
compensation claim was always appropriate is not known, as some were self-employed 
rather than employees of an incorporated company. However, all the incidents should 
have been reported as an occupational health and safety occurrence. (sub. 147, p. 13) 
An adequately resourced national body is essential if any national framework is to be 
successfully pursued, particularly if even greater reliance is to be placed on the national 
body to develop national standards in a timely fashion — the matter of the time taken to 
develop national standards being the subject of some comment in this inquiry.  
The need for timely development of national standards 
The SA Minister for Industrial Relations, the Hon Michael Wright MP (IRsub.  233), 
identified a need for a faster and more efficient decision making process, involving both 
NOHSC and the WRMC. Both the Western Australian Department of Consumer and 
Employment Protection (IRsub 219), and the ACT Government also noted the 
consequences of any undue delay in the NOHSC processes, the ACT Government saying: 
The ACT submits that there would be greater take-up within jurisdictions of existing 
national standards developed through the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission (NOHSC) if the standards were reviewed more frequently and kept up-to-
date. Many of the existing standards are simply not suitable bases for modern 
legislation, and do not provide a template for legislation that can be adopted with 
minimal modification. (IRsub. 243, p. 4) 
The point raised by the Western Australian and ACT governments is a valid one. Unless 
any centralised system of developing national standards is timely, it is difficult to ask the 
individual jurisdictions to put off change that may be needed to improve OHS outcomes.  
The role of stakeholders 
The tripartite structure of NOHSC was seen by many (ACCI, (subs. 81, 196); the ACTU, 
(IRsub.  186); the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union, (IRsub.  231); the ACT 
government, (IRsub.  243); the Victorian Government, (IRsub.  256); the Queensland 
Council of Unions, (IRsub. 241); and WorkCover New South Wales, (IRsub. 255) among 
others) as an essential ingredient in involving stakeholders in the development and 
acceptance of workplace safety standards. For example, ACCI said:     
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Occupational Health & Safety is a workplace issue in which employers and employees 
work closely together to achieve a safe and healthy workplace. Much of the regulatory 
framework and guidance materials to assist the parties is derived from national 
standards developed in close consultation with industry representatives in the NOHSC 
tri-partite forum. 
The current tripartite process whilst sometimes criticised as slow and time consuming 
provides an effective mechanism for a wide and genuine consultation and a ‘reality 
check’ on bureaucratic decision makers and for a ‘buy in’ of all the parties who have an 
interest in and responsibility to implement national policies and strategies. (sub. 196, 
p. 4) 
A consequence of the tripartite structure, however, is that NOHSC has a very large 
membership of 18, who are there primarily to represent the interests of their stakeholder 
group, rather than to progress the objectives of NOHSC. This has consequences for the 
workability of the organisation. The IC’s 1995 inquiry noted: 
With 18 members, NOHSC is simply too large to be an effective board of management. 
(IC 1995, p. 304)  
Similarly, Working Armour saw problems with consensus decisions involving diverse 
groups saying:  
The criticism that often emerges is that standards developed by a committee process 
reflects the lobbying abilities of member of that committee as opposed to the degree of 
risk posed by a specific hazard. (IRsub. 251, p. 2)  
At the same time, such representation must inevitably be selective, with some groups 
missing out on a seat at the table. This issue was raised in the previous Industry 
Commission inquiry, and in this inquiry, in relation to small business and the mining 
industry. 
Other participants supported the Interim Report’s proposals to place tripartite involvement 
at the advisory level rather than involvement via representation on NOHSC. For example, 
Housing Industry Association said that: 
HIA strongly supports this [a national OHS framework] as well as a smaller NOHSC 
Board and the development of template legislation. Obviously the issue of 
State/Territory acceptance needs to be addressed and HIA has genuine concerns about 
whether there will be universal acceptance of a national framework. (IRsub. 193, p. 3) 
Stakeholder involvement in other jurisdictions 
The Commission notes that other countries addressed the issue of stakeholder involvement 
in OHS in a variety of ways. New Zealand has recently introduced (2003) a National 
Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Committee to provide expert independent advice 
on major occupational safety and health issues. The Committee comprises five members     
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with a balance of research and professional expertise in the area of OHS. Responsibility for 
OHS in New Zealand rests with the Department of Labour (Wilson 2003; Department of 
Labour [NZ]). 
The British Health and Safety Commission is comprised of nine members with expertise in 
a range of OHS areas including members drawn from (but not representing) the union 
movement and industry. It is advised by 15 ‘Industry Advisory Committees’ covering 
particular industry groups or activities and eight ‘Subject Advisory Committees’ covering 
such areas as dangerous substances and nuclear safety. The Commission said: 
HSC’s Advisory Committees encourage the joint participation of all representative 
organisations in the improvement of health and safety at work; draw on the expertise 
and advice available from both sides of industry and elsewhere; give the problems of 
particular industries closer and more detailed attention than the Commission itself is 
able to do; and allow an industry focus on general issues … . (HSC 2003, pp. 136–140) 
In the United States of America, there are two federal agencies established under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) is responsible for conducting research and making 
recommendations for the prevention of work-related injury and illness. The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for creating and enforcing 
workplace safety and health regulations. Both agencies are located within US federal 
government departments: NIOSH is part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
in the Department of Health and Human Services, while the OSHA is located within the 
Department of Labour. 
Canada operates an OHS system with some parallels to Australia. Responsibility for OHS 
rests with the Canadian provinces. At the federal level the Canadian Centre for 
Occupational Health and Safety (CCOHS) is governed by a tripartite council of 17 
members representing governments (federal, provincial and territorial), employers and 
labour. CCOHS’s role is to facilitate consultation and cooperation among jurisdictions; to 
facilitate participation by labour and management, and to serve as a national centre for 
information relating to OHS. Each province and territory has a workers’ compensation 
board or equivalent and these boards typically comprise clearly identified worker, 
employer and public representatives. Some provinces combine their workers’ 
compensation and OHS functions under the same organisation and thus the tripartite nature 
of the organisation will apply to their OHS responsibilities. However, where workers’ 
compensation and OHS functions are separate, the OHS functions typically reside within a 
provincial department, rather than with any tripartite oversighting structure.     
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The Commission’s view on the role of stakeholders 
Certainly the development of OHS legislation and regulation cannot be undertaken without 
the commitment and involvement of employers and employees, as well as those with 
particular expertise in the field. However, there is a significant difference between a 
consultation process, and a situation where those being regulated have direct control over 
the drafting of that regulation. Where stakeholder interests diverge significantly and where 
agreement or consensus becomes a major consideration, the chance that necessary change 
will be introduced in a timely fashion is put at risk. It also introduces the likelihood that 
compromise will result in something well short of best-practice.  
As referred to earlier, the current requirement for a wide range of stakeholders to be 
represented results in a very large NOHSC ‘board’, leading to problems of workability. At 
the same time, not all stakeholders are represented with, for example, all three of the 
current employer representatives being provided by one employer organisation. A broader 
consultative process would allow other stakeholders to be involved and to be on an equal 
footing with those currently favoured by a position on NOHSC.  
The 1995 review of national OHS regulation 
Essentially the same issues arose in the Industry Commission’s (IC) 1995 review of a 
national framework for OHS in Australia. That review identified a number of concerns: 
•  the limited impact and adoption of NOHSC outputs;  
•  resistance to complete adoption of NOHSC decisions at the State level; 
•  unclear responsibilities and accountabilities; and  
•  ineffective board of management (size and composition — with both jurisdictional and 
tripartite representation). 
The IC recommended that the NOHSC be restructured to consist of no more than five 
persons selected on the basis of their expertise and skills. 
Tripartite involvement was to be accommodated via an occupational health and safety 
advisory council with representatives from the peak employer organisations, the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions, the relevant Commonwealth agencies and experts in 
occupational health and safety. In addition the IC recommended that the Standards 
Development Standing Committee be retained to advise the NOHSC on the development 
of standards — the Committee to comprise equal numbers of nominees of the Ministerial 
Council, the ACTU and the peak employer organisations.     
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A national framework was to be pursued by the use of template legislation to achieve a 
nationally consistent regime for occupational health and safety. The template was to be 
incorporated in the principal OHS legislation in each jurisdiction.  
These recommendations were not accepted, and notwithstanding the changes made to 
NOHSC in 1997 and subsequently, which in particular reduced its role in relation to 
research, the duties and organisation of this body are largely the same as when the IC 
reported in 1995.  
Implementation of national standards and codes 
Discretionary implementation at the State and Territory level also received support, 
particularly from State and Territory governments and the union movement. For example, 
Worksafe Western Australia Commission argued that the detail of implementation should 
be the responsibility of individual jurisdictions: 
The Commission strongly supports national arrangements that achieve national 
consistency for OHS but not rigid uniformity. ... Notwithstanding its commitment to 
national standards, the Commission reserves the right to consider and assess each 
standard on a case-by-case basis within its tripartite forum. Where adoption of a 
particular standard is considered appropriate, implementation will be through whatever 
instrument or instruments best meet the needs of the State. (sub. 51, pp. 3–4) 
Similarly, the Community and Public Sector Union/State Public Services Federation Group 
also supported the decentralisation of OHS (and workers’ compensation) arrangements 
saying: 
These [State] legislators are closer to the day-to-day concerns of workers and their 
families than the Federal government can ever be. It is the State legislators that focus 
on the very practical concerns of health, education, public safety and so on. These 
legislators are more accessible to organisations, including unions, that represent the 
employment based interests of their members. (sub. 52, p. 2) 
The SA Minister for Industrial Relations, the Hon Michael Wright MP noted that, in 
moving to develop nationally consistent approaches for incorporation in the relevant South 
Australia legislation, the South Australian Government applies (among other listed in the 
submission) the following principles: 
•  consultation must occur with key stakeholders at a local level prior to adopting any 
national standard or complementary legislative amendment; 
•  the implementation of any national approach should not pose an undue burden on 
sectors of the South Australian industry and/or employees working within that sector; 
and  
•  there needs to be flexibility in any national approach so that this can be easily adapted 
to emerging needs at a local level. (IRsub. 233, p. 1)     
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Nonetheless, most participants, including those who supported the current arrangements, 
considered that greater efforts towards increased consistency were both desirable and 
achievable. For example, the Western Australian Department of Consumer and 
Employment Protection considered that the overall objective of greater national 
consistency is desirable, saying that:  
This does not mean that the States should not be expected to work toward consistent 
(and even uniform) outcomes. For instance, as the States have fairly consistent general 
duty of care legislation, NOHSC should be able to develop a template duty of care 
legislation, with consistent definitions and with consistent penalties to be incorporated 
into law into each of the States. (IRsub. 219, p. 4) 
Similarly, the ACTU reported that the OHS Policy adopted by the ACTU Congress in 
2000 contains a range of provisions, including that: 
TLCs [trades and labor councils] and unions will advocate that state and territory 
governments adopt national standards in a consistent way to provide Australian 
workers with equal protection irrespective of where they work. (sub. 133, p. 11) 
The challenge in trying to improve the effectiveness of the current cooperative model is in 
accommodating issues such as stakeholder involvement and acceptance of outcomes, and 
the need for any national framework to accommodate regional and industry differences 
without resulting in different requirements applying in different jurisdictions to essentially 
the same workplace situation. 
Related models in other sectors of the economy 
As prefaced earlier in this chapter, the institutional structures to develop uniform national 
standards in other areas of the Australian economy are quite different from that of 
NOHSC. They involve a different mechanisms for involving stakeholders and more formal 
standard making and adoption processes. 
Transport 
In the area of road, rail and intermodal transport, the National Road Transport Commission 
(NRTC) has been set up with five members appointed on the basis of relevant expertise 
and skills. The NRTC became the National Transport Commission (NTC) in January 2004 
in recognition of the recent addition of rail and intermodal transport to its regulatory 
responsibilities. The NTC develops and maintains national standards and codes in the 
transport area. The NTC is funded 65 per cent by the States and Territories and 35 per cent 
by the Australian Government. The NTC reports to the Australian Transport Council 
(ATC) which is a ministerial forum for Australian Government, State and Territory 
cooperation.      
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Tripartite involvement in the decision making process is accommodated by way of 
advisory bodies reporting to the ATC and to the NTC. 
The ATC is supported by two advisory bodies: 
•  the Standing Committee on Transport, comprising chief executive officers of transport 
agencies (administrative and policy advisers to ATC Ministers); and 
•  the National Transport Secretariat, which provides advice on strategic priorities and 
directions. 
In addition, a National Transport Advisory Council is to be established, comprising public 
and private sector experts, to provide the ATC with strategic analysis and advice. 
The NTC is supported by a number of bodies including: 
•  an Industry Advisory Group, comprising representatives of transport groups, vehicle 
manufacturers, the Transport Workers Union, and the National Farmers Federation; 
•  a  Bus Industry Advisory Group, comprising representatives of state, territory and 
national bus associations, manufacturers, and representatives from related industries; 
and 
•  a number of specialist technical committees and groups. 
Implementation of the national framework developed by the NRTC/NTC is via a number 
of intergovernmental agreements covering heavy and light vehicles and rail transport. Once 
approved by ministers (at the ATC), all governments are expected to implement the 
reforms. Initially, the NRTC focused on developing template legislation, but since 1998, a 
greater range of implementation options has been used. 
Food standards 
In the area of food standards, Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) has been 
set up with a 12 person board, including members with expertise in small business and 
consumer affairs. FSANZ is responsible for developing and maintaining uniform food 
standards for adoption in Australia and New Zealand. FSANZ is funded by the Australian 
and New Zealand Governments and from fees for services it performs. It reports to the 
Australia New Zealand Food Regulation Ministerial Council, and has clear timetables for 
decision making at each level.  
Tripartite involvement in the decision making process is accommodated by way of 
advisory bodies reporting to the Ministerial Council. Assisting the Council are the: 
•  Food Regulation Standing Committee, comprising heads of Department for which the 
respective members of the Ministerial Council have responsibility, as well as the Local     
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Government Association. The Committee provides advice on the development of 
policy relating to the regulation of food; 
•  Development and Implementation Sub Committee, comprising heads of the appropriate 
Australian and New Zealand inspection and enforcement agencies, and the Australian 
Local Government Association. The sub committee is responsible for developing 
implementation policy and oversees the development and implementation of a 
consistent approach across jurisdictions in enforcing food regulations and standards; 
and 
•  Technical Advisory Group, comprising senior food officers from the jurisdictions. The 
Group provides technical advice to assist in the development of standards and in the 
coordination, surveillance and uniform interpretation and enforcement of the Food 
Standards Code. 
Implementation of the national framework developed by FSANZ is via the Food 
Regulation Agreement 2002 where, once a standard is accepted by the Council it is to be 
adopted by States and Territories without variation. 
The Commission’s view 
While progress in the development of national uniformity in road transport and food 
standards has been slower than would perhaps have been expected, the NRTC/NTC and 
the FSANZ have a number of potential lessons for OHS institutions, (some already 
identified in the IC’s 1995 report). These are: 
•  smaller boards appointed on the basis of relevant expertise and skill rather than as 
‘representatives’ of particular groups or organisations; 
•  the accommodation of stakeholder involvement by way of formal advisory committees, 
either to the Ministerial Council or to the relevant standard developing institution; 
•  clear lines of responsibility, including prescribed procedures for developing and 
implementing standards, including timetables; 
•  a formal commitment by all jurisdictions, via intergovernmental agreements to adopt 
standards approved by the Council — in the case of food standards, without variation; 
and 
•  in the case of the NTC, part funding by the States and Territories (65 per cent).  
In the case of workplace safety, differences between jurisdictions in the characteristics of 
workplaces, or in the nature of the risk faced, can be accommodated by the use of 
performance-based regulations supported by voluntary codes of practice which can reflect 
legitimate differences between regions and/or industries.     
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However, the Commission does not consider that simply changing organisational 
structures or the wording of acts or memoranda will lead to a sudden rush of improved 
outcomes. The experiences in both the transport and food standards areas demonstrate the 
magnitude of the task. The achievement of national frameworks in any area is challenging 
within a federal structure, even where there is strong agreement with its desirability.  
4.3  The Commission’s proposals for a national OHS 
framework 
The Commission considers that a single uniform national OHS regime which is focussed 
on preventing workplace injury and illness should be the medium term reform objective for 
OHS. It would build on the initiative of the recently agreed national strategy.  
To achieve this. the Commission is proposing two broad approaches, to operate in parallel. 
The first approach adapts the current cooperative model by strengthening the national 
institutional structure based on NOHSC and the WRMC — emphasising the timely 
development of best-practice national OHS standards and their implementation uniformly 
throughout Australia. Such an approach should be commenced immediately. The second 
approach is to progressively open up access to the existing Australian Government OHS 
regime, giving firms the choice of a single set of national OHS rules. The two approaches 
are not dependant on each other. Each has merits that would warrant their independent 
introduction. 
The cooperative approach 
There are two key elements involved in this proposal: a restructuring of NOHSC; and the 
introduction of an intergovernmental agreement aimed at the uniform adoption of 
legislation and regulation developed by a restructured NOHSC. 
Restructuring NOHSC 
The Commission considers that the current tripartite structure of NOHSC, where members 
are chosen by, and represent the interests of, particular stakeholders, is not conducive to 
the development of timely and best-practice workplace safety provisions. As the body 
charged with implementing a national framework for OHS, NOSHC needs to be able to 
investigate, focus on, and develop the most appropriate set of workplace safety rules 
without these being beholden to the compromises inherent in obtaining consensus from a 
wide range of interested parties.     
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Stakeholder involvement in the development of national workplace safety provisions is 
nonetheless appropriate. It can be accommodated through formal consultative mechanisms 
and advisory bodies, as operate in other areas of regulation development.  
This is particularly important in the approach being proposed by the Commission which 
envisages that NOHSC’s role will expand beyond its current focus on national standards 
and codes, to include the development of model OHS legislation for adoption by the 
Australian, State and Territory governments. 
The Commission proposes that NOHSC be restructured to become a smaller, expert body, 
(with supporting consultative mechanisms) which would recommend national legislative 
provisions, regulations and standards for approval by the Workplace Relations Ministers’ 
Council. NOHSC would comprise five to nine members selected on the basis of their 
expertise and skills including, but not being limited to: the management of health and 
safety risks; experience in the application of OHS requirements in the workforce; the 
development of OHS policy; and knowledge of recent developments in OHS regulation in 
Australia and overseas. Members of NOHSC would be appointed by the relevant 
Australian Government portfolio minister, subject to the appointments being approved by 
the Ministerial Council. 
The role of stakeholders 
Stakeholder input into the development of OHS regulation is an essential component of the 
development of national provisions. The Commission proposes that NOHSC be given the 
power to establish relevant advisory committees, to assist NOHSC in its work, drawing 
their membership from employers, unions, experts in the field of implementation, and from 
Australian, State and Territory organisations responsible for administering OHS. 
The Commission has taken into consideration comments by participants that the Interim 
Report proposals for various committees to report directly to the WRMC would be 
unworkable. Participants such as the ACCI (IRsub. 196), Business SA (IRsub. 187), the 
ACTU (IRsub.  86) supported by a number of individual unions, and the Victorian 
Government (IRsub. 256), considered that the introduction of three committees to provide 
assistance to WRMC would appear to remove the authority of NOHSC in providing advice 
to WRMC on OHS and related issues. It would mean that NOHSC standards could be 
reworked, introducing delays. In addition, it would impose an unworkable burden on the 
Council which did not have the capacity or technical expertise to undertake the assessment 
of advice from the various bodies. ACCI noted that the WRMC meets only twice a year 
and that ‘…its agenda is predetermined as are largely its outcomes’ (sub. 196, p. 8). Other 
participants also noted the predominance of industrial relations matters on the WRMC 
agenda.     
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The Commission acknowledges these concerns, and considers that the advisory functions 
should rather report to NOHSC, and be part of NOHSC’s formal consultative process. 
These would be similar to those existing in the area of road transport where the 
NRTC/NTC is advised by: a group of transport agency chief executives from each of the 
jurisdictions; a number of industry advisory groups containing both employer and union 
representation; and by a number of technical advisory groups. 
Whether NOHSC needs to go as far as establishing a large number of formal industry-
specific or subject-specific technical and advisory committees, as is the situation in the 
United Kingdom, is debatable, but this should not be precluded if the development of best-
practice legislation, regulations and codes warrants it.  
While each of the States and Territories would no longer be represented directly on 
NOHSC, they would retain involvement in the NOHSC consultative process and more 
importantly, they retain their positions on the WRMC, which would be the ultimate arbiter 
for the flow-on of any proposed legislation and regulations to the jurisdictions. The 
WRMC would continue, as at present, to be serviced by the Departments of Workplace 
Relations Advisory Committee, comprising heads of industrial relations departments in the 
jurisdictions, and the National Workplace Relations Consultative Council comprising 
representatives of employers, unions and the Australian Government, though, as with the 
WRMC itself, industrial relations are the primary focus of these bodies. 
An intergovernmental agreement 
The second key element of this approach is the negotiation of an intergovernmental 
agreement, whereby the jurisdictions agree to adopt, without modification, the legislation, 
regulations and codes developed by NOHSC and approved by the Ministerial Council. 
Similar agreements have been central to the mechanisms aimed at achieving uniformity in 
other areas of national regulation in Australia’s federal system, and provide models on 
which such an agreement could be developed in relation to OHS. 
A number of participants commented that the problem with non-uniform adoption of 
NOHSC-developed regulations does not lie with NOHSC or its structure, but rather with 
the commitment of the individual jurisdictions to adopt the standards developed. ACCI 
commented: 
The criticisms of the current tri-partite mechanisms and NOHSC relate in the main to 
the lack of delivery of the agreed outcome of national consistency. This is not so much 
a fault of the process but a lack of commitment, in the main, by the bureaucracy in the 
jurisdictions to implement polices and standards which they have assisted in developing 
and which have been endorsed by their own ministers at WRMC. (IRsub. 196, p. 6)  
A willingness to adopt nationally developed regulation is central to the achievement of 
national uniformity and the gradual elimination of differences in OHS legislation and     
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regulation across Australia. The recommended intergovernmental agreement is central to 
achieving this, but it is also likely to be one of the more difficult changes to introduce. 
A timetable for review 
One of the major criticisms of the current mechanism for developing national standards 
and codes is the time that has been taken for what many see as limited progress towards 
convergence in OHS regulation within Australia. NOHSC has been in operation for some 
18 years. An important element in providing a discipline on progress is for a timetable for 
achievement to be agreed to and spelled out early in the process. 
The Commission is not in a position to recommend on the appropriate timetable, though 
two participants (the Commonwealth Safety Management Forum (IRsub. 258, and United 
Group Limited, IRsub. 238)) did so — suggesting a 10-year time frame. Any timetable 
depends, in part, on an assessment of the amount of work involved and the level of 
resources governments are willing to provide to achieve the outcome. 
In commending the discipline of an agreed and announced timetable for achievement, the 
Commission notes that, among other specified time periods relating to the presenting of a 
standard to the food regulation ministerial council, it requires that the council must respond 
within 60 calendar days to proposals placed before it. A similar set of specified time lines 
in the review procedures would be a desirable feature of the NOHSC/WRMC review of 
OHS matters. 
Going beyond national standards and codes 
For national uniformity in workplace health and safety requirements to be fully achieved, 
the work program of NOHSC should include the review of all aspects of OHS regulation in 
Australia, covering legislation, regulations and any mandatory standards and mandatory 
codes, with the objective of developing model provisions to be adopted uniformly in each 
jurisdiction. Voluntary codes of practice could still be developed by NOHSC, but would 
not be included in any program of template adoption. Variations in codes are an important 
means by which differences in regional or industry situations are accommodated within a 
single national framework. 
The source of funding for NOHSC 
In the Interim Report, the Commission proposed that funding for NOHSC be shared by the 
jurisdictions. Some concern was expressed by participants over this proposal. ACCI 
considered that primary funding for NOHSC should remain with the Australian 
Government, saying:     
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The current funding arrangement whereby the Commonwealth funds NOHSC direct 
has many advantages … Industry believes that it is important that the federal 
government demonstrates its commitment to OHS at the national level by allocating 
federal funding in this way. 
•  A level of independence from the jurisdictions.  
•  Isolation from the possible vagaries of political change and possible conflict on the 
levels of funding and payment arrangements of shared funding arrangements. 
•  Equality of representation by the members, which is not affected or perceived to be 
affected by different levels of financial funding arrangements between the jurisdictions. 
•  A level of certainty over funding arrangements from one source, the Commonwealth. 
(IRsub. 196, p. 9) 
In the Interim Report, the Commission also considered that individual jurisdictions could 
be charged with developing, on behalf of NOHSC, regulations and codes in areas that are 
of particular relevance to that jurisdiction.  
The submission from ACCI in response to the Interim Report raised the option of linking 
funding from other jurisdictions to the ‘outsourcing’ of projects suggested above. ACCI 
said: 
There are however some NOHSC initiated projects and/or programs, which cannot be 
funded within the NOHSC budget and are consequently not included in the annual 
business plan. Under these circumstances special shared funding arrangements may be 
a necessary and effective way of developing a particular product or program. 
(IRsub. 196, p. 9) 
The Commission considers that a variety of means should be developed to ensure an 
adequate level of funding for NOSHC, involving contributions from the States and 
Territories as well as the Australian Government, together with the ‘outsourcing’ of 
particular projects to the States and Territories where they have a particular interest or area 
of expertise. This would give the States and Territories a direct interest in NOHSC, and 
remove its dependence on funding from only one of the jurisdictions involved in 
workplace health and safety in Australia. 
The Commission also considers it worthwhile to develop a program to trial innovations, as 
appropriate, in a jurisdictions or jurisdictional sub region under strictly controlled 
circumstances and time frames. 
The Commission’s recommendations 
The Commission considers that streamlining the process of developing a nationally 
uniform OHS regime in Australia is essential if best-practice OHS legislation, regulations 
and codes are to be introduced in a timely fashion and adopted uniformly in each     
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jurisdiction in Australia. A focus on technical ‘best-practice’ underlies the proposed 
restructuring of NOHSC, without losing stakeholder input. In addition, the proposed 
intergovernmental agreement would eliminate the unnecessary re-evaluation, at the 
individual State and Territory level, of already exhaustively evaluated proposals. 
The Commission recommends that the following features be included in a cooperative 
occupational health and safety national framework model in Australia: 
•  a National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) made up of five 
to nine members appointed by the Minister on the basis of their expertise and skills, 
the appointment to be approved by the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (the 
Council); 
•  clear specification of the objective of achieving uniform national occupational health 
and safety legislation and regulation in all jurisdictions in the NOHSC enabling 
legislation; 
•  agreement by all jurisdictions to adopt, without variation, the legislation and 
regulations prepared by NOHSC and approved by the Council;  
•  NOHSC have the ability to appoint advisory bodies, noting the importance of 
consulting with employers, unions and all jurisdictions; 
•  specified timetables for Council review of proposals from NOHSC, similar to those 
applying in relation to food standards — the process to be prescribed in the 
legislation; and 
•  funding of NOHSC shared by the jurisdictions together with a commitment to 
funding the research and data collection necessary to ensure the development of a 
best-practice national occupational health and safety system. 
The alternative national OHS approach 
In the area of workers’ compensation, the Commission is proposing in chapter 5 that a 
progressively expanded number of employers could apply for coverage under a national 
scheme. This would be restricted initially to a self-insurance option for larger (typically 
multi-state) firms in competition with Australian Government or former Australian 
Government organisations as an alternative to the schemes operated by the States and 
Territories.  
The Commission considers that these same employers should be able to opt for coverage 
under the Australian Government’s OHS legislation — the OH&S(CE) Act. This would 
increase the administrative savings for multi-state firms, and enable greater coordination 
and feedback between the workers’ compensation and OHS regimes. By providing choice 
for firms, it would also introduce an element of competition with the State and Territory 
RECOMMENDATION      
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OHS regimes, strengthening the incentive for reform and encouraging greater national 
uniformity under the arrangements outlined earlier. 
In addition, having firms operate under an OHS regime and a workers’ compensation 
scheme with the same jurisdictional coverage, and with related administrations, would 
enable improved data monitoring, feedback and reform.  
The introduction of coverage under the Australian Government’s OHS regime would be on 
the same progressive basis as outlined in relation to workers’ compensation in chapter 5, 
being initially confined to firms in competition with Australian Government organisations, 
followed by firms that would be eligible to self insure (typically larger firms).  
Such a phased model of a national framework would allow some testing of implementation 
issues to occur in a limited environment amongst major firms who were committed to the 
success of the new arrangements. The States and Territories would also retain primary 
responsibility for the majority of firms in their jurisdiction. A strengthened NOHSC would 
operate in parallel. 
The Commission does not consider that the lack of complete coverage of the corporations 
power, as advised by the Australian Government Solicitor, represents a significant 
constraint on the ability of the Australian Government to act effectively in this matter. 
Individual State and Territory OHS regimes would remain in place for those not eligible 
for national coverage for constitutional reasons, and many employers operating only within 
a single jurisdiction would have little reason to move to a national scheme. 
While it is envisaged that this OHS proposal would generally operate on the same time 
path as the progressive opening up of an Australian Government workers’ compensation 
insurance scheme, it would require an immediate amendment to the Occupational Health 
and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991 to enable ‘non-Commonwealth’ 
entities to be covered. The Commission considers that the Australian Government should 
seek to make the necessary legislative changes as expeditiously as possible, but that the 
proposed progressive opening up of the Commonwealth’s workers’ compensation 
insurance scheme should not be dependant on achieving related change in OHS. 
While there will be some difficulties arising from firms operating under different OHS 
regimes in the same location, the Commission does not consider this to be significant 
enough to preclude this option. The progressive opening up of the Australian 
Government’s OHS regime provides the opportunity to evaluate whether this problem is 
likely to loom large in the future, and provides the opportunity to undertake changes and to 
develop appropriate implementation protocols between the Australian Government and the 
States and Territories.     
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Similarly, the lack of complete industry coverage of the Australian Government’s OHS 
regime is not a barrier to any firms inclusion under national rules. As advised by Comcare, 
the individual State and Territory provisions would continue to apply where they did not 
exist in the Australian Government’s regime. The Australian Government would be able to 
expand its regime, drawing on best-practice provisions operating in the States and 
Territories until all sectors, and all activities, in the economy are covered by appropriate 
provisions. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Commission recommends that the Australian Government amend the Occupational 
Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991, to enable those employers 
who are licensed to self-insure under the Australian Government’s workers’ 
compensation scheme to elect to be covered by the Australian Government’s 
occupational health and safety legislation. This legislation would be extended to cover 
those insuring under any future alternative national premium paying insurance scheme. 
Administration of the Australian Government’s OHS regime 
The Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (SRCC), established under the 
SRC Act, is broadly responsible for providing the regulatory framework for the Australian 
Government’s workers’ compensation arrangements and OHS program. The SRCC does 
not have its own staff and relies on Comcare staff to carry out its functions. Comcare (a 
statutory authority established under the SRC Act) administers and enforces the OHS (CE) 
Act in addition to its role of administering the Australian Government’s workers’ 
compensation arrangements. 
In the discussion on expanding access to the Australian Government’s workers’ 
compensation arrangements in chapter 5, the matter of the most appropriate regulatory 
structure was reviewed. The broad conclusion outlined in that chapter was that: 
•  regulatory and service functions should be separated — that is, a clear separation of the 
SRCC and Comcare; 
•  it is appropriate to establish the regulator’s independence by replacing the existing 
stakeholder composition with members appointed on the basis of their skill and 
expertise; but 
•  some elements of functional separation and regulator independence need not be 
undertaken until step 2 and possibly later with step 3 of the recommended arrangements 
for workers’ compensation. 
With such a separation of regulatory and service functions, the question arises as to where 
the regulation and enforcement of the Australian Government’s OHS regime should rest.     
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There are different views and practices among the jurisdictions in Australia as to whether 
the regulation of workers’ compensation and OHS should be separate. The use of a single 
regulator is seen to provide benefits through greater coordination and feedback between 
workers’ compensation and OHS matters. Conversely, the different aims and issues of 
workers’ compensation and OHS were seen as reasons as to why they should be separated, 
but with strong links on information sharing. 
If the recommended increased access to the Australian Government’s workers’ 
compensation and OHS arrangements is adopted, it is unlikely, at least initially, to attract 
the number of employers to warrant the creation of separate workers’ compensation and 
OHS regulators. Responsibility for both functions would rest with the SRCC. 
In the short term, it would be reasonable to continue the situation where the enforcement of 
the Australian Government’s OHS regime rests with Comcare. Further, as is currently the 
arrangement, much of the OHS enforcement and inspection tasks could continue to be 
undertaken by State agencies on behalf of the Australian Government. However, as 
progress is made towards step 2 of the Commission’s recommendations, the number of 
firms covered by the Australian Government’s OHS regime will increase. Comcare will, in 
time, become one of many organisations oversighted by the SRCC, albeit the largest, with 
responsibility for managing the Australian Government’s workers’ compensation 
insurance.  
The question of separating the enforcement of the OHS regime from Comcare should then 
be considered — that is, whether to establish a separate dedicated inspectorate. The 
AMWU noted that this issue has arisen in the past saying: 
Comcare is the OHS regulator: the trade union movement has consistently complained 
about the lack of a well resourced dedicated Commonwealth inspectorate … 
(IRsub. 231, p. 4) 
One option would be to incorporate the OHS enforcement function into the Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations. In a number of states, such as Queensland, 
Western Australia and Tasmania, OHS administration and enforcement is undertaken by 
the relevant industrial relations department. An alternative option would be to establish an 
Australian Government inspectorate reporting directly to the SRCC consistent with its role 
of regulating both workers’ compensation and OHS for the Australian Government. 
In conclusion, the long-term establishment of a separate Australian Government OHS 
inspectorate would be desirable, either as an independent agency or as part of the 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations — but this is unlikely to be 
necessary until step 2 of the Commission’s workers’ compensation recommendations. In 
the interim, enforcement should remain with Comcare. 
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5  National frameworks for workers’ 
compensation 
This chapter identifies and assesses suitable models of national frameworks for workers’ 
compensation and presents the Commission’s proposals. The chapters that follow deal with 
particular workers’ compensation matters that the Commission has been asked to report on 
by its terms of reference. 
5.1  Issues for developing a national framework 
There are a number of national framework issues arising from the differences in various 
jurisdictions’ workers’ compensation schemes. The most significant arise from the added 
compliance burdens and costs borne by multi-state employers as illustrated in chapter 2. 
They include for: 
•  self-insured employers, the different prudential requirements, employees coverage, 
statutory benefit structures, injury management requirements and access to common 
law settlements; and 
•  for premium-paying employers, the different and complex rules of employee coverage, 
remuneration base for the payment of premiums and injury management requirements. 
For mobile workers, national framework issues arise from differences in coverage, and 
from differences in the allocation of liability for degenerative injuries and illnesses of long 
latency. 
The lack of uniformity amongst workers’ compensation schemes can spill over to several 
Australian Government programs. Ignorance or confusion about eligibility of coverage 
(because of the differences in the definition of employee) can mean an injured worker 
becomes the responsibility of the Australian Government (under its Medicare or social 
security programs). Purposeful action by one of the parties, say to avoid reporting an injury 
or lodging a claim, could have the same effect (with ABS data suggesting significant 
under-reporting of work-related fatality, injury and illness).  
The various statutory benefit structures have differing effects on Australian Government 
programs. Injured or ill workers may resort to social security in those jurisdictions where 
the statutory benefit structures do not cover long tail claims. In Victoria, for example,      
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payments for some end at 104 weeks and, in Queensland, all benefits cease at five years. 
Premature exhaustion of a lump sum can leave others with no alternative than to fall back 
on the Australian Government’s social security programs.  
5.2  National framework models  
There was widespread support amongst participants for a national framework for workers’ 
compensation. However, participants differed as to what they considered would constitute 
a suitable model. Some favoured a model centred on cooperation amongst the jurisdictions. 
Some favoured a nationally available scheme which was offered to employers as an 
alternative to existing State and Territory schemes. And some called for a single national 
workers’ compensation scheme which could draw on best practice elements of existing 
schemes. 
As noted in chapter 2, the Commission identified several models of national frameworks 
for both occupational health and safety (OHS) and workers’ compensation. In response to 
participants’ comments and its own analysis, the Commission has confined its assessment 
of models for workers’ compensation to the following four: 
•  self-insurance under the Australian Government’s Comcare scheme (model A); 
•  an alternative national self-insurance scheme (model B); 
•  an alternative national insurance scheme (model C); and 
•  a new national cooperative body (model D).  
Self-insurance under the Comcare scheme (model A) 
The Australian Government could, as of now, allow the limited number of employers, who 
meet the competition test, to self-insure under its Comcare scheme, subject also to meeting 
prudential, claims management, OHS and other eligibility requirements (appendix E). State 
and Territory workers’ compensation schemes would continue to operate unchanged, 
except for the impact of those few who could leave to join Comcare. An example of this 
model can be found in the road transport policy area when the Australian Government 
established the Federal Interstate Registration Scheme (box 5.1).     
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Box 5.1  Federal Interstate Registration Scheme 
The Australian Government established the Federal Interstate Registration Scheme in 
1987 as an alternative to State and Territory-based registration for heavy vehicles. 
That Scheme was designed to provide uniform charges and operating conditions for 
heavy vehicles engaged solely in interstate operations. The Scheme included 
standards in relation to vehicle construction, equipment and performance as well as a 
requirement for mandatory third party insurance. To establish the Scheme, the 
Australian Government relied on section 92 of the Constitution which requires that 
trade amongst the States and Territories be absolutely free.  
Source: (Australian Government) Department of Transport and Regional Services (2002). 
 
 
Currently, the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act), which 
establishes the Comcare scheme, enables Australian Government authorities and eligible 
corporations to apply for a licence to self-insure and/or manage claims. Section 100, gives 
the Minister discretionary power to declare as ‘eligible’ for a self-insurance licence a 
corporation that:  
•  is, but is about to cease to be, a ‘Commonwealth authority’;1 or  
•  was previously a Commonwealth authority; or  
•  is ‘carrying on business in competition with a Commonwealth authority or with 
another corporation that was previously a Commonwealth authority’.  
The last category, effectively a competition test, could apply to a range of corporations in 
such sectors as banking, telecommunications, air transport, postal, defence and 
broadcasting.  
If the Minister declares a corporation eligible under section 100, then the granting of a 
licence is subject to approval by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission 
(SRCC). The SRC Act and Ministerial Directions specify the criteria and procedures the 
SRCC is to follow when granting licences.  
                                                 
1 The SRC Act defines ‘Commonwealth authority’ in section 4(1). It includes a body corporate in 
which the Australian Government has a ‘controlling or substantial interest’. A ‘controlling 
interest’ is defined in the same section as meaning ‘an interest in the body corporate that enables 
the person holding the interest to: a) control the composition of the board of directors of the body 
corporate; or b) cast, or control the casting of, more than one-half of the maximum number of 
votes that might be cast at a general meeting of the body corporate; or c) control more than one-
half of the issued share capital of the body corporate (excluding any part of that issued share 
capital that carries no right to participate beyond a specified amount in a distribution of either 
profits or capital).       
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The Minister has published some public policy principles that he may consider in 
exercising his discretionary power in relation to private corporations in competition with 
previous or existing Commonwealth authorities (Commonwealth’s Workers’ 
Compensation Scheme Eligibility for Coverage for Non-Commonwealth Corporations). 
While not an exhaustive list, the principles include the likely impact of the grant of a self-
insurance licence on:  
•  employees of the corporation; 
•  the corporation; 
•  the integrity of the Australian Government scheme of workers’ compensation 
(Comcare) under the SRC Act; and 
•  the operations of the State and Territory workers’ compensation schemes.  
In the eleven years since section 100 and its predecessor (section 108C) have been in 
operation, no private corporation has been declared eligible by the Minister for issue of a 
self-insurance licence, except in circumstances where it was previously a Commonwealth 
authority. The Australian Government Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations reported that, in recent times, there has been a number of employers seeking to 
self-insure under Comcare (sub. 166, p. 22). Private corporations including Sing Tel Optus, 
Westpac Banking Corporation, Manpower Services (Australia) and Skilled Engineering 
advised the Commission that they have applied, or investigated the possibility of applying 
(subs 57, 75; IRsubs 178, 202).  
Private corporations self-insured under the Comcare scheme would still be subject to State 
and Territory OHS arrangements. There is currently no provision for these corporations to 
elect to be subject to the Australian Government’s OHS legislation (primarily the 
Occupational, Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991). However, a 
self-insurance licence would incorporate conditions pertaining to OHS which would be 
established and monitored by the SRCC, which itself would be guided by the Australian 
Government’s OHS legislation.  
To deal with this situation, legislation could be introduced to enable all corporations self-
insured under the Comcare scheme to elect to be covered by existing or modified 
Australian Government OHS legislation. Such corporations would also continue to come 
under the relevant State or Territory legislation for matters not covered by Australian 
Government legislation (as is currently the case for Australian Government agencies).  
The Australian Government Solicitor has advised the Commission that the Australian 
Government could rely on its corporations power under the Constitution to enact the 
relevant legislation (box  5.2 and appendix  C). This would extend the current OHS 
inspection and enforcement arrangements (including cooperation of the States and 
Territories) to this wider group of employers.      
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Box 5.2  The Australian Government’s constitutional powers 
Corporations power. Under section 51(xx) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth has 
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth 
with respect to ‘foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within 
the limits of the Commonwealth’. The power enables the Australian Government to 
regulate a wide range of matters relating to constitutional corporations after their 
formation, including their trading and financial activities. But it would not cover sole 
traders or partnerships. In order to be within the scope of the corporations power, the 
Australian Government law must have a sufficient connection with the subject matter of 
the power. The power could be used to extend existing Australian Government OHS 
legislation, or enact new OHS legislation, and to enact new national schemes of self-
insurance or insurance.  
Recent legislative examples of the use by the Australian Government of the 
corporations power are the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 and the Gene Technology Act 
2000. The Workplace Relations Act 1996 also relies on the corporations power for 
certain of its provisions (for example, governing Australian Workplace Agreements).  
Insurance power. Under section 51(xiv), the Commonwealth has power to make laws 
with respect to ‘insurance, other than State insurance; also State insurance extending 
beyond the limits of the State concerned’. The power applies to the activity of 
insurance, the essential characteristic of which is a relationship of indemnity between 
an insured and an insurer. The power cannot be used to make laws governing self-
insurance, or insurance carried on by a State or Territory as an insurer (apart from 
State or Territory insurance operating beyond the State or Territory). Accordingly, the 
power could only be used to enact a new national insurance scheme.  
Other powers. The Commonwealth also has powers to make laws in respect of OHS 
and workers’ compensation under: 
•  section 51(i) with respect to ‘trade and commerce with other countries, and among 
the States’ (interstate and overseas trade and commerce power);  
•  section 122 ‘for the government of any territory surrendered by any State to and 
accepted by the Commonwealth’ (territories power); and 
•  section 51(xxix) with respect to ‘external affairs’ (external affairs power). This power 
could support Australian Government legislation which discharges an obligation 
imposed on Australia by an international treaty or instrument. The 1981 International 
Labour Organisation Convention 155 (Occupational Safety and Health Convention) 
could, if Australia became a party, support reasonably comprehensive Australian 
Government legislation concerning OHS. Similarly, the 1964 Convention 121 
(Employment Injury Benefits Convention) could support an Australian Government 
workers’ compensation scheme prescribing particular entitlements if Australia 
became a party. 
 (Continued next page) 
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Box 5.2  (continued) 
Once new Australian Government laws were in place, section 109 of the Constitution 
would operate such that the laws would over-ride State and Territory legislation to the 
extent that there is any inconsistency between them. 
Source: Appendix C. 
 
 
The Australian Government does not have specific constitutional power over OHS and 
workers’ compensation. There are, however, a number of constitutional powers that it 
could rely upon to implement a new national self-insurance or insurance scheme, and a 
related scheme for OHS. The chief power would be the corporations power. This would 
enable Australian Government legislation to achieve a high level of coverage of employers 
and their employees. Reliance on other constitutional powers would lead to legislation that 
was relatively less comprehensive in scope.  
Support by participants for the model was mixed.  
Participants such as the Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association (IRsub. 222, p. 2), 
Manpower Services (Australia) (IRsub.  178, p.  2) and Sing Tel Optus (sub.  57, p.  3) 
unequivocally supported the model. Sing Tel Optus considered that there would cost 
savings from self-insuring under the Comcare scheme, even in its existing state:  
Though there are weaknesses in the Comcare system — and some of the coverage they 
provide and some of the structures behind it seem at times to be overly generous and 
other times not necessarily consistent — by having one consistent scheme 
Australia-wide, the defects associated with the system, we believe, are far outweighed 
by the advantages. (trans., p. 301)  
For quite a number of participants, support was conditional on changes being made to the 
Comcare scheme. These participants included national employers such as Westpac 
Banking Corporation (IRsub. 229, p. 1), the Insurance Australia Group (sub. 89, pp. 14–
16), the Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia (IRsub. 237, p. 5) and the 
National Council of Self Insurers (sub. 168, pp. 21, 50; IRsub. 223, p. 2). Telstra (sub. 136, 
p. 3) held a similar view.  
For example, a survey of self-insured employers by the National Council of Self Insurers 
indicated that, while there was little support for the scheme as it exists, there would be 
increased support if the statutory benefit structure was changed (sub. 168, pp. 21, 50). In a 
subsequent submission, the Council considered that entry to the scheme should be ‘an 
optional choice’ for self-insured companies, and that it would require ‘significant 
modifications’ to the scheme before recommending it as an option to members 
(IRsub. 223, p. 2).  
Other participants did not support the model, or expressed strong reservations about it 
along the following lines:     
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•  employers would be ‘disadvantaged’ by a move to the Comcare scheme (Australia 
Meat Holdings, sub. 96, p. 8); 
•  being primarily a white collar scheme, Comcare is not designed for heavy industry 
(Injuries Australia, sub. 125, p. 9; The New South Wales Bar Association, IRsub. 190, 
para. 17); 
•  there are problems with the way claims are managed under the Comcare scheme 
(Injuries Australia, sub. 125, p. 9); 
•  the model would create a ‘two level process within a State where workers and 
employers are dealt with differently when the same circumstances apply’ (Workers’ 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission (Western Australia), sub. 137, p. 4); 
•  self-insurance, whether under the Comcare scheme or another national scheme, should 
be a ‘privilege not a right and any model that would increase the density of self-insurers 
is not supported’ (ACTU, IRsub. 186, para. 61; the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ 
Union, IRsub. 188, para. 12);  
•  workers would not benefit from a move to self-insurance under the Comcare (or other 
national) scheme (ACTU, IRsub. 186, para. 63; the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ 
Union, IRsub. 188, para. 13); 
•  the model would not apply to small- to medium-sized employers or unincorporated 
employers (the ACT Government, IRsub. 23, para. 41);  
•  the Comcare scheme, a statutory benefits scheme, does not perform as well as other 
schemes against a range of performance indicators despite its limited coverage and 
generally white collar pool (The New South Wales Bar Association, IRsub. 190, p. 5), 
particularly against the Queensland scheme which has access to common law damages 
(the Queensland Law Society, IRsub. 245, pp. 1–2; the Australian Plaintiff Lawyers’ 
Association, IRsub. 252, pp. 8–9); and 
•  the model would have adverse impacts on the viability of State and Territory schemes 
as well as on employers remaining in those schemes (Victorian Government, 
IRsub.  256; WorkCover Queensland, IRsub.  205, 225; Workers’ Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Commission (Western Australia), sub. 137, p. 5; the ACT Government, 
IRsub. 243, para. 24;). 
Many of these concerns were also raised about models B and C, which are outlined later in 
this chapter.  
The Commission has assessed this model against each of the four public policy principles 
that the Australian Government Minister takes into consideration when considering the 
eligibility of an employer for self-insurance under the Comcare scheme. Much of this 
assessment is also pertinent to models B and C. This sub-section concludes with a 
consideration of other matters about the model.      
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Impacts on employees  
All employees of a business which self-insured under the Comcare scheme would have the 
same legal entitlements regardless of the State or Territory they worked in. As the 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations noted, ‘all employees of an eligible 
corporation would have the same access to compensation and the same benefits’ (sub. 166, 
p. 23).  
The effects on employees from being subject to the Comcare scheme, particularly on their 
statutory benefits and workers’ compensation coverage, would be relative to the particular 
State or Territory scheme in which they were employed. For the majority of employees, 
statutory benefits could improve from a move to the Comcare scheme. According to 
worked examples in the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (WRMC) fourth 
Comparative Performance Monitoring report, the Comcare scheme ranked second amongst 
the schemes (behind the South Australian scheme) in terms of how its statutory benefits 
compared with pre-injury earnings, and the level of statutory benefits payable to injured 
high income employees (2002b, pp. 91, 94). Telstra noted:  
In comparison to the majority of State jurisdictions, the SRC Act has a generous 
weekly benefit rate for the first 45 weeks of incapacity, with 13 or 26 weeks being the 
usual period before reducing, notably in the two largest employing States, Victoria and 
New South Wales respectively. (sub. 136, attachment 2, p. 4)  
However, statutory benefits should not be seen in isolation from other scheme elements. 
The Comcare scheme offers more restrictive access to common law settlements than a 
number of other schemes and they are capped at a relatively low level. WorkCover 
Queensland believed that there would be a ‘loss of benefits’ under any national scheme 
that restricted access to common law settlements and said ‘the creation of a level playing 
field for statutory benefits comes at the expense of common law rights [in models A to C]’ 
(IRsub. 225, p. 5).  
Some multi-state employer participants considered that the model would enable greater 
attention to be given to the prevention of work-related injuries, illness and fatalities rather 
than, as currently, on compliance with different State and Territory schemes. As the Pacific 
National noted:  
Rather than being proactive and developing better prevention and implementation 
strategies, internal safety management staff must spend time training and researching 
jurisdictional differences. (sub. 169, p. 7)  
On the other hand, some workers who were previously covered under an existing State or 
Territory scheme might not be covered under the Comcare scheme (and possibly vice 
versa) because of differences in the definition of employee and in the use of deeming 
provisions. Elsewhere the Commission has recommended action to coordinate definitions 
between jurisdictions (model D).      
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Also, some participants considered that there were elements of the Comcare scheme which 
would adversely affect employees. The Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union noted 
that: 
... Comparative to other workers compensation systems, AMWU members covered by 
the Comcare system (Federal government employees e.g. Department of Defence) are 
generally treated more fairly and equitably. However, this is not necessarily the 
position of employees covered by self insurers under the Comcare system. The AMWU 
has required to be extremely active in supporting our injured members in those 
circumstances. With one of our large employers, union officials have been involved in 
negotiating arrangements additional to the provisions of the Act. ... the presence of an 
industrial agreement/policy on how claims are to be managed appears to be an essential 
factor in improving the claims management behaviour of self insurers. (IRsub. 231, 
para. 13) 
It also noted difficulties : 
... due to the lack of statutory time limits on the decision makers. Injured/ill workers 
have 30 days for reconsideration with internal review process and 60 days for an 
application to the external review process. No such time limits exist for the insurer, 
which is very unfair for those who are waiting for a determination on acceptance of 
liability. Financial hardship can be significant as workers use all their sick, annual or 
long service before having to rely on Centrelink payments. The system could be made 
more efficient by the introduction of time frames for the decision making processes. 
(IRsub. 231, para. 14) 
These concerns would not necessarily limit organisational change. The impacts on 
employees, were the employer to move to the Comcare scheme, could be a matter for 
discussion during enterprise bargaining negotiations. Should there be adverse impacts from 
a move, the employer may wish to offer countervailing benefits. 
Impacts on employers 
Major considerations for employers in deciding between adopting the Comcare scheme (or 
any alternative national scheme) and continuing with their existing State and/or Territory 
scheme(s) would include: costs of achieving and maintaining self-insurer status; level of 
current premiums (and, related to this, the effects of any cross-subsidies); the benefits 
payable to workers; claims and injury management efficiencies; and savings from dealing 
with only one jurisdiction. 
In self-insuring under the Comcare scheme, eligible employers could:  
•  avoid the costs and complexities of meeting different State and Territory scheme 
requirements. These include not only self-insurance requirements, but also situations 
where employers are currently self-insured under some State and Territory schemes, 
and pay into premium pools in other jurisdictions for various reasons, such as where      
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they do not meet the minimum employee criteria of particular jurisdictions (such as 
Queensland’s threshold of 2000 local employees);  
•  introduce equality across the full spectrum of compensation, rehabilitation and return to 
work for their workers; and 
•  introduce one corporate OHS and workers’ compensation culture and practice.  
As an example of cost savings, Sing Tel Optus estimated that it would save approximately 
$2 million of its annual workers’ compensation cost of $6 million, were it permitted to 
self-insure under the Comcare scheme (sub. 57, p. 11).  
There would also be improved competitive neutrality between private and Australian 
Government (or previous Australian Government) employers. Sing Tel Optus considered 
that, were it permitted to be self-insured under the Comcare scheme, it would: 
… be on a level playing field with Telstra so we can achieve the same competitive 
advantages as Telstra by being subject to the same, more efficient, workers’ 
compensation arrangements. (sub. 57, p. 3) 
Telstra pointed out that, in respect of its total incapacity payments under the Comcare 
scheme, there would be overall reduction on weekly benefits of about 10  per cent or 
$1.4  million a year if it were to come under State and Territory schemes (sub.  136, 
attachment 2, p. 4). 
However, there were various criticisms of the Comcare scheme, particularly of its statutory 
benefit structure (including its limited access to commutations), administration, licensing 
costs and dispute resolution processes.  
The National Council of Self Insurers believed that: 
… the benefits provided by, and administrative arrangements associated with Comcare 
in its current form could make it more costly for national employers operating across 
several jurisdictions. (IRsub. 223, p. 2) 
Among the concerns of the Westpac Banking Corporation about the Comcare scheme were 
the following: 
•  The need to adopt Comcare administrative policies and procedures are viewed as a 
constraint on Westpac’s ability to develop and implement its own tailored management 
programs, particularly in the development of rehabilitation policies and procedures.  
•  The benefits structure of Comcare is such that it provides benefits that are more 
generous in both monetary amount and the period over which benefits are provided 
than the state-based schemes.  
•  The availability of payment of normal weekly earnings up to 45 weeks under Comcare 
is seen as providing a disincentive to employees to effect rehabilitation during that 
time.      
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•  Without having performed an extensive cost/benefit analysis, it is questionable as to 
whether there is any financial benefit in terms of licence fees, bank guarantees, 
actuarial costs and audit costs. By way of example … Westpac’s national self-
insurance licence fees incurred for each State and Territory as at 30 September 2002 
were a total of $881,655.00. It is Westpac’s understanding that licence fees under 
Comcare would be for an amount between approximately $800,000.00 and 
$1,000,000.00. (IRsub. 229, p. 1) 
The Insurance Australia Group argued that:  
It is also questionable whether Comcare’s main dispute resolution forum — the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal — is suitable for resolving private sector disputes. 
(sub. 89, p. 15) 
Whether an individual employer will gain from a move to the Comcare scheme will 
depend on whether there is an overall increase in the costs of compensation and claims 
management for the employer and how this compares with any offsetting cost reductions 
(such as compliance cost reductions) and less tangible benefits such as those that derive 
from having a common OHS culture and uniform compensation arrangements. The 
outcomes of such a benefit–cost calculation is contingent on the circumstances of 
individual employers. In this vein, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
expected that: 
… national companies, with operations in a number of jurisdictions and in competition 
with Commonwealth entities, particularly those currently holding individual 
state/territory self-insurance licences, would carefully examine this option in the light 
of their own circumstances, licensing fees, the licensing conditions, and the application 
of the Commonwealth OHS Regime. (IRsub. 196, p. 11)  
As employers would have a choice as to whether they joined a national scheme using 
Comcare’s existing conditions, they would only do so if they assessed that the benefits to 
them exceeded the costs. It they did not, they would continue with their existing 
arrangements.  
Risk to the Australian Government 
The Commission sought the advice of the Australian Government Actuary on the risk to 
the Australian Government of allowing private employers to self-insure under the Comcare 
scheme (appendix B).  
The Australian Government Actuary advised that, if the self-insured employer meets its 
claims liability, there is no direct financial exposure to the Australian Government. 
However, there is a risk to the Australian Government if the licence of a self-insurer is 
revoked (say because of employer insolvency) and the bank guarantee fails to cover the 
claims liability incurred under the period of the licence. The bank guarantee:      
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•  may be of an insufficient amount because of: ‘expected insufficiency’; estimation 
error; failure of the reinsurer to cover certain claims; inadequate allowance for claims 
arising from insolvency or latent exposures; fraud; and higher than expected inflation; 
and 
•  is not accessible to the Australian Government (through Comcare) because the bank 
has failed, or because of fraud.  
In the case of the bank guarantee being of an insufficient amount, the potential exposure to 
the Australian Government is the residual level of claims liability (the difference between 
the whole of the claims liability and that portion that is covered by the bank guarantee). 
However, in the case of concurrent bank failure or fraud, the Australian Government could 
potentially be exposed to the whole of the claims liability.  
Whilst the Australian Government Actuary did not report directly on the size or probability 
of these risks (apart from noting that bank failure would be ‘very unlikely’), the 
Commission notes that instances of schemes being exposed to the claims liability of an 
insolvent self-insurer have been very few. Details of those few Australian self-insurance 
failures and subsequent government responses are given in chapter 12, box 12.1).  
To reduce the risk to the Australian Government, the Australian Government Actuary 
proposed that specific prudential requirements could be strengthened as follows: 
•  bank guarantee — requiring a minimum amount of $5 million, requiring catastrophe 
reinsurance retention (which the SRCC previously required), or imposing a blunter 
approach such as the central estimate of claims liability plus 40 per cent; 
•  reinsurance — providing for actuaries to advise on the entire reinsurance arrangement 
for approval under the scheme;  
•  financial capacity — requiring a different or additional hurdle such as a minimum level 
of net tangible assets, minimum wage roll, or some combination of these; 
•  actuarial valuation of liabilities — imposing an ‘approved actuary model’; 
•  reporting — improving the reporting requirements of self-insurers; and 
•  licence revocation — making more explicit the processes governing the revocation of 
the licence.  
The Commission notes that a review by Bateup Actuarial + Consulting Services (Bateup) 
of the Australian Government Actuary report (as well as of the Taylor Fry report, see later) 
was commissioned by the Law Council of Australia. Bateup expressed the view that the 
report provided a ‘sound discussion of the nature of direct financial risks to the 
Commonwealth’. She also considered that the areas of the prudential framework suggested 
for consideration of change also appeared reasonable but needed further investigation 
(2004, pp. 3–4 in IRsub. 250).      
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The Insurance Council of Australia expressed the view that prudentially regulating self-
insurers under the Comcare scheme, which is a long tail scheme, poses an ‘immense’ 
obligation on the regulator: 
In addition to establishing the value of the liabilities, the prudential regulation of self 
insurers requires you continually assess the financial viability of their business …    
[and considered]  
One solution to this problem is through the appropriate use of insurance to either a low, 
or perhaps even ground, level of internal exposure, with cover being provided by 
APRA licensed insurers. As the law currently stands, it is only through APRA licensed 
entities that the Commonwealth Government can be assured of effective prudential 
regulatory oversight of the balance sheet of the organisation carrying long term 
financial risk. (IRsub. 260, p. 2) 
In the Interim Report, the Commission expressed support for the Australian Government 
Actuary’s proposals to strengthen the financial capacity requirements. This would reduce 
the probability of an employer collapsing under the Comcare scheme, as only financially 
sound employers would be eligible to self-insure. Further, in the unlikely case that they do 
fail to meet their claims liability, the strengthened bank guarantee requirements would 
minimise the probability of the guarantee being insufficient. Additional measures to those 
proposed by the Australian Government Actuary which could also reduce the residual risk 
to the Australian Government are described in chapter 12 on self-insurance. 
The Commission notes that, since the Interim Report, the SRCC has reviewed its 
prudential requirements for self-insurers in consultation with the Australian Government 
Actuary. Its proposed new prudential conditions (box 5.3) are to apply to existing self-
insurers after 1 July 2004 and to new self-insurers from the date of licence commencement. 
The SRCC also proposes to undertake additional monitoring of self-insurers under the 
scheme. The new requirements appear to exceed those proposed initially to the 
Commission by the Australian Government Actuary. 
Impacts on the State and Territory schemes 
The model would impose some competitive discipline on the operation of State and 
Territory schemes.  
Several participants, particularly, State and Territory governments (for example, Tasmania, 
Western Australia, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory) considered that there 
would be adverse impacts on their schemes if employers exited to self-insure under 
Comcare (or a national self-insurance or insurance scheme). In general, their concerns 
about this model (as well as models B and C) focused on the possible premium increases 
for employers remaining in State and Territory schemes, particularly, small- to medium-
sized enterprises, rather than the viability of them.       
120    
 
The impact on premium rates in existing schemes should, in principle, differ according to 
whether those who exit are currently self-insured or premium payers.  
Currently self-insured 
If the exiting employer is currently self-insured and is paying the State or Territory scheme 
a licence fee and levy which reflects the administration cost of regulating it, then there 
should be minimal direct financial impact on the State/Territory scheme. The self-insured 
employer is already outside of the premium pool. Although the scheme would lose the 
financial revenue from the levies and fees, it would also forgo the administration cost.  
The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry pointed out that: 
... as many major corporations are already self-insured and pay only a licensing fee, 
rather than paying premiums to the WorkCover Authorities, ... the impact on 
jurisdictions financial viability and consequently premium rates would be minimal. The 
smaller jurisdictions already have a premium income based on SMEs and manage their 
business around their constituency. It could be argued that this is a management and 
efficiency issue rather than an issue of income stream. (IRsub. 196, p. 12)      
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Box 5.3  New prudential requirements for self-insurers under the 
Comcare scheme 
The SRCC has introduced the following new requirements for self-insurers under the 
Comcare scheme. The requirements apply to existing self insurers after 1 July 2004 
and to all new self-insurers from the time of licence commencement:  
•  The level of bank guarantee required of self-insurers will increase. Licensed self-
insurers will be required to obtain bank guarantees for an amount which is the 
greater of their outstanding claims liabilities at the balance date of their projected 
outstanding claims liability in 12 months (for 6
th year licensees), 18 months (for 4
th–
5
th  year licensees), or 24  months (for 1
st–3
rd  year licensees) calculated at the 
95
th percentile, plus one catastrophe reinsurance retention amount. The minimum 
bank guarantee will be subject to a minimum of $2.5 million and must be obtained 
from a bank which has a credit rating of, or equivalent to, Standard and Poor’s AA 
group or better.  
•  Licensed self-insurers will be required to advise the SRCC of any significant 
increase in employee numbers, any significant increase in the risk profile of the 
work undertaken, or any material change to its financial position.  
•  Yearly account must now be provided to the SRCC within seven days of the 
licensee having to produce them under the Corporations Act or Australian Stock 
Exchange listing rules.  
•  Requirements for licensed self-insurers to have liability reports prepared by suitably 
qualified and experience actuaries will be aligned with that of APRA. Actuaries must 
be a Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries Australia and have at least five years post-
qualification experience as an actuary in general insurance. Furthermore, the 
actuary must not be an employee of a partner of the organisation which provides 
financial audit services to the licensee or who in any way has a material financial 
dependence on the auditor.  
•  Other requirements will include: ensuring greater sufficiency in the claims 
administration component of the bank guarantee amount; requiring actuaries to 
describe and comment on the suitability of licensees’ reinsurance arrangements; 
and clarifying where a second liability report may be required.  
The SRCC has also adopted a process of financial monitoring of self-insurers to alert it 
of any impending failure. The process will involve using media and ratings agencies as 
well as reviewing self-insurers’ audited financial statements. The process, which will be 
outsourced, will be piloted prior to 1 July 2004.  
Source: Comcare, pers. com. 
 
 
There are, however, two caveats:  
•  the fixed costs of regulating self-insurers would have to be spread over fewer self-
insurers and, accordingly, levies and fees for those that remain in the State and 
Territory scheme may need to be increased; and       
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•  non-Australian Government employers self-insuring under the Comcare scheme would 
continue to be subject to State and Territory OHS legislation and, unless the Australian 
Government amended its own OHS legislation (as proposed in this report), this might 
necessitate the implementation by State and Territory governments of cost recovery 
mechanisms in those jurisdictions where OHS activity is funded from workers’ 
compensation premiums. Some schemes (for example, New South Wales) already have 
provisions to levy employers exiting to self-insure under the Comcare scheme to 
recover the costs of regulating them for OHS purposes. However, other schemes, such 
as Tasmania, do not.  
Currently premium paying 
If the exiting employer is currently a premium-payer under a State or Territory scheme, 
then there could be higher premiums for the remaining employers. This could occur if 
there were cross-subsidies between risk pools and if the exit was from pools that paid 
higher premiums than the costs they brought to the scheme. It could also occur within a 
risk pool, if the exit was of employers with below average contributions of risk. This 
situation could exist between large and small employers as has been explained by the 
Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA 2000). In addition, it could occur in risk pools 
where industry rates are affected by premium capping, as the capacity to provide such 
cross-subsidies from within a pool or the scheme could be compromised by the loss of 
firms paying uncapped premiums. Conversely, lower premiums may result if the exit was 
of employers who benefited from existing cross-subsidies. Thus, the influence of 
employers exiting to Comcare (as well as models B and C) on the premiums for those 
remaining in existing schemes depends on the nature and extent of cross-subsidies built 
into the schemes and the volume of insurance that would be lost. If the nature and extent of 
cross-subsidisation is small and the ‘loss’ of insurance business is small, then any influence 
on premiums for remaining employers would be very small.  
As indicated above, only a limited number of participants expressed an interest in self-
insuring under the Comcare scheme and many of those already self-insure in one or more 
jurisdictions.  
Cross-subsidies and small business 
In privately underwritten schemes, the nature and extent of cross-subsidies is likely to be 
limited by commercial considerations and competitive pressure among insurers. As the 
Insurance Council of Australia argued: 
… there would be few, if any, cross subsidies in a privately underwritten model unless 
forced upon insurers by some regulatory process. The reason for this is that the 
competitive dynamic of the market would act as an effective restraint on the “loading     
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up” of certain policies so that others could effectively be underpriced. (IRsub. 260, 
p. 4) 
In the publicly underwritten schemes, most governments have policies to limit the nature 
and extent of cross-subsidisation.  
Information available on the nature and extent of cross-subsidisation in existing schemes is 
dated and fragmentary. The RiskNet Group, quoting data prepared in 1999 by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers for the NSW Rating Bureau on NSW Employers’ Premiums 
Distributions averaged over seven years from the NSW scheme, provided the following 
indication of cross-subsidisation among premium bands during the 1990s: 
•  $1–$10 000 premium band, accounted for 26.3 per cent of premium, but 31.6 per cent 
of total claims costs (underpaying);  
•  $10  000–$100  000 premium band, accounted for 33.0  per cent of premium, but 
30.9 per cent of total claims costs (overpaying); 
•  $100  000–$500  000 premium band, accounted for 20.9  per cent of premium, but 
19.9 per cent of total claims costs (overpaying); and 
•  more than $500  000 premium band, accounted for 19.8  per cent of premium, but 
17.6 per cent of total claims costs (overpaying) (sub. 120, p. 7). 
The Economic Development Committee of the Victorian Parliament’s Inquiry into 
WorkCover Premiums for 2000/01 reported the Chief Executive of the Victorian 
WorkCover Authority stating in evidence that: 
... since about 1995/96 or 1996/97 there has been a relatively constant level of cross 
subsidy [from large (payroll of $4 million or more) to small (less than 20 employees) 
employers] in the scheme. It is now [2000-01] sitting at around $73.3 million ...    
and that   
... small business is paying 27 per cent of total premium, compared to their cost (to the 
scheme) which is 32 per cent. (2001, p. 55) 
The Victorian WorkCover Authority submitted that the cross-subsidy was a legacy of the 
bonus and penalty system which had applied before 1993 and that it ‘… has progressively 
been removing this cross-subsidy, in 1999-2000, the cross-subsidy of small business still 
represented about 3  per cent of premium or $50  million’ (2000, p.  25). Capping of 
premium rate increases was reported as one of the factors delaying its removal.  
As noted in chapter  10 on premium setting, although some cross-subsidisation is 
unavoidable for small to medium-sized employers (these are typically charged industry      
124    
 
rates), large employers should, in principle, be charged premiums that more closely reflect 
the expected costs they bring to a scheme (that is, be experience rated).2  
However, Bateup pointed out:  
... not all components of claims costs and expenses [of large employers] are experience 
rated (for example, large claims). [And] ... even if the employer is “experience” rated, 
cross-subsidies exist in some jurisdictions. If large employers were to leave the State 
schemes, the extent of any such cross-subsidisation would directly affect scheme 
finances (and the remaining small to medium sized employers). (2004, p.  5 in 
IRsub. 250) 
An example of how the mix of own claims expense (experience) and industry risk are 
changed with employer size in setting premiums is provided by the Victorian WorkCover 
Authority (2000, figure 7, p. 20). In that example, the contribution of experience is varied 
from 0  per cent at remuneration of $50  000 or less to a maximum of 90  per cent at 
remuneration of $1 billion. The relative contribution of claims expense is less with less 
riskier industries, but none-the-less contributes some 75 per cent of the total premium at a 
remuneration of $100 million. Different schemes use different schedules for defining the 
relative contribution of own claims expense and industry risk.  
The ACT Government reported that: 
The ACT workers compensation regulations require that insurers minimise, as far as 
possible, the extent of cross subsidisation both across and within industries. However, 
the relatively small size of many industries in the ACT means that it is not possible to 
eliminate cross subsidisation ... The withdrawal of large employers would have an 
impact on the size of the premium pool within industries and potentially across 
industries, depending on an individual insurer’s employer/risk profile. (IRsub.  243, 
para. 27) 
It also considered that the loss of premium from large employers could lessen the incentive 
of insurers to offer coverage in the Australian Capital Territory, leading to a lessening of 
competition in the market placing ‘… upward pressure on prices, with a negative impact 
on those smaller businesses who are unable to self-insure … [and that this] … has the 
potential to exacerbate an already difficult situation for scheme participants’ (IRsub. 243, 
paras 28, 33).  
Bateup believed that the resulting increase in premium rates for small and medium sized 
employers from loss of premium revenue with increased self-insurance ‘… could be due to 
                                                 
2 Whilst it is possible that an exiting multi-state employer has a policy covering a small number of 
employees in one or more State or Territory, for which it is not possible to eliminate cross-
subsidies, removing a few policies of this size from the premium pool would have a minimal 
effect on the premiums of those employers remaining in the pool.     
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both loss of claims cost subsidies from the large employers and/or an increase in their 
share of expenses due to the loss of economies of scale’ (2004, p. 6 in IRsub. 250).  
Scale economies 
One argument against allowing exit from State schemes is that the smaller pool may 
increase costs for the remaining employers by reducing the chance to exploit economies of 
scale (that is, reduce the chance to spread unavoidable fixed costs over a larger number of 
employers). This argument was advanced by a number of participants, including: Bateup 
(2004 in IRsub. 250); the Victorian Government (IRsub. 256); and WorkCover Queensland 
(IRsub. 225). 
Figure 5.1, which shows the schemes’ administration costs as a proportion of their income, 
suggests that there is no obvious correlation between administration costs and the size of 
the scheme.  
Figure 5.1 Administration  costs 








1999-00 13.6 13.5 15.6 19.4 15.8 22.6 20.1 48.1
2000-01 17.0 14.0 19.8 18.3 18.1 27.3 20.0 26.9
2001-02 23.8 19.9 28.8 19.5 23.5 29.2 20.6 15.1









Source: HWSCA (2003).  
The largest scheme (New South Wales) has higher costs than Western Australia and 
similar costs to South Australia. A number of other factors, such as whether the scheme is 
privately underwritten, may also influence administration costs. Economies of scope could 
be realised by insurers who were selling products other than workers’ compensation 
insurance. 
WorkCover Queensland reported that it maintains a regional presence in 24 locations 
throughout the State and that erosion of the premium pool could lead to downsizing and      
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centralisation of regional office functions, as had occurred with the progressive exit since 
1998 of 24 self-insuring employers, representing 15 per cent of premium and claims costs 
(IRsubs  205, 225). It reported that its regional presence was highly valued by injured 
workers and employers in remote areas.  
Premium volatility 
Another possible impact of exiting premium-payers is that premium volatility could 
increase in State and Territory schemes. The Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation 
Commission (Western Australia) said: 
There are concerns that the departure of large employers could have a negative impact 
on residual premium pools. Premium systems require industry premium pools of 
sufficient size to reduce the pendulum effect of large claims. (sub. 137, p. 5) 
The Queensland Government said: 
Large national employers leaving a State workers’ compensation scheme will directly 
contribute to increased risk and volatility in that scheme, increasing the burden for the 
other employers remaining in the scheme. It is not possible at this time to estimate the 
level of volatility, given the access points for any national scheme has not been 
determined. (sub. 154, pp. 16–17) 
There would only be an increase in the volatility of premium rates if the premium pool 
became so small that the pooling effect of insurance is lost. However, this is not supported 
by the evidence: 
•  schemes that have a small premium pool do not have increased volatility in premiums. 
The South Australian scheme has a pool that is significantly smaller than New South 
Wales and Victoria, and South Australia has allowed a large number of premium-
paying employers to exit the premium pool to self-insure; 
•  reinsurance policies can be taken out by the State or Territory scheme to reduce 
volatility; and 
•  privately underwritten schemes can involve very small markets (for example, the 
Australian Capital Territory) because insurers offer workers’ compensation as part of 
their overall business with individual firms.  
Impact on premiums  
For the Interim Report, the Commission sought actuarial advice from Taylor Fry on the 
impacts on premiums in the State and Territory schemes of enabling eligible employers to 
self-insure under the Comcare scheme (appendix D). The focus of that report was on the 
impacts of the exit of premium payers, although the impacts of exiting self-insurers were 
also considered briefly.      
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There were difficulties in obtaining the necessary data from several of the States selected 
for the Interim Report analysis. Accordingly, Taylor Fry relied upon alternative sources of 
data — the ABS for average weekly earnings by industry and jurisdiction and Dunn and 
Bradstreet for the numbers of employees in large corporations — and extended the analysis 
to all States and Territories. The data were used to estimate remuneration and then 
premiums. A limitation with this information is that it is not related directly to the 
remuneration (and thus premiums) of an employer for workers’ compensation purposes. 
The following were among the notable impacts identified by Taylor Fry: 
•  the estimated reduction in premium revenue for the State and Territory schemes from 
exiting premium-paying employers eligible to self-insure under the Comcare scheme 
could range from a likely $154 million or 2.7 per cent (if one in five employers exited) 
to a maximum of $771 million or 13. 5 per cent (if all eligible employers exited); and  
•  as large premium-paying employers in existing schemes tend to be charged experience-
rated premiums (and thus, should not in principle be cross-subsidising other 
employers), their exit should have a relatively neutral impact on the schemes.  
Taylor Fry also noted that, using data provided by the Tasmanian Government, if the 
number of self-insurers reduced from the current 15 to four, as a result of all those eligible 
exiting to join a national self-insurance scheme, then there would be a significant increase 
in individual regulatory contributions required to cover the same level of services. It said 
that the impact on the larger schemes would not be as great as that indicated for Tasmania, 
provided sufficient self-insurers remain. However, a subsequent analysis using Victorian 
data by am actuaries indicates that there could be a similar proportionate eligibility to 
transfer to national self insurance in Victoria (appendix D).  
However, those schemes with a small number of self-insurers (for example, the Northern 
Territory has six and the Australian Capital Territory has eight) have lower fees and levies 
for comparable self-insurers than imposed by schemes with more self-insurers. For 
example, a self-insurer in the Australian Capital Territory pays only $10 000 (plus GST) in 
licence application and administration fees over the three year period of the licence, which 
is considerably lower than the schemes with more self-insurers. This suggests that the fixed 
costs of assessing self-insurance applications and administering self-insurers on an ongoing 
basis, and thus the impacts of exiting self-insurers on those that remain, are likely to be 
very low.  
In her commissioned review of the Taylor Fry report, Bateup agreed that there is 
uncertainty in the results produced stemming from the inability of Taylor Fry to access 
scheme data which necessitated reliance on alternative data and the making of a number of 
subjective assumptions (2004, p. 4 in IRsub. 250). Comment on Bateup’s commissioned 
review by the principal author of the Taylor Fry report is provided at appendix D.      
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Subsequent to the Interim Report, am actuaries was asked to explore the sensitivity of the 
Taylor Fry results to varying levels of loss of premium revenue and levels of cross-
subsidies provided by exiting employers (appendix D and table 5.1). The results indicate 
that, with ‘plausible’ estimates of loss of premium revenue and cross-subsidies, the impacts 
on scheme average premium rates of model A would be very small. For example, based on 
an estimated level of exiting employers’ premium as a proportion of premium income 
falling between 2.7 per cent (if one in five employers exited) to 13.5 per cent (if all eligible 
employers exited); and cross-subsidies falling between 15  per cent to 25  per cent, the 
impact on average premiums would fall within the range of 0.3 per cent to just over 3.0 per 
cent. This represents an average percentage increase in premium rate and not an additional 
percentage point increase to the average premium. The impact on individual businesses 
would vary around the average.  
Table 5.1  Increase in scheme average premium rates for remaining 
employers  
per cent  
Assumed level of premium exiting scheme (per cent)  Assumed level of 
cross-subsidy 
(per cent)   2 4  6  8  10 12 14 16 18 20 
10  0.2  0.4  0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.3 
15  0.3  0.5  0.8 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.3 
20  0.3  0.7  1.1 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.2 
25  0.4  0.8  1.3 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.3 3.8 4.4 5.0 
30  0.5  1.0  1.5 2.0 2.6 3.1 3.8 4.4 5.1 5.8 
Source: Appendix D. 
Am actuaries noted that, while the estimates of cross-subsidies were based on its 
experience, information to determine the level of cross-subsidies between employers 
exiting and those remaining is ‘not readily available, mainly because of the difficulty in 
determining the “true” or expected cost for each employer’. The range of rates of cross-
subsidy used in the analysis is substantially larger than the publicly reported rates cited 
above.  
The recent availability to the Commission of Victorian data has enabled a check to be 
made on the previous analysis quantifying the impact that alternative national self-
insurance could have on the Victorian scheme’s remuneration base and premium pool. The 
data enabled more accurate classifications to be made of workplaces and of the ability to 
qualify for alternative national self-insurance, and hence a more accurate estimate of 
impacts. Using the same criteria for assessing a corporation’s potential to self-insure, the 
analysis estimated smaller effects than indicated previously. For example, under model A, 
if it was assumed that one in five of potentially eligible corporations were to transfer to the 
Comcare scheme, then the estimate of the premium reduction to the scheme would be 
1.6 per cent as opposed to the 2.7 per cent indicated by the Taylor Fry analysis. Similarly,     
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if it was assumed that all eligible corporate employers were to transfer to the Comcare 
scheme, then the estimate of the premium reduction would be 8.1 per cent as opposed to 
the 13.5 per cent indicated by the Taylor Fry analysis (appendix D).  
Other matters 
Outstanding claims liability 
When an employer moves from a State or Territory publicly underwritten scheme to self-
insure under the Comcare scheme, there would be an outstanding claims liability that needs 
to be managed. This would also arise when an employer moves between insurers in a 
privately underwritten scheme, or between paying premiums and self-insuring within a 
scheme.  
Essentially, there are two existing methods for managing outstanding claims:  
•  The employer could take responsibility for the outstanding claims. For an existing self-
insurer this would be a continuation of their current management of the claims. A 
premium-paying employer, however, would require a payment from the State or 
Territory scheme to cover the cost of managing the outstanding claims, as the premium 
it paid should have, in principle, covered the cost of those claims.  
•  Alternatively, the State or Territory scheme could manage the outstanding claims for a 
premium-paying employer from the premiums already paid.  
Under both methods, schemes in deficit could consider obtaining deficit-funding 
contributions from exiting employers. This currently applies in New South Wales.  
At present, there is no provision within the Comcare scheme to govern the situation where 
an employer were to exit and return to a State or Territory scheme. Amendments would 
need to be introduced to address this matter.  
Data 
A further effect of employers leaving a State or Territory scheme to self-insure under the 
Comcare scheme is that information about their claims may no longer be available to the 
State or Territory. The Queensland Government stated that:  
Queensland would be very concerned that a national scheme may undermine this 
comprehensive and consistent data record with various inclusions or exclusions of this 
States’ workers. (sub. 163, p. 18) 
The lack of data may hamper the scheme’s ability to regulate the employer for OHS. To 
overcome this concern, the SRCC could increase the reporting requirements for self-     
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insurers and pass the data on to the relevant State and Territory. This increased data 
collection would be reflected in the increased reporting requirements recommended by the 
Australian Government Actuary.  
An alternative national self-insurance scheme (model B) 
Under this model, the Australian Government could draft legislation to establish a new 
national self-insurance scheme for which all eligible employers could apply for a licence. 
The new scheme would operate as an alternative to the insurance and self-insurance 
arrangements of the existing State or Territory schemes. Unlike model A, this model would 
not be limited by the competition test. The Australian Government Solicitor has advised 
the Commission that the Australian Government could rely on its corporations power to 
enact the new national self-insurance scheme (box 5.3 and appendix C). 
The new scheme would need to have provisions for self-insurance licensing requirements 
(such as prudential and claims management requirements), definitions of ‘employee’, 
‘work-related injury or illness’ and ‘employer’, statutory benefits, injury management 
(claims management, return to work and rehabilitation) and dispute resolution. In terms of 
scheme design, the Australian Government could offer the current Comcare arrangements, 
or redesign particular scheme elements, such as the current long tail benefit structure and 
the dispute resolution procedures along the lines recommended in the following chapters. 
Whichever course is taken, consultation with key stakeholders would be required to 
facilitate its implementation. However, should a ‘blank sheet’ approach be taken to scheme 
design, there is a risk that the model would be significantly delayed or not be implemented.  
Either the Australian Government Actuary’s proposals to strengthen prudential 
requirements or the SRCC’s new prudential requirements (box 5.3 above) would address 
the Australian Government’s concerns about being further exposed to risk. Instruments to 
deal with residual risks are discussed further in chapter 12.  
However, because the new national self-insurance scheme would be based on the exercise 
by the Australian Government of its corporations power, it would not be available to non-
corporate employers.  
Smaller corporate employers may not, individually, meet the prudential tests. To deal with 
this, there may be scope within the new scheme to introduce provisions to enable smaller 
corporate employers to obtain a group self-insurance licence. Clayton observed:  
The prudential and size criteria which operate with respect to self-insurance preclude 
this option being open, on an individual basis, for small to medium size employers. 
However, especially in the United States from the 1950s, this barrier has been mitigated 
by the development of group self-insurance, an arrangement which allows employers 
engaged in similar industrial, commercial or professional area, or having a similar risk 
profile, to join together in a group which becomes a self-insured entity. It is thus a     
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mechanism through which comparatively small employers may achieve self-insured 
status. (1997, p. 7)  
In the United States of America, group self-insurance has become popular among certain 
groups of employers, such as local government, as workers’ compensation has become 
more difficult to obtain. However, a contentious issue has been ‘joint and several liability’ 
under which each member of the group assumes legal responsibility for all other members. 
As with model A, employers opting into this new national self-insurance scheme could 
also be covered by Australian Government OHS legislation. 
Like model A, participant support for this model was mixed. A number of participants 
supported the establishment of a national self-insurance scheme. For example, the Institute 
of Actuaries Australia argued that:  
A national self-insurance framework is needed, which would allow at least large 
national employers to self-insure on a uniform basis across Australia. (sub. 88, p. 3) 
At a minimum, national self-insurance would be available to large national employers, 
in parallel with the existing arrangements. (sub. 88, p. 19) 
The National Council of Self Insurers considered: 
A properly constructed national self insurance framework would lead to greater 
efficiencies, offer significant savings to companies operating in more than one state and 
contribute to the ability for companies to compete in the global market place. 
(IRsub. 223, p. 1) 
However, given that the scheme requirements remain uncertain, support from a number of 
employers was conditional on the design of the scheme and subject to stakeholder 
negotiations. For example, the National Australia Bank argued that its ‘preferred model 
would therefore be a national scheme that would be developed federally with all parties 
being involved’ (sub. 42, p. 6). 
Other participants were not supportive of this model. The Queensland Workers’ 
Compensation Self Insurers’ Association noted there were differing and diverse views 
among its members on a national scheme.  
Concerns have been expressed by a number of members in relation to the potential 
negative impact of a national scheme for Queensland based self insurers. 
A concern has been raised by some members on running two congruent schemes (one 
national optional scheme and one state based scheme), namely the confusion for service 
providers and workers if payment structures, costs and entitlements are different. 
As a matter of importance it is felt that any move towards national options or 
consistency should have primary regard for equality for national as well as state based 
self insurers.      
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The financial performance of the Queensland Scheme should be considered at length if 
national consistency is an option thus ensuring stakeholders in the Queensland Scheme 
are not disadvantaged in any way. (IRsub. 253, p. 1)  
The Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union supported the ACTU position that self-
insurance is a privilege and not a right and considered that: 
8. From the evidence provided by the Commission, it is clear that employers are 
supportive of a national self-insurance scheme, as long as its benefit levels and scheme 
structures are less than those under the current Comcare scheme. 
9. As the Interim Report gives little time or discussion to benefit levels and support 
arrangements that provide incentives for injured or ill employees via “benefit step 
downs and caps”, the AMWU assumes that the Commission itself is supportive of a 
benefit structure that would not see a replication of the current “comparatively high 
level of income replacement” under Comcare.  
10. The AMWU represents employees who are currently covered by the Comcare 
scheme. We have many difficulties with the administration of this scheme; however we 
will not support processes that advantage large employers who wish to self-insure by 
reducing the benefits currently paid to our ill/injured members covered by the Comcare 
scheme. (IRsub. 188, p. 2) 
And the NSW Minerals Council requested that coverage under model B (and model C) be 
‘broad and inclusive’ of all industry sectors, including the coal industry in NSW, to 
provide equitable access to competitive mainstream workers’ compensation arrangements’ 
(IRsub. 235). 
Comments on elements that would be desirable in a new scheme were provided by a range 
of participants and covered most elements. Most would have liked a more detailed 
proposal to comment on. Many based their comments on elements of the Comcare scheme 
that they considered should be changed to provide a better national scheme. Participants 
providing detailed comment on elements of model  B included: the Australia Industry 
Group (IRsub.  240); Australia Meat Holdings (IRsub.  247); the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (IRsub.  196); and the National Council of Self Insurers 
(IRsub. 223). Elements frequently mentioned by employers and employer organisations 
included benefit structures and dispute resolution.  
The Commission’s comments on individual elements of workers’ compensation schemes 
are provided in the following chapters.  
Most of the detailed comments on the implications of model A given above are applicable 
to this model. They differ in degree of impact on State and Territories to the extent that 
more employers would be able to avail themselves of the option of national self-insurance. 
The extent to which this would occur is a matter of conjecture and would depend in part on 
the detail of the scheme elements and how they related as a whole relative to the existing     
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schemes used by employers. However, analysis of Victorian data by am actuaries indicates 
that if it is assumed that one in five of eligible corporations were to transfer to national 
self-insurance, then it is estimated that ‘both scheme remuneration and premiums would 
reduce by around 4% to 5%’ (appendix D).  
An alternative national insurance scheme (model C) 
Depending on the performance of a nationally available self-insurance scheme and the 
nature of reform in the State and Territory schemes, the Australian Government may wish 
to consider an alternative national insurance scheme at a later date. An alternative national 
insurance scheme would require the exercise of the Australian Government’s constitutional 
powers and the establishment of new provisions.  
In the Commission’s view, private underwriting of such a scheme would be desirable. 
Although research into the relative merits of public and private underwriting suggests that 
sound management can be more important than the form of underwriting, the 
characteristics of private underwriting which promote themselves to the Commission are:  
•  capital risk being accepted by the capital markets;  
•  competition in the marketplace, with incentives for efficiency and innovation; and  
•  greater transparency of any governmental influence over premiums. 
Participants raised questions about the nature of the provisions of a national insurance 
scheme. Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd said: 
The most difficult issue will be achieving a workable national legislation. No doubt 
various elements will be taken from the existing schemes. However, which elements 
will be chosen? Will the elements most beneficial to employers be chosen? Will the 
elements most beneficial to employees be chosen? Will the elements most beneficial to 
multi-state employers be chosen? Will the elements most beneficial to single employers 
be chosen? (IRsub. 247, p. 2)  
Irrespective of the provisions, the added competition and ability to be covered for inter-
state operations under a single scheme would be welcomed by many small and medium 
businesses who operate inter state and would be too small to self-insure nationally. 
However, national employer organisation were varied in their views on this model. The 
Australian Industry Group said: 
We support the development of the model. We believe that the introduction of 
competitor scheme would have a positive impact for employers. However, there are a 
number of important concerns to be addressed before such a scheme could be 
implemented. (IRsub. 240, p. 17)  
The concerns it nominated related to cross-subsidies, benefit levels, private underwriting 
and fraud prevention.       
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The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, while supporting optional national 
self-insurance and more consistent State insurance arrangements, did not support the 
introduction of a national insurance option: 
On balance industry does not support the recommendations as many employers have 
concerns over the proposal and would oppose a move to a national workers 
compensation scheme. Whilst the proposal would ensure national consistency and a 
level playing field for all employers in terms of premium setting and conditions it does 
create its own problems and issue for employers and jurisdictions alike. (IRsub. 196, 
p. 13) 
The issues and problems it identified related to: its belief that there would be a tendency to 
increase cross-subsidies to the disadvantage of small and medium enterprises; the difficulty 
of gaining political agreement on a range of issues, including its recommendations to 
reduce premiums and close benefits loopholes; and the potential for growth in a 
‘compensation mentality’ (IRsub. 196, p. 13).  
Australian Business Limited (ABL) did not support the model, saying: 
We can see no valid reason for competition between national and state based schemes 
within a single jurisdiction. The vast majority of Australian businesses operate within 
one jurisdiction, most are small businesses. Small businesses present workers’ 
compensation schemes with particular challenges. For most small businesses workplace 
injuries are an unusual and irregular event. They do not and are unlikely to ever have 
the systems and approaches necessary for effective post injury management. As a 
consequence they are particularly reliant on the support available via the formal system, 
be that from the statutory authority, licensed service providers or others. We would be 
particularly concerned that this support, and the development of additional assistance to 
smaller businesses and their employees would be dissipated if spread across two 
jurisdictions. 
ABL would also be concerned that a competitive environment may result in unhelpful 
comparisons being made between the relative costs of the State and national schemes. 
As the Commission has noted the major determinant in scheme performance over time 
appears to be how the scheme is managed rather than the underwriting model. On 
balance we believe there would be a real risk that price differentials between the two 
systems will focus attention on the superficial differences between the schemes rather 
than the underlying cost drivers. (IRsub. 249, pp. 7–8) 
The opening up of a national scheme to all corporate employers would have potentially 
significant impacts on existing State and Territory schemes compared with models A and 
B. Those public schemes with large unfunded liabilities may need to arrange cover for 
those liabilities through appropriate ‘exit’ arrangements. Some of the smaller schemes may 
ultimately become unviable on a stand-alone basis if a significant number of employers 
switch to the national scheme. Nevertheless, the operation of a number of private 
underwriters in small jurisdictions such as Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the 
Australian Capital Territory attests to the capacity of insurers to operate with small     
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premium pools for any one class of insurance. Further, it is unlikely that the changes would 
occur at a pace that precluded the steady rationalisation of existing arrangements. 
Small and medium enterprises 
For small and medium enterprises, insuring nationally as opposed to regionally offers the 
scope for the further development of cost-saving innovations, such as the specialised risk 
pool provided to it members by the Pharmacy Guild in New South Wales. It would also 
facilitate the development of specialist support organisations, such as the Professional 
Employers Organisations (PEOs) which originated in the United States of America in the 
early 1980s.  
PEO’s contract with small to medium sized businesses to manage employee related issues 
such as workers’ compensation claims, payroll, payroll tax and OHS. The PEO hires the 
employees of a small to medium enterprise and leases them back to that company. They 
currently employ around 3 million employees in the United States of America and mostly 
deal with small employees with an average of 16 employees. PEOs also operate in Canada.  
Liability for OHS is jointly shared between the worksite employer and the PEO, so an 
employee leasing agreement normally includes an undertaking on the part of the worksite 
employer to implement safety measures and procedures designed by the PEO. This is a 
solution to the claim that small and medium enterprises often lack the resources to properly 
instigate safety measures. PEO’s also have better access to rehabilitation resources and a 
network of employment opportunities for injured workers who are unable to receive re-
employment at the pre-injury workplace. As a large purchaser of insurance, the PEO may 
be able to access premium discounts on workers’ compensation insurance that would not 
be available to individual small employers.  
An issue in the United States of America which would also be relevant in Australia is 
whether both the host employer and the PEO are covered by the exclusive remedy 
provided under workers’ compensation and therefore protected from common law action. 
In America, this is largely determined by statute in the relevant US State. In Australia, the 
corollary would be whether either the host employer or the PEO would be treated as a 
‘third party’ and therefore liable for common law damages in jurisdictions which otherwise 
prohibit these actions against an employer (such as South Australia). One answer may be 
to deem both to be ‘co-employers’ and establish joint liability. Related issues of labour hire 
in Australia are dealt with in detail in chapter 6.  
A national cooperative body (model D) 
Many participants were in favour of a cooperative approach to a national workers’ 
compensation framework. They included State and Territory governments (or their      
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agencies) as well as groups representing workers such as unions (with a bias to national 
consistency rather than national uniformity) and injured workers’ associations, as well as 
employer representatives. Indicative of their comments is the following statement by the 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry: 
… we do strongly advocate nationally consistent standards, regulations and systems 
managed and administered consistently by the jurisdictions, and the creation of 
mechanisms to make that happen. The objective should be for a co-operative approach 
between the Commonwealth and State/Territory governments while still leaving 
primary responsibility for these systems with the States. (trans., pp. 790–1) 
Such a cooperative approach can be fostered by institutionalising cooperation among the 
Australian, State and Territory governments on workers’ compensation matters. It would 
be independent of, and to operate in parallel to, the Australian Government’s own 
initiatives as set out under models A to C.  
The model would be developed differently from — but would, nonetheless, be broadly 
compatible with — that proposed for OHS in chapter 4. This reflects the Commission’s 
view, based on feedback from participants, that OHS should proceed immediately to 
progressive development of uniformity, whereas for workers’ compensation, there would 
be benefit in progressively developing greater national consistency.  
In the Interim Report, the Commission identified the following specific features of the 
model as it would apply to workers’ compensation: 
•  A national body established by Australian Government legislation. It would have a 
board of five to nine members with relevant expertise and skills in workers’ 
compensation matters.  
•  The national body would be directly accountable to the WRMC which would 
determine the priority areas requiring attention, make decisions on recommendations 
made to it, appoint members to the national body and oversight its performance.  
•  The national body’s main functions would be to develop standards for consideration by 
the WRMC, collect data and undertake/coordinate analysis and research, and monitor 
and report on the performance of workers’ compensation arrangements.  
•  The Australian, State and Territory governments would retain responsibility for 
implementation, with a view to improving the performance of their respective schemes 
and, over time, achieving greater national consistency. 
•  Funding of the national body would be shared by the jurisdictions. 
Initially, the national body for workers’ compensation could focus on developing 
nationally consistent scheme elements over which there is common agreement or where 
agreement is likely (for example, definitions of employee, employer and     
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wages/remuneration), rather than on intractable matters (for example, common law and 
private underwriting). 
It was envisaged that the national body for workers’ compensation and that for OHS, as 
proposed in chapter 4, would cooperate in areas where the responsibilities for one body 
could influence the progress of the other. This cooperation could be formalised by a 
memorandum of understanding between the two bodies which outlined consultation 
protocols and/or overlapping representation (for example, on a decision making or 
advisory panel). 
The national body for workers’ compensation would provide a forum for the jurisdictions 
to share their ideas and experiences on workers’ compensation matters, thus promoting 
some of the positive attributes of ‘competitive federalism’ as discussed in chapter 2. It 
would give a higher formality to the development of national consistency in workers’ 
compensation arrangements than that which currently applies through HWCA.  
There was considerable participant support for the basic thrust of the model as outlined in 
the Interim Report. Among the participants expressing unequivocal support were the 
Australian Industry Group (IRsub. 240, p. 6), the Insurance Council of Australia (trans., 
p. 1270), the National Association of Road Freight Operators (IRsub. 236, p. 4) and the 
Australian Meat Industry Council (IRsub. 234, p. 3).  
Participants supporting some aspects of the model, or advocating modifications to it, 
included the Queensland Council of Unions (IRsub.  241, p.  3), the Law Council of 
Australia (IRsub. 250, pp. 2–3) and Australian Business Limited (IRsub. 249, p. 8).  
However, participants such as the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(IRsub.  196, p.  14), WorkCover New South Wales (IRsub.  255, p.  3), the ACT 
Government (IRsub. 243, para. 44) and WorkCover Queensland (IRsub. 255, p. 1) did not 
support the model as outlined, considering that existing arrangements through HWCA 
were adequate.  
The following examines some specific issues about the model as well as participants’ 
concerns in response to the Interim Report.  
Is there a need for a new national body? 
Some participants considered that the existing cooperative arrangements through HWCA 
were appropriate and working well and, accordingly, suggested that there was no need for 
a new national body for workers’ compensation. The Workers’ Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Commission (Western Australia) said that: 
… [the HWCA] model is not overarching but genuinely leaves primary responsibility 
for workers’ compensation to the states and territories, relying on beneficial      
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competition between schemes to drive scheme improvements and service delivery 
innovations. (sub. 137, p. 6) 
The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry considered that the: 
The proposed interim arrangements [for a national scheme] overseen by a small expert 
board [with functions as broadly proposed by the Commission] will be an ineffective 
and cumbersome process, which would not operate any more effectively than the 
current processes under the more consultative jurisdictional processes of [the Heads of 
Workers’ Compensation Authorities]. (IRsub. 196, p. 14–15) 
Furthermore, it said that the model would ‘lock in an expectation, even perhaps a pre-
determined certainty, that a national scheme will be introduced some time in the future’ 
(IRsub. 196, p. 14).  
Some State and Territory government participants considered the model would duplicate, 
rather than replace, existing cooperative arrangements for workers’ compensation. The 
WorkCover New South Wales was of the view that: 
The HWCA has been an effective body for jurisdictions to discuss and agree on 
consistent approaches to workers compensation arrangements. The establishment of a 
new body to oversight workers compensation, with funding shared by jurisdictions, is 
not supported on the basis that it would simply add another level of bureaucracy 
without any evidence of improved outcomes for either injured workers or employers. 
(IRsub. 255, p. 3) 
The ACT Government did not support:  
.. the establishment of a new national body that would require additional funding to be 
provided by the States and Territories. These functions are already being performed by 
the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities … and no duplication or additional 
bureaucracy is necessary or desirable. (IRsub. 243, para. 44) 
It also noted that the monitoring of schemes, including data collection is already 
undertaken through the WRMC, with the publication of outcomes in comparative 
performance monitoring reports (IRsub. 243, para. 43).  
Attention was drawn by State and Territory government participants to the work facilitated 
through HWCA. WorkCover New South Wales observed that cross-border arrangements 
was an example of ‘successful cooperation’ between the jurisdictions (sub.  151, p.  2). 
Similarly, the ACT Government noted the:  
... the recent agreement to resolve long-standing cross-border workers compensation 
issues, and the amount of work that has already been done to improve consistency 
between jurisdictions. This is particularly evident in jurisdictions that share borders, 
such as the ACT and NSW, where significant elements of injury management processes 
are identical. (IRsub. 243, para. 46)      
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Nonetheless, while not reflecting on the professionalism or goodwill of its members, there 
is good reason to doubt the effectiveness of HWCA. Since 1997, when it released its report 
Promoting Excellence: National Consistency in Australian Workers’ Compensation, 
HWCA’s momentum for national consistency has slowed. Its work is now confined to 
reporting on comparisons between the jurisdictions’ workers’ compensation (and OHS) 
arrangements. Also, although cross-border arrangements are now being put in place in 
some jurisdictions, discussions commenced some ten years ago and implementation 
resulted from action initiated unilaterally by Queensland. Moreover, as noted in chapter 2, 
although these cross-border arrangements are intended to reduce compliance costs for 
employers, there is still ongoing uncertainty and confusion amongst employers about 
certain aspects.  
Several State and Territory government participants considered that formalising existing 
cooperative arrangements for workers compensation would be useful. The ACT 
Government considered that: 
The HWCA is already well progressed in identifying and prioritising key outstanding 
issues in national uniformity for workers compensation. It is submitted that formalising 
the role of the HWCA, and requiring this body to report to the WRMC would be 
preferable to establishing an additional body that will duplicate most of the HWCA’s 
work. The HWCA should be asked to progress priority national policy issues, including 
significant areas not fully dealt with by the Commission’s inquiry, such as cost-shifting 
associated with the loss of superannuation and retirement savings associated with work-
related injuries. (IRsub. 243, para. 47) 
WorkCover Queensland suggested that: 
The problem of consistency across jurisdictions would be far better addressed through 
the formation of a small, professional committee. The nucleus of this committee could 
emanate from the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities (HWCA) or the 
Workplace Relations Ministers. Ideally, legislation could be enacted to formalise 
HWCA, which currently has neither the formal mandate nor the power to make and 
implement recommendations. Clearly, this committee would need fair representation 
from each state, and should not be driven solely out of the New South Wales or 
Victorian arenas. (IRsub. 225, p. 1)  
The Commission accepts the view that duplication of existing cooperative arrangements 
for workers compensation would be undesirable and unnecessary. It envisages that 
model D would incorporate these arrangements, including absorbing HWCA. However, 
the national body should not be purely a formalised HWCA, as suggested by some 
participants.       
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Specific features of the model 
Participants expressed a range of views on specific features of the model — including the 
composition of the board of the national body, stakeholder representation, the role of 
HWCA, the appropriateness of the WRMC, and the relationship between the new body and 
the WRMC.  
The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry expressed the view that:  
The proposal for an interim board is we believe an unworkable proposal and ACCI 
would not support the proposal for the following reasons:  
•  There appears to be no effective role for industry as there is no designated industry 
representative.  
•  Board members are subject to political appointment.  
•  The function set out [as proposed by the Commission] would in effect create a new 
Commonwealth bureaucracy.  
•  There are no cost or operational benefits articulated in the proposal. (IRsub.  196, 
pp. 15)  
The Law Council of Australia envisaged that the national body:  
… would be a representative body including governments and key stakeholders (such 
as unions, employers and the legal profession), which would develop standards for 
implementation by individual jurisdictions. These standards would be the “national 
frameworks” for workers’ compensation, and would be subject to continuous 
monitoring in terms of their take-up and effectiveness in individual jurisdictions. 
(IRsub. 250, p. 6) 
Australian Business Limited expressed the view that any national body ‘should ensure the 
representation of industry, as essential to achieving improved workplace safety and 
rehabilitation outcomes’, be independent of government and free to conduct research that it 
deems relevant ‘without having to take into account political and other pressures that arise 
from time to time’. It further considered that the body could generate sufficient support 
from industry and other interested parties to be self-sufficient, but would benefit from a 
‘reasonable level of seed funding which will also give it sufficient time to establish its 
credentials. This, in our view would be a legitimate application of public monies, 
particularly as the commitment would be limited both in quantum and time’ (IRsub. 249, 
pp. 8–9). 
The ACT Government said it was unclear that: 
... the body proposed by the Commission would include any representation from the 
ACT, or whether there would be any mechanisms to ensure that the views of ACT 
employees, businesses and the community would be adequately represented. 
(IRsub. 243, para. 45)     
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While not commenting on the model specifically, the ACTU expressed the view that: 
National consistency objectives and policies should be developed through a tri-partite 
representative body of employer, employee and government members. (IRsub.  186, 
p. 12) 
Several participants expressed concern that the WRMC, to which the national body would 
present advice and recommendations, would not be appropriate in relation to workers’ 
compensation matters. Aon noted that: 
History and past performances indicate this council experiences division due to party 
politics and power politics, depending on electoral cycles and other government 
business being negotiated, such as trade-off opportunities. (sub. 73, p. 5) 
The Tasmanian Government also expressed the concern that the Council: 
… is largely dominated by industrial relations issues, which may, at times, overshadow 
important OHS and workers’ compensation issues. This may be accentuated in 
jurisdictions where industrial relations, OHS and workers’ compensation are not within 
the same ministerial portfolio. (sub. 135, p. 3) 
Many of these matters have been traversed, or are similar to those discussed, in chapter 4 
in relation to the cooperative model proposed for OHS. In view of that discussion, as well 
as participants’ comments above, the Commission considers it particularly desirable that: 
•  the national body should have appropriate and effective levels of independence, 
expertise and accountability; 
•  there should be minimal duplication of existing cooperative arrangements; and 
•  stakeholder input should be of an advisory nature only.  
Accordingly, the revised features of the model would be as follows: 
•  A national body would be established by Australian Government legislation and would 
have an independent board of five to nine members with relevant expertise and skills in 
workers’ compensation matters.  
•  Because the national body would be established by Australian Government legislation, 
members of the board would need to be accountable (and issue an annual report) in the 
first instance to the relevant Australian Government portfolio minister. The minister 
would appoint board members, subject to approval by the WRMC. The board could 
also issue an annual report to the WRMC. 
•  The national body’s main functions would be to develop nationally consistent scheme 
elements for consideration by the WRMC, collect data and undertake/coordinate 
analysis of research, and monitor and report on the performance of workers’ 
compensation schemes. It is envisaged that the current WRMC performance monitoring 
role would be transferred to the national body.       
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•  The WRMC would decide on recommendations of the national body and determine 
priority areas for the national body’s attention.  
•  The Australian, State and Territory governments would retain responsibility for 
implementation, with a view to improving the performance of their respective schemes 
and, over time, achieving national consistency.  
•  Funding of the national body would be shared by the jurisdictions.  
•  The national body would have the ability to appoint advisory committees. For example, 
it could appoint:  
–  an advisory committee consisting of non-government stakeholders such as 
representatives of employers (including of small and medium enterprises), insurers, 
self-insurers, workers (including injured workers), lawyers, medical providers and 
allied health professionals, and rehabilitation providers, to formalise advice on 
stakeholder concerns; and  
–  an advisory committee consisting of government regulatory officials from the 
Australian, State and Territory agencies responsible for administering workers’ 
compensation arrangements to formalise advice on operational matters. This committee 
could absorb the existing HWCA. It could also include regulatory officials from the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.  
Progress towards national consistency 
Progress towards national consistency through the national cooperative body alone would 
most likely be slow and inconsistencies would remain for a long time. The Victorian 
Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry said that establishing a national body to 
advance consistency (and uniformity) may not be a solution and drew attention to the slow 
progress made in road transport and the work of the (then) National Road Transport 
Commission (sub. 66, pp. 7–8). The Business Council of Australia noted in relation to 
workers’ compensation (and OHS) that: 
Over the last 20 years there have been a number of attempts to develop and implement 
national standards on the basis of cooperation between the Commonwealth, States and 
Territories. None of these have been fully successful. (sub. 143, p. 1) 
It may be difficult for a national body to reach meaningful agreements on a wide range of 
matters, given that workers’ compensation arrangements need to be seen in their entirety, 
consisting of inter-related elements reflecting the unique trade-offs and bargains made 
among different stakeholders in each jurisdiction over time. The Northern Territory 
Government observed: 
A cooperative approach, which involves all jurisdictions in the process of developing 
nationally consistent workers’ compensation standards appears reasonable. However, 
given the variety of workers’ compensation schemes across jurisdictions, achieving     
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consensus would be difficult and as such, would require substantial commitment by all 
jurisdictions. The Territory is committed to working towards nationally consistent 
standards where achievable and appropriate. (sub. 144, p. 14) 
And Skilled Engineering said: 
… although Model D, a national cooperative model, is good in theory it is unlikely to 
happen as there are too many political agendas and too much compromise between the 
states and territories. (IRsub. 208, p. 8) 
The Law Council of Australia recognised the concern that the cooperative nature of the 
model would ‘produce only slow or minimal reform’ and suggested the model incorporate 
mutual recognition (which it called ‘model D+’): 
Mutual recognition would allow multi-jurisdictional employers of a minimum size 
(which would have to be decided upon) to obtain workers’ compensation coverage in 
the employer’s “home” State or Territory jurisdiction for its workers located in other 
States or Territories. This would allow for a degree of competition between States and 
Territories so as to encourage best practice, within the cooperative approach of 
Model D. (IRsub. 250, p. 9)  
Indeed, it is envisaged that, model D would allow for agreements between governments 
that could facilitate mutual recognition of certain aspects of workers compensation 
arrangements, including if necessary, in relation to self-insurance licensing requirements. 
The agreements could be implemented through the new national body. The issues arising 
with such arrangements are discussed further in chapter 12.  
The relationship between workers’ compensation arrangements and other statutory 
compensation schemes, such as compulsory third party schemes, would add complexity to 
the model. The New South Wales Bar Association alluded to this and submitted that a ‘co-
operative model on peripheral issues such as journey claims is inappropriate whilst 
different compensatory regimes exist in third party insurance’ (sub. 64, p. 4). 
Concerns about slow progress towards national consistency suggest that the focus of a 
national body on workers’ compensation may well be more successful, initially, on core 
technical and other matters, such as the definition of ‘employee’, ‘employer’ and ‘wages’ 
which are a source of added compliance costs for employers operating in more than one 
jurisdiction.  
The Australian Industry Group was cognisant of the ‘political obstacles’ that are seen ‘all 
too frequently in any co-operative forum between the Commonwealth and the States and 
Territories’: 
We think these obstacles can be overcome by a concentration of the new body’s energy 
on priority issues which are aimed at achieving consistency in the areas of workers’ 
compensation that generate compliance costs for employers who operate in more than 
one state or territory. (IRsub. 240, p. 21)      
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It went on to identify the areas of priority for the immediate, medium and long term: 
We see the highest priority areas as:  
•  The development of a national data set on workers compensation.  
•  Uniform national definitions of “employer” and “employee”. … 
•  Uniform national definitions of “illness and injury”. … 
•  Uniform national definitions of “work relatedness”. … 
•  Uniform national definitions of attribution. … 
•  A uniform national approach to notification of injuries and incidents.  
•  A uniform national definition of pre injury weekly earnings.  
•  A uniform national approach to the role of consultation with employees including the 
posting of policies and legislation.  
Issues for the medium term should include: 
•  Given the weaknesses we have expressed earlier in having competing systems of 
benefit levels, uniform national benefit structures including dealing with the issues of 
common law, commutations and journey and recess claims. … 
•  Dispute resolution.  
The other areas such [as] underwriting and premium setting should be considered in the 
longer-term context of developments in the workers’ compensation area. (IRsub. 240, 
pp. 21–2)  
The Commission is of the view that the proposed agenda of the new national body is a 
matter for the WRMC, on the advice of the new board, to determine. Further consideration 
of individual matters, including appropriate principles to guide the development of each, 
are set out in ensuing chapters. 
If an alternative national self-insurance model were implemented, it may accelerate 
progress under this model towards national consistency amongst existing schemes. A 
possible national insurance scheme (model C) may eventually be necessary if there is little 
progress in other forums. 
A new national approach for the catastrophically injured 
A national approach to the funding of long term care of the catastrophically injured has 
been the subject of discussions among the Australian, State and Territory governments in 
ministerial meetings on insurance issues. The catastrophically injured are generally persons 
with spinal cord injury (paraplegia and quadriplegia), brain injury or other major trauma 
(for example, severe amputations) who require lifetime care of a specific type (for 
example, home nursing and personal care) (PwC 2003).      
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The total annual compensable cost of claims from the catastrophically injured is estimated 
at around $520 million to $600 million. An estimated 61 per cent of catastrophic injuries 
are caused by motor accidents (and thus funded predominantly by compulsory third party 
schemes), 15 per cent are due to public liability negligence, 13 per cent are due to the 
workplace (and thus funded by workers’ compensation schemes), and 11 per cent are due 
to medical negligence (PwC 2003). 
The interest in a national approach to the catastrophically injured arises because of various 
concerns about existing funding arrangements which include the following:  
•  services to the catastrophically injured are provided or purchased by many and varied 
organisations; 
•  coverage and benefits vary by injury type and compensation status (box 5.4); 
•  lump sum payments do not adequately provide for long term care; and 
•  there is very little consistency in the definition, entry points or eligibility criteria for the 
catastrophically injured (Institute of Actuaries Australia Long Term Care TaskForce 
2003 and Moran 2002). 
 
Box 5.4  Varying approaches to the funding of long term care 
The funding of the care received by a catastrophically injured person varies 
considerably depending on the cause and type of accident — whether work-related, 
traffic-related, medical negligence, bad luck or misadventure. For example, a 
catastrophically injured person can receive under: 
•  all workers’ compensation schemes, no fault periodic payments, with common law 
lump sums available in Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania and the 
Australian Capital Territory; 
•  public liability (including medical indemnity), common law lump sums; and 
•  compulsory third party schemes, no-fault payments in Victoria, Tasmania and 
Northern Territory and common law lump sums in other jurisdictions. 
Source: PwC (2003).  
 
 
For an individual workers’ compensation scheme, the catastrophically injured (which is a 
small sub-group of long tail claimants) accounts for only a small proportion of the total 
number of claims, but a larger proportion of overall scheme cost. For example, McKinsey 
& Company in its recent report of the New South Wales WorkCover scheme estimated that 
catastrophic injuries represented about 100 new claims a year or less than 1 per cent of all 
claims, but about 5 per cent of the scheme’s outstanding claims liabilities (2003, p. 49). 
Claims can significantly impact on employers and on the financial cost of those schemes 
that do not shift a proportion of these costs to the Australian Government.      
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A national approach to the funding of long term care of the catastrophically injured has a 
number of advantages. A key advantage is that it would have the potential to ensure that a 
minimum standard of care could be provided to this group of injured persons regardless of 
the cause of accident. However, there would be challenges in devising an appropriate 
scheme, particularly in relation to its financial management (for example, sources of 
funding and asset management) and operation and administration.  
The Commission accordingly supports the current review by the Australian, State and 
Territory governments of these matters. 
5.3  The Commission’s proposals for a national 
workers’ compensation framework 
Existing national coordinating mechanisms have proven ineffective in resolving the 
compliance complexities and costs for multi-state employers. Although an objective of 
HWCA is to develop initiatives which promote ‘consistency’ of scheme design and 
administration, the tangible outcome of its efforts over the last five years has been on 
providing comparative information about the schemes. The WRMC, whilst generating 
comparative performance monitoring information, is primarily concerned with industrial 
relations matters. 
Each of the models set out above has merit and, taken as a package, would form an 
implementation strategy which could progressively reduce the compliance burdens and 
costs for multi-state employers and the mobile workforce.  
In essence, the proposed strategy is for the Australian Government to introduce model A 
immediately, and commence drafting appropriate legislation for the alternative national 
self-insurance scheme under model B. The appropriateness and timing of implementing 
model C could be assessed at a later date. These schemes would operate in parallel to 
existing State and Territory schemes. The expectation from model  D would be for an 
increasing level of consistency of schemes across Australia. In this respect, it must be 
recognised that a change to any one element of a scheme can have far reaching and 
unexpected impacts on overall scheme outcomes. Actuaries typically suggest that it takes 
up to five years to determine the outcome of any change. 
The Commission has no evidence of support by the States and Territories for a single 
uniform national workers’ compensation scheme. Many of the stakeholders at the 
individual jurisdictional level have suggested that concessions won in hard fought 
negotiations would not be willingly surrendered for the sake of national uniformity. For 
example, Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd said it:     
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… opposes any move towards national uniformity in workers compensation. We 
support the retention of the state-based workers compensation jurisdictions. Employers 
who currently operate in Queensland would be drastically disadvantaged if they had to 
operate under a scheme that was more like any other jurisdictions. This is because in 
our view as a national based Queensland based business that this scheme is the most 
economically viable. (IRsub. 247, p. 1) 
Importantly, the Commission does not support national uniformity of workers’ 
compensation for its own sake. In arriving at this view, the Commission recognises that the 
majority of employers (who are predominantly small to medium enterprises) and their 
employees operate only within a single jurisdiction. To them, national uniformity has little 
relevance. Further, it is not apparent that there is any single perfect or best scheme. Best 
practice can be reflected in a number of different ways and schemes must constantly adapt 
to the wider socio-economic environment within which they operate. Innovation and 
learning should be encouraged. It is for these reasons that, when commenting on the 
various elements of workers’ compensation schemes, the Commission has sought to 
highlight the important principles upon which individual elements should be based and 
indicate their implication for choice of appropriate measures, rather than focus on the 
choice of measures for individual elements of the scheme per se.  
Implementation issues 
To enable the early provision of some of the benefits to the economy from improved 
national frameworks for workers’ compensation, the Commission considers that the 
initiation of models A and D could be undertaken immediately. For model A, as indicated 
above, the Minister should indicate his willingness to declare as eligible for self-insurance, 
corporations that qualified under the SRC Act. The prudential supervisory arrangements 
that have been discussed could be used to vet applications and provide ongoing 
monitoring.  
Likewise for model D, the Australian, State and Territory governments could indicate their 
willingness to focus on developing and adopting nationally consistent scheme elements 
over which there is likely to be common agreement, such as in definitions of employee and 
employer, and the remuneration basis for premiums.  
To facilitate decision making by employers about their possible uptake of model A, the 
Australian Government should also preface legislative action about extending the scope of 
its OHS regulatory regime to qualifying self-insurers. It could also preface, at an early 
stage, the consultative arrangements for determining individual elements of model B.  
To minimise the costs of delay, the Commission considers that the development of the 
detail of model B should be based on consultation around an existing operational scheme, 
such as Comcare, rather than using a ‘blank sheet’ approach for its design. Such an      
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approach would focus the consultation process on rebalancing a few major elements of the 
scheme on ‘best practice’, rather than seeking to achieve a new balance over all elements at 
the one time. The latter has a higher risk of delay and of failure as it would be more 
difficult to determine a balanced outcome.  
All the negotiations about future models should focus on the core objectives of workers’ 
compensation — adequate financial compensation; appropriate rehabilitation and return to 
work; affordable premiums; and full funding by employers.  
The Commission considers that the stepped implementation which has been recommended 
is a cautious approach which permits the impacts of improved national frameworks for 
workers’ compensation to be revealed to all stakeholders in a controlled manner. 
Adjustments and reviews could be made along the way as and when required.  
Institutional arrangements 
The Commission considers that the exiting institutional arrangements for Comcare would 
require extensive modification and development to support the Australian Government’s 
expanded role in providing better national frameworks for workers’ compensation (and 
OHS). The existing operation of the regulatory framework provided by the SRC Act 
effectively results in the regulator, the SRCC, being a stakeholder body embedded within 
Comcare, rather than a stand-alone regulator. As was prefaced in chapter 4, what would be 
required for good regulatory governance is:  
•  the establishment of regulatory functions by statute;  
•  a separation of regulatory functions from service functions; and  
•  establishment of regulatory independence through (a) the appointment of 
Commissioners with the requisite experience and skills to direct the regulator’s 
operations and be held accountable for them, and (b) appropriate funding and staffing 
of the regulator to undertake the specified regulatory functions.  
In keeping with its stepped approach to expanding nation-wide provision of worker’s 
compensation under a single scheme, the Commission considers there should be 
incremental growth and development of the institutional arrangements for its regulation. In 
part, this would be dependent on growth in the required regulation.  
As the first step, model A, involves regulation of additional employers under the existing 
Comcare scheme, it could be undertaken with the existing regulatory arrangements. 
However, with increased regulatory demand and to avoid conflict of interest developing, or 
the appearance of the same, a minimalist option would be to provide the SRCC with 
dedicated resources from within Comcare to act independently and administratively ‘ring 
fence’ its regulatory functions from Comcare’s operations.      
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The second step, model B, involves legislative action to establish an alternative national 
self-insurance scheme. It is anticipated that it would involve a substantial increase in 
regulatory requirement. Either at this stage or earlier, the Commission considers that 
legislation should be introduced to revamp the governance structure as well as operational 
independence of the existing regulator along the lines of that required for good regulatory 
governance, as indicated above.  
The final step, model  C, involves establishing an alternative national workers’ 
compensation insurance scheme. This would involve a further substantial increase in 
regulatory requirement as insurers were approved to enter (and exit) the scheme. However, 
their prudential supervision would continue to be provided by the Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority.  
Further details of the existing and revised institutional arrangements which would be 
appropriate to support an expanded Australian Government role in the provision of 
worker’s compensation under an alternative national scheme are given in appendix E on 
institutional arrangement for national worker’s compensation frameworks.  
The Commission recommends that the Australian Government develop an alternative 
national workers’ compensation scheme to operate in parallel to existing State and 
Territory schemes by taking the following steps progressively: 
•  step 1 — immediately encourage self-insurance applications from employers who 
meet the current competition test to self-insure under the Comcare scheme, subject to 
meeting its prudential, claims management, occupational health and safety and other 
requirements; 
•  step 2 — commence, at the same time, the development of an alternative national 
self-insurance scheme for corporate employers who wish to join such a scheme, and 
who meet prudential, claims management and other requirements; and 
•  step 3 — in the longer term, consider the establishment of an alternative national 
premium-paying insurance scheme for corporate employers who so wish, including 
small to medium enterprises, which would be competitively underwritten by private 
insurers and incorporate the national self-insurance scheme established under step 
2. 
The Commission recommends that the current regulatory framework for the oversight of 
the Australian Government’s workers’ compensation schemes and occupational health 
and safety regimes be strengthened by progressively developing the Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation (SRC) Commission as a stand-alone regulator. The 
SRC Commission to: 
RECOMMENDATIONS      
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•  be controlled by a board of independent directors appointed for a fixed term on the 
basis of their expertise and skills; 
•  have a full-time director appointed as chairperson; and  
•  be provided with its own staff and funding. 
The Commission recommends that, independent of, and operating in parallel to, the 
progressive development of a national workers’ compensation scheme, the States and 
Territories join with the Australian Government to establish immediately a new national 
body for workers’ compensation having the following features:  
•  establishment by Australian Government legislation with an independent board of 
five to nine members appointed by the Minister on the basis of their relevant 
expertise and skills, the appointment to be approved by the Workplace Relations 
Ministers’ Council (the Council);  
•  it would develop nationally consistent scheme elements for consideration and 
approval by the Council, collect data and undertake/coordinate analysis of research, 
and monitor and report on the performance of workers’ compensation schemes. It 
would take over the current performance monitoring role of the Council; 
•  its priority work areas would be determined by the Council; 
•  it would have the ability to appoint advisory bodies, noting the importance of 
stakeholder concerns and operational matters to maintaining the contemporary 
relevance of workers’ compensation schemes; and  
•  its funding would be shared by the jurisdictions.  
The Australian, State and Territory governments would retain responsibility for 
implementation, with a view to improving the performance of their respective schemes 
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6  Defining access and coverage 
This chapter is concerned with the term of reference which asks the Commission to 
identify and report on ‘… a consistent definition of employer, employee, workplace and 
work-related injury/illness and fatalities relevant to both workers’ compensation and 
occupational health and safety (OHS) that could be adopted consistently across Australia’. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the principal objective of OHS regulation is the prevention of 
injury and illness. All jurisdictions have adopted a common approach by enacting specific 
OHS legislation which establishes a general duty of care that is imposed on employers, the 
self employed, persons in control of premises where work is undertaken, occupiers, 
suppliers and employees. The duty — to remove or reduce work risks arising from 
workplace hazards — is broad in coverage and is owed to both employees and to others 
who may be affected by the worksite, work activity or work equipment. Workers have 
obligations not to put others at risk and to obey the reasonable instructions of their 
employers in relation to OHS. Despite this commonality of approach, the legislative 
provisions are not uniform across Australia and there exist differences in the detail of their 
application.  
Workers’ compensation is more narrowly focussed on the employer-employee relationship. 
It is concerned with providing adequate financial compensation  and appropriate 
rehabilitation and return to work for employees in the event of work-related fatality, injury 
or illness while ensuring that employer contributions cover scheme liabilities. Typically, 
but not exclusively, employers make payments by way of insurance, or insurance-like, 
premiums to cover their financial risks. For self-insured employers, the financial risks are 
borne directly by the employer. Self-employed contractors, professionals, small businesses 
and farmers are typically not covered by formal workers’ compensation schemes. Instead, 
they are responsible for arranging their own insurance for work-related fatalities, injuries 
and illnesses.  
The coverage of workers’ compensation is more limited than for OHS, being designed 
around three core criteria, namely: 
•  the claimant must be an employee (as defined by the relevant scheme); 
•  they must have suffered an injury or illness (or there must be a fatality) which is 
compensable; and     
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•  there must be the requisite connection between the fatality, injury or illness and the 
claimant’s employment (work-relatedness). 
There are significant variations across Australian jurisdictions in the definitions adopted 
for establishing elements of all three criteria.  
Importantly, there has been increasing variation in the nature of work relationships 
between workers and employers as contracting, casualisation and part-time work have 
increased. This has had implications, in particular, for the distinction between those 
workers who are regarded as employees and required to be covered by formal workers’ 
compensation schemes, and workers who are regarded as self-employed contractors and 
are responsible for their own cover. In addition, the boundary between what is and what is 
not ‘work-related’ is not always clear cut, particularly for diseases of long latency or those 
which have a number of contributing factors.  
Adding to this dynamic environment have been various court interpretations of legislative 
provisions, the financial performance of some workers’ compensation schemes, the views 
and bargaining strengths of various stakeholders in the schemes and legislative responses 
by the jurisdictions. The resultant disparate approaches of the jurisdictions have 
contributed to the complexities and costs faced by an increasing number of employers and 
workers who operate across State and Territory boundaries (chapter 2). 
The emphasis in this chapter is on definitions that are relevant for workers’ compensation 
schemes. Definitions relevant to OHS matters were covered in chapter 4.  
The next section discusses the definitions of employer and employee. Section 6.2 then 
deals with workplace and work-related fatality, injury and illness. Each section concludes 
with principles relevant to determining coverage.  
6.1  Employer and employee 
Definitions in workers’ compensation legislation 
Jurisdictions base their definition of the work relationships that should be covered by 
workers’ compensation schemes on the common law definition of employee. The factors 
that courts consider when determining whether a work relationship is that of an employee 
or independent contractor are given in box 6.1. However, in their workers’ compensation 
legislation, each jurisdiction supplements the common law definition through use of an 
unique set of inclusions (‘deeming’) and exclusions.      
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Box 6.1  Factors courts consider when determining whether a worker is 
an employee or independent contractor 
The Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission provided the 
following summary of the current state of the law as it pertains to determining whether 
an individual is an employee or independent contractor: 
1. Whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor turns on whether 
the relationship between the worker and the putative employer is to be 
characterised as a contract of service or a contract for the provision of services. The 
ultimate question will always be whether the worker is the servant of another in that 
other's business, or whether the worker carries on a trade or business of his or her 
own behalf: that is, whether, viewed as a practical matter, the putative worker could 
be said to be conducting a business of his or her own. This question is answered by 
considering the totality of the relationship. 
2. The nature of the work performed and the manner in which it is performed must 
always be considered. 
3. The terms and terminology of the contract are always important and must be 
considered. However, in so doing, it should be borne in mind that parties cannot 
alter the true nature of their relationship by putting a different label on it. 
4. Consideration should then be given to the following ‘indicia’ bearing in mind that no 
list of indicia is to be regarded as comprehensive: 
(a) Whether the putative employer exercises, or has the right to exercise, control 
over the manner in which work is performed, place of work, hours of work and 
the like. Control of this sort is indicative of a relationship of employment.  
(b) Whether the worker performs work for others (or has a genuine and practical 
entitlement to do so).  
(c)  Whether the worker has a separate place of work and or advertises his or her 
services to the world at large.  
(d)  Whether the worker provides and maintains significant tools or equipment.  
(e)  Whether the work can be delegated or subcontracted.  
(f)  Whether the putative employer has the right to suspend or dismiss the person 
engaged. 
(g)  Whether the putative employer presents the worker to the world at large as an 
emanation of the business. Typically, this will arise because the worker is 
required to wear the livery of the putative employer. 
(h)  Whether income tax is deducted from remuneration paid to the worker. 
(i)  Whether the worker is remunerated by periodic wage or salary or by reference 
to completion of tasks. 
(j)  Whether the worker is provided with paid holidays or sick leave.  
(Continued next page)     
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Box 6.1  (continued) 
(k)  Whether the work involves a profession, trade or distinct calling on the part of 
the person engaged. Such persons tend to be engaged as independent 
contractors rather than as employees. 
(l)  Whether the worker creates goodwill or saleable assets in the course of his or 
her work. 
(m)  Whether the worker spends a significant portion of his remuneration on 
business expenses.  
This list is not exhaustive. Features of the relationship in a particular case which do not 
appear in this list may nevertheless be relevant to a determination of the ultimate 
question. 
Source: Abraham Abdalla v Viewdaze Pty Ltd t/a Malta Travel (2003) AIRC 927971. 
 
 
Examples of workers deemed to be employees, and therefore included under workers’ 
compensation coverage, include in: 
•  several jurisdictions — provisions to the effect that when contractors do not sublet the 
contract, nor employ workers, they are deemed to be employed by the principal. 
However, they must be engaged for the purposes of the principal’s main business; 
•  New South Wales — outworkers, some contractors (as above), some rural contractors, 
taxi drivers, sales representatives, jockeys, certain harness racing drivers, ministers of 
religion and some timber getters; 
•  Victoria — timber contractors, drivers of vehicles used for carrying passengers for 
reward, contractors (as above);  
•  Queensland — sharefarmers who do not use mechanical equipment and get less than 
one-third of proceeds, salespersons paid by commission if the commission is not 
connected to the trade of the salesperson, contractors (as above), and labour hire 
workers; and  
•  Tasmania — volunteer fire fighters, police, ambulance workers and other prescribed 
volunteers. 
Examples of workers who are specifically excluded from coverage include: 
•  crewmembers of fishing vessels; 
•  most sportspersons; 
•  outworkers in Tasmania; and 
•  persons employed on a casual basis where the purpose of the employment is other than 
for the employer’s trade or business — in New South Wales, Western Australia, 
Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory.     
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In the past, some jurisdictions have adopted definitions which are used for other purposes 
in order to gain the benefits of certainty and/or consistency, and to lower compliance and 
enforcement costs. For example, Queensland and the Northern Territory formerly used the 
income tax ‘pay-as-you-earn’ (PAYE) taxpayer definition to define workers required to be 
covered under their schemes. Since the demise of the PAYE definition for income tax 
purposes, the Northern Territory has introduced a provision that excludes persons when 
they have an Australian Business Number. This provision narrows the coverage and is 
currently being reviewed, with the intention of providing a broader definition that is also 
clear and unambiguous.  
The Victorian Government drew attention to the definition used by their WorkCover 
Authority which sought ‘to distinguish between genuine contracting relationships and 
those that amount to “fake self-employment”, where a person, formally described as an 
independent contractor, is actually solely or overwhelmingly working for the one business 
entity’ (IRsub. 256, p. 36). While noting that the Australian Taxation Office had taken 
steps to clarify this situation, it reported that the definition used in Victoria was derived 
from that used for their payroll tax purposes.  
Queensland has recently introduced a ‘results test’, based on concepts used by the 
Australian Taxation Office to define personal services income. It excludes from coverage 
those individuals who satisfy all three of the following conditions:  
•  the individual is paid to achieve a specified result or outcome; and  
•  the individual has to provide the tools, plant and equipment, necessary to do the work; 
and  
•  the individual is liable for rectifying the defects in their work or for resulting damages.  
WorkCover Queensland considered: 
The test identifies people who are not workers, giving all other individuals an 
entitlement to compensation. This reduces the need for multiple provisions deeming 
specific individuals to be workers, as well as reduces employer administration and 
compliance costs. (IRsub. 225, p. 13) 
It also reported that a working party of the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities 
was currently exploring options to achieve consistency among jurisdictions based on the 
Queensland definition. As well, the working party was exploring options to achieve 
consistency in the definition of the remuneration base for the levying of premiums.  
Coverage of workers under existing schemes 
The nature of and variations in definitions, and shortcomings in available data sources, 
means that there is no agreed estimate of the extent to which workers are covered under 
existing workers’ compensation schemes.     
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In its recent submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Employment and Workplace Relations inquiry into Aspects of Workers’ Compensation, 
the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations stated that ‘… up to 40 per cent 
of the workforce may no longer meet the test applied for coverage under the various 
workers’ compensation schemes’ (HoR, sub. 48, p. 3). 
The Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities (2002) Comparison of Workers’ 
Compensation Arrangements Australia and New Zealand report (the most recent available) 
indicated that a total of some 8.21 million workers were covered under the major schemes 
during 2000-01. Given that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2002b) estimated 
that there were 9.16 million employed persons at June 2001, this would suggest a coverage 
of some 90 per cent of all workers.  
However, this is an overstatement of coverage. Some workers hold more than one job 
during the year (the ABS (2001a) estimate that 7 per cent of the workforce hold two or 
more jobs and nearly all second jobs are not of a standard nature) and some, who worked 
inter-state, would be covered under more than one scheme. Aon stated in its submission 
that there are a significant number of ‘nominal’ policies in place to cover work outside the 
normal jurisdiction of business (sub. 73, p. 4).  
Work by Moran (2002) using ABS (2000a) survey data on forms of employment during 
August 1998, indicated a coverage of 76.6 per cent. Application of the same methodology 
to more recent survey data (ABS 2002a), indicates coverage of approximately 78 per cent 
by November 2001. However, most schemes have legislated to include a wider group of 
workers than would be covered by the common law definition of employee. Conversely, 
those who are likely to be counted as covered by this methodology, but who may not be, 
are: owner managers of incorporated enterprises; family workers; people who work for 
payment in kind; and illegal workers.  
The ABS’ (2001a) survey of employment arrangements and superannuation, using 
household survey data collected during April to June 2000, estimated that, of total 
employed persons of 8.73  million, some 6.34  million employees reported they were 
covered by workers’ compensation. This would indicate a coverage of 73 per cent. The 
estimate would be slightly higher if dependent contractors were included.  
On all the available evidence, the Commission concludes that approximately three-quarters 
of employed persons are covered by workers’ compensation schemes. 
Traditional work arrangements 
There has been a shift away from traditional employer-employee, full-time work 
arrangements over the last two or more decades and this has contributed to the decrease in 
the number of workers to which workers’ compensation provisions apply. Data which     
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show the detail of the shift are limited, as labour force statistics are collected in relatively 
broad categories. The group that makes up ‘non-traditional’ is very disparate. It includes 
temporary workers, part-time workers, the self-employed, those employed on fixed terms, 
labour hire workers, outworkers, seasonal workers and unrecorded work. 
The decrease in the proportion of full-time workers and the increase in the proportion of 
part-time and casual workers are shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2. Whilst casual and part-time 
workers are formally covered by workers’ compensation legislation, they are often more 
likely to be unaware of their entitlements or be afraid of the impact on their job of 
reporting a claim. 
Figure 6.1  Share of persons employed full-time and part-time, 1984 to 2003 











Source: ABS (Labour Force Australia, Cat. no. 6291.0.55.001). 
Data showing the increase in the proportion of workers not covered by the common law 
definition of employee is more problematic. The ABS (1997a) found that the proportion of 
all employed persons whom it defined as self-employed1 remained relatively unchanged at 
15  per cent from February 1978 to February 1996. However, the proportion of owner 
                                                 
1  A self-employed person can be an own account worker or an employer, and is defined as a 
person who ‘operated his or her own economic enterprise or engages independently in a 
profession or trade and the business is not incorporated, either with or without employees’. This 
definition excludes owner managers of incorporated enterprises and is based on the main job of 
the worker.     
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managers of incorporated enterprises increased from 1.8 per cent to 5.6 per cent2 (ABS 
1997b). The Productivity Commission’s (Waite and Will 2001) analysis using ABS data 
showed that the proportion of employed persons it defined as self-employed contractors3 in 
Australia increased by at least 15 per cent over the two decades to 1998. An increase in 
self-employed contractors would result in a decrease of formal coverage. 
Figure 6.2  Share of casual employmenta, 1988 to 1999 
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a Casual employment is defined as employment that does not attract entitlements for either holiday or 
sickness benefits. 
Sources: Burgess and Strachan (1999, p. 124); Burgess and Ruyter (2000, p. 252).  
Cost-shifting 
The lack of formal coverage of some workers can result in a large proportion of the costs 
of fatality, injury or illness affecting these workers being shifted onto Australian 
Government programs such as Medicare and social security. The Department of Family 
and Community Services noted: 
Although State compensation schemes are responsible for supporting injured workers 
from the time of injury, where an individual is unable to attribute responsibility for an 
accident or illness, the social security system effectively becomes a de facto 
compensation scheme. Definitional exclusion of many persons from the workers 
compensation system and the changing nature and form of workplace relations are 
                                                 
2 This is under counted as some owner managers of incorporated enterprises may identify 
themselves in the Labour Force Survey as working for an employer rather then being 
self-employed. 
3 Employed persons who operated their own business without employees and supply labour 
services to clients on an explicit or implicit commercial contract basis.     
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resulting in a significant number of workers falling outside the scope and coverage of 
the traditional workers compensation systems. The self-employed are, in most cases, 
excluded from coverage and left to make their own personal accident compensation 
insurance arrangements. For those that fail to take up a personal insurance policy, or for 
those that fall through the cracks of the workers compensation system for a number of 
other reasons, the income support system is often the only recourse. (sub. 167, p. 3) 
A high proportion of people who suffer compensable injuries do not make claims, even 
when they are formally covered by workers’ compensation insurance. The claiming rate is 
lower amongst certain groups and for certain types of injuries. For example, the 
precariously employed and adolescents appear to be less likely to make claims than other 
workers (Quinlan and Mayhew 1999). 
According to a recent ABS survey (2001b), less than 40  per cent of persons who 
experienced a work-related injury or illness received workers’ compensation (table 6.1). 
Over half did not apply for compensation, the majority considering that the injury was 
minor or it was inconvenient to apply (table 6.2). It would be reasonable to conclude that 
the cost of such injury and illness is generally likely to be small and be borne by the 
worker and, if necessary, Medicare. 
Table 6.1  Persons who experienced a work-related injury or illness 
in the year ending September 2000 
 ‘000    % 
Applied for workers’ compensation and did not receive it  28.5  6.0 
Did not apply for workers’ compensation 259.9  54.4 
Applied and received workers’ compensation  189.4  39.6 
Total 477.8  100.0 
Source: ABS (2001b, pp. 12–13). 
However, a significant proportion stated that the reason they did not apply for workers’ 
compensation is because they were not covered or were not aware of workers’ 
compensation benefits (7.7 per cent), did not think they were eligible (4.7 per cent) or 
thought it would have a negative impact on current or future employment (2.3 per cent). 
These accidents and illnesses may be more significant as could be the costs borne by 
injured workers, Medicare and the social welfare system.      
162    
 
Table 6.2  Reasons for not applying for workers’ compensation 
persons who experienced a work-related injury or illness in the year ending 
September 2000 
Main reason for not applying for workers’ compensation   
 ‘000  % 
Not covered or not aware of workers’ compensation benefit  36.8  7.7 
Did not think eligible  22.4  4.7 
Minor injury only/not considered necessary  127.4  26.7 
Negative impact on current or future employment  10.9  2.3 
Inconvenient/required too much effort/paperwork  17.3  3.6 
Employer agreement to pay cost  11.5  2.4 
Other/don't know  33.5  7.0 
Total 259.9  54.4 
Source: ABS (2001b, p. 13). 
Issues 
Knowledge of coverage is important. To allow the matching of liability with premiums 
paid, and to avoid under payment of premiums, employers and insurers need to be able to 
identify those workers who are required to be covered by workers’ compensation schemes. 
Further, for workers to make informed decisions, they need to know if they are covered. If 
it is clear that they are not covered, then they have responsibility for their own cover. 
In this respect, Quinlan reported research which indicated that 82 per cent of employed 
persons knew that they were covered by workers’ compensation, but that some 47 per cent 
were not sure which system (state, federal or other specified scheme) covered them 
(sub.  93, p.  22). The awareness varied significantly between different industries and 
occupations.  
Due to its nature, the common law definition does not provide certainty for some working 
relationships. As a result, the matter may not be determined until it is tested in court 
following an incident.  
Some jurisdictions have recently reviewed their definitions used for coverage. As 
mentioned above, Queensland has introduced a new results-test definition. In New South 
Wales, Le Couteur and Warren (2002) recommended (and the State is currently 
implementing changes based on it) an approach that harmonises the definitions used for 
workers’ compensation and pay-roll tax purposes and eliminates direct use of the common 
law approach. Workers who are paid wages (as defined for the purpose — it includes any 
payment for which an employer is required to withhold income tax under the Pay-As-You-
Go withholding system or payments that are subject to superannuation contributions) are 
covered. All contractors are covered unless they meet one of seven tests. In addition, they     
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recommended deeming to deal with special cases. They also prefaced a longer-term goal of 
national alignment with the income tax definition of personal services income.  
In South Australia, Stanley et al. (2002) recommended that the definition of workers 
required to be covered by their WorkCover scheme should have a better alignment with 
South Australian industrial relations law. The recommendation, which involves a new 
definition for contract of employment, presumes that contracts to supply labour involve 
employees, unless it can be shown that the other party is a client or customer of a business 
genuinely carried on by the worker. The recommendation lists factors to be considered 
when determining whether or not a worker is carrying on a business. These are drawn from 
the criteria that courts have used to determine a contract of service (box 6.1 above).  
Confusion and uncertainty 
A source of confusion for workers and employers about their legal rights and obligations 
can be the complexity of current arrangements and inconsistencies across states. This 
particularly affects parties which operate interstate. The Association for Payroll Specialists 
stated that: 
When a business operates in more than one jurisdiction, the difficulty in ensuring the 
accuracy of the information being provided to the insurer increases substantially. Not 
only are there differences in the definitions of employer, employee, workplace and 
work-related injury/illness, there are also numerous differences in the definitions of 
wages for premium calculations, wages for payment of benefits, the excess the 
employer is liable to pay for each claim made for time lost due to injury/illness, and 
whether the insurer will pay the employee directly if employment is terminated. 
All these differences and many others lead to the likelihood of payments and 
calculations being incorrect. (sub. 15, p. 1) 
The Housing Industry Association cited the case given in box  6.1 and the Western 
Australian case of Brian Ryder v Beaulieu of Australia Ltd, 2003, WAIRC 08203 to 
illustrate how Tribunals interpreted the various factors and the weightings that could be 
applied to them (IRsub. 193). It argued that the various parties are left with a significant 
amount of confusion, particularly when they are also faced with the adaptations of the 
control test as applied by State Revenue offices for payroll tax purposes, the interpretation 
for superannuation purposes and the differing perspectives of the eight separate workers’ 
compensation schemes. It supported adoption of Queensland’s results test and considered 
that it was:  
… very helpful because it does give a knowable, commercially certain avenue for 
people certainly in our industry, to be able to know what their status is rather than 
having to have a reasonably certain view, but subject to what someone else may say at 
a later date and another place, and it’s that uncertain element that’s caused much of the 
not only confusion for business, particularly small business, but increased 
administrative costs for workers compensation authorities. (trans., p. 1215)      
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It stated that, since Queensland has adopted the new test, ‘the workload of the Housing 
Industry Association in terms of members who came to us with problems with WorkCover 
has fallen away almost completely …’ (trans., p. 1215). It noted that:  
The Queensland definition for workers compensation purposes relies on the Personal 
Services Business (PSB) tests from the Federal Alienation of Personal Services Income 
legislation. Specifically if a contractor is operating a Personal Services Business then it 
is not necessary for that contractor to be covered for workers compensation by the 
principal. (IRsub. 193, p. 6) 
Similar satisfaction with the Queensland results test was expressed by BDS Recruit Pty Ltd 
(IRsub. 213, p. 3). It saw the need for there to be separate definitions of ‘employer’ and 
‘employee’ for workers’ compensation and OHS, given their different scopes.  
The Queensland Government also reported success with the test so far (it was implemented 
in July 2003) (sub. 205, p. 2). The Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union considered 
that it was too early to assess its effects and that the ‘…formulation of the common law 
tests for determining if a person is an employee … has not been considered by the courts or 
the State Industrial Relations Commission’ (IRsub. 231, p. 1). 
Contractors 
There is a proportion of contractors whose relationship with their client is not one of 
genuine independence, as the worker is economically dependent on and subservient to a 
single ‘employer’, even though this is not characterised as such under common law. This 
occurs in essentially three ways:  
•  the worker sets up a private company or partnership;  
•  work arrangements are set up like the Odco case4, where the Federal Court decided 
that the labour hire company was not the employer because it had no control over the 
worker and, as there was no contract between worker and client, the client was also not 
the employer (see section below on labour hire agencies); and  
•  features are incorporated into the contract that the courts would consider to be 
indicators of a relationship that is not an employer-employee relationship (for example, 
the workers supply their own tools and, in theory, the contract provides for the work to 
be delegated to someone else, see box 6.1) (Creighton and Stewart 2000). 
These workers are referred to as dependent contractors. In a Productivity Commission 
analysis of ABS data (Waite and Will 2001), the number of dependent contractors was 
estimated to be 215 200 (or 2.6 per cent of employed persons) in 1998. Contractors were 
categorised as dependent contractors if they had leave entitlements or identified themselves 
                                                 
4 Building Workers Industrial Union of Australia v Odco Pty Ltd (1991) 33 ALR 235.     
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as casuals, if they had no control over their working procedures and were prevented from 
subcontracting, or if they had no control over their working procedures and were prevented 
from working for multiple clients. This definition would underestimate the numbers 
because there exist other contractors who have work arrangements consistent with being an 
employee, for example, where a contract has been deliberately designed to allow 
subcontracting in theory, but this is not exercised.  
The Master Builders Australia was opposed ‘… to the notion of extending compulsory 
workers’ compensation insurance to so-called dependent contractors’ (IRsub. 217, p. 3). In 
establishing a definition of worker required to be covered, it considered the control test 
needed to be supplemented ‘… with a test that aligns with the test used in income tax law’ 
(IRsub. 217, p. 3). In particular, it sought ‘… adoption of the same terms as are used in the 
alienation of personal services provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) 
(ITAA97)’ (IRsub. 217, p. 7). An alignment with something equivalent to an Australian 
Taxation Office ruling as to what is definitively the test was also envisaged by the 
Australian Meat Industry Council (IRsub. 234, p. 5).  
Mobile workers 
Workers whose work takes them to different jurisdictions are at times not covered by 
workers’ compensation. Recent cross-border initiatives by Queensland, followed by New 
South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, have gone 
some way to address the issue of coverage of temporary work inter-state but so far have 
not provided a complete solution. The Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities are 
coordinating the development of a mutual recognition framework for workers’ 
compensation arrangements in respect of coverage for employees operating temporarily in 
another jurisdiction. Currently, to ensure cover of employees who move across borders, 
employers need to check with the appropriate government body and it is necessary for 
many workers who work inter-state to be covered under more than one scheme.  
The difficulty of introducing a mutual recognition framework which could cope with all 
possible cross-border issues that could arise was illustrated by Jim Pearson Transport 
(IRsub. 224).  
Casual workers 
In a recent ABS survey (2001b), nearly 22 per cent of casual workers reported not being 
covered or not knowing if they are covered by workers’ compensation. This is partly due to 
employers not declaring their employment of casual workers and partly to the existence of 
cash-in-hand work arrangements. Coverage of such workers is an issue of increasing 
magnitude as the number of casual workers increases (figure 6.2 above).     
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Quinlan has examined the issue of increased casualisation of the workforce and the 
implication for workers’ compensation. He pointed to a major increase from 18 per cent of 
the workforce in 1988 to 25 per cent in 1999. He noted that: 
The Australian data just cited doesn’t include the well over 200,000 backpacker tourists 
that visit Australia every year, almost all of whom take on casual and seasonal work to 
supplement their income even though only a minority actually obtain work permits. 
(sub. 93, p. 8) 
He also cited evidence that casual workers are less likely than other workers to claim 
workers’ compensation, pointing to a study by the ABS of workers in New South Wales:  
In relation to occupational groups, uncertainty was greatest amongst sales and 
personnel services (10% were unsure of their coverage) followed by labourers and 
related unskilled workers (8.5%). Uncertainty amongst retail workers would seem more 
than coincidental with its propensity to employ young inexperienced workers on a 
casual part-time basis. (sub. 93, p. 22) 
Labour hire arrangements  
Labour hire agencies can play two different roles. In one, agencies just ‘place’ workers, 
who are then left to negotiate their own work arrangements with the client, including, by 
implication, coverage under workers’ compensation insurance. In the other, agencies have 
an ongoing relationship with the worker whereby they act as a labour hire service — for 
example, for the provision of workers with particular skills, such as nurses, or ‘temps’. In 
this situation, where there is an absence of a contract directly between the client (or host 
organisation) and employee, the labour hire company is effectively the employer.  
There continues to be a degree of confusion and uncertainty regarding the responsible 
employer in labour hire arrangements (see submissions from the Victorian Government 
(sub.  164, p.  11), the Institute of Actuaries Australia (sub.  88, p.  10), the Australian 
Plaintiff Lawyers Association (sub. 69, p. 11), Telstra (sub. 136, p. 16) and the Australian 
Industry Group (sub. 104, p. 17)). This is partly due to different provisions applying in the 
jurisdictions, as well as to confusion arising over the case law that has developed around 
Odco-type cases (discussed above), with some firms constructing relationships in an 
attempt to avoid compulsory coverage. Recently, the Full Bench of the South Australian 
Workers’ Compensation Tribunal upheld a decision that a worker engaged in a Odco-type 
arrangement was an employee of the contracting agency (that is, the labour hire firm). This 
case is under appeal.  
The Recruitment and Consulting Services Association highlighted the inconsistency and 
confusion across borders about legal responsibility of the labour hire agency and the client: 
Particularly in South Australia, the host organisation probably wouldn’t be prosecuted 
whatsoever. In New South Wales the host organisation may be prosecuted on an equal 
footing. In Victoria we’re still trying to determine that. In each and every state it will     
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vary, and of course the burden of proof in New South Wales is different to the burden 
of proof in Victoria. (trans., p. 954) 
Participants expressed a desire for there to be clarity about the status of labour hire workers 
so as to clarify coverage, minimise confusion and simplify administration of these 
arrangements. In particular, the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union were unclear as 
to how the recommended principles for defining an employee, as set out in the Interim 
Report, would apply to labour hire workers (IRsub. 188, p. 5).  
In specifically addressing this issue, the Stanley report recommended that:  
An employment agency which contracts to supply the labour of a person (the worker) 
to another party (the client) is to be deemed to be that person’s employer, except where 
this results in a direct contract between the worker and the client. (2002, vol. 2, p. 14)  
Although this places the responsibility on the employment agency which is not directly in 
control of the work environment, the Commission sees merit in such a deeming approach. 
It provides clarity and certainty whilst allowing those who wish to develop alternative 
arrangements for coverage of the risk to do so and to know that they should do so.  
Two labour hire agencies, Skilled Engineering (trans., p.  1036) and BDS Recruit 
(IRsub. 213, p. 3) informed the Commission that they inspect work sites where they intend 
to send employees to ensure the sites are safe. If they are not satisfied with the safety of the 
work environment, then they do not place their people on those sites.  
Outworkers 
The number of outworkers has been increasing5, as have been the types of work they 
perform (Quinlan, sub. 93, p. 5). This has been facilitated, for some, by improvements in 
telecommunications technology and has brought with it a number of problems for the 
operation of workers’ compensation schemes. These include the limited ability of 
employers to control workplace risk and be held accountable for it. In addition, there is 
uncertainty about coverage of these workers as they often supply their own equipment and 
can appear to be self-employed workers. Also, there are difficulties in determining whether 
an accident ‘arose out of or in the course of employment’ — a necessary condition for 
making a claim under workers’ compensation (section 6.2). 
The current arrangements for coverage of outworkers vary between jurisdictions. 
Outworkers are not covered in Tasmania, but are specifically included in New South Wales 
and Victoria. 
                                                 
5 The ABS (2000b) has estimated that 21 per cent of persons at work worked some hours at home 
and classified 11 per cent as home workers.      
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A limit of ‘contract of service’  
For a contract of service to exist there has to be remuneration and the remuneration has to 
be in return for the work done. Hence, defining coverage on this basis does not include a 
range of unpaid voluntary workers as well as work arrangements in a family, social or 
domestic context. Those who work for religious and spiritual organisations are usually also 
excluded. Similarly, farmers, artists and small shop owners are not considered to be 
employees because they derive part of their income from the profit of supplying goods and 
services. To provide clarity and certainty in such situations, some jurisdictions have used a 
range of deeming provisions. 
National framework issues 
In the 1997 report on Promoting Excellence National Consistency in Australian Workers’ 
Compensation, the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities considered the question 
of who should be covered for workers’ compensation ‘in order to provide consistency in 
the definition of a “worker” and to provide some predicability at the outset of an 
employment relationship about responsibility for workers’ compensation insurance’ 
(HWCA 1997, p. 10). It recommended an approach to coverage based on principles that: 
•  the common law concept of employment should be the fundamental determinant of 
coverage;  
•  coverage should not be extended to the self-employed;  
•  schemes should cover contractors who are incorporated, but who operate as a sole 
proprietor or in partnership, in circumstances where they derive a personal service 
income from predominantly one organisation; and  
•  standardised categories of deemed coverage should be granted to certain classes of 
worker. (1997, p. 10) 
The final report of the Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry 
recommended that the Australian Government encourage the States and Territories to 
continue efforts to harmonise the key definitions of their various workers’ compensation 
systems, particularly the definition of ‘worker’ (RCBC 2003b, p. 271). 
Having assessed issues of coverage under current schemes, and the impacts on various sub-
groups of workers, the Commission considers that the following criteria should be used 
when defining workers to be covered by workers’ compensation schemes: 
•  employer control. It is neither desirable, nor practicable, for all work relationships to be 
compulsorily covered by formal workers’ compensation schemes. The degree of 
control, as developed under common law, enables work relationships to be divided into 
those involving a ‘contract of service’ where employers exercise control over the 
conduct of work, and should be covered, from those involving a ‘contract for service’     
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where workers carry on a business or trade on their own behalf and are responsible for 
providing their own cover;  
•  certainty and clarity. The successful operation of any scheme depends on all parties 
knowing and understanding their rights and responsibilities. In particular, workers need 
to know, from the outset, which work relationships provide cover and, similarly, 
employers need to know the work relationships for which they are required to provide 
cover;  
•  administrative simplicity. Workers’ compensation schemes are costly to administer and 
costly for employers to comply with. These costs can be minimised if there are few, 
simple and definite rules. Practicability is an important consideration when introducing 
a new or changed feature of a scheme;  
•  consistency with other legislation and other jurisdictions. There are significant 
informational benefits and cost savings from the use of consistent, and where possible 
common, definitions across a number of policy areas. The nature of work relationships 
is important in other contexts, such as industrial relations, payroll tax and income tax, 
and alignment of coverage under workers’ compensation with these provides scope for 
significant benefits; and  
•  durability and flexibility. The schemes operate in a dynamic environment and as such 
should seek to provide sufficient flexibility to cope with a wide variety of situations so 
as to provide durable, longer-term definitions. 
The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Australian Industry Group and 
Australian Business Limited supported, in general terms, the above criteria for defining 
workers to be covered by workers’ compensation schemes. The Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry considered that the principles should not be used to extend the 
definition beyond the common law ‘contract of service’ (IRsub. 196, p. 16). The Australian 
Industry Group considered that ‘Whenever a scheme requires an employer to be liable for 
work that they cannot adequately control it has the potential for undermining the integrity 
of the Scheme’ (IRsub. 240, p. 25). Australian Business Limited did not think that ‘the 
definition should be modified to accommodate specific groups of workers and types of 
work’ (IRsub. 249, p. 9). It considered that the parties to such arrangements should bear 
the responsibility of protecting their own interests, including purchasing appropriate levels 
of income protection and related insurances.  
In contrast, the Queensland Council of Unions, while also agreeing in general terms with 
the above criteria, was concerned that any definition arising from application of the 
principles should not be exclusive. In particular, it was concerned that any definition 
should not exempt any person currently covered and that it ‘include casual employees, 
volunteers, labour-hire employees, outworkers or any employees defined as contractors or 
sub-contractors designed to avoid OHS and workers’ compensation obligations’ 
(IRsub. 206, p. 2).      
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The Direct Selling Association of Australia was also supportive of the principles put 
forward for defining workers to be included, but considered that deeming coverage would 
not work ‘… for our people because of the undefined workplace [and] the uncontrolled 
working conditions …’ (trans., p.  1177). As a small business, LMR Roofing Pty Ltd 
considered that there were important advantages to having definitions of 
employer/contractor made in ‘clear and plain English’ as opposed to the current ‘cryptic, 
grey, descriptive way that they’ve described workers and deemed workers’ in current 
legislation’ (IRsub. 199, p. 5; trans., p. 1191). It was also concerned that ‘If people choose 
to be a contractor they should not be made to be employees …’ as important productivity 
issues were involved (trans., p.  1188). These views were supported by the Housing 
Industry Association which opposed the use of deeming when it ‘… undermines 
contractual relationships and attempts to impose a non-preferred regime onto contractors 
who have knowingly entered into a contractual arrangement’ (IRsub. 193, p. 7). They were 
also supported by Master Builders Australia which considered that ‘… the deeming of so-
called dependent contractors as employees will not assist in bringing clarity to the divide 
between employees and contractors’ (IRsub. 217, p. 10).  
The Commission recommends the following as principles to use when defining an 
employee, to determine coverage under compulsory workers’ compensation schemes:  
•  employer control, recognising that the common law ‘contract of service’ provides a 
solid basis for defining an employee in most situations; 
•  certainty and clarity, as coverage under workers’ compensation should be clear to 
both workers and employers at the commencement of the work relationship. For 
certain groups of workers and types of work relationships, deeming may be 
necessary; 
•  administrative simplicity, to reduce the costs of administration and enforcement;  
•  consistency with other legislation, to capture significant informational benefits and 
cost savings; and  
•  durability and flexibility, to deal with a wide variety of work arrangements.  
As outlined above, Queensland has recently adopted a ‘results-test’ approach to defining 
workers required to be covered by its workers’ compensation scheme. The initial 
indications are that it has provided the added certainty and clarity for the coverage of 
workers to the basic common law definition of employee which was provided formerly by 
its PAYE-based definition. Workcover Queensland considered that the results test was an 
effective means of achieving the Commission’s recommendations. ‘It circumvents the 
traditional “contract of service” test … [and] … responds to the changing dynamics of 
employment arrangements by broadening the group of individuals entitled to workers’ 
compensation’ (IRsub.  225, p.  13). As mentioned above, the Heads of Workers’ 
RECOMMENDATION     
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Compensation Authorities are looking at it as a basis for developing a consistent definition 
across schemes. Although it is a specific stand-alone definition for workers’ compensation 
purposes, it is based on concepts used by the Australian Taxation Office for determining 
alienation of personal services income (box 6.2).  
In New South Wales, by way of contrast and following a review by Le Couteur and 
Warren (2002), a new definition is being adopted which provides for greater commonality 
with the definition of worker being adopted for pay-roll tax purposes. In addition to added 
certainty and clarity, it should provide cost-saving benefits to employers and the 
government from administrative simplicity and consistency with other legislation within 
the one jurisdiction. Adoption of this approach among all jurisdictions would be limited by 
differences in pay-roll tax schemes among the jurisdictions. It would require them to adopt 
a new definition for both purposes.      
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Box 6.2  Personal services income tests 
The Review of Business Taxation (the Ralph Report) found that the rapid growth in the 
number of individual contractors and consultants had implications for the integrity of the 
tax system because of the favourable tax arrangements that were available for 
personal services income. Under those arrangements, the income earned (personal 
services income) by an individual contractor or consultant could be paid to another 
entity such as a company or partnership. This provided a number of tax advantages, 
such as income splitting and larger tax deductions than were available under normal 
PAYE arrangements. 
The Government introduced a number of amendments to tighten the system as part of 
the New Business Tax System (Alienation of Personal Services Income) Act 2000. The 
amendments, which included treating payments to companies and trusts as 
assessable income, were not to apply where an individual or entity was earning 
personal services income and set out a results test to define this. 
The results test requires an individual to be earning at least 75 per cent of personal 
services income under the following arrangements: 
•  under a contract or arrangement where the individual works to produce specific 
results and payment is based on achieving these results; 
•  where the individual provides the tools and equipment necessary; and 
•  where the individual is responsible for rectifying any faults in the work. 
Where all these tests are met, the income is considered to be from personal services. 
However, where an individual fails the results test and provided more than 80 per cent 
of their income comes from more than one client, they are able to self-assess against 
the following tests: 
•  the unrelated clients test (provides services to two or more unrelated clients); 
•  the employment test (engages employees or sub contractors to perform at least 20 
per cent of the work under contract); and 
•  the business services test (operates from premises used exclusively for business 
and physically separate from the private residence). 
To be considered as personal services income, only one of the above tests has to be 
satisfied. 
Source: ATO website. 
 
 
Another approach to seeking benefits from commonality across policy areas as well as 
certainty and clarity within workers’ compensation is provided in South Australia where 
the Stanley (2002) review recommended greater consistency between the definition of 
employment used for workers’ compensation and industrial relations. As with the NSW 
approach, differences among jurisdictions, in industrial law in this case, limit its easy 
adoption by other jurisdictions.      
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Of the models for national frameworks outlined in chapter  5, model  A (self-insurance 
under Comcare) would rely on the existing Comcare scheme definition of employee to 
define coverage (box 6.3).  
 
Box 6.3 Coverage  under  Comcare 
Companies that self insure under Comcare (that is under section 100(c) of the Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988) are referred to as ‘licensed corporations’. 
The Act states that a person who is employed by a licensed corporation is eligible to 
seek compensation and that person is taken to be employed by a licensed corporation 
if, and only if: 
(a)  a person performs work for that corporation under a law or a contract; and 
(b)  pursuant to that law or pursuant to the law that is the proper law of that contract, 
as the case may be, the person would, if that corporation were not a licensed 
corporation, be entitled to compensation in respect of injury, loss or damage 
suffered by, or in respect of the death of, the person in connection with that 
work. (s. 5(1A))  
This indicates that, for licensed corporations, eligibility is to be determined by reference 
to the legislation of the jurisdiction in which they operate. However, licensing is subject 
to the approval of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission and as 
part of this approvals process it must be satisfied that ‘the grant of the licence will not 
be contrary to the interests of the employees of the licensee whose affairs fall within 
the scope of the licence’ (s.  104(2(c))). This would allow coverage issues to be 
considered and determined at the licensing stage.  
 
 
Model B (an alternative national self-insurance scheme) would require new legislation to 
be implemented. This provides a convenient time for a preferred definition of employee to 
be developed and adopted that is consistent with the principles recommended above. This 
would also apply to a possible future alternative national premium-paying insurance 
scheme (model C). The Commission considers that the income tax definition of personal 
services income should be used as a basis for defining employee for the purposes of 
coverage under a national workers’ compensation scheme. It would provide certainty and 
clarity at the commencement of work relationships. And by being aligned with a major 
piece of national legislation affecting all organisations, the definition would provide 
additional benefits from administrative simplicity and consistency. Given the importance 
of the definition to income tax law, it is also likely that it would have its contemporary 
relevance maintained so as to deal with a wide variety of work arrangements. As with 
current definitions, the basic definition may need to be supplemented by a limited set of 
exclusions and deeming provisions so as to deal efficiently with particular work 
arrangements, such as with charitable institutions, volunteer fire fighters, SES volunteers 
and labour hire firms.     
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Under model D, which is based on formalising cooperation among the jurisdictions, the 
proposed national cooperative body should use common principles, such as those 
recommended, when developing and advocating a common definition of employee for 
purposes of coverage. As indicated above, the Commission considers the income tax 
definition of personal services income should be used as a basis for this. If all jurisdictions 
adopted a common definition on an item of fundamental importance to the operation of 
their schemes as the definition of employee for coverage, then it would help them achieve 
greater consistency among their schemes and reduce the costs associated with differences 
in their schemes.  
6.2  Workplace and work-related fatality, injury and 
illness 
The focus in this section is on work-relatedness. Under workers’ compensation schemes, a 
workplace includes any place at which employees are required to be for the purposes of 
carrying out employment duties. 
As The Australasian Faculty of Occupational Medicine has pointed out: 
It is fundamental to a cause-based compensation scheme, in this case workers’ 
compensation, that work-caused health afflictions may be reliably identified and 
distinguished from what is not work-caused. There are difficulties in making such 
identification and distinction with diseases of long standing or long latency although 
seldom with ‘blood on the floor’ injuries.  
The definition of work-relatedness is fraught for four reasons:  
•  slow-developing health afflictions (eg spinal degeneration, noise-induced deafness, 
arterial disease) have causes that cross boundaries within and between 
compensation schemes;  
•  it is difficult to establish or apportion cause in retrospect because much verifiable 
information is commonly missing6;  
•  risk factors for many diseases may be known but not necessarily how the risk 
factors interact to produce the disease; and  
•  some people regard a workers’ compensation scheme as a source of local 
humanitarian aid and exert pressure through courts and tribunals to gradually push 
                                                 
6 As an illustration, the Australasian Faculty of Occupational Medicine referred to its guide on 
occupational cancer in which is stated:  
… the occurrence of a cancer in a person previously exposed to a cancer-causing agent cannot 
readily be attributed to that agent, since work-related cancers are usually indistinguishable, 
histological and in natural history, from similar cancers unrelated to work. A decision on whether 
an exposure was causal in development of cancer is based on factors such as whether exposure 
occurred, the extent and timing of exposure, and consideration of the balance of probabilities in 
the light of current scientific evidence. (2003, p. 31)     
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the margins of what is embraced by work-relatedness. This underlines the uneasy 
joining of need with cause. (sub. 29, p. 4) 
Nonetheless, a practical application of work-relatedness is required if workers’ 
compensation schemes are to cover only those fatalities, injuries and illnesses that are truly 
work-related and to avoid cost-shifting. If the criteria are too stringent, then is would 
involve cost shifting from employers to injured workers and to the Australian 
Government’s Medicare and social programs. Conversely, if the criteria are too lax, then 
there would be cost shifting to employers for medical conditions that are minimally 
work-related. 
Current approach 
In effect, the definitions of all jurisdictions recognise injury (both internal and external), 
illness (including mental), industrial deafness and aggravation, acceleration, deterioration, 
exacerbation or re-occurrence of a condition. There are, however, many differences: some 
make specific reference to mental illness; some refer to injury by accident; some include a 
specific definition of disease; and South Australia specifically excludes coronary heart 
disease. Jurisdictions make varying provisions for particular diseases such as dust disease, 
stress-related conditions, repetitive strain injury and hearing loss. 
The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry considered that the definitions of 
illness and injury used in most jurisdictions were comprehensive and that attempts to 
define them in excessive detail ‘… would lead to much dispute and would in the final 
analysis not achieve the [coverage] objective’ (IRsub. 196, p. 17). However, it cautioned 
against advocating ‘comprehensive coverage’ because it believed that ‘comprehensive 
coverage sometimes is code for taking coverage to the nth degree … [and that it] … could 
be used unintentionally even to take coverage of the schemes out to every potentially 
defined medical condition’ (trans., p. 1357).  
Similarly, Australian Business Limited considered that qualifiers like ‘comprehensive’ and 
‘recognised’ (for medical conditions) were not needed as it was unclear as to the 
interpretation that would be placed on them (IRsub. 249, p. 10).  
All jurisdictions use the phrase ‘arising out of or in the course of employment’ to express 
work-relatedness in their enabling legislation, apart from Tasmania, which uses a narrower 
definition of ‘arising out of and in the course of employment’ [emphasis added].  
‘Arising out of’ signifies employment causation or contribution. The courts have given it a 
wide interpretation. An important case that considered the meaning in detail was Brooker v 
Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia) Limited (1933) AC 669, where several workers 
died when the building they were working in collapsed as a result of an earthquake. The     
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deaths were judged to have ‘arisen out of’ employment because the immediate cause was 
some factor associated with the employment, namely, the destruction of the employer’s 
premise whilst the workers were inside. 
Most claims are made under the ‘in the course of employment’ provision. This provision 
specifies a temporal relationship and the worker need only be engaged in an activity that 
was part of or incidental to employment. The limits of the relationship are not clear cut and 
some jurisdictions have provided legislative guidance for the interpretation of this 
provision. For example, the South Australian legislation specifies that employment of a 
worker includes when they are at the place of employment on a working day but before 
work begins (in order to prepare or be ready for work) or after work ends (while preparing 
to leave or in the process of leaving) (Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986, 
s. 30(3)). The issue of coverage during journeys to and from work is addressed later. 
Issues 
Work-related concept problematic for certain injuries and illnesses 
As indicated above, determining work-relatedness for certain injuries and illnesses is 
problematic in two situations: conditions that are of long latency or acquired over a number 
of years of exposure; and those that have a number of contributing factors. 
Long latency and gradual onset injuries and illnesses 
Illnesses of long latency or those that are acquired over a number of years include skin 
cancer, emphysema, noise induced hearing loss and degenerative back conditions. When 
workers have had a number of different jobs, it can be difficult to assign appropriate 
responsibility for the condition to a particular employer. This issue is compounded when 
workers have been employed in a number of jurisdictions (box 6.4). The significance of 
this issue is growing as there has been an increase in the mobility of workers and in the 
frequency of changing jobs (Quinlan, sub. 93, p. 18). Added to this is the issue of the 
ageing of the workforce and the progressive accumulation of injury, and longer recovery 
time, of older workers.     
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Box 6.4  Illnesses of a gradual nature  
Dr Sherryl Catchpole, a medical officer at the Workers Medical Centre in Brisbane, 
submitted: 
The Dust Diseases, eg Silicosis, Coal Workers Pneumoconiosis, Asbestosis, and 
Noise Induced Hearing Loss are recognised as being acquired over years of 
exposure. Decisions may have to be made by the claimant and the certifying doctor, 
as to which jurisdiction is the appropriate one for lodging a claim if the worker has 
moved interstate or from Commonwealth to State employment. 
With differing rules between jurisdictions there are further complications for 
decision making. An example of this is with industrial deafness. In Queensland the 
claim is accepted for lump sum compensation only if the initial reported loss is greater 
than 5%, and subsequent loss is only eligible after a 3 year period and a further 1% 
loss. Comcare requires a 10% initial loss and subsequent loss of 5%. A worker with 
hearing loss will provide a full work history. Often the medical officer suspects that the 
loss, for instance in a 50 year old boilermaker, started many years ago during the trade 
apprenticeship, and has only become apparent now because of the added effects of 
aging. Hearing protection has only been supplied by employers for about the last 10 
years, and worn consistently by workers for the last 5 years. 
It seems to me that it is often quite by chance as to which employer within a jurisdiction 
has the loss attributed for causation. When the worker has been employed in the 
construction industry the list of employers may run to several pages, and many of the 
employers are now out of business. Surely it would be fairer if there was one set of rules 
across Australia and a pool of money contributed by all employers within an industry for 
claims with accumulative exposure causation. (sub. 128, p. 3) 
 
 
The available data from the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission’s 
database indicates that the occurrence of these types of injuries is significant — 
somewhere in the order of 12 per cent of claims. In addition, claims of this nature are 
likely to be more expensive than average.  
Some of the workers’ compensation legislation contains special provisions for injuries or 
illnesses of long latency or that are acquired gradually. For example, most jurisdictions 
make specific provisions for dust disease (New South Wales has a special fund which 
employers in particular industries contribute to, and a board to manage this fund). Also 
New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have 
special procedures for determining compensation entitlements and employer liability for 
hearing loss. In South Australia, hearing loss is deemed to have arisen out of employment 
in which the worker was last exposed to noise capable of causing noise-induced hearing 
loss, subject to proof to the contrary. The provisions, however, are not consistent across 
jurisdictions and add to the complexity facing workers who move inter-state.      
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There are essentially three broad approaches that have been used to attribute work-related 
costs: 
•  Attribute the costs to the last job where the employee was exposed to conditions that 
could have caused the illness. This is relatively simple to implement, but results in the 
last employer bearing more than his or her fair share of the full cost of the claim. It also 
discourages employers from hiring older employees or anyone with a history of an 
illness of this nature or an employment history that may have exposed them to risk 
factors. This is largely what occurs currently. 
•  Implement a system whereby if an employer can show that a claim could be partly the 
result of other employment, then reduce the impact of the claim on the employer’s 
experience rating. This results in more of the cost being part of a general (industry) 
premium rate. 
•  Apportion costs on the basis of which employment contributed to the injury or illness 
and how much it contributed. This is largely impractical to implement because 
administrative costs are high and the accuracy is uncertain. Also employees may move 
across jurisdictions and employers go out of business before the disease emerges as a 
problem. 
 There are no easy solutions to the problems associated with determining the degree of 
work relatedness and attributing the costs of long latency and gradual onset injuries and 
diseases. The current approach of expressly identifying some that are clearly associated 
with certain occupations or industries (such as dust), using appropriate levies and creating 
special procedures to handle such claims provides a practical solution in some 
circumstances, but it is not a panacea.  
Diseases with a number of contributing factors 
Identifying work-relatedness is also problematic for diseases that have a number of 
contributing factors such as lifestyle, ageing, degenerative or hereditary factors, as well as 
work. For example, ageing workers are more prone to muscular/skeletal injuries. Also, 
psychological injuries, such as stress, can be caused by a combination of work and non-
work factors. Jurisdictions variously exclude certain stress-related conditions and 
psychological conditions resulting from demotion, dismissal, transfer and the like. This is 
to allow employers to conduct reasonable management functions. 
However, as The Australasian College of Occupational Medicine has said: 
… where a disease has many possible causes – one of which is occupation – the actual 
cause is often difficult, if not impossible, to decide in retrospect. (1990, p. 19)     
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This issue and its implications for cost-shifting on to workers’ compensation schemes was 
considered by a number of participants. According to the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations: 
Coverage now extends beyond compensation for traumatic injury and disability to 
occupational stress and diseases, such as musculo-skeletal degenerative disorders. Such 
types of compensable injuries/diseases may be contributed to by factors external to the 
workplace such as ageing and degenerative conditions. (sub. 166, p. 13) 
The Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission (Western Australia) 
observed: 
In determining what constitutes appropriate boundaries the Commission should 
acknowledge that the issue of cost shifting is not limited to that of the State systems to 
the Commonwealth. For instance, in the WA system injuries and illnesses attributable 
to multiple causes provide the opportunity to shift cost onto the workers’ compensation 
scheme. A number of injuries and diseases covered by workers’ compensation relate to 
the aggravation or acceleration of pre existing injuries, degeneration, environmental or 
social causation factors which would otherwise be met via the Commonwealth social 
security or medical health budgets if they did not occur or present in the work 
environment. (sub. 111, p. 6) 
The various schemes have introduced tests to help insurers assess claims and, in particular, 
more fairly apportion the costs of claims to employers.  
Contribution of employment 
In addition to the basic ‘arising out of or in the course of employment’ criteria, 
jurisdictions, to a varying degree, also include a test of the degree of contribution to the 
illness or injury from employment. This is an ‘in or out’ test in that if the condition meets 
this test, then it is covered by workers’ compensation insurance; if it does not, then it is not 
covered. Uncertainty as to which particular test applies and what exactly it applies to, 
particularly for multi-state employers, arises from: 
•  differences between jurisdictions; 
•  different arrangements for different conditions within a jurisdiction; 
•  unclear legislation;  
•  changes to legislation; and  
•  uncertainty of interpretation by the courts. 
In the case of diseases, to be eligible, for example: 
•  in the Australian Capital Territory, employment must be ‘a substantial contributing 
factor’;      
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•  under Comcare, employment must have ‘contributed to a material degree’; and 
•  in Western Australia, employment must be ‘a contributing factor and contribute to a 
significant degree’.  
Some jurisdictions have also added a provision of this nature for injuries. This provision 
also differs across jurisdictions:  
•  in New South Wales, employment must be ‘a substantial contributing factor’.  
•  in Victoria, employment must be ‘a significant contributing factor’ to an injury, 
although this has recently been tested in the courts7.  
•  in Queensland, the same test applied until 1997 when it changed to ‘the major 
contributing factor’. Two years later Queensland reverted to ‘a significant contributing 
factor’.  
The difficulty with the current employment contribution tests has been highlighted by the 
Australasian College of Occupational Medicine which said: 
•  worker’s compensation statutes do not clearly specify a threshold below which the 
contribution of employment to injury or disease is so trivial that it may be disregarded. 
Without a specified threshold of work-relatedness, a worker’s compensation Act is 
ambiguous. This is because it implies that any contribution – be it 35%, 5%, 1% or as 
low as 0.01% – would be sufficient for the disease to be fully compensable. To call 
something ‘work-related’ when in fact work has contributed just 1% – seems to fly 
outside the boundary of the commonly-accepted meaning of this term. This departure 
from common parlance brings about the ambiguity.  
For a range of disease – severe and otherwise – the various proportional contributions 
from employment fall on a continuum which ranges from near 0 to 100%. In the 
absence of statutory guidance, doctors are left to define their own thresholds below 
which they consider the work contribution to be so small that to regard it as existing 
would be nonsensical. Thus, doctors are forced to make two discrete categories – work-
related and not – from what is truly a continuum. (1990, pp. 19–20) 
Employers argued that there should be more emphasis on employment causing the injury 
or illness, instead of covering any medical condition that happens in the workplace. In 
particular, employers sought a restricted definition whereby employment has primacy of 
causation. The National Council of Self Insurers stated that the definition of injury should 
clearly link injury to the work tasks (sub. 168, p. 39). Woolworths argued:  
                                                 
7 The Victorian Supreme Court found that it was not necessary for work to be ‘a significant 
contributing factor’ in the case of physical injury (in this case the worker cut his hand whilst 
peeling an apple whilst on a paid work break on the employer’s premise) – the caveat was only 
intended to apply to disease. On appeal the High Court agreed with the Supreme Court and the 
workers medical costs were covered by Victorian WorkCover. Carlton & United Breweries & 
Anor v Hegedis (2000) VSC 380.      
    181
 
Injuries covered should be limited to those arising “out of or in the course of 
employment”, and where employment is “the major significant factor” contributing to 
the injury. The current definitions allow claims to be paid for events such as merely 
walking at a workplace. It is not reasonable that employers be held liable for everyday 
events, just because they occur at a work-place. (sub. 98, p. 5)  
Their use of ‘the’ major significant factor rather than ‘a’ major significant factor was 
deliberate (trans., p. 553). The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry agreed and 
stated in their submission that:  
…the definition of attribution as ‘the major contributing factor’ would remove much of 
the confusion and lack of consistency in interpretation by WorkCover authorities and 
the courts in workers compensation cases. (IRsub. 196, p. 17) 
This was supported by the Australian Industry Group (IRsub. 240) and Australian Business 
Limited (IRsub.  249). The Queensland division of The National Meat Association of 
Australia argued that: 
The current definition of injury allows the acceptance of claims even when 
employment is not the major cause. It is possible that an illness may manifest itself 
while a person is at work, or an injury occurs at work simply because the person was at 
work at the time, and under these circumstances employment may be assessed as “a 
significant contributing factor”. 
… It is submitted that:  
The definition of injury be amended to ensure that employment is the major and 
substantial cause of the injury, and that injuries due to other causes are excluded from 
the workers’ compensation system. (sub. 83, p. 2) 
In contrast, the Victorian Government stated its belief that: 
… the ‘a significant contributing factor’ test does strike the right balance, and that a 
move to ‘the major contributing factor’ test would represent an unacceptable 
impediment for the establishment of compensability by injured workers. (IRsub. 256, 
p. 36) 
A similar argument was made by the Queensland Council of Unions. It considered that the 
change in Queensland to ‘the major contributing factor’ had led to the rejection of a lot of 
legitimate claims and did nothing to improve occupational health and safety (trans., 
p.  1018). It claimed that ‘significant’ had been introduced in the first place to lift the 
barrier higher because the schemes were experiencing increases in non-visible injuries. 
Woolworths provided an estimate of the significance of a change from ‘the major 
contributing factor’ to ‘a significant factor’: 
The only state where the company was able to analyse a trend was in Queensland 
where the proposed definition of “the major significant factor” was introduced into 
legislation from January 1997 to June 1999. From July 1999 the definition was changed     
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to “a significant contributing factor”. Woolworths self-insurance statistics show that the 
rejection of claims lodged under the previous definition in 1998/99 was 5.8%, and that 
this decreased to 3.3% in 1999/00 with the amended definition. (sub. 156, p. 2)  
This estimate provides some indication of impact there would be of changing the test 
definition to ‘the major contributing factor’.  
To provide some clarity of the contribution of employment, all jurisdictions have used 
industrial disease schedules which list certain diseases that are covered by workers’ 
compensation legislation if the worker was engaged in a prescribed form of employment. 
For example, hepatitis B is considered an industrial disease if the worker was employed in 
a hospital, other medical centre, dental centre or employment associated with a blood bank. 
Whereas a desirable principle is for an employer to meet the proportion of the injury or 
illness to which employment has contributed, it is recognised that apportioning the costs of 
a condition to different work and non-work related factors would result in significant 
administration costs and disputation.  
The Commission considers that, in view of it being problematic to determine the 
contribution of work to some medical conditions, the definition of attribution included in 
workers’ compensation legislation should be based on there being significant evidence of 
its contribution. The ‘a significant contributing factor’, which is used in a number of 
jurisdictions is a minimum acceptable test. Recognition that work should be the major 
contributing factor would give greatest clarity. The development of a uniform test of work-
relatedness applying to both disease and injury across all jurisdictions would enable a 
significant body of case law to develop which would add to certainty of outcomes. 
Finally, as emphasised by BDS Recruit Pty Ltd, early notification of workplace incidents 
to employers is important to prevent subsequent disputation about the work relatedness of 
any injury (IRsub. 213). 
Journeys to and from work 
The coverage of journeys to and from work under workers’ compensation schemes varies 
across jurisdictions. In this respect, the common law position is that whilst travelling to and 
from work, an employee is not within the course of employment. However, a number of 
jurisdictions have deemed this travel to be within the course of employment and therefore 
compensable (Comcare, New South Wales, Queensland, the Australian Capital Territory 
and the Northern Territory). The others — Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia 
and Tasmania — have not. Where journey claims are not covered by workers’ 
compensation, alternative coverage is provided for all motor vehicle journeys under each 
jurisdiction’s compulsory third party (CTP) insurance schemes. In all schemes, journeys 
made during the work day that are an integral part of work are covered.     
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WorkCover Queensland reported that, although the Queensland scheme covers journey 
claims (and all recess breaks as well), it does not impact directly on employers’ premiums 
as they exclude them from the experience-based rating calculations (IRsub. 225, p. 13). 
The cost of them is spread over other elements of the premiums.  
Employers claim that, as they have no ability to control circumstances associated with 
journeys, these should not be covered by workers’ compensation legislation (see 
submissions from Australia Business Limited (sub. 106, p. 15), the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (sub.  81, p.  5; IRsub.  196, p.  18), the Minerals Council of 
Australia (sub.  141, p.  4) and the Australian Industry Group (sub.  104, p.  23)). For 
example, Woolworths stated that: 
Journey claims (to and from work only) should not be covered under workers’ 
compensation legislation, as employers have no ability to control these events. (sub. 98, 
p. 5) 
On the other hand, unions have argued that journey injuries arise out of or in the course of 
employment because of the requirement for workers to attend their place of employment. 
Journeys are simply a physical relocation of the worker to the place of employment to 
undertake activities to the benefit of the employer and so should be covered. For example, 
the Queensland Council of Unions said it:  
… strongly believes that journeys to and from work must be included in any workers’ 
compensation scheme and totally opposes any removal of this provision. We do not 
accept that lack of control by an employer is a reason for omitting this important 
provision. There are many situations in employment where the employer cannot control 
the employee eg walking to meetings in another building and labour hire situations. 
The QCU submits that but for work, the worker would not be in the situation and 
therefore should be entitled to a no fault workers compensation scheme. (IRsub. 241, 
p. 6)  
The financial significance of the journey claims varies. Some participants have stated that 
journey claims make up only a minor portion of their costs whereas for others it is a 
significant factor. In part, this can depend on the nature and occurrence of the totality of 
the injuries and illnesses experienced by the organisation’s employees. 
For example, Telstra said that: 
The differences in this provision [relating to journey claims] would have significant 
impact on Telstra’s claims numbers and costs due to the number of commuting to and 
from work claims which Telstra has and the fact that these claims are prone to being of 
a serious and long term nature. To show this point the following Telstra claims data is 
provided: 
•  There are currently 311 “open” commuting to/from work claims out of the total of 
3,562 total open claims, or 8.7%.     
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•  The cost to date of these 311 claims is $25.6m, or 12.5% of the total cost to date of all 
current open claims. 
•  The average cost to date of these 311 claims is $82,485.13 per claim, which is 44% 
higher than the average cost per claim of all open claims. 
•  Of the overall 22 open dependant claims within Telstra, 10 resulted from commuting 
to/from work claims.  
•  In 2001/02 the number of commuting to/from work claims received was 231 out of a 
total number of 1,739 claims received, or 11.2%. (sub. 136, p. 3, attachment 2) 
Westpac Banking Corporation found that journey claims comprised approximately one-
third of total claims in New South Wales (sub.  130, p.  2). Woolworths, in providing 
additional information on its journey claims for New South Wales and Queensland, stated 
that these: 
… journey claims have represented 4-5% of the total number of claims over the last 2 
years. Cost analysis reveals journey claims have been approximately 20% higher on 
average than other workers compensation claims. Another matter that is worthy of note 
in relation to journey claims … is the problems that can occur when there is a third 
party recovery action pending. Third party litigation occurs in approximately 30% of 
cases, and can be a significant deterrent in a successful return to work. The legal action 
in these cases is often not resolved for at least two years, and the worker is often not 
motivated to achieve a full return to work until the action is settled. (sub. 156, pp. 1–2) 
As evidenced from the above, the cost of journey claims can be significant and influence 
the affordability of workers’ compensation. Also, while journeys to and from work are an 
inevitable part of meeting employment commitments, the mode and nature of the journey, 
and the location of the workers’ residence relative to work are not, in most circumstances, 
matters over which the employer exercises any control. In addition, where it is not 
included, compulsory coverage for motor vehicle journeys is provided under CTP 
schemes. Some workplaces have also negotiated special provisions for their inclusion as 
part of enterprise bargaining.  
In view of these factors, the Commission, on balance, does not support the inclusion of 
journeys to and from work within workers’ compensation schemes. 
Recess breaks and work social events 
Jurisdictions also vary in their coverage of injuries that occur during lunch times or other 
breaks. Legislation in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland states that injuries 
sustained during an ordinary or authorised recess are covered as long as the worker does 
not voluntarily subject themselves to abnormal risk of injury. Examples of cases from New 
South Wales include:     
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•  A worker who injured his knee during a game of touch football whilst on his lunch 
break was awarded compensation. The worker was judged to have not subjected 
himself to abnormal risk. 
•  A worker on his lunch break who suffered a hypoglycaemic attack while driving and 
then collided with a semi-trailer was awarded compensation because he did not 
voluntarily subject himself to an abnormal risk as this implies that there was some 
degree of deliberation or intention. 
South Australian legislation specifies that authorised breaks at the place of employment are 
covered. Tasmanian legislation states that absences are not included except where they 
occur at the request or direction of the employer or, if it is work-related, with the expressed 
or implied authority of the employer.  
The other jurisdictions rely on the common law interpretation of their legislation. If an 
employee is allowed to spend breaks on an employer’s premises then he or she is in the 
course of employment and therefore injuries arising are compensable. If the rest break is 
taken away from the employer’s premise then the courts apply a test of reasonableness. 
The courts tend to interpret the legislative provisions liberally. The Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry gave as an example: 
A decision by the NSW Supreme court where an employee in his lunch break showing 
off to a friend by riding a motor bike up a steep grade sustained a serious injury and 
which the court ruled was ‘in the course of employment’ is an example of an 
interpretation.  
The employer in this case claimed that he was not in control of the activity and could 
not be expected to take responsibly for the employee’s reckless actions. (sub. 81, p. 6) 
More generally, for social and recreational activities, if employers have expressly or 
implied, induced or encouraged their workers to engage in an activity, then an injury 
arising from that participation is compensable under workers’ compensation legislation. 
Participants indicated that consistency across jurisdictions in this area was desirable, but 
there was no consensus as to what the provisions should be. The Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry strongly supported restricting coverage to recess breaks at the 
workplace and employer sanctioned events, based on the lack of employer control 
(IRsub. 196, p. 18). The Queensland Council of Unions considered that full coverage must 
be afforded to recess, meal breaks and work-related events (IRsub. 206, p. 2). And the 
Victorian Government argued for its current position (IRsub. 256). 
The Commission accepts that the employer’s ability to exert control over workplace recess 
breaks and social activities is a relevant consideration. Such an approach would have the 
advantages of ease of understanding and administrative simplicity, thereby minimising 
delays in claims management and the scope for disputation.     
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National framework issues 
For defining the work-relatedness of fatalities, injury and illness under workers’ 
compensation schemes a number of criteria are relevant. These include: 
•  employer control. Statutory obligations are placed on employers under workers’ 
compensation (and OHS) legislation to exercise control over safety at workplaces and 
be held liable to pay compensation for work-related fatalities, injuries and illnesses. On 
this basis, work-relatedness would be confined to situations where employers could 
exercise a degree of control over circumstances. Journeys to and from work and 
accidents occurring off-site during recess breaks or non-sanctioned activities would be 
excluded and work-sanctioned social and sporting events would be included, 
irrespective of location.  
•  work contribution. Workers’ compensation is a cause-related compensation scheme 
and not a welfare scheme to compensate workers for injury, illness and death 
irrespective of cause. For certain illness and death, determining the contribution of 
work to the condition can be problematic and practical tests have to be developed if 
such schemes are to operate as intended.  
•  certainty and clarity. For a number of conditions, the determination of work-relatedness 
requires the exercise of judgment. Regulators should ensure that the intention of 
legislation is clear. Acceptance of the results is more likely where the bases on which 
the judgments are made are known and understood. At times, however, this may 
require the inclusion, or exclusion, of certain conditions and specification of onus and 
standard of proof. Also, certainty and clarity are aided if there is consistency in 
definitions across borders and for different conditions as can assist in building up a 
body of case law to support them, as well as directly reduce confusion, complexity and 
uncertainty.  
•  administrative simplicity. The determination of work relatedness of cause can be 
complex and costly for some conditions. These costs should be borne in mind when 
specifying tests of the work contribution. It provides a basis for specifying minimum 
thresholds for certain conditions, such as industrial deafness.  
•  availability of alternative forms of cover. This is relevant in optional areas of coverage, 
such as journey claims and recess breaks. It is not relevant to the basic rationale 
underlying compulsory coverage for employees under employer-financed schemes. 
This criterion provides an added rationale for excluding journey claims as CTP would 
cover the majority of journeys to and from work.  
The Commission recommends the following as principles to use when defining work-
related fatality, injury and illness under compulsory workers’ compensation schemes:  
RECOMMENDATION     
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•  definition of injury and illness to be comprehensive in terms of coverage of medical 
injuries and illnesses and include aggravation, acceleration, deterioration, 
exacerbation or recurrence of a medical condition;  
•  definition of work-relatedness to be in terms of ‘arising out of or in the course of 
employment’, as used by nearly all jurisdictions; 
•  definition of attribution, ‘a significant contributing factor’, which is used in a 
number of jurisdictions, to be a minimum benchmark, while ‘the major contributing 
factor’ would add greater clarity;  
•  coverage for journeys to and from work not to be provided, on the basis of lack of 
employer control, availability of alternative cover in most instances and the ability to 
be dealt with under enterprise bargaining; and  
•  coverage for recess breaks and work-related events to be restricted, on the basis of 
lack of employer control, to those at workplaces and at employer sanctioned events. 
Under model A (self-insurance under the Comcare scheme) of the options for national 
frameworks outlined in chapter 5, the coverage of illness, definitions of work-related and 
attribution would be those currently applying under the Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1988. The Act covers a wide range of injury and disease, including 
mental illness and aggravation of existing medical conditions. It uses the ‘arising out of or 
in the course of employment’ test to define work relatedness and ‘material degree’ to 
define the attribution of work to disease. Journey claims are covered, as are injuries that 
occur during ordinary recess breaks.  
Model  B (an alternative national self-insurance scheme) requires new legislation to be 
implemented. This provides an opportune time for new definitions to be developed that are 
consistent with the above recommendations. An alternative national premium-paying 
insurance scheme (model C) would provide a similar opportunity.  
Under model  D (a national cooperative body), jurisdictions could work towards a 
consistent approach, particularly in the areas of attribution, journey claims and recess 
breaks. They could also consider consistent ways of handling the difficulties of diseases of 
long latency and those with a number of contributing factors, such as skin cancer, hearing 
loss, the dust diseases, back conditions and stress. This could be done independently of, 
and concurrently with, the implementation of broader based self-insurance under model A 
and the development of subsequent more widely-based models. 
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7 Injury  Management 
This chapter considers that part of the terms of reference which asks the Commission to 
identify and report on issues relating to appropriate approaches to injury management.  
Although the intent of occupational health and safety (OHS) arrangements is to prevent 
work-related fatality, injury and illness, not all harm is avoided. Where prevention fails, 
the task of minimising the associated human and economic costs falls to injury 
management. The Workplace Injury Management and Workers’ Compensation Act 1998 
(NSW) defines injury management as:  
… the process that comprises activities and procedures that are undertaken or 
established for the purpose of achieving a timely, safe and durable return to work for 
workers following workplace injuries. (Section 42 (1)) 
The emphasis on providing ‘a timely, safe and durable return to work’ is a feature of all 
schemes. According to the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
(NOHSC): 
Early intervention and a workplace focus for rehabilitation are recognised as effective 
in reducing the economic and human costs associated with work-related injury and 
disease … research and practical experience have demonstrated employers benefit from 
developing systems for early identification, treatment and management of work-related 
injury or disease, thereby reducing the prospects of an injury or disease becoming a 
long-term workers’ compensation claim. This approach will typically involve some 
form of early reporting of injury and a coordinated response from management 
involving all relevant parties. (1995a, p. 2) 
To achieve this, mechanisms have been established to encourage injured employees to 
participate in rehabilitation as soon as medically feasible and, whenever possible, at the 
pre-injury workplace. Despite this, there are scheme attributes which can frustrate the goal 
of early and durable return to work — in particular, the incentives provided to employees 
through the benefits structure and those provided to employers to facilitate rehabilitation. 
As explained by Associate Professor Nicholas Buys: 
The establishment of workers compensation schemes usually focuses on levels of 
benefits and entitlements to benefits with little regard for the impact of these provisions 
on prevention and rehabilitation. Consequently the systemic features of workers 
compensation schemes militate against successful rehabilitation. The presence of 
common law, lack of focus on employer responsibilities to assist injured workers to 
return to work, and poorly funded rehabilitation services have contributed to this 
problem. (sub. 92, p. 1) [Emphasis in original]     
190    
 
Claims management and dispute resolution procedures also have important roles to play in 
effective injury management. There is evidence that when confrontation is introduced into 
the claims process, recovery may be delayed (RACP 2001; Kenny 1995b; and The 
Australian Psychological Society Ltd, sub. 165, p. 3). 
7.1  Why injury management is important 
Aside from the obvious benefits to the injured worker from recovering as soon as possible, 
associated personal costs can also be reduced. Financial benefits can also accrue to the 
employer through lower workers’ compensation premiums, avoidance of retraining costs 
and reductions in other expenses. Indirect benefits may arise through improved 
productivity and workplace morale. To the extent that there is cost-shifting, early recovery 
can reduce the burden on the general community. 
There have been various attempts to quantify the direct benefits of injury management to 
the employer: 
•  Ashby analysed rehabilitation services provided by the Queensland Department of 
Education in one region of Queensland in 1995-96. He estimated that an annual outlay 
of $82 050 generated annual savings of $3.8 million (1999, p. 44) — a benefit-to-cost 
ratio of 47 to 1. The savings arose from lower workers’ compensation premiums and 
reduced sick leave, but excluded potential indirect benefits of rehabilitation such as 
improved morale or productivity. The costs comprised the salaries of rehabilitation co-
ordinators; incidental costs were excluded (1999, p. 36); 
•  a review of Commonwealth Rehabilitation Services (CRS) programs (Anutech 1993) 
estimated a benefit-to-cost ratio of 9 to 1; 
•  the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council (1990) estimated that the benefit-to-cost 
ratios for a number of workers ranged from less than 1 to 1 to over 33 to 1; and 
•  Ganora and Wright (1987) provided case-study data for a firm of 300 employees which 
had developed its own injury management and rehabilitation program with a benefit-to-
cost ratio of 13 to 1. 
However, in a study of a Commonwealth government business enterprise, Hocking et al. 
(1993) found that rehabilitation, while acceptable to employees, was not undertaken in a 
cost-effective manner and resulted in a net financial loss. 
Although overseas compensation and rehabilitation systems can differ greatly from those 
of Australia, evidence from the United States of America suggest that there are significant 
savings for every dollar spent on rehabilitation (Roberts, Wood and Thomas 1985). A 
review of US studies suggested that the benefit-to-cost ratio can vary considerably, with 
estimates of between 1 to 1 and 36 to 1 (Pati 1985).     
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A number of studies have attempted to estimate the overall benefits of effective injury 
management. Taking into consideration the benefits to the individual of a full recovery, the 
gains to the community and the indirect benefits to the firm, the total benefits of 
successfully returning an injured worker to work may be four to eight times the direct 
savings in workers’ compensation payments (Ganora and Wright 1987; IC 1995).  
7.2  Factors which facilitate recovery 
The Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP) reviewed the factors which 
contribute to recovery following an injury or illness. While some of these factors are 
unique to the individual — such as socioeconomic circumstances or psychological 
attributes — others relate to the method of compensation. Among the factors identified by 
the RACP as influencing recovery were: 
•  early intervention; 
•  workplace-based rehabilitation; 
•  the benefits structure; and 
•  effective claims management (2001, p. 4). 
Early intervention 
The RACP noted that one of the reasons for poorer health outcomes following injury was: 
The management of initial treatment (for example, in non-specific musculo-skeletal 
injuries, not identifying psychosocial risk factors [‘yellow flags’], not encouraging 
resumption of normal behaviours as much as possible, not encouraging return to work 
or normal activities, etc.). (2001, p. 4) 
The Rehabilitation Task Group, comprising representatives of workers’ compensation 
schemes, employers, employees and rehabilitation providers, also acknowledged the 
importance of early intervention: 
Early and effective workplace-based rehabilitation is instrumental in maintaining or 
returning injured employees to work, thereby minimising costs associated with work-
related injury. Benefits for employers include a reduction in compensation costs, 
retention of experienced and skilled employees and increased employee morale. 
Employee benefits include a decrease in loss of earnings and financial costs, in addition 
to a reduction in the psychological effects of work-related injury. (NOHSC 1995a, p. 5) 
The importance of early identification of the medical issues involved, and the development 
of an appropriate treatment strategy, were identified by many participants. According to 
Buys:     
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Early intervention is a key component of a workers compensation scheme. Early 
intervention includes a range of components: (a) maintaining communication with 
workers who are absent from the workplace, (b) appropriate medical treatment, (c) 
immediate contact with the treating doctor to obtain return to work restrictions, and 
provide information about job demands and the availability of transitional work, and 
(d) implementation of a clearly defined return to work program that may include 
modifications.  
Provision of rehabilitation services as soon as possible after injury is strongly 
correlated with early return to work. For example, a study in Victoria (Strautins & Hall, 
1989) examined return to work data of 443 injured workers who were referred to an on-
site disability management program in a company that had manufacturing plants in the 
areas of paper, steel, cardboard and plastic products. There were two important 
findings. First, early referral to rehabilitation was linked to likelihood of return to work. 
For example, of those referred within 8 – 28 days of injury, 77% returned to work. 
Where workers were referred after a month, only 66% returned to work. Second, the 
earlier the referral to rehabilitation the shorter the time taken to return to work. Of those 
workers who were referred to rehabilitation within seven days of injury, 73% had 
returned to work within 28 days. However of those workers who were referred for 
rehabilitation after 29 days, only 42% had returned to work within 28 days. (sub. 92, 
p. 3). 
Employer groups also recognised the need for early intervention: 
Good injury management is the most effective driver of high workplace morale, cost 
mitigation, shared responsibility and positive outcomes. Injury management should 
commence immediately the injury occurs. Jurisdictions and employer management 
strategies of lost time injuries in particular must not provide the disincentive for the 
early reporting of claims and immediate injury management by the employer.  
The most critical period of any claim is the first 24 to 48 hours. It is during this time 
that the injured worker requires the most support in a number of areas including 
personal, moral, medical, financial with a clear understanding of the return to work 
expectation and assistance. Poor support systems for workplace injury can result in an 
adversarial relationship developing between the injured worker and the employer and 
the chances of a successful return to work diminish quickly. (Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, Western Australia sub. 55, p. 16) 
Figure 7.1 indicates the relationship between referral and return to work for a sample of 
500 workers from the Australian Capital Territory.     
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Figure 7.1  Early Intervention and return to work 






































Source: Association of Rehabilitation Providers in the Private Sector, ACT (sub. 139, p. 14). 
The Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association also provide evidence of the benefits 
of early intervention. Table 7.1 indicates that there was a 90 per cent return to work rate 
when the delay between injury and referral to a rehabilitation provider was less than 20 
days. When the delay to referral was increased to between 49 and 105 days, the return to 
work rate fell to 62  per cent. In part, the correlation between early intervention and 
successful return to work reflects the fact that medical conditions typically have to be 
stabilised before rehabilitation can commence. For more serious injuries, which could be 
expected to involve a lower likelihood of successful return to work, the time delays 
involved in stabilisation can be substantial. In some cases, the delay between injury and 
referral to a rehabilitation 
 
Table 7.1  Rehabilitation costs and delays to referral 
Delay between injury and 
first referral 
Return to 
work rate  
Average cost with
a return to work   
Average cost with
 no return to work   
  % of cases  $  $
20 days or less  90  1 354  2 539
21 to 48 days  71  1 801  3 287
49 to 105 days  62  1 664  3 110
a Sample of 1393 workers injured since January 1999 in Victoria, South Australia and the Australian Capital 
Territory who were referred to rehabilitation providers. 
Source: ARPA (2004).     
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provider has been as long as 2000 days (ARPA 2004). Rehabilitation costs are lowest 
when rehabilitation commences immediately. 
Some participants identified the need for early indicators of the risk factors that could lead 
to an injury becoming a long term disability. ‘Red flags’ relate to physical risk factors; 
‘yellow flags’ are indicators of psychological and social risk factors — for example, in 
relation to the management of chronic pain. Failure to adequately manage chronic pain can 
lead to long-term disability and delay return to work (CCH 2003a, p.  712). This is 
particularly problematic in soft tissue injuries which represent almost two-thirds of 
workers’ compensation injury claims (NOSHC 2003a). Merse, Fitzgerald and Nichols 
(sub. 5, p. 3) noted that most people with soft tissue injuries to the back, neck or shoulders 
recover quickly. However, around 15 per cent will still be unable to return to work after six 
months and many of these will be permanently disabled. Those with long term injuries 
utilise around 80 per cent of the resources associated with managing this type of injury. 
Early identification and treatment of psychological risk factors therefore has the potential 
to produce considerable savings in rehabilitation resources.  
The financial advantages of early intervention were also noted by the Department of 
Family and Community Services: 
… the importance of returning injured people to work within six months of injury was 
affirmed by NSW data indicating that two-thirds of workers’ compensation payments 
were for claims over six months duration. Earlier referral to vocational rehabilitation 
(within six months of injury) was found to save employers and insurers $6 million each 
year (around 21% of scheme vocational rehabilitation costs) and increased people’s 
earnings by $9 million. (sub. 167, p. 6) 
Workplace-based rehabilitation 
Maintaining contact with the workplace has been identified as a major contributor to 
successful recovery. Return to work allows injured workers to maintain self-esteem, 
benefit from the social network provided by the workplace, ensure that skills do not 
atrophy and enable income to be earned during rehabilitation.  
The RACP noted the importance of maintaining contact with the workplace: 
Unemployment is, in itself, a risk factor for poor health. There are multiple and 
interrelating effects of being away from work, including loss of sense of identity, loss 
of social networks, loss of economic control and independence, loss of social status, 
loss of financial security (such as loss of family home), and so on. Long-term 
unemployment is notoriously hard to break. (Where unemployment is caused by injury, 
this is exacerbated by employer’s reluctance to employ anyone with pre-existing 
injuries because of risk to workers’ compensation premiums and the perceived risk of 
re-injury.) (2001, p. 4)     
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The RACP concluded: 
People who have had to leave work or abandon their normal activities due to injury 
usually find their social networks reduced and their social support reduced 
proportionately. Social support from family and friends has a protective health effect 
and assist people to recover from illness. People who do not have access to social 
support die earlier, suffer more illness and are marginalised from society, making them 
emotionally and physically vulnerable. (2001, p. 15) 
If practicable, return to work should occur at the pre-injury workplace. This ensures that 
injured or ill workers have access to existing workplace and related social networks and 
that rehabilitation occurs in a familiar and relevant environment: 
Wherever possible, rehabilitation should be workplace-based as this provides the most 
realistic environment to assess work fitness. It also assists the employee and employer 
to maintain appropriate links which might be otherwise compromised by the 
injury/compensation process. (NOHSC 1995a, p. 5) 
In an analysis of workers’ compensation recipients in the United States, Galizzi, Boden 
and Liu (1996) found that return to work was quicker, and subsequent unemployment rates 
were lower, among employers who returned to their pre-injury employer rather than an 
alternative employer. Among the employees of smaller firms, who were unable to provide 
return to work opportunities, rehabilitation was slower. 
The financial benefits to employers of instigating workplace-based rehabilitation can be 
substantial. Hawkins (2000, p.  6) provides evidence that Queensland employers using 
workplace-based rehabilitation in 1995-96 reduced average premium costs by 17 per cent 
and average claim duration by five days.  
The advantages of rehabilitation at the pre-injury workplace are also reflected in the 
experience of the CRS: 
The CRS Australia experience is that the average gap between date of injury and date 
of referral are: 
•  for return to work with the same (ie. the injury) employer — 4.5 months 
•  for return to work with a new employer — 8.4 months 
Despite the long delays before referrals are made, CRS Australia has been able to effect 
return to work rates of 84% (same employer) and 56% (new employer) in this scheme. 
(Department of Family and Community Services, sub. 167, p. 8)     
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Benefits structure 
The incentives provided by workers’ compensation benefits are discussed in chapter 9. 
There is strong evidence that, beyond a certain level1, an increase in benefits results in an 
increase in both the number of claims and claim duration. Moreover, lump sum 
compensation can lead to poor recovery outcomes (chapter 8). 
It has long been recognised that the payment of compensation can delay recovery (Dereby 
and Tullis 1983; Hanson-Myer 1984). McNaughton et al. (2000) found that whether or not 
a claimant was receiving earnings-related compensation was the strongest determinant of 
whether a case would be closed within 12 months. For claimants receiving earnings-related 
compensation, 41 per cent cases were not closed after 12 months compared to 16 per cent 
in the non-earnings related group. Case closure statistics should be interpreted with caution 
as they may not indicate durable return to work (Butler, Johnson and Baldwin 1995). 
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that incentives provided through the benefits structure 
can adversely influence rehabilitation outcomes. Hirsch (1997) found that, for a given 
injury, workers were likely to remain away from work longer when compensation for lost 
earnings was increased. 
The benefits structure may also influence the type of injuries claimed for, with consequent 
implications for recovery statistics. This raises the possibility of moral hazard, such as 
exaggerating the severity of the injury or claiming for an injury which occurred outside the 
workplace. For example, it can be difficult to establish the severity of soft tissue injuries — 
which include sprains, strains and lower back injuries — or to attribute them to one cause 
(Insurance Australia Group, sub. 89, p. 39). Butler, Durbin and Helvacian examined the 
marked increase in soft tissue injuries in US workers’ compensation claims and concluded 
that the ‘ … moral hazard response explains most of the 30% increase in the proportion of 
soft tissue injuries during the 1980s’ (1996, p. 1).  
The potential for moral hazard was recognised by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Western Australia: 
Another important issue lies in the exaggeration of symptoms. With high benefit levels, 
individuals find that they are pressured to justify their absence, and then begin to 
exaggerate the extent of their injuries or illness. This process can have deep 
psychological implications, in that individuals often come to believe their own 
exaggerations, thus perpetuating the duration of absence, and undermining the potential 
for effective recovery. This process has been termed ‘functional overlay’, and its 
destructive effects are well documented. (sub. 55, p. 11) 
                                                 
1 The Institute of Actuaries of Australia (sub. 88, p. 10) provides evidence that increases in income 
replacement above 75  per cent can lead to more than proportional increases in claim costs 
(chapter 9).     
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Effective claims management 
The way in which an injured worker is treated, particularly during the early stages of the 
claim, may condition their expectation of, and commitment to, the rehabilitation process 
(Foreman and Murphy 1996).  
RACP identified the following factors as having the potential to delay recovery: 
•  The initial response to claimants by insurers (for example, acting as though claimants 
are automatically assumed to be fraudulent, thus pushing them into a defensive ‘I’ll 
show them, I’m really sick’ attitude) … 
•  The handling of case management by insurers (for example, not developing appropriate 
return to work programs nor monitoring these, not providing claimants with good 
information about the effects of long-term sick leave, etc.). 
•  The handling of case management by treating doctors, including specialists (for 
example, not reviewing treatment by service providers and continuing treatment which 
is not helping, providing unnecessary treatment, not giving early referral to pain 
management programs, not addressing psychological problems such as depression). 
•  The number and type of medical examinations required … the effect of these appears 
to be twofold: to entrench illness behaviours and to prejudice the claimant further 
against the insurance company. (2001, p. 20) 
Kenny (1995b) provides evidence that if an injured employee considers the claims 
management process to be unsympathetic or judgemental it can become adversarial and 
lead to delays in rehabilitation. The adversarial nature of common law compensation can 
also delay return to work (chapter 8). 
7.3  Scheme approaches to injury management 
Although best practice principles for injury management have been broadly accepted in all 
jurisdictions, differences exist in the way in which these principles have been incorporated 
into scheme arrangements (Victorian Government, sub.  164, p.  15). In particular, the 
schemes differ in regard to the specific responsibilities assigned to key stakeholders.  
Employers 
Most schemes emphasise workplace-based programs and employer involvement in the 
process (Comcare, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Australian Capital 
Territory). By contrast, South Australia places greater emphasis on services provided by 
external rehabilitation specialists and a case-management approach facilitated by claims 
managers. Western Australia and the Northern Territory are less prescriptive. They simply 
require that employers take reasonable steps to provide rehabilitation and suitable     
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employment. Obligations placed on employers are set out in table  7.2 and include the 
following: 
•  report the injury to the insurance company as soon as possible; 
•  provide suitable duties whenever practicable. Suitable duties are determined on the 
basis of medical advice and must involve ‘productive’ employment — ‘demeaning’ or 
‘token’ duties cannot be offered. This requirement is imposed by all schemes; 
•  develop a rehabilitation program which outlines the process of returning the injured 
employee to the workplace. A rehabilitation program is written in consultation with the 
treating doctor and the worker. In complex cases, it may also involve a rehabilitation 
provider. This is a requirement of all schemes except Western Australia, the Northern 
Territory and Seacare. In New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland this requirement 
is only imposed on large employers2. In New South Wales and the Australian Capital 
Territory, it is known as an injury management plan and is drawn up by the insurance 
company; 
•  develop a return to work (RTW) plan which outlines the suitable duties offered to the 
employee. A RTW plan is designed to make clear the physical limitations on the 
worker and the steps to be taken in the graduated return to normal duties; 
•  employ a rehabilitation/RTW coordinator who, amongst other duties, collaborates with 
the injured worker and the treating doctor to establish appropriate rehabilitation and 
return to work strategies. In New South Wales, they collaborate with the claims 
manager in writing an injury management plan. This requirement applies to large 
employers in New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania3; and  
•  keep the injured worker’s position open for a specified period of time (which can vary 
between schemes). This is a requirement of all schemes except for Seacare, the 
Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. In Tasmania and Western 
Australia, the obligation is to maintain the position ‘if reasonably practicable’. 
                                                 
2 In New South Wales, this is an employer with a workers’ compensation premium of $500 000 or 
more; in Victoria this is an employer with a payroll of $1  million or more; in Queensland, 
workplaces with more than 30 employees are required to have a rehabilitation plan while in 
Tasmania, this requirement applies to workplaces with more than 20 employees.  
3 In Tasmania, workplaces with more than 50 employees are required to have a rehabilitation 
coordinator.     
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Table 7.2  Employer obligations in rehabilitation/return to work 
  Notify 
insurer 














position   
open 
 days          months 
Comcare 1a Yes No  Yes  Yes  Indefinitely 
Seacare 12  Yes  No  No  No  ns 
NSW 2  Yes  Yesb  Yesb No 6 
Victoria 10  Yes  No  Yesb Yese 12 
Queensland 10  Yes  Yesb  Yesb No 6 
WA 3  Yes  No  No  No  12 
SA 5  Yes    Noc Yes Yes  Indefinitelyf
Tasmania 5g Yes Yesb Yesb No 12 
ACT 2  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  ns 
NT 3  Yes  No  No  No  ns 
a For a serious personal injury, incapacity or dangerous occurrence. Within 2 hours for a fatality. b For large 
employers. c In South Australia, self-insurers are required to have a rehab/RTW coordinator. d In New South 
Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, employers are required to comply with injury management policy 
developed by the insurance company (claims manager). e For workers with no work capacity for 20 or more 
days. f For firms with 10 or more employees. Firms with less than 10 employees are required to keep position 
open for 12 months. g Working days. 
Sources: HWCA (2002); scheme sources. 
The strong correlation between early intervention and successful return to work has 
prompted two schemes — New South Wales and Western Australia — to allow 
provisional workers’ compensation payments to be made without any admission of liability 
on the part of the employer. According to the Association of Rehabilitation Providers in 
the Private Sector, ACT: 
Short timeframes on accepting liability and access to benefits while liability is being 
determined, assists early intervention. There have been cases where claimants have 
gone back to work before liability was determined because liability was not held up by 
the insurance process. (sub. 139, pp. 13–14) 
Work placement 
In some circumstances, returning the employee to the pre-injury workplace is not possible. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises are often unable to offer suitable duties or lack the 
necessary resources to undertake workplace-based rehabilitation. Those difficulties were 
identified by Workplace Injury Management Services:     
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Lack of opportunities for return to work with the pre-injury employer is especially the 
case for small to medium employers. Based on our experience, we estimate that as 
many as 80% of injured workers of small to medium employers, who are still off work 
at three months post injury, will not return to ongoing work with their pre-injury 
employer.  
To varying extents workers’ compensation schemes include provision for vocational 
retraining and placement services for injured workers who cannot return to work with 
their pre-injury employer. As well, several jurisdictions provide varying levels of 
incentives and support to employers who employ previously-injured workers, such as 
wage and training subsidies, premium exemptions and protection from future costs 
associated with the injury (eg, NSW’s JobCover program, Victorian WISE program 
and South Australia’s RISE Program).  
However, in our experience vocational retraining and placement services are generally 
under-utilised. Where they are accessed, it is often as a last resort after sometimes 
lengthy delays and unsuccessful attempts to achieve return to work with pre-injury 
employers, which may result in considerable frustration and loss of confidence for the 
injured worker. (sub. 37, p. 5) 
Other arrangements could facilitate the placement of employees of small to medium 
enterprises following a work-related injury or illness:  
There may also be opportunities for workers’ compensation schemes to access or learn 
from the services and expertise of specialist disability placement services such as those 
funded through the Commonwealth Government’s Job Network program. (WIMS 
sub. 37, pp. 5–6) 
The specific problems arising from labour hire arrangements were noted by a number of 
participants. For example, BDS Recruit Pty Ltd observed: 
In the labour hire industry the employer, the agency, in most cases cannot provide 
suitable duties as they may only have an office with limited duties. The host company, 
controller of the workplace has no obligations under current legislation to participate in 
any way in the injury management system. This results in: 
•  The injured worker having limited access to suitable duties. 
•  The introduction of a 3
rd party to try and find suitable duties for the worker, adding to 
the cost of the claim. 
•  The job the worker was in being filled by another casual worker as the host company 
has no obligation to keep it open for the injured worker. 
•  The injured worker staying on compensation because there is no work to return to. 
(IRsub. 213, p. 6) 
The Commission’s preference is for labour hire companies to be deemed the employer for 
workers’ compensation purposes (chapter 6). This would include responsibility for injury 
management. The Commission notes the difficulties faced by labour hire companies in 
providing suitable duties but considers that these difficulties are also likely to be faced by     
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the host company. The host company’s decision to enter into a labour hire arrangement 
reflects the temporary nature of the intended employment relationship. Furthermore, the 
costs of workers’ compensation claims would normally be reflected in labour hire 
agreements entered into by the host company and the labour hire company. 
In addition to the obligations placed on employers to facilitate rehabilitation, some 
schemes provide incentives for employers to hire workers injured at another workplace. 
These incentives may take the form of training subsidies, exemption from paying workers’ 
compensation premiums for a worker injured at another workplace or indemnification 
against costs arising from an aggravation of a pre-existing injury.  
For example, in New South Wales, the JobCover Placement program provides: 
•  a training allowance of up to $300 for the first 12 weeks; 
•  workers’ compensation premium exemption for the injured worker in the first year; and 
•  payment for second injury costs if the worker has a work-related aggravation of a pre-
existing injury in the first year of employment. 
Incentives for new employers of injured workers are also offered by Victoria, South 
Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory. These ‘second-injury’ arrangements 
need to be closely monitored to ensure that re-employment subsidies are only received by 
employers hiring previously injured workers. For example, in South Australia, scheme data 
would suggest that 72 per cent of workers’ compensation claimants had a prior injury. 
However, according to the HWSCA survey of injured workers, the figure was only 41 per 
cent (2003, pp. 21–2).  
In December 2003, the Australian government initiated a pilot program to improve access 
for recipients of the Disability Support Pension to the employment services offered by the 
Job Network. These services could also be accessed to provide employment opportunities 
for workers’ compensation claimants. Workers’ compensation schemes and industry 
associations could also directly contribute to reducing job search costs and facilitating the 
placement of injured workers.  
Programs aimed at the placement of injured workers operate in other countries. The 
Workers’ Compensation of British Columbia offers a free service to employers who submit 
job vacancies online. The employers are then contacted with the details of injured workers 
who may meet the employer’s requirements. Employers are also eligible for financial 
benefits when hiring injured workers. South Australia has introduced a similar job-
matching service through its RISE program.     
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In North America, many smaller firms4 have entered into employee leasing arrangements 
with Professional Employer Organisations (PEOs). The PEO manages workers’ 
compensation claims, payroll, payroll tax and OHS for the client company. In an 
arrangement similar to labour hire for temporary employees, the PEO hires the employees 
of the client company and leases them back. As a larger employer, the PEO can exploit 
economies of scale in handling personnel relate matters, including workers’ compensation 
and workplace risk assessment. It may also be better placed to offer workplace-based 
rehabilitation opportunities. As a large purchaser of insurance, the PEO may be able to 
negotiate premium discounts on workers’ compensation insurance that would not be 
available to individual smaller employers. Employee leasing agreements have been entered 
into by a small number of Australian employers.  
Employees 
Employees are generally required to make all reasonable attempts to participate in 
rehabilitation. Failure to do so can result in a reduction, suspension or cessation of benefits. 
Specific obligations include the following: 
•  notify the employer about the injury as soon as possible (all schemes); 
•  cooperate in medical examinations and provide medical reports on request by the 
insurer (Comcare, Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory); 
and 
•  cooperate in the establishment of a rehabilitation/RTW plan and comply with its 
provisions (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, the Northern 
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory). 
Doctors 
Medical practitioners have a primary role in providing initial treatment and the prognosis 
for rehabilitation and return to work. Typically they play a central role, together with the 
employer and employee, in developing injury management and return-to-work strategies 
(NOSHC 1995a, p. 10). Among the other tasks of the treating doctor are: initial diagnosis 
and treatment; ongoing treatment; referral to specialist treatment; and, where necessary, 
cooperation with the employee, employer and rehabilitation provider to facilitate return to 
work.  
                                                 
4 Collectively, firms with employee leasing arrangements employ around 3 million employees. The 
average firm covered by an employee leasing arrangement has 16 employees (NAPEO 2004).     
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The central role of doctors in pronouncing workers fit to return to work, and the condition 
under which that return should occur, has been acknowledged by workers’ compensation 
schemes. For example, in the Northern Territory: 
Doctors are the ‘gate keepers’ of the workers’ compensation scheme, with no other 
medical or paramedical group being afforded equivalent powers. This places doctors in 
a privileged position when it comes to workers’ compensation matters, as under the 
Northern Territory’s legislation only they have the authority to issue medical 
certificates for lost time by injured or ill workers. With such powers comes a number of 
responsibilities to ensure that the injured or ill worker receives appropriate, timely and 
effective treatment during their period of injury or illness (Northern Territory Worksafe 
2004). 
In all schemes, injured workers have the right to receive treatment from their own doctor. 
In New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, an injured worker is required to 
nominate a treating doctor who is prepared to cooperate in the establishment of a 
rehabilitation plan. However, if a dispute arises over the worker’s medical condition, 
independent medical advice may be sought by the insurer. In Victoria, Queensland, 
Western Australia and Tasmania disputes can be referred to a medical panel for arbitration 
(chapter  13). In New South Wales, medical disputes are referred to the Workers’ 
Compensation Commission. Under the Australian Government schemes, expert medical 
witnesses, who are independent of both parties, can be used by the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal to resolve disputes. 
Allied health professionals 
Allied health professionals include physiotherapists, occupational therapists, chiropractors 
and psychologists. Participants noted the importance of services provided by allied health 
professionals in ensuring effective rehabilitation outcomes. For example, the 
Chiropractors’ Association of Australia (CAA) submitted that the recommendations 
contained in the Interim Report reinforce the view of: 
… the GP as the gatekeeper and makes no mention of other allied health professionals 
who have an important role in the management of many claimants and especially of 
those workers who require a rehabilitation coordinator … The CAA is of the view that 
chiropractors by virtue of their undergraduate training are suitably qualified to provide 
an equal or superior gate-keeping role to GPs for neuro-musculoskeletal injuries. There 
have been instances in the past where medical practitioners have indulged in 
discriminatory practices against chiropractors (and other health professionals). We 
consider this may prejudice the rehabilitation of the worker and compromise the ability 
of the medical practitioner to act as the sole gate-keeper for workplace injuries. 
(IRsub. 230, p. 2) 
The Commission acknowledges that, in many cases, once the initial medical diagnosis is 
made and immediate treatment is given, allied health professionals are primarily     
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responsible for rehabilitation. However, as noted by NOSHC the ‘ … medical practitioner 
is central to the rehabilitation of injured employees and must be consulted prior to the 
implementation or maintenance of return to work programs’ (1995a, p. 10). In a national 
survey of almost 3,000 injured workers, doctors were identified by about a quarter of those 
surveyed as most helpful in assisting return to work. Physiotherapists were regarded as 
most helpful in facilitating return to work by 13 per cent of injured workers. Other allied 
health professionals were identified as most helpful by 18 per cent of workers (HWSCA 
2003, p. 36).  
Allied health professionals, such as occupational therapists, can also be involved in 
preventing work-related injuries (OT Australia, Victoria sub. 13, p. 3) in particular those 
involving musculo-skeletal injuries. Counselling services may also be utilised to prevent 
work-related stress claims. 
Some participants submitted that inflexibility in claims management practices may have 
resulted in the under-utilisation of services provided allied health professionals. OT 
Australia, Victoria said the reasons for this inflexibility included: 
•  Service delays in claims administration, 
•  The need for paper-based approvals by claims officers for every hour of service, 
•  Varying degrees of intervention towards rehabilitation, depending on the expertise and 
workload of individual claims officers, 
•  Systemic barriers to a focus on early intervention and prevention, and 
•  Post-injury purchase of services and no provision for prevention services. (sub. 131, 
p. 1) 
Claims management 
Insurers are responsible for claims management. In publicly underwritten schemes, the 
claims management may be outsourced to private insurers. The insurance company may 
either be responsible for writing an injury management or rehabilitation plan (New South 
Wales) or approving its implementation. Several participants noted the importance of 
claims management in successful rehabilitation:  
There is a direct relationship between the design of the injury management programme 
and the benefits regime in respect to duration. It is possible for an insurer to effectively 
‘park’ a claimant in a scheme and only comply with statutory obligations in respect of 
rehabilitation or return-to-work. The long-term prospects of the injured worker 
returning to work may be minimal if this occurs. 
The skills required to rehabilitate an injured worker are different to those required to 
manage a claim and a case could be made for a total separation of the two functions 
within the workers’ compensation scheme. (Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations, sub. 166, p. 26)     
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In South Australia, claims agents are responsible for coordinating return to work. In New 
South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, the insurance company develops a 
rehabilitation plan in consultation with the worker, employer and treating medical 
practitioner.  
Rehabilitation providers 
Rehabilitation providers: offer advice on return to work strategies; arrange alternative 
employment if injured workers cannot return to their previous job; arrange for the 
assessment of psychological factors that might be impairing return to work; arrange 
counselling, if necessary; and arrange independent medical opinions for the purpose of 
claims management. Rehabilitation providers may also be involved in dispute resolution. 
As noted by NOHSC, ‘[i]t should not be necessary to refer all injured employees to a 
rehabilitation provider. In many cases, liaison with the treating medical practitioner and 
workplace supervisor may be all that is required to develop an appropriate rehabilitation 
program for an injured employee’ (1995a, p. 13). In a national survey of injured workers, 
the rehabilitation provider was identified as most helpful in facilitating return to work by 
9 per cent of injured workers (HWSCA 2003, p. 36). 
Although rehabilitation providers employ allied health professionals, the role of the 
provider is not to supply treatment but to manage the rehabilitation process. In all schemes, 
with the exception of Tasmania and Queensland, rehabilitation providers require 
accreditation (Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association, sub. 160, tables 1 and 2). 
Queensland and Tasmania are currently considering the introduction of accreditation. 
7.4  Outcomes of injury management 
A key indicator of injury management success is the rate of durable return to work. 
Nationally, around 83 per cent of workers return to work within six months, but for 10 per 
cent of workers it is not durable (box 7.1). The national durable return to work rate of 
73 per cent is below its peak level of 77 per cent in 1999-00 and slightly below the level 
when comparative rates were first compiled in 1997-98.      
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Box 7.1  Results from the Australasian Return to Work Monitor 
The Australasian Return to Work Monitor is a survey undertaken on behalf of HWSCA. It 
compares rehabilitation and return-to-work (RTW) outcomes across workers’ compensation 
schemes in Australia and New Zealand. All Australian jurisdictions, with the exception of 
Western Australia and the Northern Territory, participate in the survey. Each worker 
surveyed: 
•  had submitted a claim seven to nine months before; and 
•  had more than 10 days compensation paid (including any employer excess).  
Key results of the survey for Australian jurisdictions in 2002-03 were: 
•  83 per cent of injured workers returned within six months of making a claim; 
•  73 per cent of injured workers achieved a durable return to work (that is, had returned to 
work and were still working at the time of the survey); 
•  the most common reason for returning to work was ‘recovery from injury’ (41 per cent) 
followed by ‘economic need’ (17 per cent) and ‘wanting to RTW’ (16 per cent). Pressure 
from the employer, insurer or workers’ compensation scheme was rarely identified; 
•  three-quarters of workers who returned to work felt ready to do so;  
•  three-quarters of workers who returned to work reported they had been given suitable 
duties; 
•  doctors were reported most frequently (23 per cent) as being most helpful to return to 
work; and 
•  on average 57 days of compensation was paid and the average claim cost was $10 102. 
Source: HWSCA (2003). 
 
 
Comparative return to work outcomes are provided in figures 7.2 and 7.3. Across 
jurisdictions, several trends could be observed: 
•  All schemes recorded similar outcomes with respect to return to work at the pre-injury 
workplace. Across the Australian schemes surveyed, 83  per cent of workers who 
returned to work did so with their pre-injury employer. The differences between the 
jurisdictions were relatively minor, with the exception of Comcare and Seacare, which 
both recorded a rate of return to the pre-injury employer of about 95 per cent.     
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Figure 7.2  Comparative return to work outcomesa, 2002-03 







RTW 83 82 82 82 87 95 77 84
Durable RTW 75 70 72 71 75 90 67 68
NSW Vic Qld SA Tas Com Sea ACT
 
a The return to work rate measures the proportion of injured workers who have returned to work within six 
months of making a claim. The average return to work rate for Australia (excluding the Northern Territory and 
Western Australia) was 83 per cent in 2002-03. The average durable return to work rate was 73 per cent in 
2002-03. 
Source: HWSCA (2003, pp. 1–2). 
Figure 7.3  Employment conditions on return to work 2002-03 







Return to same employer 82 86 80 87 87 95 96 77
Return to same
employer/same duties
68 65 69 57 70 77 87 62
Given suitable duties 78 75 75 81 81 81 68 76
NSW Vic Qld SA Tas Com Sea ACT
 
Source: HWSCA (2003, pp. 12–14, 31). 
•  68 per cent of injured workers returned to the same employer and carried out the same 
duties as they did before their injury. Injured workers most frequently returned to the     
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same employer and the same duties in Seacare (87 per cent) and Comcare (77 per cent). 
The lowest rate of return to the same employer and the same duties was in South 
Australia (57 per cent). 
•  36  per cent of injured workers participated in rehabilitation. The highest rates of 
participation in rehabilitation were in the Australian Capital Territory (83 per cent), 
Tasmania (65 per cent) and South Australia (65 per cent), while the lowest were in 
Queensland (17 per cent) and Seacare (9 per cent). New South Wales and Victoria had 
participation rates close to the national average (HWSCA 2003, p. 49). 
Return to work plans 
A comparison of return to work provisions is provided in figure 7.4.  
•  49 per cent of injured workers reported that they had a RTW plan developed for them. 
The proportion was highest in South Australia (67  per cent) and lowest in Seacare 
(17 per cent). 
•  Of those who received a RTW plan, 72 per cent considered them helpful to return to 
work. This proportion was highest in Comcare (82 per cent) and Queensland (79 per 
cent) and lowest in Seacare (59 per cent).  
Figure 7.4  Comparison of return to work provisions, 2002-03 







Had RTW plan 55 45 38 67 60 59 17 61
RTW plan was helpful 69 68 79 69 74 82 59 67
Given help with RTW
plan
56 53 62 51 71 73 59 51
NSW Vic Qld SA Tas Com Sea ACT
 
Source: HWSCA (2003, pp. 24, 26, 27).     
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Comparing outcomes 
It is difficult to compare return-to-work outcomes between schemes. Differences in benefit 
structures, dispute resolution mechanisms and the labour force covered by schemes make it 
difficult to isolate the impact of return to work and rehabilitation provisions. Nonetheless, 
a few broad inferences can be drawn: 
•  The design and implementation of RTW plans, and the provision of suitable duties, 
appear to have an important role to play in facilitating return to work. Comcare, which 
had the highest durable return to work rate, had the highest proportion of workers who 
found that RTW plan helpful; a high proportion of workers who felt they had been 
given help to implement their RTW plan; and (along with South Australia and 
Tasmania), the highest proportion of workers who believed they had been given 
suitable duties when returning to work. 
•  The experience of Seacare illustrates the crucial role that employment conditions can 
have on injury management outcomes. Reflecting the difficulties of finding alternative 
duties in the maritime industry, Seacare claimants were more likely to report that they 
returned to the ‘same employer, same duties’ (figure 7.3). Graduated return to work is 
problematic in the maritime industry5. Reflecting this, Seacare had the lowest 
proportion of workers with a RTW plan (figure  7.4), but the highest proportion of 
workers who felt ready to return to work (81 per cent). Comcare, which largely covers 
public service employers, was able to offer the highest proportion of return to the same 
employer. These observations suggest that a ‘one size fits all’ approach may not be 
appropriate in injury management and that consideration should also be made of the 
nature of employment covered by the scheme. 
The Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association (ARPA) has identified the claims 
management features which it believes are most conducive to workplace based 
rehabilitation. ARPA divided schemes into four types: 
•  State underwritten and administered (Queensland): ‘While these schemes generally 
agree with the need for early intervention they are usually the slowest at claim 
determination and therefore the slowest at referral to rehabilitation services.’ 
(sub. 175, p. 1) [italics in original] 
•  State underwritten and agent administered (South Australia, New South Wales and 
Victoria): ‘These schemes are reasonably quick at claim determination which can allow 
                                                 
5 According to HWSCA an ‘injured seafarer ready to return to work must have access to a 
supernumerary position on a ship for a graduated return to seafarer duties or must be passed 
medically fit by an Australian Maritime Safety Authority approved medical practitioner in 
accordance with fitness for duty regulations if able to return to full pre-injury seafarer duties. 
There are few supernumerary positions on ships. As ships are often away from port for 4–6 
weeks, the options for graduated return to work under such conditions is limited’ (2002, p. 65).     
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for early rehabilitation intervention. In reality Agents will often ‘triage’ claims in house 
which adds a delay to intervention times. Some use in house rehabilitation for this 
function which could be considered a form of early intervention, others use less 
qualified and experienced people for this role resulting in slow or inappropriate 
rehabilitation service delivery.’ (sub. 175, p. 2) 
•  Insurer underwritten and administered (Tasmania, Western Australia, Northern 
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory): ‘These schemes are also reasonably 
quick at claim determination which can allow for early rehabilitation intervention. They 
are also often ambivalent to the value of rehabilitation to the scheme so are more likely 
to delay referral. It is only when time standards are built into these schemes that early 
intervention is achieved. (sub. 175, p. 3) [italics in original] 
•  Self insured (Comcare): ‘Self Insurers often have in house rehabilitation providers that 
know about the injury before the claim is determined … Self Insurers achieve the best 
levels of early intervention. This level of early intervention is difficult to achieve in any 
other way and may not be translatable to other schemes … Self insured rehabilitation is 
almost exclusively workplace based. This scheme form understands the value of 
retaining a focus on the workplace if return to work is the primary outcome expectation 
of the scheme. It is often easier for self insured employers to understand the importance 
of training supervisors and managers to support injured workers in their recovery and 
return to work.’ (sub. 175, p. 4) [italics in original] 
7.5  National framework issues 
The Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities proposed seven principles of best 
practice injury management: 
•  In a workers’ compensation system, early return to work is the expected outcome of 
occupational rehabilitation intervention. Occupational rehabilitation should be 
workplace-based with services aimed at the maintenance or restoration of a worker to 
appropriate employment. 
•  The employer should be responsible for assisting in the occupational rehabilitation and 
return to work of their injured workers, as well as keeping the job available for a 
reasonable period. 
•  Occupational rehabilitation services are not required for all injured workers, but, where 
necessary to achieve a return to work, services are most effective when delivered as 
soon as possible after injury, and subject to regular assessment for relevance, 
effectiveness and results. 
•  Workers’ compensation systems should provide an environment where an early return 
to work is seen by the injured worker as the most appropriate outcome. This involves 
an obligation on behalf of the injured worker to participate positively in the 
occupational rehabilitation programme and return-to-work plan.     
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•  Insurers and managed fund agents should ensure that there is a clear focus on 
occupational rehabilitation and return to work as part of the workers’ compensation 
claims management process. 
•  Occupational rehabilitation is most effective when the employer, worker, medical and 
rehabilitation providers (where involved) jointly develop, implement and show a 
commitment to return-to-work programmes. 
•  The workers’ compensation system regulator should have responsibility for developing 
and fostering a culture which strongly supports and reinforces the expectation of return 
to work as the normal outcome for any work related injury or disease. The regulator’s 
role should be to develop, communicate, promote and enforce the legislative 
framework required to achieve return to work and the provision of occupational 
rehabilitation. (HWCA 1997, p. 15)  
These principles are consistent with those proposed by other organisations (for example, 
NOHSC (1995a, p. 3)6 and IC (1994, p. 127)). They have been broadly accepted in all 
jurisdictions, although the details of how these principles are implemented can vary. Some 
schemes favour a regulatory approach to facilitate workplace-based rehabilitation, such as 
New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania who require large firms to hire a 
rehabilitation coordinator. Other schemes are less prescriptive. According to the Victorian 
Government: 
Common acceptance of these principles does not mean that the States have adopted 
uniform approaches to promoting these behaviours. For example, Victoria has initiated 
an educational campaign whilst South Australia has introduced compulsory RTW 
plans. These different approaches demonstrate that encouraging these behaviours is not 
easily mandated through a regulatory regime. The Australian Rehabilitation Providers 
Association highlights these challenges stating that increasing control and regulation 
does not automatically lead to better outcomes, as does the Australian Industry Group 
(AiG) who comment that instruments such as written RTW plans are more commonly 
understood as a compliance issue “rather than a legitimate part of the rehabilitation 
process”. This is evidenced by the Tasmanian experience in 2001-02 where durable 
RTW outcomes of 79  per cent exceeded the Australian average even though no 
accreditation procedures, fee setting or other controls were in place. Accordingly, there 
are significant challenges in identifying and extracting best practice in achieving 
rehabilitation and durable RTW outcomes. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
findings of the Comparative Performance Monitoring report that few guidelines or 
principles can be established that greatly influence the degree of success associated 
with specific worker rehabilitation programs and the implementation of durable RTW 
plans. (sub. 164, p. 15) 
                                                 
6 These principles were developed by the Rehabilitation Task Group which included 
representatives of the Victorian WorkCover Authority; Workers’ Compensation Board of 
Tasmania; WorkCover Corporation of South Australia; Work Health Authority of the Northern 
Territory; Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland; WorkCover Western Australia; 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Australian Council of Trade Unions; Comcare; 
Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service; and Victorian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.     
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An important advantage of a federal system of workers’ compensation is that it provides 
opportunities for jurisdictions to learn from each other. This may be particularly important 
in injury management where medical treatment protocols and rehabilitation practice can 
change over time. Differences in local conditions and the nature of employment in each 
jurisdiction may also necessitate different approaches in relation to return to work. In this 
respect, the Commission endorses the comments of the Tasmanian Government: 
The Government believes that in broad terms the differences between jurisdictions with 
respect to early intervention and return to work arrangements are not particularly 
significant. This is an aspect of workers compensation systems that is largely driven by 
notions of best practice and there are benefits in being able to compare results and 
innovations. This is a strong example of where a multiplicity of systems is providing a 
demonstrated benefit. 
There may be some differences in reporting and legislative requirements which could 
create some difficulties for employers operating in more than one jurisdiction if claims 
management is centralised. However, the Government’s view is that claims are best 
managed at the local level and that therefore these differences are largely irrelevant. 
(sub. 135, p. 9) 
Comparability of injury management outcomes is currently hampered by the lack of 
consistency in benefit structures and dispute resolution mechanisms. In particular, the 
presence of common law in some jurisdictions may affect early return to work (chapter 8). 
However, schemes have recently taken steps to facilitate the exchange of information; in 
particular, the Return to Work Monitor (HWSCA 2002, 2003). Moreover, schemes have 
shown a willingness to co-operate on injury management issues. The development of best 
practice guidelines for injury management (NOHSC 1995a) and guidelines for the 
accreditation of rehabilitation providers (NOHSC 1995b) are two important examples. 
Some participants pointed to the compliance costs imposed on multi-state firms by 
different rehabilitation and return to work provisions (Insurance Australia Group, sub. 146, 
p. 3). However, these costs are unlikely to be significant. Where schemes have imposed 
restrictions, for example compulsory RTW plans, they have also made available 
comprehensive material (such as template RTW and rehabilitation plans) to make 
compliance easier. This material is often directed specifically to small- to medium-sized 
employers.  
 
The Commission recommends the following as principles to facilitate durable return to 
work: 
•  early intervention, including the early notification of claims and the 
provisional assignment of liability; 
RECOMMENDATION     
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•  workplace-based rehabilitation where possible, at the pre-injury workplace, 
noting the various schemes aimed at overcoming the particular difficulties 
faced by small to medium enterprises in this respect; and 
•  return to work programs developed and implemented by a committed 
partnership of the employer, employee and treating doctor, drawing on the 
services of a rehabilitation coordinator and allied health professionals as 
required.  
Those eligible firms who choose to self-insure under Comcare (model A) would be subject 
to its injury management provisions. ARPA were of the opinion that Comcare was 
essentially a self-insurance scheme and had features most conducive to achieving to early 
intervention and workplace based rehabilitation (sub. 175, p. 4). This view is supported by 
the fact that Comcare has the highest return to work rate of any scheme (HWSCA 2003, 
p.  1). Under an alternative national self-insurance scheme (model  B) the injury 
management provisions of Comcare could also apply.  
An alternative national insurance scheme (model  C) would provide an opportunity to 
consider whether the injury management provisions of Comcare were appropriate for 
premium-paying employers, particularly smaller employers. For example, the provision 
that a firm must keep the injured worker’s position open indefinitely may be considered an 
onerous impositions on small firms. This could be modified, as in South Australia, to apply 
only to larger firms.  
The national body charged with developing internally consistent scheme elements 
(model  D) would continue the cooperation demonstrated by schemes in sharing 
information and developing consistent guidelines in injury management. One area in which 
greater national consistency could be achieved is in the accreditation of medical and 
rehabilitation professionals. Groups representing rehabilitation providers (for example, 
ARPA sub.  160, tables 1 and 2) noted the costs imposed by different accreditation 
standards applied to rehabilitation providers across schemes. The Commission sees no 
reason for different accreditation standards to apply and notes that best practice principles 
have already been agreed to by the schemes (NOHSC 1995b). An agreement of mutual 
recognition of accreditation standards could reduce the cost of multiple accreditation and 
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8  Common law access 
The Commission has been asked to consider the ‘implications of retaining, limiting or 
removing access to common law damages for work-related injuries/illness and fatalities’. 
The common law is the set of traditional English legal principles which have been adopted 
by Australian courts. The common law of tort1 may provide injured workers with an 
alternative avenue to compensation, distinct from statutory workers’ compensation. 
Although rarely used, action for workplace harm may also be brought against an employer 
for breach of contract. 
Under statutory workers’ compensation schemes, employees do not have to establish fault 
in order to receive compensation — it is only necessary to show that the workplace fatality, 
injury or illness arose ‘out of or in the course of employment’2. However, to succeed in a 
common law action for the tort of employer negligence, it is necessary to show that the 
employer breached a duty of care owed to the employee and, as a result, damage was 
suffered. Similarly, in an action for breach of contract, an injured worker must establish 
that it was the employer’s breach of an express or implied term of the employment contract 
which caused the injury. 
The inclusion of common law can have a significant impact on the statutory benefit 
structure. Schemes with little or no common law access — such as Comcare and South 
Australia — tend to have statutory benefits which cater for the ongoing needs of 
permanently impaired workers (are ‘long-tail’ schemes). Schemes with relatively 
unrestricted common law access — such as Queensland and Tasmania3 — tend to have a 
statutory benefits structure directed towards workers with shorter-term illnesses or injuries. 
These schemes look to the common law to meet the needs of the more seriously injured. 
                                                 
1 Tort is a private or civil wrong, independent of contract, arising from wilful or negligent 
misconduct in breach of a duty of care owed to an injured person. 
2 The exception is Tasmania which uses ‘and’ instead of ‘or’. 
3 The Australian Capital Territory has unrestricted common law access and a long-tail benefits 
structure (chapter 9).     
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8.1  Common law in workers’ compensation  
Common law actions 
Common law actions may be brought by employees directly against employers for the 
employer’s own actions, against employers for the actions of third parties, or directly 
against third parties. The majority of common law actions in workers’ compensation are 
under the tort of employer negligence. Employees may also bring action for breach of 
contract.  
Employer liability in tort 
Negligence can be established by proving that an employer breached a general duty of care 
or a statutory duty. 
Breach of general duty of care 
Employers are regarded as having a general duty to provide their employees with a ‘safe 
system of work’. This includes, inter alia, a duty to: 
•  employ reasonably competent staff; 
•  take reasonable care to ensure a safe place of work; and 
•  provide, inspect and maintain safe plant and equipment (CCH 2003a, p. 122). 
Where an employer fails to satisfy the duty of care (is negligent) and an employee suffers 
loss as a result, damages may be recovered by the employee, provided common law actions 
are not disallowed by legislation. Employers may be held directly liable for their own acts 
or omissions, or vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of employees or third parties 
(for example, contractors). 
Breach of statutory duty 
An action for breach of a statutory duty may be available where such a right is provided 
under the OHS regulation. This is distinct from a criminal action under OHS regulation 
against an employer. Since OHS regulations are clearly established under legislation, 
breach of statutory duty will often be easier to prove than negligence.      
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Employer liability in contract 
Although seldom used, employment contracts can provide the basis for a common law 
action against an employer. Under contract law, an employer will be held liable for the 
consequences of a breach of that contract. This may be a breach of an explicit term of the 
employment contract, such as an OHS provision of an award, or a term implied into the 
contract by the courts. Unlike actions in tort, damages for breach of contract will not be 
reduced to take account of an employee’s contributory negligence. However, it may be 
difficult to establish that the loss suffered by the employee was caused by the breach of 
contract.  
Third party liability 
All schemes allow injured workers to claim damages against non-employers. Examples 
include when a third party supplies defective products to be used in a workplace or 
provides negligent advice. However, usually, an injured worker will seek to hold the 
employer liable for the actions of third parties. The employer (or the employer’s insurer) 
may then seek indemnification from the third party.  
If damages are awarded, the employer is entitled to be repaid any workers’ compensation 
previously paid or the amount of damages, whichever is the less. The employee also ceases 
to be entitled to any further workers’ compensation. 
Provision is also made for an employer to institute proceedings on behalf of an employee 
against a third party. In this case, the employee retains their right to workers’ compensation 
once the common law award is exhausted. 
Common law damages 
Damages can be awarded for economic and non-economic loss. Economic loss is a 
measure of reduced earning capacity and expenses incurred as a result of the injury. This 
includes not only past earnings loss which is directly attributable to the harm, but also 
future earnings loss. Non-economic loss relates to pain and suffering, reduced enjoyment 
of life, reduced expectation of life, impairment and disfigurement. Common law damages 
are normally paid as a lump sum. 
8.2  Common law access in Australian jurisdictions 
Common law is not available in all Australian jurisdictions. Since the mid-1980s, all 
Australian governments, with the exception of the Australian Capital Territory, have     
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restricted the availability of common law for workers’ compensation claimants. Some 
states have abolished common law access altogether.  
The availability of common law damages can be restricted by excluding certain heads of 
damages, making eligibility subject to meeting a minimum injury threshold or placing a 
cap (upper limit) on the amount of damages which can be paid. Schemes may also impose 
a limit on the time in which a common law claim can be initiated. 
Access to common law was removed in the Northern Territory from 1 January 1987 and 
South Australia from 3 December 1992. In the Comcare and Seacare schemes, damages 
have been abolished for economic loss (although actions may be taken by dependants in 
the case of death). In New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia, access to 
common law is restricted to workers with a serious injury (the definition of this differs 
between jurisdictions) and damages are capped4. In Queensland and Tasmania, there are 
no caps on damages but access is subject to a minimum injury threshold.  
Where access is restricted to more seriously injured workers, most schemes use thresholds 
based on impairment percentages. In Western Australia, access to common law is based on 
a disability threshold. Thresholds based on narrative tests or monetary thresholds tend to 
erode over time, allowing claimants with less serious injuries or illnesses to access 
common law: 
Since their introduction in the 1970s both monetary and verbal thresholds have been 
greatly eroded by claims “padding” to surmount thresholds, by expansive judicial 
interpretations of verbal thresholds, and by the impact of inflation on monetary 
thresholds — most of which are not indexed to increases in the nominal costs of injury 
compensation. (Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock 1996, p. 57) 
All schemes which provide compensation through a statutory scheme and allow damages 
at common law include provisions to prevent compensation by both. Most jurisdictions 
allow the claimant to retain the right to no-fault damages up to the point at which their case 
for negligence is proved. Any compensation received under the no-fault scheme is then 
repaid and the claimant is prevented from accessing further statutory benefits. If the claim 
is not successful, the worker will continue to receive compensation under the statutory 
scheme. Two jurisdictions — the Australian Government and Queensland5 — require an 
irrevocable election over which form of compensation to pursue. An election to pursue 
common law damages precludes further receipt of statutory benefits. Table 8.1 provides a 
comparison of common law access across the jurisdictions. 
                                                 
4 New South Wales abolished common law actions in 1987 but reintroduced them, in modified 
form, in 1989. Victoria abolished common law access in 1997 and reintroduced it in 1999. 
5 In Queensland, this restriction applies only to workers with an impairment of less than 20 per 
cent of statutory maximum compensation. Workers with a more severe impairment can pursue 
both concurrently.     
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Table 8.1  Access to Common Law in Australian jurisdictions 





Election of avenues 
Australian 
Government 
Non-economic loss only 
(max $110 000 in 
Comcare; $138 571 in 
Seacare). No restrictions 
on dependants or in third 
party actions. 
10% impairment  Irrevocable decision to sue, 
relinquishes right to statutory 
lump sum benefits. No 
restrictions on dependants.  
New South Wales  Economic and non-
economic loss. 
Non-economic loss not 
available for injuries 
sustained from 27/11/01. 
 








Irrevocable decision to sue, 
relinquishes right to statutory 
lump sum benefits. For 
injuries sustained from 
27/11/01, may pursue both 
concurrently until damages 
awarded. 
Victoria  Economic and non-
economic loss. (Max for 
economic loss $933 000; 
max for pain and 
suffering $406 000). No 
medical costs. Not 
available for injuries 




May pursue both concurrently 
until damages awarded. 
Queensland  Economic and non-
economic loss 
None  Only if permanent impairment 
less than 20% of statutory 
maximum compensation.  
Western Australia  Economic and non-
economic loss. For 
disability less than 30%, 
limit of $284 615d 
16% disability according 
to Table of 
Compensation Payable  
Only for disability less than 
30%. 
South Australia  Abolished.  na  na 
Tasmania  Economic and non-
economic loss. No limits 
30% impairment  May pursue both concurrently 




economic loss. No limits 
None  May pursue both concurrently 
until damages awarded.  
Northern Territory  Abolished  na  na 
a Defined to be where compensation under Table of Disabilities is greater than 25 per cent of maximum 
amount or entitlement under non-economic loss is greater than $45  350. For injuries occurring after 
27 November 2001, access is restricted to workers with at least 15 per cent whole person impairment. b 
Damages for non-economic loss reduced if the loss is assessed at less than $60 450. These thresholds are 
indexed.  c For pecuniary loss $36  590. For pain and suffering $36  730 (for injuries occurring before 
12 November 1997) and $35 340 (for injuries after 19 October 1999). d Indexed. 
Sources: HWSCA (2002); Victorian Government, sub. 164, p. 12; scheme sources. 
Although only a small proportion of claimants proceed to common law, payments to them 
can represent a significant proportion of scheme liabilities. For example, in 2000, around 
1 per cent of claimants initiated common law action in New South Wales. Common law 
payments in that year represented over 20 per cent of scheme liabilities (PwC 2001, p. 8).     
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Common law access in other countries 
In most countries, the role of common law as an avenue of providing compensation has 
largely been replaced by statutory workers’ compensation schemes, while its role as a 
deterrent has largely been assumed by OHS regulations. For example, common law actions 
are disallowed in New Zealand, which compensates workplace injury, along with all other 
personal injury, through a comprehensive, no-fault scheme. 
Common law actions for workplace injury are also generally disallowed in the United 
States and Canada — the only two countries (other than Australia) to have federal systems 
of workers’ compensation. ‘Exclusive remedy’ is provided by statutory schemes. 
Exceptions are allowed in some circumstances6. US courts view workers’ compensation as 
part of the employment bargain under which employees relinquish common law rights in 
return for a guarantee of compensation by employers. It is only when employers breach 
this contract, for example, by failing to carry workers’ compensation insurance or by 
intentionally causing harm, that the exclusion from common law action is removed. 
The United Kingdom allows unrestricted common law access for work-related fatality, 
injury and illness. For this reason, all employers are required to carry privately 
underwritten Employers’ Liability insurance. There is no separate statutory workers’ 
compensation fund (Williams 1991, p.  132). Workers who are unable to establish 
negligence on the part of their employers, or who choose not to pursue a common law 
claim, may be entitled to payments through the social security system7. 
A review of the UK civil justice system, conducted in the mid-1990s, concluded that the 
common law was: 
… too expensive in that the costs often exceeded the value of the claim; too slow in 
bringing cases to a conclusion and too unequal: there is a lack of equality between the 
powerful wealthy litigant and the under resourced litigant. It is too uncertain: the 
                                                 
6 Georgia allows common law actions for breach of statutory duty. Texas is the only US state 
which does not make participation in workers’ compensation compulsory. In Texas, firms who 
choose not to participate in the workers’ compensation scheme are not protected from common 
law actions.  
7 The Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit provides payment in the event of an injury or 
specified illness which is work-related. Access to this benefit is dependant on suffering a 
minimum impairment of 14 per cent, which equates to the loss of an index finger or a big toe. 
The benefit is a specified weekly amount (not a proportion of pre-injury earnings) and depends 
on the severity of the injury. For example, a person with an impairment of 100 per cent receives a 
payment of £116.80 per week. In 2003, this represented 24 per cent of average weekly earnings 
in the United Kingdom. A claimant with an impairment of 20 per cent may receive a payment of 
£23.36 per week. This benefit is not paid for the first 90 days following a claim and may include 
an unemployability supplement and Exceptionally Severe Disability Allowance. An Industrial 
Death Benefit is not payable to surviving dependents for work-related fatalities occurring after 11 
April 1988 (Department of Work and Pensions, 2003, pp.15–16).     
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difficulty of forecasting what litigation will cost and how long it will last induces fear 
of the unknown; … it is incomprehensible to many litigants … and too adversarial. 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, 1996, p. 1) 
In response to this report, the UK government introduced a number of reforms including a 
framework designed to encourage pre-trial settlement; fast-tracking of smaller claims; 
reforms to legal costs and the encouragement of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs 2001, p. 4). 
8.3  Evaluating common law in workers’ compensation 
Access to common law differs across jurisdictions. Over the past two decades, nearly all 
schemes have restricted access to common law on a number of grounds, including that it: is 
fundamentally contrary to the concept of ‘no-fault’; undermines scheme affordability; and, 
is inimical to early intervention, rehabilitation and return to work. According to the 
Northern Territory Government: 
Common law is not available as the NT Government believes this is inappropriate for a 
‘no fault’ scheme since it increases costs, results in significant delays, provides a 
disincentive to rehabilitation and return to work, and creates an adversarial 
environment which is detrimental to the workers long-term return-to-work prospects. 
(quoted in IC 1994, p. 120) 
Participants have expressed strong views, either supporting or opposing common law 
access. 
The arguments against a role for the common law in workers’ compensation include: 
•  common law runs counter to the basic principle of a no-fault scheme; 
•  common law can be slow, denying the victim access to timely compensation; 
•  common law has high transactions costs, reducing the amount of compensation 
available for injured or ill workers and/or their dependants; 
•  common law is inimical to rehabilitation and return to work because it promotes 
confrontation between the employer and employee; 
•  common law may delay rehabilitation and hamper effective injury management 
because damages are determined by the severity of the injury sustained; 
•  compensation is not guaranteed under common law, which can leave some injured or 
ill workers without adequate income support; and 
•  common law damages are provided as lump sums, which can be dissipated by the 
victim or otherwise prove inadequate to meet longer term need.     
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According to the Australasian Faculty of Occupational Medicine: 
… access to common law assists a person with a serious injury to gain a financial basis 
for changing their lifestyle or mode of employment. However, its administrative costs 
are proportionally high and its slowness can delay recovery and act against 
minimisation of disability and handicap. This opposes what is needed. A compensation 
scheme should encourage recovery and minimise long-term disability. (sub. 29, p. 5) 
The Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) also argued that common law can be counter-
productive to rehabilitation: 
The focus of any workers’ compensation system should be on return to gainful 
employment rather than litigation as a means to resolving claims. The MCA considers 
that litigation through common law can act as a disincentive to return to work and 
directly conflict with a focus on injury management. Common law action may be 
appropriate in some circumstances where employees have permanent severe 
impairment but even then, the adversarial court system is not always in the best 
interests of injured workers (third parties may be the beneficiary of any such action). 
(sub. 141, p. 5) 
Optus expressed similar views: 
Optus believes that access to common law damages: 
(a) increases the potential for disputes between employers and employees; 
(b) can reduce the incentive for some workers to participate positively in return to work 
programs; and 
(c) significantly increases costs of workers’ compensation arising from legal costs and 
increased cost of administration. (sub. 57, p. 5) 
While noting that access to common law damages can exist alongside statutory benefits, 
the Institute of Actuaries of Australia commented: 
… [common law] is based on the concept of fault, which does not sit comfortably with 
the needs-based approach of statutory benefits. In order to accommodate this 
needs-based ethos, it stretches the concept of fault so that it no longer has any meaning 
and in a way that is not compatible with the reforms underway elsewhere in common 
law. (sub. 88, p. 13) 
Other submissions (for example, COSBOA, sub. 7; Australian Physiotherapy Association, 
sub. 20; Territory Insurance Office, sub. 27; Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association, 
sub. 114) argued for the removal of common law or its restriction to the most seriously 
injured workers. 
Arguments for the retention of common law include: 
•  it is a fundamental right; 
•  it is intended to provide ‘just’ compensation for those harmed because of the 
negligence of others;     
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•  it provides an efficient process to monitor the adequacy and propriety of a no-fault 
scheme; 
•  it provides an incentive for employers to prevent work-related fatality, injury and 
illness; 
•  it prevents employers from shifting costs on to others; 
•  there are some cases for which statutory benefits are too inflexible to cover particular 
cases (for example, disfigurement); 
•  without common law, some workers/dependants would suffer from under-
compensation; and 
•  removal of access to common law for work-related fatalities, injuries or illnesses would 
discriminate against those harmed in (as opposed to outside) the workplace as a result 
of the negligence of others.  
Some inquiry participants, particularly those representing legal professionals, strongly 
supported the retention of common law. For example, the Queensland Law Society argued 
that access to common law is a basic right which can assist in the recovery process: 
Structures can be developed to contain costs without the arbitrary abrogation of 
citizens’ rights as must necessarily follow from the introduction of any inhibition upon 
the right to bring common law claims. In addition, there is ample evidence that access 
to common law remedies facilitates rehabilitation rather than inhibiting rehabilitation in 
any way.  
It is the contention of this submission that the Queensland scheme, including common 
law remedies, is the pre-eminent workers’ compensation scheme in Australia. It is 
affordable, fully funded and maintains the traditional rights of injured workers to seek 
individual compensation assessments that recognise the specific circumstances that the 
individual claimant brings to each case. (sub. 97, p. 4) 
The NSW Bar Association presented the case for common law on the basis of assigning 
responsibility for workplace safety: 
… the duty of care is the fundamental but basic underpinning of workplace safety. 
Common law liability, before and after accidents, is a necessary overarching principle 
which will, in conjunction with a no-fault scheme, achieve proper balanced outcomes 
… The Bar Association endorses the concept of personal responsibility in risk 
allocation. … Philosophically the basis of common law theory is the allocation 
of  personal responsibility. Modern exposition of the theory takes account of 
compulsory insurance but declines to depart from the fundamental underpinning. 
(sub. 64, pp. 20–1) 
 
The Queensland Council of Unions (QCU): 
… has consistently opposed the diminishing ability of workers to access common law.     
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The QCU stresses that compensation claims occur as a result of poor OHS by 
employers with the majority of workplace injuries and illnesses being predictable and 
therefore preventable. This is particularly true of manual handling injuries (the largest 
compensated class of injuries) and illness from hazardous substances (the largest 
occupational killer). 
Workers, like other members of society, must be granted the right to sue where 
negligence has caused them injury or illness. Common law access has functioned 
historically as a powerful deterrent for negligent employers and has provided workers 
with the ability to claim compensation which is directly relational to the degree of 
impact of the injury on their lives. (sub. 91, p. 3) 
Taking into consideration the above arguments for and against common law, there are 
three broad criteria against which common law in workers’ compensation can be 
evaluated: 
•  the incentives it provides to prevent workplace injury or illness. (In particular, whether 
these incentives are appropriately allocated between employers and employees); 
•  how well it provides compensation to victims of workplace injury or illness (including 
the costs of providing that compensation) and whether it gives appropriate incentives 
for rehabilitation; and 
•  how well it satisfies reasonable standards of ‘justice’. 
Legal rules and the provision of incentives for safer workplaces 
The two tort rules for assigning liability for workplace harm are strict liability (as applied 
in statutory workers’ compensation schemes) and negligence. 
Strict liability 
Under strict liability8 there is no standard of care which will allow the employer to escape 
liability. Irrespective of who is to blame, the employer is legally responsible for all 
fatalities, injuries or illnesses ‘arising out of or in the course of employment’9.  
                                                 
8 The terms strict liability and no-fault liability (as used in current workers’ compensation 
arrangements or compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance) are interchangeable. Both rules 
provide the same incentive effects. However, there are some minor differences. For example, 
under traditional strict product liability rules it was possible for the defendant to escape liability 
by making use of ‘affirmative defences’. These defences include that the plaintiff had willingly 
assumed the risk (after being fully informed by the defendant of the possible consequences) or 
that the plaintiff used the product in a way that it was clearly not intended to be used. No-fault 
liability is also typically imposed by legislation as part of a compulsory insurance scheme. 
9 The exception is Tasmania as noted at footnote 2.     
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When the employer is required to fully compensate an injured employee, the cost of the 
injury is internalised by the firm. As a general rule, people who are forced to bear costs 
have an incentive to reduce them. An important argument in favour of strict liability is that, 
by confronting a firm with the full cost of workplace injury or illness, cost effective OHS 
procedures will be incorporated into firm management practices.  
In addition, since the cost of workplace harm is a part of the firm’s operating costs, 
production decisions will reflect accident costs. Where market conditions allow, these 
costs are passed on to consumers. This reflects the important distinction between legal 
incidence and economic impact. 
Although a standard of strict liability could be seen as assigning all responsibility for OHS 
to employers, there are strong natural incentives for employees to avoid injury and to avoid 
harming others. Moreover, OHS regulations also require employees to exercise care. 
Compensation under statutory workers’ compensation schemes is also typically less than 
complete (chapter 9) which further increases incentives for safe workplace behaviour. 
The observation that employees may contribute to workplace injury or illness has lead to 
some participants advocating the concept of ‘contributory negligence’ in workers’ 
compensation schemes (for example, ACCI, sub.  81, p.  9). ‘Contributory negligence’ 
would involve reducing the benefit paid to an injured worker in proportion to their 
culpability in causing the injury or illness. However, such an approach would negate many 
of the advantages of strict liability. Disputation over employee fault would result in further 
delay and increased legal costs. Legal costs already represent a significant proportion of 
workers’ compensation costs. Additionally, no-fault schemes have generally evolved as 
workers have given up their right to sue in return for guaranteed (but possibly lower) levels 
of compensation. Any attempt to return the apportioning of fault in statutory workers’ 
compensation schemes would, in all likelihood, lead to pressure for increased benefits. 
All workers’ compensation schemes have provisions to prevent an employee from 
receiving compensation if the incident occurred as a result of the ‘serious and wilful 
misconduct’ of the employee10. Working under the influence of alcohol or drugs qualifies 
as such behaviour.  
Insurance and OHS incentives 
Workers’ compensation insurance does not necessarily distort the incentives provided to 
employers by liability rules. Insurers will attempt to provide the correct incentives to 
ensure that the behaviour of the employer is consistent with risk minimisation. This can be 
achieved by linking insurance premiums to the employer’s behaviour (experience rating) 
                                                 
10 This provision does not apply in the case of death or serious injury.     
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or by some form of co-insurance (such as an excess under which the employer pays a 
predetermined share of the injured workers’ costs — chapter 10). In this way, the insurance 
premium reflects the expected cost of injury or illness arising from the workplace and the 
employer continues to face adequate incentives to provide a safe working environment.  
Incentives can be diluted if there is a considerable time delay in any increase in risk being 
reflected in premiums. Cross-subsidisation can also dampen incentives. In most schemes, 
insurance premiums are capped, even for the riskiest firms, implying that firms which 
invest in safety initiatives are effectively subsidising the behaviour of less safe firms 
(chapter  10). This may mitigate, to a significant degree, any incentives for desirable 
behaviour in managing workplace risk. 
Compulsory insurance may actually increase the deterrence offered by liability rules by 
mitigating the problem of the ‘judgment-proof’ defendant. A defendant without the 
capacity to pay damages is said to be ‘judgment-proof’ and any threat of award of damages 
against such a defendant is meaningless as a means of encouraging optimal behaviour. It 
has been argued that a judgment-proof defendant may fail to take adequate care to prevent 
catastrophic events but will initiate measures to prevent less damaging occurrences 
(Shavell 1987).  
Negligence 
The availability of an action for negligence can create positive incentives for both 
employers and employees to take care. Employees may have their damages reduced by the 
proportion of their own negligence in causing injury or illness. Employers will be liable for 
damages arising out of their own negligence. 
To succeed in an action of employer negligence, an employee must prove that the 
employer failed to meet a standard of care. Courts determine what a reasonable standard of 
care is by considering the evidence of both employers and employees. This is based on a 
comparison between the cost of reducing workplace harm and the expected benefits: 
… broadly, negligence requires someone who has a duty of care to take reasonable care 
to protect against foreseeable harm. What is reasonable is decided on balancing the 
likelihood and severity of an injury that may occur on the one hand, and the cost and 
inconvenience of obviating that risk on the other hand. (Law Council of Australia 2002, 
pp. 25–6) 
The case for common law as a deterrent may be strongest in situations where accidents can 
be prevented by the actions of both employers and employees. Since employers can escape 
liability (and therefore the need to provide compensation) by meeting the standard of care, 
employees will be induced to take additional care, over and above that taken by the 
employer, in workplace situations whenever it is their best interests to do so.     
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Although a negligence rule can induce an optimal level of care (for example, reasonable 
safety management practices) there is no reason to expect that it will induce an efficient 
level of firm activity. This is because once the standard of care is satisfied, the employer is 
no longer responsible for harm arising out of the workplace and the costs of work-related 
fatalities, injuries or illnesses will not be passed on to the firm. 
Empirical studies conducted in the United States do not support the conclusion that 
common law provides greater incentives to reduce workplace risk than does a no-fault 
scheme: 
… the empirical evidence does not yield a determinate conclusion as to the effects of 
tort liability on accident rates. One explanation for the variation in the empirical results 
is that the least cost avoider may vary according to technological conditions and also 
from industry to industry. The evidence does not establish that tort liability will reduce 
workplace injuries: it indicates that it might reduce those injuries in some industries in 
the absence of a regulatory regime, although in those circumstances workers’ 
compensation appears to have a greater deterrent effect. (Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock 
1996, p. 355) 
The absence of a discernible deterrent effect may indicate that the pre-existing contractual 
relationship between employers and employees (which could be expected to reflect 
workplace risk), together with experience rated premiums and OHS enforcement, provide 
adequate incentives. In the words of Insurance Australia Group: 
In the context of workers’ compensation, it is certainly arguable that the fault principle 
no longer operates to achieve its original aims: 
•  The no fault concept is already well entrenched as a means of accessing benefits. Strict 
liability has been imposed on employers because of the close and special nature of the 
relationship between employers and employees. If satisfactory levels of no fault 
benefits are provided there should be no need for “add-on” or “election of” common 
law damages to mitigate the loss. 
•  Other mechanisms provide the “punishment and deterrence” factor for employers 
including OHS laws and, depending on the scheme, experience-based premiums. 
(sub. 89, p. 24) 
The Institute of Actuaries of Australia noted that the common law  
… punishes the employer for negligence. Where genuine fault exists, action under 
occupational health and safety legislation is a more effective penalty and is not softened 
by insurance. In many cases, however, there is little or no fault on the employer’s part. 
(sub. 88, p. 13) 
There are several reasons why the threat of common law action may provide employers 
and employees with inadequate incentives. 
First, the strength of any deterrence is muted by the indirect and delayed link between a 
common law action and its reflection in future workers’ compensation premiums and other     
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costs to employers. Common law actions are comparatively rare for individual small 
employers and are usually given only partial weight in determining future premiums, 
because of the difficulties in differentiating between good and bad risks on the basis of rare 
events. In addition, a common law claim may not be finalised for a number of years, 
effectively divorcing any ensuing incentive from the original event. According to the 
Australasian Faculty of Occupational Medicine: 
Use of common law as an incentive to prevention is too slow and indirect, and its case-
by-case processes do not make for orderly setting of priorities in prevention. (sub. 29, 
p. 6) 
Second, if liability cannot be assigned, or there is a high probability that it will not be 
assigned, a potential defendant’s incentives to take care are obviously greatly reduced. A 
plaintiff’s ability to prove liability in the case of industrial disease may be limited by the 
fact that a long period of time may elapse before the suit can be brought, reducing the 
chance of a successful action because evidence may be stale or the employer may no 
longer be in business. This is potentially a greater problem for industrial illnesses, such as 
mesothelioma, which can have a latency period of up to 40 years. Establishing liability for 
disease may also be problematic because it can be difficult to prove that the harm 
originated in the workplace rather than from some other source. 
Third, a rule of negligence may fail to provide correct incentives for accident prevention if 
the standard of care is set inappropriately. For example, there are circumstances in which 
the employer may not have been able to prevent the injury and an assignment of fault is 
inappropriate. According to The Australasian Faculty of Occupational Medicine: 
Common law is potentially available for injury where the source of energy comes from 
within the body, i.e. over-exertion injury. However, all the manual handling practices 
implemented in the last two decades have had but a modest effect on the severity of 
over-exertion injuries of the back, neck and shoulder. One is then forced to conclude 
that these injuries cannot be reliably prevented with existing knowledge, and that 
employers are right to question how they can be reasonably held to be negligent when 
they occur. So, while the potential for a heavy claim in common law may act as an 
incentive for an employer to comply with OHS law in regard to prevention of fractures, 
cuts, burns and electrocutions, it cannot reasonably do so in regard to muscle strains. 
(sub. 29, p. 5) [Emphasis in original] 
Some have expressed concern that, in order to ensure that plaintiffs are adequately 
compensated, fault has been found in circumstances where it traditionally would not have 
been. This has resulted in a shifting of the burden of liability towards employers. 
According to this view, the standard of care applied to employers and employees is not 
significantly different to that operating under statutory no-fault schemes. The Chief Justice 
of New South Wales observed: 
Over a few decades — roughly from the sixties to the nineties — the circumstances in 
which negligence would be found to have occurred and the scope of damages     
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recoverable if such a finding were made, appeared to expand considerably … There 
seems very little doubt that the attitude of judges has been determined to a very 
substantial extent by the assumption, almost always correct, that a defendant is insured. 
The result was that the broad community of relevant defendants bore the burden of 
damages and costs awarded to an injured plaintiff. Judges may have proven more 
reluctant to make findings of negligence, if they knew the consequence was likely to 
bankrupt the defendant and deprive him or her of the family home … The proposition 
that any degree of fault — whether minor or gross — justifies compensation for the 
whole of a plaintiff’s loss — whether catastrophic or minor — may also not have 
applied in quite the same way, in the absence of the ubiquity of insurance. (Spigelman 
2002, p. 2) 
Similar observations have been made in the NSW Court of Appeal:  
•  I think that it is impossible to read recent decisions of the High Court of Australia 
without realising that employers are now required to comply with safety standards 
which, only 20 years ago, would have been seen as imposing an onerous, even an 
absurd burden on employers … Throughout the common law of negligence, but 
particularly in the employer/employee field, the standard of care required of a 
defendant has moved closer to the border of strict liability. (McHugh JA 1985 quoted 
in Spigelman 2002, p. 3)11 
•  [the law] effectively places [the defendant] in position of an insurer … There may be a 
view, even a preponderant view, that this is a desirable development of the law because 
otherwise seriously injured plaintiffs may be forced to rely on social services supplied 
by the government. But there are, as it seems to me, serious implications flowing from 
the far reach of the present doctrine. (Clarke JA 1993, quoted in Spigelman 2002, p. 5)  
•  The current tendency to consider only individual circumstances which produce injury 
and the means by which those circumstances could have been changed and the injury 
avoided is redefining the foundation of the law of negligence by impermissibly 
expanding the content of the duty of care from a duty to take reasonable care to a duty 
to avoid any risk by all affordable means. Such an approach pays insufficient regard to 
the degree of the risk of injury from the particular circumstance which caused injury 
and to the time, effort and cost of avoiding the risk of injury and the financial capacity 
of a defendant to undertake such a task. (Fitzgerald JA 2000 quoted in Spigelman 2002, 
p. 5) 
This view is supported by the fact that findings of contributory negligence against 
employees are comparatively few. In a sample of 261 common law claims in New South 
Wales, PwC found that ‘only 13 (5%) had some degree of contributory negligence 
recorded in the common law file. 3 of these claims were assessed as being 50% 
contributable, whilst the other 10 were assessed as being less than 20% contributable’ 
(2001, Appendix B, p.13).  
                                                 
11 Justice McHugh’s comments were subsequently rejected by the High Court.     
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There is some evidence that this ‘long term trend has been reversed’ (Spigelman 2002, 
p. 3). From 1987 to 1999, the High Court heard 40 personal injury cases. In 32 cases the 
decision was in favour of the plaintiff. In contrast, from 2000 to 2002, the High Court 
heard 24 personal injury cases of which only 5 were in favour of the plaintiff (Davies 
2003, p. 2). 
Finally, common law damages are an uncertain form of compensation. Uncertainty 
surrounding likely outcomes from a common law action may imply that inadequate 
incentives are provided to employers and employees. Statutory benefits ensure certainty of 
compensation, and so reinforce incentives in a predictable way. On this point, the Institute 
of Actuaries of Australia noted: ‘The amounts awarded [under common law] are 
substantially less predictable and can give rise to substantial cost escalation, long after the 
corresponding injuries have occurred’ (sub. 88, p. 13). 
In conducting its review of the law of negligence, the Ipp Panel observed: 
The Ministerial communiqué, the Terms of Reference, and the breadth and range of the 
responses the Panel received in submissions and consultations, indicate that there is a 
widely held view in the Australian community that there are problems with the law 
stemming from perceptions that:  
(a) The law of negligence as it is applied in the courts is unclear and unpredictable. 
(b) In recent times it has become too easy for plaintiffs in personal injury cases to 
establish liability for negligence on the part of defendants.  
(c) Damages in personal injuries cases are frequently too high. 
… Irrespective of whether these perceptions are correct, they are serious matters for the 
country because they may detract from the regard in which people hold the law, and, 
therefore from the very rule of law itself. (2002, p. 25) 
In sum, a rule of strict liability may provide better incentives for harm reduction than a rule 
of negligence because: 
•  it ensures that liability is established quickly; 
•  it ensures costs of workplace harm are internalised by the employer; 
•  it ensures that the employer will be found liable; and 
•  it provides certainty as to the amount that the employer will be found liable. 
Compensation for workplace harm 
The aim of common law damages is to restore the worker, as far as money can, to the 
position they were in before the accident. In an unrestricted system, it meets the full loss of 
earning capacity and explicitly compensates non-economic loss. Under common law, when 
the injury stabilises, an award of damages is made on a personalised assessment of the     
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individual’s circumstances. This, it is argued, allows more accurate, individualised 
compensation than that provided by the statutory scheme through the use of impairment 
schedules and tables of disabilities. Common law damages may therefore avoid any 
inequities which flow from standardisation, particularly in the case of the seriously injured. 
In the words of one lawyer: 
While any civilised society provides assistance for those injured, the Common Law 
provides an active system of compensation to those who have been wrongly injured by 
the negligence of others. Compensation goes beyond mere assistance, placing the 
injured person as far as possible in the position they would be in if they had not been 
injured at all. (K M Splatt & Associates, IRsub. 210, p. 1) 
This advantage of common law is likely to be greatest in the case of non-economic loss. 
Non-economic losses, by their nature, are impossible to fully insure against — prior to an 
accident occurring, the psychological and physical impacts of an injury cannot be 
accurately quantified. Furthermore, compensation for heads of damage like pain and 
suffering may vary considerably between individuals.  
However, the evidence suggests that common law damages do not vary greatly between 
individuals. Neave and Howell studied common law damages awards received by injured 
road accident victims in South Australia. They examined whether the amounts allowed for 
non-economic loss reflected individual plaintiff’s circumstances. 
It would be expected that individual assessment of the non-economic loss would result 
in awards varying with age, sex and degree of disfigurement. … In fact, the Table 
suggests the adoption of a tariff with almost all injured people receiving very similar 
amounts. … Comparison of the amounts received by these … plaintiffs suggests that 
individual assessment of loss may have little effect on the size of non-economic loss 
payments. (1992, p. 83) 
Economic losses may be more efficiently compensated through insurance arrangements — 
such as those provided by statutory benefit schedules — since they can be linked to the 
victim’s pre-injury earnings or to some other specified amount. Compensation of economic 
losses through periodic payments may also overcome some of the problems associated 
with lump sum compensation. The Tasmanian Government: 
… noted the disadvantages of lump sum settlements as follows: 
•  they promote a tattslotto culture and weaken the return-to-work focus of the system; 
•  they may result in cost to the Commonwealth Government where settlements are used 
for purposes other than those for which they are intended; and 
•  they may be inadequate to meet the future needs of recipients; 
In addition to the above identified disadvantages, the Government also believes that 
there is a real potential for mismanagement of large sums of money, particularly if clear 
legal and financial advice is not obtained and followed. (sub. 135, p. 8)     
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Adequacy of lump sums 
The assessment of lump sums is subject to several areas of uncertainty, including: 
•  claimants expected earnings if the accident had not occurred; 
•  changes in claimants’ capacity for work in the future; 
•  future rates of inflation; 
•  future interest rates; and 
•  future tax rates. 
Neave and Howell examined the extent to which road accident victims were under or over 
compensated. They found that: 
•  16 per cent of those surveyed were living in families which were below the poverty 
line (compared with 12 per cent in the general population); 
•  19 per cent were reliant on social security for reasons related to the accident; 
•  22 per cent were rated by interviewers as financially insecure because of the accident; 
and 
•  53 per cent said their compensation was insufficient to cover their accident related 
costs (1992, p. 85). 
At the time of settlement, 60  per cent of recipients were satisfied with the amount of 
compensation they received. By the time of the interview (eight to nine years after 
settlement), only 24 per cent were satisfied (1992, p. 51). 
The pre-accident incomes of these victims were significantly higher than for a population 
of comparable age and sex. The post-accident income distribution in the interview group 
was no higher than the expected income distribution for a population of comparable age 
and sex. This decline in the income position of compensated road accident victims, relative 
to uninjured people in the general population, suggests that they may not have received 
damages sufficient to cover their economic loss.  
Overall, the study raised considerable doubts as to the suitability of lump sums, and 
concluded that: 
In the long run, under-compensation and over-compensation caused by inflationary 
pressures and wrong predictions can only be prevented by a statutory scheme providing 
indexed periodic payments for economic loss. (Neave and Howell 1992, p. 87) 
The Institute of Actuaries of Australia noted that the common law: 
… provides benefits mainly in a lump sum form, which does not match the ongoing 
needs of many claimants. When a lump sum is provided to compensate for loss of 
income and ongoing costs, it is almost certain to be the wrong amount. Even if the     
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conversion is correct on average across all claimants, almost all will either exhaust the 
lump sum and suffer hardship, or turn out to have more than was needed. (sub. 88, 
p. 13) 
The Tasmanian Government also noted the potential for lump sum compensation to prove 
inadequate for the lifetime needs of injured or ill workers and their dependants: 
At this stage, the Government has only anecdotal evidence of situations whereby 
injured workers find themselves reliant upon the social security system upon 
exhausting lump sum settlements. There have been cases in which workers have 
suffered considerable financial hardship and distress where settlements have been 
exhausted prior to the expiration of social security preclusion periods. This is clearly a 
matter of grave concern. (sub. 135, p. 8) 
Dissipation of lump sums 
Another criticism of common law damages is the scope for dissipation of the lump-sum, 
potentially leading to cost shifting on to the Australian Government’s social security 
system.  
Neave and Howell asked interviewees about how they used their lump sum in the year 
after their claim was resolved.  
It was not possible for us to determine the number of people who had mismanaged their 
lump sum. Nor was there any statistically significant relationship between use of the 
lump sum in any particular way and current poverty or insecurity. However there were 
undoubtedly some people … who had dissipated their compensation, either through 
mismanagement or bad luck. 
Many people found it daunting to have to manage their money to cover future losses 
and costs. Some accident victims told us they had been pressured by family or friends 
to lend them money which had not been repaid. Several people had invested in a 
business which failed. A few young people commented that they were “too immature” 
to handle their lump sum and regretted having spent it unwisely. When people who felt 
their compensation was inadequate to cover their financial loss were asked to comment 
on the reasons for this inadequacy, [22 per cent] referred to mistakes made in investing 
their lump sum. (1992, p. 58)  
Based on a survey of its members, the Australian Plaintiff Lawyers’ Association provided 
evidence that, in a number of cases, lump s u m s  w e r e  u s e d  t o  improve the financial 
circumstances of the injured party: 
Although no obvious patterns could be drawn from [the] survey data, the greater 
majority of workers used lump sums to reduce liabilities including mortgages and other 
loans. Between 5% and 30% applied damages to funding self-employment 
opportunities and between 10% and 50% acquired assets. One thing was certain from 
the data: suggestions that all common law claimants irresponsibly dissipate lump sums 
and turn to social security is an obvious myth. (IRsub. 252, p. 6)     
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It is sometimes argued that the problems which injured people experience in investing their 
compensation could be overcome by providing them with financial advice. However, this 
was not strongly supported by the Neave and Howell study, which found that 28 per cent 
of those who followed professional advice in the management of their compensation were 
financially secure, compared with 20 per cent of those who did not use professional or 
legal guidance. 
Current taxation arrangements may favour dissipation because common law lump sums are 
generally treated as a tax-free capital gain, but income earned from the investment of the 
lump sum is taxable. In December 2002, the Australian Government granted a tax 
exemption to structured settlements. A structured settlement is a common law agreement 
reached between a plaintiff and a defendant which involves the defendant purchasing an 
annuity on behalf of the plaintiff. The annuity has to satisfy certain criteria to qualify (for 
example, it has to be purchased from an insurance company which is authorised to sell life 
insurance products). Both the lump sum used to purchase the annuity and the income 
stream are tax free12.  
The Australian Plaintiff Lawyers’ Association (IRsub. 252, p. 5) submitted that the use of 
structured settlements may alleviate many of the concerns over the dissipation of lump 
sums. Currently, the tax exemption for structured settlements does not apply to workers’ 
compensation. The Tasmanian Government noted that the decision not to exempt 
structured settlements awarded in workers’ compensation claims ‘still appears to be a 
major impediment to introducing structured settlements’ (sub. 135, p. 8). Extending the tax 
exemption to workers’ compensation claims may remove some of the limitations of 
common law lump sum settlements (including the potential for cost shifting to the 
Australian Government’s social security system as a result of the dissipation of common 
law settlements — chapter 9).  
However, the Institute of Actuaries of Australia cautioned that structured settlements 
would not solve all the problems associated with lump sums. In particular, the potential for 
a mismatch between economic needs and compensation remains: 
While structured settlements are now encouraged outside the context of workers’ 
compensation, they are not compulsory and do not fully solve the mismatching 
problem. They cannot properly allow for unexpected deterioration of a compensable 
condition, or increases in ongoing costs, in the way that statutory benefits can. (sub. 88, 
p. 13) 
                                                 
12 The tax exemption also applies to structured orders which have the same features as structured 
settlements but are imposed by a court.     
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Incompatibility with rehabilitation and return to work 
A number of participants identified a potential link between the availability of common 
law actions and poor rehabilitation outcomes. For example, Buys submitted that: 
There is considerable evidence to show that access to common law is incompatible with 
a scheme that focuses on rehabilitation. The adversarial nature of common law redress 
does not facilitate recovery and return to work; in effect the presence of common law is 
a major disincentive to participate in vocational rehabilitation. For example, a study of 
200 workers with back injuries over a three year period … found that workers who 
pursued litigation against employers reported significantly higher levels of disability, 
pain and psychological distress than workers who were not pursuing litigation. A 
second finding was that a return to satisfying, meaningful employment during the 
compensation process minimised disability, pain and psychological distress. These 
results send a strong message that the adversarial process of common law is 
psychologically and physically detrimental to injured workers and costs the system 
millions of dollars in payouts and lawyers’ fees. Other studies also highlight this 
problem. (sub. 92, p. 2) 
Similar views were expressed by Woolworths: 
The ability of injured workers to access any form of significant lump sum benefit can 
be detrimental to their recovery. In Woolworths’ experience, this can mean that some 
employees focus on remaining “injured” so that the extent of lump sum is increased. 
This situation can be aggravated by the involvement of the legal profession. (sub. 98, 
p. 7) 
And by the Association of Rehabilitation Providers in the Private Sector – ACT Chapter: 
Generally, common law can make it difficult to motivate clients to return to work, 
acting as a disincentive. For example, a ‘pot of gold’ syndrome can develop with some 
injured workers. They will try to maximise a common law payout by staying off work 
because they believe an early return to work might impact on their settlement. The 
injured worker then has a different agenda to the other parties involved in the 
rehabilitation process. … Difficulties in common law can occur where solicitors give 
medical advice. For example, they might suggest to their client that they are not ready 
to commence rehabilitation, or that they should not attend an assessment or recommend 
particular surgeons or investigations. Delays also occur with solicitors being tardy in 
facilitating consent for providers to talk to their client’s treating practitioners, thus 
reducing the impact of early intervention. (sub. 139, pp. 10–11) 
The potential for common law access to be detrimental to rehabilitation and return to work 
has been identified in previous inquiries. For example, the Commission of Inquiry into 
Workers’ Compensation Common Law Matters in NSW (the Sheahan Inquiry) concluded: 
It is unarguable that the objective of obtaining from the NSW compensation scheme the 
maximum possible award of common law damages conflicts with the statutory 
objectives of the scheme ... Swift and effective treatment, rehabilitation, and early 
return to work at maximum earning capacity, do not sit comfortably with a tax-free     
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lump sum based upon an extended period of provable past economic loss, and 
estimated likely future losses and costs, and better account of the intangible 
consequences of injury, such as pain and suffering, loss of “amenity of life” and so on. 
The increasing focus on gaining a maximum lump sum, especially one offering the 
prospect of recovering large common law damages for economic loss, is seen to 
encourage “illness behaviour” rather than “wellness behaviour”, and transforms the 
expected focus on support, recovery and an early return to safe productive work into an 
adversarial relationship which is costly, in terms of money, time and scheme objectives, 
and eats into the funds available for the assistance of all injured workers. (2001 p.18) 
This view has also been supported by studies of injury victims in the United States. Those 
involved in common law actions related to their injury tended to have a less successful 
rehabilitation and a lower probability of returning to work (Dichraff 1993; Hadler 1996; 
Klekamp, McCarty and Spengler 1998; Deyo 2000; Blackwell et al. 2003). Although, a 
recent study of workers’ compensation claimants in California found no significant 
correlation between legal representation and poorer rehabilitation outcomes (Braun et al., 
1999).  
Some participants disputed the link between common law access and poor rehabilitation 
outcomes. The Queensland Law Society argued that a lump sum payment, in contrast to 
ongoing income support, can provide positive incentives for rehabilitation: 
Working life pensions can be demonstrated to operate as a disincentive to 
rehabilitation. That disincentive is not present where once and for all common law 
awards are made or where redemption of weekly pension rights is available. (sub. 97, 
p. 5) 
Redemptions of weekly payments are available in all schemes, although conditions of 
access vary considerably (chapter 9). 
Of most concern to the Commission are the delays involved in reaching a settlement, 
which can be detrimental to the interests of the worker, and the adversarial nature of the 
common law, which can entrench the worker in behaviour that is incompatible with 
successful rehabilitation. 
Delays in reaching settlement 
Delay is inevitable in a common law system. An injury must stabilise before a final 
assessment of damages can be made. There are also procedural and tactical delays during 
the hearing of a common law claim. This has a detrimental effect on the financial position 
of the claimant, may affect incentives for rehabilitation and return to work, and adds to the 
complexity of the compensation process.      
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A recent survey of common law workers’ compensation claims in New South Wales found 
that the average time for finalisation of a common law claim in 2000 was 4.7 years, down 
from a peak of 5.6 years in 1996 (PwC 2001, p. 49). This experience is consistent with that 
of other jurisdictions. In Queensland, the average time between injury and lodgement of a 
common law workers’ compensation claim was 2.9 years in 2003-03; while the average 
time between lodgement and finalisation was 1.7 years (Q-Comp 2003, p.  12). By 
comparison, claims finalised through the statutory scheme are of a much shorter duration. 
According to the Queensland government: 
Current scheme wide statistics (WorkCover and self-insurers) indicate that the majority 
of claims are finalised within the first 26 weeks … Only 3% of claims have more than a 
year off work and very few claims (58 claims in 2000-01 and 120 claims in 2001-02) 
exceed 2 years’ duration … trend analysis indicates that 3% to 4% of WorkCover 
Queensland claims progress to common law. (sub. 154, p. 20) 
Delays in reaching a settlement can be detrimental to the welfare of the injured worker and 
place them under financial pressure. According to the NSW Legal Services Commissioner: 
Perhaps the biggest area of concern expressed to my Office by people suffering 
personal injuries and caught up in the legal system is the amount of time that the 
process takes. It is simply inhuman to expect a person to attain any sense of self worth 
or positive attitude when years can pass after an injury before any compensation 
becomes payable, notwithstanding the miniscule amount the statutory schemes offer by 
way of interim payment … We hear horror stories of the destruction caused to 
relationships, the physical and mental health of the injured and to the community 
generally by the huge delays involved in compensating people for their injuries. 
… The most often heard comment by complainants to my Office in this area is, “if I 
only knew what I was going to go through, I would never have lodged a claim.” It is for 
this reason that it is of no surprise to me whatsoever that the medical profession’s 
research now shows that the process involved in motor vehicle and work related injury 
cases makes people sick. I am only surprised that it has taken them so long to do the 
research which confirms what most others know. (Mark 2001, p. 5) 
 
An injured worker, who had lodged a common law claim in Queensland, identified the 
adverse consequences of delay as:  
Continually relying on family to help cover expenses eg: retraining, tuition, and 
children’s education too, today still waiting on the finalisation of a common law claim. 
The average time is 5 years for a case like mine … I’m lucky to have a supportive 
family and an understanding bank. Once my income protection insurance started, all 
sickness benefits were paid back. I have to pay full price on all medication and are not 
eligible for support from government agencies i.e.: re training for job placement … 
Why is there such a delay in common law cases leaving the injured worker in limbo? 
(Millen, sub. 61, p. 2)  
Medical rehabilitation may be delayed by workers attempting to act in a way to maximise 
their claim under common law. Similar incentives exist for workers to avoid occupational     
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rehabilitation, as this may reduce their potential common law damages. According to one 
doctor: 
Litigants might remain sick (consciously or unconsciously) because of the rewards they 
are given or are likely to obtain by remaining ill. Certainly, in my own practice, I have 
more than once been confronted by patients who state they have been instructed by 
their lawyers not to have medical treatment because if they get better, they will likely 
reduce their compensation or influence settlement. Other full time GPs have also stated 
they have experienced similar situations. (Kelly 2000, p. 2) 
The Insurance Council of Australia also noted: 
As a result of the possibility of a (large) lump sum payment, common law can act as a 
fundamental disincentive to effective injury management and early return to work, 
which is, of course, the fundamental aim of workers’ compensation. Further, where 
access to common law exists, it has been suggested that workers may even be 
encouraged to act in a manner that would maximise any lump sum payment … There is 
an equity case for common law access to those suffering catastrophic or severe injuries, 
or whose injuries are as a result of employer negligence. However, there is a 
fundamental tension between maximising damages and return to work that cannot be 
ignored. (sub. 74, p. 25) 
However, there are features of the common law which are intended to facilitate 
rehabilitation. In particular, there is a common law duty for plaintiffs to mitigate their loss 
(take reasonable steps to minimise the extent of injury) prior to an award of damages. 
According to K M Splatt & Associates: 
… clear principles of common law exist stating that plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate 
their loss. It is the duty of every lawyer acting for a plaintiff in a personal injuries claim 
to explain that the injured worker has a duty to mitigate loss and to ensure the client is 
actively involved in rehabilitation. Any solicitor or barrister who creates obstacles to 
rehabilitation, in order to increase damages, is subject to disciplinary action for 
professional misconduct, which could lead to suspension or striking off. (IRsub.197, 
p. 4) 
Jurisdictions which allow common law access may also have in place mechanisms 
designed to encourage rehabilitation prior to the commencement of a common law action: 
The Queensland system includes rehabilitation programs, organised by WorkCover, in 
the statutory process that the lawyer is not involved in. In fact, only when the injury has 
stabilised is an assessment made by the Medical Tribunal, which becomes the basis of 
an offer by WorkCover to finalise the claim, can the injured worker elect to move on 
into the Common Law processes. This ensures that any rehabilitation required by the 
injured worker is provided by WorkCover prior to the Common Law claim proceeding. 
(K M Splatt & Associates, IRsub. 197, p. 4)     
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The adversarial nature of common law 
Although early access to rehabilitation services is an important determinant of successful 
return to work (chapter 7), there is strong evidence that the way in which compensation is 
determined can also influence the likelihood of successful rehabilitation. In identifying the 
factors which contributed to poorer health outcomes following an injury or the onset of an 
illness, the Australasian Faculty of Occupational Medicine noted: 
The factors that have been identified through interviews or discussions with 
stakeholders but have not been formally tested are: 
•  The adversarial system of managing compensation cases, which encourages parties to 
take up fixed opposing positions and creates a climate where getting a result in the 
court case becomes the goal of both parties, rather than fully rehabilitating the injured 
person. 
•  Encouragement from some plaintiffs’ lawyers to remain inactive in order to achieve the 
highest possible settlement. 
•  The length of time between injury and settlement. In one study, 29 months was the 
average time to settlement. While some legislation requires that the injury be 
‘stabilised’ before settlement, stakeholders suggest that cases are often ‘dragged out’ 
unnecessarily, particularly by insurers’ lawyers. Ordinary delays in the court system 
are also a problem. (2001, p. 4) 
Similarly, Hadler provides evidence that the compensation process itself may induce 
poorer health outcomes: 
The process demands that the injured litigant demonstrate the magnitude of the illness 
to whomever sits in judgment of the validity of the demonstration … The litigant is 
likely to lose the prerequisite skills for well-being, the abilities to discern among the 
morbidities, and to cope. The litigant is likely to embody the perspective and language 
of the diagnostic algorithm. Inexorably, the litigant is drawn into the vulnerable state, 
too often never to return. In that event, a legal victory is pyrrhic. (1996, p. 2399) 
In essence, according to Hadler ‘If you have to prove you are ill, you can’t get well’. 
The adversarial nature of the common law process can undermine the employment 
relationship, reducing the prospects of successful workplace based rehabilitation. 
According to the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry: 
Common law is based on an adversarial system, which inhibits the rehabilitation 
process and the normal expectation of a return to work by encouraging both parties to 
become entrenched in their adversarial roles in order to achieve maximum gain. 
(sub. 81, p. 18) 
The Commission acknowledges that plaintiffs have a common law duty to mitigate losses 
by undertaking rehabilitation, where practicable, prior to an award of damages. It also 
recognises that this duty has been supplemented by legislation in some jurisdictions.     
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However, the Commission remains concerned that the adversarial nature of the process, 
together with financial incentives provided to claimants and delays in reaching settlement, 
reduce the prospects for successful rehabilitation and return to work. 
Finality 
The award of a common law lump sum provides finality for both the injured worker and 
the workers’ compensation insurer. The worker receives a final payment with which they 
can do as they like, free of the continued scrutiny of their eligibility for compensation and 
the oversight of their use of funds. Such finality allows the worker to make a psychological 
break with the injury and may assist in the recovery process. According to the Law Council 
of Australia: 
But one thing that ought to be borne in mind is, if you ask the accident victim what they 
want, they will tell you - as they have told me on countless occasions, as they've told 
the other lawyers on countless occasions - what they want is some finality. If they have 
a major accident, they do not want to be in a situation where they are depending upon 
handouts for the rest of their life. They don't want to be in a situation where they're 
being required to turn up for medical examinations throughout the balance of their life. 
They don't want to be wondering from one day to another whether the benefits will 
continue or whether they'll be cut off. 
They would like to take a lump sum, provided it is a lump sum calculated on some 
realistic basis to represent the lifetime losses that they will suffer. That is a strong 
preference of accident victims. There are a lot of myths put forward about the 
rehabilitation benefits of one scheme or another, but our long-held view has been that it 
is a myth to believe that putting people on the drip-feed for the whole of their lives is 
an effective form of rehabilitation. (trans., p. 1096) 
Similarly, the Queensland Law Society quotes medical evidence that: 
Periodic payments do not make the disabled self-reliant, instead they make them 
dependant and the disabled lose all motivation to improve their status. Such payments 
do not allow closure but continue and reinforce the accident process. (sub. 97, p. 5) 
The availability of lump sum compensation also provides benefits to insurers (including 
self-insurers). The insurer can close the file on a particular case, saving administrative 
costs. The insurer has also made concrete an expense which otherwise would have run on 
indefinitely into the future. However, finality can also be provided through a commutation 
of statutory payments (chapter 9). 
Allocation of common law damages 
Some view common law damages as unfairly distributed. Victims with relatively minor 
injuries can be over-compensated if insurance companies settle rather than subject     
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themselves to the costs of litigation13 while, at the other extreme, injury victims with 
catastrophic injuries receive lump sum payments which can prove to be insufficient to 
meet their longer-term needs14. According to the Ipp Report: 
… we have taken the view that the resources devoted to compensation for negligently-
caused personal injury and death should be allocated in such a way as to provide 
support and assistance where it is most needed. There is reason to think that, under 
personal injury law, the less seriously injured tend to be treated relatively more 
generously than the more seriously injured. In our view, if any group is treated 
relatively better than any other, it should be the more seriously injured. (2002, p. 181) 
A justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland also observed that many court decisions 
appeared to overcompensate the less seriously injured: ‘Today it is commonplace that 
claimants with relatively minor disabilities are awarded lump sums greater than the 
claimant (or defendant) could save in a lifetime’ (Thomas JA, quoted in Spigelman 2002, 
p. 4). 
Evidence of this allocation pattern is provided by the PwC report into common law 
workers’ compensation claims in New South Wales. The report found that the most 
seriously injured claimants were not better compensated than they would be by the 
statutory scheme, while workers with low to moderate impairments tended to be over-
compensated: 
•  The most obvious characteristic of claimants which has changed is that they are less 
severely injured than in earlier years and are receiving larger settlements for 
comparable levels of severity (2001, p. 44); 
•  The dramatic increase in common law settlements in more recent years has been 
because of a significant increase in the number of common law claims with low levels 
of severity (0% to 25%) (2001, p. 40); 
•  If we assume individual severely injured claimants remained on benefit until retirement 
age, the common law lump-sum provides a reasonable “buy-out” of the future income 
stream. However, the literature supports a view that the provision of a large lump sum 
is often not used in the manner intended and assumed, leading to the compensation 
being dissipated (2001, p. 79); 
•  For injured claimants at a moderate to low level of severity, typically common law 
payouts appear to “under compensate” relative to the theoretical long term statutory 
benefits. However, experience has shown that claimants at this level of severity do not 
                                                 
13 In a survey of common law claims in New South Wales, PwC (2001, p. B13) found that the 
average legal cost to insurance companies of workers’ compensation claims finalised in court 
was $15 772, compared to average insurer legal fees of $9868 for negotiated settlements. 
14 An influential US study found, that when the level of economic loss was small, victims of motor 
vehicle accidents recovered on average 4 ½ times their economic loss under tort law. When the 
injury was serious the average recovery was only 1/3 of the economic loss (United States 
Department of Transportation 1971 Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and their Compensation in the 
United States. Quoted in Cooter and Ulen 1988, p. 467).     
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continue on benefits for long periods. Thus in reality they are overcompensated and 
hence the provision of common law results in a net cost to the Scheme. (2001, p. 79) 
Since common law awards are based on the assignment of fault, individuals with the same 
injury can also receive different compensation. According the Sheahan Inquiry: 
The avowed purpose of awarding damages at common law is to put the injured plaintiff 
back into the position which would have been obtained in the absence of the injury – or 
at least to do so as well as, or to the extent that, a payment of money can. It is not the 
objective to leave the worker better off, but, at the moment, some plaintiffs, with 
identical injuries, but different fact situations, recover differential damages, or no 
damages at all. (2001, p. 14) [emphasis in original] 
Legal expenses 
Common law requires the assignment of liability and possible litigation. As such, the cost 
of resolving an injury claim through common law can be considerably higher than 
resolving it through a no-fault scheme. This has the potential to undermine scheme 
affordability and, to the extent that the plaintiff is responsible for any legal expenses, may 
limit the amount of compensation available to the injured worker. In reviewing the law of 
negligence, the Ipp Report noted that the costs of delivering compensation — primarily, 
legal costs and insurers’ administrative costs — could be as high as 40 per cent of the total 
cost of compensating injury victims (2002, p. 28). 
Since nearly all schemes have removed access to common law or limited it to the most 
seriously injured workers15, the number of injured workers who seek compensation 
through the courts is low. However, the individual payments and the associated legal costs 
tend to be high. For example, as at June 1999, common law payments (legal fees and 
damages) represented 22 per cent of the Victorian scheme’s liability, but these claims had 
been initiated by only 4  per cent of workers’ compensation claimants. (Department of 
Treasury and Finance (Victoria) 2000, pp. 26, 55). The impact of common law payments 
on scheme affordability can be considerable. Concerns about the impact of these payments 
were the main reason for the restriction of common law access in nearly all Australian 
jurisdictions. According to a 1998 study by Coopers and Lybrand, 
Access to lump sums has been the single most significant reason for past deterioration 
in claims costs in Australian schemes … it is the benefit and legislative structure of the 
Schemes, together with the overall social environment, [which] are the most critical 
factors affecting claims costs. (quoted in PwC 2001, p. 34) 
                                                 
15 The exception is the Australian Capital Territory which allows unrestricted access. There is no 
threshold for access in Queensland but less seriously injured workers are required to relinquish 
statutory benefits in order to pursue a common law claim (table 8.1).     
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The actuary for WorkCover New South Wales estimated that ‘a common law claim is 
between 10% and 20% more costly than the benefits they replace’ (quoted in PwC 2001 
pp.  7–8). Recent changes in New South Wales have limited the role of courts in 
determining compensation. Access to common law is restricted to workers with an 
impairment of at least 15 per cent and damages are only available for economic loss. All 
claims for work-related damages lodged after 27 November 2001 must be referred to the 
NSW Workers’ Compensation Commission for mediation prior to proceeding to court. The 
final offers of settlement will be taken into account by the court in determining what costs 
are recoverable by the parties. Legal costs are also regulated and cost schedules are 
designed to encourage early resolution of claims (Sheahan 2004, p. 13). According to the 
NSW Government: 
Changes have been made to increase the levels of statutory permanent impairment 
benefits and better focus the availability of common law benefits to serious cases. 
Independent actuarial analysis has shown considerable savings to the scheme from 
these amendments principally through reductions in legal costs. In the future, 
expenditure will increasingly focus on weekly benefits and the need to improve return 
to work rates. (WRMC 2003, p. 116) 
Comparing legal costs across schemes is difficult because data reported by schemes often 
includes costs associated with statutory disputes. In 2000-01, legal fees paid by schemes16, 
including those associated with dispute resolution, ranged from more than 15 per cent of 
total claims costs in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory (which have 
common law access) to 4 per cent of total claims costs in South Australia (which does not 
allow access to common law) (WRMC 2002a, p. 83). 
Schemes have different methods of attributing legal expenses, which can further 
complicate comparability: 
In most jurisdictions, legal costs paid by the schemes are limited by public court scales. 
These govern how much the winning party receives towards legal costs from the losing 
party — usually the workers’ compensation scheme. In other states, such as SA, these 
amounts are capped legislatively. In NSW these limitations do not apply. The higher 
costs in NSW are explained in part by the practice of paying all the workers’ legal 
costs, including additional private amounts charged to the worker over and above the 
court scale. Victoria’s costs are lower because scheme administrators manage legal 
work actively on every claim, thus reducing both winners’ and losers’ costs. (WRMC 
2002a, p. 82) 
                                                 
16 According to WRMC: ‘Payments by schemes under the broad heading “legal costs” are reliably 
representative of payments made to lawyers. Lawyers, however, distribute their costs between 
disbursements, including court costs, medico-legal reports, investigation costs, expert witnesses’ 
expenses and professional fees. Legal costs can reflect both common-law-associated legal costs 
— generally higher than statutory costs — as well as statutory dispute-associated legal costs’ 
(2002a, p. 88).     
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Some schemes have regulated legal costs as a means of preserving scheme affordability. 
For example, in 1996 Queensland imposed restrictions which prevent a worker, with an 
injury or illness that entitles them to less than 20 per cent of the statutory maximum lump 
sum compensation, from recovering costs prior to the commencement of a common law 
action. For workers with a more severe injury or illness, the amount of costs they can 
recover is specified by regulation17. Since the imposition of these changes, legal costs 
have declined dramatically. While average common law settlements in Queensland rose 
from $86 180 in 1998-99 to $97 916 in 2002-03, average plaintiff costs fell from $12 154 
to $1792. Over the same period, defendant legal costs changed little. In 1998-99, the 
average defendant’s cost was $14 268. In 2002-03, the average defendant in a Queensland 
common law workers’ compensation claim paid costs of $14 395. (Q-Comp 2003, p. 12) 
Legal costs tend to be disproportionately high for smaller claims which may otherwise be 
more efficiently handled by an administrative compensation system: 
… it is well known that in general, the smaller the personal injury claim, the higher the 
proportion of the total cost of meeting the claim attributable to legal expenses. For 
instance, the Trowbridge Report to the Insurance Issues Working Group of Heads of 
Treasuries, Public Liability Insurance: Practical Proposals for Reform (30 May 2002) 
… estimates that for public liability claims of between $20,000 and $100,000, legal 
expenses account for about 35 per cent of the total cost of claims; whereas for claims 
over $500,000 they account for about 20 per cent of the total cost. We also know that 
overall, the administrative costs of the personal injury compensation system are very 
much higher than those of other compensation systems, in particular the social security 
system. These facts support the conclusion that reducing the number, and the cost of 
resolving, smaller claims could make a significant contribution to reducing the overall 
cost of the system without disadvantaging those most in need of support and assistance. 
(Ipp 2002, p. 182). 
 
Although of the opinion that consideration of legal costs was outside their Terms of 
Reference, the Ipp Review Panel recommended the nationwide adoption of Queensland 
legislative provisions18 which prevent a plaintiff from recovering costs when the damages 
awarded are less than $30  000. Where an award of damages is between $30  000 and 
$50 000, the plaintiff can only recover up to $2500 from the defendant in legal costs. 
(2002, p. 185). These provisions do not apply to work-related fatality, injury or illness. 
Common law legal action can also impact on the size of medical costs. For example, 
extensive diagnostic tests may be required to establish the extent of the injury or illness in 
order to determine the level of damages. The medical service provider is placed in the 
                                                 
17 The pre-proceedings process includes a compulsory settlements conference and, if agreement is 
not reached at this stage, a written exchange of offers between WorkCover and the worker. At 
least four days before the settlement conference, the lawyer for the worker must also provide a 
written statement of costs incurred and an estimate of the costs expected to be incurred through 
the conference process and, if that fails, at trial.  
18 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld).     
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position of not only treating the injury or illness, but also providing medical evidence on 
the extent of the harm for legal purposes. 
Where available, the common law is also an avenue of dispute resolution. Disputes can 
either involve disagreement with the insurer’s decision (statutory dispute) or a common 
law action. Typically, the cost of resolving a common law claim is much higher than the 
cost of resolving a statutory dispute. In 2001-02, the average legal cost of a statutory 
dispute in the Queensland scheme was $425, compared to an average legal cost associated 
with common law claims of $13 978 (WRMC 2003, p. 118).  
Some participants, such as K M Splatt & Associates (IRsub. 197) and the Queensland Law 
Society (IRsub. 207), noted that Queensland has the lowest disputation rate of any scheme 
(figure 13.1). In part, this may reflect the fact that Queensland has a well-established 
scheme whose rules are well understood by all stakeholders (chapter  13). These 
participants also note that Comcare, which has very restricted common law access, has a 
relatively high disputation rate. However, comparing disputation rates across schemes is 
problematic because it can depend on other features of scheme design, in particular 
statutory benefits structures. According to the Workplace Relations Ministerial Council: 
Queensland, which has a low disputation rate, has a long-standing benefit regime, 
experienced in-house claims officers and well-understood dispute handling processes. 
However Comcare, despite having these same features too, has high disputation rates. 
This is, in part, due to the long tail nature of the Comcare scheme where a high number 
of ongoing benefits disputes can arise from the large population of ongoing claims, 
compared to the smaller number of new claims. (WRMC 2003, p. 56) 
Queensland has introduced pre-trial proceedings, including mandatory settlement 
conferences. These pre-trial arrangements can be a means of lowering the costs of dispute 
resolution and minimising the degree of conflict between the parties.  
Other common law jurisdictions, such as New South Wales and Victoria, have disputation 
rates in excess of 20 per cent of new claims. Tasmania has a disputation rate in excess of 
30 per cent of new claims (figure 13.1). However, as noted in chapter 13, care must also be 
taken in comparing disputation rates across jurisdictions because of different definitions of 
a dispute. For example, disputation rates may be inflated in New South Wales and 
Tasmania because of the practice of ‘deeming’ disputes in claims which have not been 
settled within a specified time.  
Justice 
It has been argued that access to common law when injured by another person’s negligence 
is a basic legal right. This provides an opportunity for public scrutiny of workplace 
accidents and injury in open court. However, an employee need not sue their employer to 
provide public scrutiny. This could be undertaken by OHS authorities, which have powers     
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to bring actions against employers for breaches of OHS standards. Furthermore, most 
common law actions are settled without a court ruling. PwC (2001, Appendix B, p. 13) 
found that two-thirds of common law cases surveyed were settled prior to proceeding to a 
court hearing. 
Participants, such as the Law Council of Australia (trans., p. 1098), noted the importance 
to claimants of receiving some recognition from their employer of the harm received. 
Mayou (1996) provides evidence that the motivation for seeking an award of damages ‘ … 
is often focused on the lack of concern or apology by those believed to be responsible 
rather than on gaining maximum financial reward.’ 
However, other participants expressed the view that attempts to receive vindication 
through the legal system might ultimately be unsuccessful: 
I think right across the country, from a rehabilitation perspective it is agreed that 
common law has far more disbenefit than benefit. Even sometimes it could be said that 
somebody gets their retribution and moves on, and that might be a way of shifting 
somebody that’s really entrenched from a rehab perspective, but that rarely happens. 
Our experience in general is that people never feel as if they have received retribution. 
(Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association, trans., p. 1320) 
The courts are also represented as the ultimate guardian of the claimant against unjust or 
capricious administrative action. The worker may have their claim heard by judges who are 
distanced from the workers’ compensation scheme. However, this objective could also be 
achieved by allowing the claimant access to an efficient and fair dispute resolution system 
which recognises the principles of natural and administrative justice (chapter 13).  
Some participants have argued that reducing access to common law damages would 
involve an abrogation of workers’ rights (Queensland Law Society, sub. 97, p. 4; QCU, 
sub. 91, p. 3; K M Splatt & Associates, IRsub. 197, p. 9). However, in advocating reforms 
to the law of negligence, the Ipp Panel noted: 
Some people have contended that any statutory reform of the law … will deprive 
injured persons of their ‘rights’. As long as any such reform is not retrospective, that 
proposition is incorrect. Parliament can change the law at any time, and parliamentary 
amendment of the law — including the common law — is, of course, a very common 
occurrence in Australia. It is part of our democratic system. (2002, p. 29) 
Moreover, many of the current conditions for access to common law settlements were 
established by legislation (Spigelman 2002, p. 6). 
8.4  National framework issues 
On balance, the Commission regards the common law as an inappropriate mechanism for 
providing workers’ compensation in most circumstances.      
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Some view the common law as a more affordable means of resolving serious claims. 
WorkCover Queensland argued that: 
Despite purported savings for large, national employers, WorkCover Queensland 
believes that the scheme described by the Commission [in the Interim Report] will be 
unaffordable without massive premium increases. Based on New South Wales 
experience detailed in the Grellman Report, over time statutory claims costs will 
increase. Without the availability of common law to reduce tail claims, these increased 
costs will become unaffordable without massive increases in premium for those 
employers who have opted to be part of the Comcare scheme. (IRsub. 225, p. ii) 
The Commission acknowledges that the Queensland scheme, which is fully funded, has 
low premiums. However, long-tail claims can be managed cost-effectively in a scheme 
with little or no common law access. Comcare has a long-tail statutory benefits structure 
and does not require the worker to establish fault in order to receive compensation for 
serious injury or illness. This scheme, which is also fully funded, had the lowest 
standardised premium19 in 2001-02 (WRMC 2003, p. 40). Moreover, Comcare has the 
highest return to work rate of any Australian scheme (chapter 7).  
Should common law be retained, the Commission considers that access should be 
restricted to the most seriously injured workers, in particular the catastrophically injured, 
for whom the poorer rehabilitation outcomes associated with common law actions are less 
relevant. The sense of justice received by assigning fault is also likely to be greatest in 
these circumstances. However, the Commission would not support an arrangement which 
adequately compensated seriously injured workers only in the event of fault being 
established. 
The Commission also recommends that common law damages only be available for non-
economic loss, while economic loss is compensated by statutory benefits. The advantages 
of common law in providing personalised damages are likely to be greatest in 
compensating heads of damages such as pain and suffering and disfigurement 
(notwithstanding the evidence that awards of damages tend to be relatively standardised). 
Economic loss, by its nature, is amenable to compensation through insurance arrangements 
such as those provided by statutory benefit schedules. Such an approach would also ensure 
that, irrespective of the ability to establish fault, the economic needs of the more seriously 
injured could be met.  
WorkCover New South Wales commented on this recommendation: 
The NSW Government supports the retention of common law access for the most 
seriously injured workers but for economic loss only. NSW does not support access to 
common law for non-economic matters. This is because of the inherent difficulties in 
courts assessing levels of impairment and that the open-ended nature of such claims put 
                                                 
19 Standardised premiums take into account differences in industry composition, the number of 
self-insurers and employer excesses between jurisdictions.     
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funding pressures on compensation schemes. (Sheahan Inquiry Report, 2001). 
(IRsub. 255, p. 5) [italics in original] 
However, caps can be placed on these damages as recommended by the Ipp Report (2002, 
p.194) and currently imposed by Comcare, Victoria and Western Australia. Damages for 
non-economic loss also represent a smaller percentage of awards to the most seriously 
injured. Restricting access to the most seriously injured could therefore minimise the 
impact on scheme viability. Public liability claims data from 1999-2000 in New South 
Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, indicate that damages for non-economic loss 
accounted for 45 per cent of the cost of claim for claims less than $100 000 but only 13 per 
cent of the cost of claims over $500 000. Future economic loss (including medical care) 
represented more than half the cost of the largest claims (Trowbridge 2002, p. 85). 
Limiting damages to non-economic loss would also overcome some of the major problems 
associated with inadequacy and/or dissipation of lump sums. If damages were restricted to 
economic loss only, it is possible that future medical and living expenses may rise shifting 
the costs of the injury or illness back on to the worker. This also has profound implications 
for cost-shifting on to the Australian Government’s social security and health budgets. 
Allowing common law damages to provide some recompense to injured or ill workers for a 
reduced capacity to enjoy the amenities of everyday life may also accord with community 
notions of justice. 
The Commission recommends that common law should not be included in a national 
framework for workers’ compensation on the grounds that it: 
•  does not offer stronger incentives for accident reduction than a statutory, no-fault 
scheme; 
•  can provide lump sum compensation which may prove inadequate to the longer term 
needs of seriously injured workers; 
•  may over-compensate less seriously injured workers who, in the normal course of 
events, could be expected to rehabilitate and return to work; 
•  delays rehabilitation and return to work (if there are psychological benefits to be 
derived from receiving a lump sum, these could be obtained through statutory 
benefits); and 
•  is a more expensive compensation mechanism than statutory workers’ compensation. 
If common law is to be included in a national framework, then access should be 
restricted to: 
•  the most seriously injured workers (subject to meeting an impairment threshold); 
and 
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•  non-economic loss only. 
Where common law access is retained, jurisdictions might give consideration to: 
•    imposing restrictions on plaintiff legal fees (including incentives for early 
settlement); 
•  mandatory settlement conferences (which include an exchange of offers); and 
•  legislative provision to encourage early rehabilitation by plaintiffs.  
The national cooperative body (model D) would involve a process by which schemes could 
achieve greater consistency in common law access. However, reaching consensus on 
common law access could continue to prove elusive. When HWCA (1997) set out its ‘best 
practice’ benefits structure, it was required to offer two options — one with, and one 
without, common law access — although its preference was to remove common law.  
The Comcare-based model (model A) has a very limited role for common law. Common 
law damages are only available for non-economic loss and are capped at $110 000 (non-
indexed). Comcare has generous weekly benefits (only South Australia is more generous), 
though statutory lump sum payments tend to be less than in other schemes (WRMC, 2003 
p. 62).  
Establishing an alternative national self-insurance scheme (model  B) would require 
enabling legislation, as would an alternative national insurance scheme (model C). As part 
of that process the Australian Government should determine the role permitted for 
common law settlements. The Commission’s recommendation is that common law access 
not be allowed. If common law access is to be allowed, the Commission recommends it be 
restricted to non-economic loss for the most seriously injured.      
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9  Statutory benefit structures 
In this inquiry, the Commission has been asked to identify and report on ‘a consistent 
benefits structure that provides adequate levels of compensation, including income 
replacement and medical and related costs, for injured workers and their families’. 
Statutory benefits are provided to compensate injured or sick workers for lost income, 
medical and rehabilitation expenses, and, if the injury or illness is serious enough, for a 
diminished capacity to enjoy the activities of everyday life. Benefit structures vary 
considerably across schemes. Differences exist in the level and duration of benefits, as well 
as in limits on the amount of compensation paid.  
In the Commission’s view, there is no single ‘best practice’ benefit structure that is 
appropriate in all circumstances. Of most relevance is that the benefit structures are aligned 
with the broader objectives of: prevention of workplace injury and illness; adequate 
financial compensation; and early intervention, rehabilitation and return to work. The 
appropriateness of a benefits structure depends, in part, on the interaction between 
workers’ compensation, other accident compensation schemes and the social security and 
taxation systems. In setting out their principles of good benefit design, the Heads of 
Workers’ Compensation Authorities (HWCA) commented: 
… the most important priority is to prevent workplace injury and illness occurring. 
However, where such an event occurs, the minimisation of the human and financial 
costs of the event are the next important priority, particularly through recovery and 
prompt return to work. Where losses are, in fact, suffered, they need to be met in the 
most appropriate manner through best practice benefit design. 
Good benefit design ensures an appropriate allocation of the costs from these losses 
between employers, employees and taxpayers more generally. The various systems to 
meet the needs of injured workers and people with disabilities in our society have 
developed in a haphazard fashion. This means that people can have several possible 
sources of assistance in some circumstances. These can vary considerably in size or 
have different eligibility criteria. (1997, p. 44) 
Determination of appropriate benefits structure will also involve consideration of other 
scheme priorities — in particular, scheme affordability. According to the Tasmanian 
Government: 
It is critical that the form and level of benefits is aligned with the objectives of the 
system. Thus benefits which encourage dependency or maintenance of symptoms are 
incompatible with the objectives of the Tasmanian system. The form of the benefit     
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structure embodies a balance between the interests of employers (affordability) and the 
interests of workers (benefit adequacy). Selecting a benefit structure also involves a 
balance between the interests of severely disabled workers and those sustaining minor 
injuries and illnesses. (sub. 135, p. 7) 
9.1  Features of statutory benefit structures 
Statutory schemes provide: income replacement in the form of periodic payments; 
reimbursement for medical and rehabilitation expenses; and lump sum payments to 
compensate for non-economic loss and in the event of death.  
Income replacement 
All schemes link income replacement to the pre-injury earnings of the worker. Normally, 
this includes regular overtime1. In the Australian Government schemes, Queensland, 
Tasmania and the Northern Territory regular higher duties, penalty payments and 
allowances are also included. Long service benefits and ‘one-off’ bonuses are not included 
by any scheme. Award wages may be used in New South Wales, Queensland and Western 
Australia. 
All schemes impose some limit on weekly benefits. In jurisdictions other than New South 
Wales, this takes the form of a ‘step-down’ in benefits, the timing and extent of which vary 
considerably. In addition, each scheme imposes a different limit on the overall amount of 
benefits which can be paid (see table 9.1). 
Some jurisdictions have relatively long periods before the step-down occurs. Under the 
Australian Government schemes, there is full income replacement for the first 45 weeks, 
with a step-down to 75 per cent of pre-injury normal weekly earnings that may be paid 
until normal retirement age (65 years of age). South Australia reduces benefits only once, 
after 52 weeks, to 80 per cent of pre-injury earnings, and may continue to pay benefits until 
retirement age. Both jurisdictions have relatively high upper limits on benefits (twice 
average weekly earnings in the case of South Australia). Benefits in the Northern 
Territory’s scheme follow a similar pattern, stepping-down at 26 weeks.  
New South Wales increases the earnings replacement ratio after 26 weeks (from 80 per 
cent to 90  per cent) but significantly reduces the maximum amount of compensation 
available (by over 75 per cent). 
                                                 
1 The exception is New South Wales.     
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In order to strengthen return to work incentives, two jurisdictions — Victoria and South 
Australia — reduce benefits by a notional amount that is an estimate of the amount the 
worker could earn if he or she returned to the labour force. 
In New South Wales and Victoria, payments can be stopped after two years. In 
Queensland, unless the worker meets a minimum injury threshold, benefits are reduced 
after two years to the level of the Australian Government pension for a single individual 
(currently $220 per week). After five years, all payments under the Queensland scheme 
stop. Tasmania ceases all payments after 10 years.  
Table 9.1  Weekly benefits 2003-04 
  Initial income 
replacement 
Step-down 





Full 75%  45  weeks  Weekly benefits limited to 150% of AWE 
for full-time adults (current limit of 
$1409.40). 
NSW 80% a 90% b  26 weeks  Weekly benefits limited to $1348.60 c. 
After 26 weeks $317.20. Payments can 
be stopped after 2 years.d 
Victoria 95%  75% f  26 weeks  Weekly benefits limited to $1050 c. 
Payments cease after 2 years unless 
permanently incapacitated. 
Queensland 85% e 65% g  26 weeks  Total amount payable in weekly benefits 
limited to $157 955. Benefits cease after 
5 years. 
WA Full a  85%  4 weeks  Weekly benefits limited to $1021.60 c. 
SA Full  80% f  52 weeks  Weekly benefits limited to twice State 
AWE (current limit of $1662). After 52 
weeks, 80% of this. 




Payments stop after 10 years.  
NT  Full  75%  26 weeks  After 26 weeks, weekly benefits limited to 
150% of jurisdiction AWE (current limit of 
$1358.70). 
ACT Full $316.03  c 26  weeks  None. 
a Or award wage. b  A ‘step-up’ but coupled with a reduction in the maximum amount of compensation 
payable. c Indexed. d If the worker is no longer seeking employment, is unemployed mainly as a result of 
labour market conditions or has unreasonably rejected an offer of employment. e Or, if greater, award wage or 
70% of Queensland Ordinary time earnings. f If the worker has some work capacity this may be reduced to 
take account of notional earnings. g After 104 weeks, workers with an impairment of less than 15% whole 
body receive the Australian Government single pension rate. 
Sources: HWSCA (2002); scheme sources.     
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Medical benefits 
All schemes reimburse reasonable medical and rehabilitation expenses. Some schemes 
impose a limit on medical benefits, although there is normally discretion to exceed this in 
certain circumstances. In Victoria, benefits cease 52 weeks after weekly payments cease. 
New South Wales and Western Australia impose a limit of $50  000 and $37  843, 
respectively. Queensland caps reimbursement for private hospitalisation at $10 000 for a 
single incident. 
Lump sum payments 
Lump sum payments may be made in the event of death or as compensation for non-
economic loss. In all jurisdictions, it is also possible for a claimant to receive a lump sum 
as a commutation of periodic payments — although the conditions governing access vary. 
Death benefits 
In 2003-04, statutory benefits paid in the event of death ranged from $135 531 in Western 
Australia to $285 750 in New South Wales. Across all schemes, the average death benefit 
was about $204 000. 
In addition to the lump sum payment, death benefits can include a pension paid to 
dependants. This can be related to pre-injury earnings (Victoria, South Australia, 
Tasmania), average state earnings (Queensland) or an indexed amount (currently ranging 
from $50.75 per week for each dependant child in the Australian Capital Territory to 
$86.60 per week in New South Wales). 
Non-economic loss 
Non-economic loss is a measure of the impact of the injury on the worker’s lifestyle: pain 
and suffering; permanent impairment; disfigurement; and reduced expectation of life. 
Some schemes (the Australian Government, New South Wales and Victoria) compensate 
pain and suffering separately from other non-economic loss. Others provide one lump sum 
payment for all non-economic loss. 
In 2003-04, maximum payments for non-economic loss ranged from $135 531 in Western 
Australia to $347 890 in Victoria. The average across all schemes was around $211 000. 
Lump sum compensation will normally only be paid for impairments that are permanent. 
In determining whether impairment is permanent, the following factors can be taken into 
account:     
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•  the duration of the impairment; 
•  the likelihood that the employee’s condition will improve; and 
•  whether the employee has taken all reasonable steps to rehabilitate. 
Compensation payable for non-economic loss is based on the degree of impairment and is 
determined according a formula contained in the legislation governing each scheme (or 
where used, specified in the Table of Maims or Disabilities). 
In all schemes except for Queensland, Western Australia and the Australian Capital 
Territory, access to lump sum compensation for non-economic loss is dependent on 
meeting a minimum impairment threshold. Guides such as those published by the 
American Medical Association are used to establish the degree of impairment2.  
The Institute of Actuaries of Australia noted the importance of thresholds as a means of 
determining access to these payments, but also identified their impact on behaviour: 
Thresholds are commonly used to eliminate trivial claims or to restrict access to 
particular benefits, such as Common Law damages or lump sums for permanent 
impairment. This can result in significant administrative savings, and helps to direct 
limited funds to those who have the greatest need. 
Thresholds in benefit structures can, however, have perverse effects. A threshold 
creates an incentive for claimants near the threshold to try to meet it. This, in turn, can 
create a flow-on, if the same measure is used to set benefit levels. If claimants below 
the threshold are pushed over, others must also be pushed up, to avoid anomalies, and 
the benefit cost is increased for claimants that genuinely meet the threshold. This extra 
cost can sometimes exceed the saving from the claims that are eliminated. Care is 
needed in costing and to ensure that the threshold has the desired effect. These 
problems are eased, but not eliminated, if a deductible can be used instead of a pure 
threshold. (sub. 88, p. 11) 
Commutations 
In all jurisdictions, it is possible to redeem (or commute) weekly benefits as a lump sum. 
Redemptions or commutations absolve the scheme of ongoing liability to compensate the 
recipient. They may also involve recipients relinquishing claims to future medical 
expenses.  
Provisions for payment vary significantly between jurisdictions. For example, in New 
South Wales a commutation may be paid if the claimant has a permanent disability of at 
least 15 per cent, has been paid compensation for non-economic loss and has lodged the 
                                                 
2 An impairment percentage is a measure of the extent to which the capacity to undertake the 
activities of daily living has been reduced.     
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workers’ compensation claim not less than two years previously. In Victoria, a lump sum 
settlement of weekly payments (not including medical expenses) is available if the 
claimant has no prospect of work, has been on benefits for more than 104 weeks and is 
over 55 years of age. The Australian Government schemes allow lump sum settlements 
only when weekly payments fall below a minimum level (currently $81.81) and the 
claimant’s incapacity is unlikely to change. Any claimant who receives a redemption under 
an Australian Government scheme retains entitlement to reimbursement for future medical 
expenses. In South Australia, there are no restrictions on access. 
Commutations provide greater flexibility for insurers/self-insurers in dealing with 
claimants for whom return to work is not a realistic option, or in circumstances where 
periodic payments have fallen to very low levels. The benefits of commutations were noted 
by several participants (for example, Woolworths, sub.  98, p.  1; Northern Territory 
Government, sub. 144, p. 21).  
However, the payment of lump sums is problematic in accident compensation. Key 
concerns are that establishing eligibility may unnecessarily delay rehabilitation and/or the 
payment may be dissipated, forcing the claimant to fall back on social security payments 
by the Australian Government (chapter 8). 
In setting out its principles of ‘best practice’ benefits design, HWCA noted: ‘redemptions 
of future benefits are not desirable and should be available only in limited circumstances’ 
(1997, p. 87). However, HWCA also noted that administrative costs could be reduced by 
redeeming small weekly payments. It recommended that payments falling below 20 per 
cent of average weekly earnings should be subject to redemption (1997, p. 25). 
Adequate safeguards are needed to ensure commutation is in the worker’s best interest. 
Incentives should also be put in place — by schemes and by insurance companies — to 
ensure that commutation is not simply seen as an expedient means of closing a claim, but 
is an option of last resort in cases where the chances of successful rehabilitation are 
minimal.  
9.2  Evaluating statutory benefits 
An evaluation of benefit structures needs to take into account a number of factors, 
including other features of the scheme such as access to common law (often traded-off 
against statutory benefits) and dispute resolution mechanisms. These other features can be 
important determinants of the degree of satisfaction derived by injured employees in the 
resolution of their claim.      
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Moreover, any evaluation of workers’ compensation benefits should be undertaken in the 
context of alternative sources of accident compensation and the social security and taxation 
systems. The Department of Family and Community Services commented:  
When employees become ill or injured in the workplace and are not covered by a 
statutory workers’ compensation scheme or private insurance arrangements and have 
no other alternative means of financial support the social security system becomes their 
means of support and acts as a de-facto workers’ compensation scheme. (sub. 167, 
p. 10) 
The success of a benefits structure can be evaluated against: 
•  how adequately it compensates injured workers (both in terms of compensation paid 
and coverage);  
•  how well it reinforces incentives for employers and employees. In particular, incentives: 
for safer workplaces; for employees to participate in rehabilitation and return to work; 
and for employers to facilitate return to work; and 
•  the degree to which the costs of workplace injury and illness are funded from employer 
contributions rather than shifted elsewhere (primarily, to the Australian Government). 
These criteria involve obvious trade-offs. A ‘generous’ benefits structure may provide poor 
incentives for rehabilitation and return to work. Conversely, benefits that impose limits on 
income replacement (as a means of encouraging return to work) may be regarded as 
inequitable for workers with serious injuries which respond slowly (if at all) to 
rehabilitation.  
Similarly, if benefits are reduced to provide incentives to employees to participate in 
rehabilitation and return to work, this may encourage claimants to seek other forms of 
compensation (which shifts costs away from the workers’ compensation scheme). If 
benefits are increased, cost shifting on to the workers’ compensation scheme, by people 
who have sustained injuries or illnesses outside the workplace, can be encouraged. 
The benefit structures of the various workers’ compensation schemes also reflect the 
historic compromise between the stakeholders in each jurisdiction. As schemes have 
evolved in response to these competing influences, some have taken on characteristics akin 
to long term social security:  
During the course of this century the scope of workers’ compensation accessibility and 
responsibility has been extended both by legislation and by judicial interpretation. The 
system has developed ‘into an elaborate but rather disordered scheme for social 
security benefits’. (QBE Insurance, sub. 99, p. 8)     
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Adequacy 
Adequacy is a measure of the extent to which benefits meet the needs of ill or injured 
workers. Compensation for workplace injury or illness occurs in a number of ways: wages 
which have an in-built risk premium; workers’ compensation; or private insurance 
(including insurance as part of a superannuation policy). Evaluation of adequacy should 
take these into account together with the social environment in which the scheme operates 
(for example, alternative forms of compensation will condition expectations as to 
appropriate benefit levels).  
Furthermore, there are some losses that are extremely difficult to insure against. Non-
economic losses such as pain and suffering are impossible to quantify prior to harm 
occurring. Those policies that are purchased by individuals against the event of a traumatic 
injury, illness or death normally only cover the expected financial loss to dependants 
and/or the individual.  
Compensating wage differentials 
Even in the presence of explicit workers’ compensation, wages will adjust, at least 
partially, to compensate for known workplace risk: 
All other things equal, the typical US worker in a job with a likelihood of injury at 
about the labour market average earns 2 – 4 per cent more than a person working in a 
totally safe job. (Kneisner and Leeth 1995, p. 9) 
Although workers in riskier jobs may receive higher wages, there are compelling reasons 
to believe that the compensation will be less than complete. There is a potential 
information asymmetry in that job applicants may not fully appreciate all of the potential 
risks involved in employment. Risks may only become apparent after employment has 
commenced, in which case the worker can leave, renegotiate wages or accept the existing 
wage in conjunction with statutory workers’ compensation benefits.  
There is evidence that changes in workers’ compensation benefits are reflected in wages. 
Using US data, Gruber and Krueger (1990) found that a $1 increase in expected benefits 
led to a $0.86 fall in wages. A more recent study, by Kaestner (1996), which analysed US 
workers by age group, found that a $1 increase in expected benefits reduces wages by more 
than $1. This is consistent with the earlier results of Moore and Viscusi and may be 
evidence that some of the indirect costs of workplace harm are also passed on to workers 
(1990, pp. 67-68). Kaestner also found that, amongst the youngest age group of workers 
who were covered by mandated minimum wages, a 1 per cent increase in expected benefits 
and associated costs led to a 1.5 per cent increase in unemployment.     
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First-party insurance 
Insurance policies can be purchased to provide income replacement in the event of injury 
or illness, or lump sums in the event of death, total and permanent disability, or a traumatic 
medical event. Private insurance policies include offsets to prevent ‘double-dipping’ 
(receipt of workers’ compensation and other insurance benefits for the same injury). 
Income protection policies have features consistent with workers’ compensation (an 
immediate step-down to 75 per cent of pre-injury earnings and a time limit on benefits). 
However, they also normally have a waiting period before benefits can be accessed. 
Using US data, Viscusi and Evans (1990) provide evidence that most employees will not 
typically purchase full income replacement insurance. Using the actual levels of workers’ 
compensation benefits, together with estimates of compensating wage differentials, the 
authors conclude that the average worker would insure around 70 per cent of their income 
if given the choice. Hyatt (1996) surveyed a group of workers’ compensation claimants. 
By asking what wage would induce them to give up their workers’ compensation benefits, 
he estimated that the preferred replacement rate (the ratio of compensation benefits to 
earnings) was between 80 and 90 per cent. 
Less than complete compensation may also be adequate since employees may incur fewer 
expenses (for example, transport to and from work and child minding) when they are off 
work (IC 1994, p. 112). 
Superannuation 
Adequacy also involves consideration of future income needs. No scheme currently pays 
superannuation contributions on behalf of employees who are away from work because of 
work-related illness or injury. HWCA recommended that: 
… employers should be required to maintain statutory superannuation contributions on 
behalf of injured workers who have not returned to work for such period as they are 
required to hold a job open. These contributions are made in addition to the benefits 
payable directly to the worker. (1997, p. 17)  
Inclusion of superannuation contributions could provide for some of the needs of injured 
workers after the cessation of benefits — at the latest, schemes cease weekly benefit 
payments at normal retirement age (65  years of age). Most jurisdictions include 
superannuation contributions in the definition of remuneration for the purpose of 
calculating premiums. Inclusion of superannuation contributions in the benefits structure 
would therefore be consistent with the recommendation of the Institute of Actuaries that 
‘… benefits are not provided where no premium is payable and premiums are not charged 
where no benefit is payable’ (sub. 88, p. 9).     
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Incentive provision 
The levels of benefits, conditions of access and the manner in which the benefit is paid 
(periodic or lump sum) all provide incentives for particular forms of behaviour. Taxation 
and interaction with other income support mechanisms, such as social security, are also 
important. These incentives are complex and may depend on other scheme features — for 
example, access to common law and dispute resolution (Institute of Actuaries of Australia, 
sub. 88, p. 11). 
Empirical evidence suggests that benefit increases lead to a greater incidence and duration 
of claims. Worrall and Butler reviewed US evidence on the impact of benefits on claim 
duration, and concluded: 
People respond to incentives. If social insurance benefits increase, applications for 
beneficiary status will increase. The evidence from the [workers’ compensation] 
program indicates that applications (claim filing) ... [are] quite sensitive to changes in 
the level of benefits. (1989, p. 122) 
A range of US studies suggest that a 10 per cent increase in benefit levels leads to an 
increase in claims of between 4 and 10 per cent (Butler 1983; Butler and Worrall 1983; 
Worrall and Butler 1989; Johnson and Ondrich 1990; Thomason 1993; Currington 1994; 
Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin 1995; Hirsch, Macpherson and Dumond 1997). 
The Industry Commission (IC) (1994, p. 106) reported that when compensation payments 
in South Australia were increased from 74 per cent to 100 per cent of average weekly 
earnings in 1974, there was an increase of 55 per cent in time taken off work following an 
accident. In Western Australia, increasing payments from 53 per cent to 95 per cent of 
average weekly earnings in 1973 preceded a 22 per cent increase in compensated time off 
work. 
Krueger examined the impact of benefit increases on claim duration in a US scheme. He 
concluded: 
… the duration of injuries increased by 8 per cent more for the group of workers that 
experienced a 5 per cent increase in benefits than for the group of workers that had no 
change in their benefit. (1990, p. 1) 
However, in the case of death and serious injury, the natural human desire to avoid harm, 
together with a potential increase in premiums following an increase in benefits, appear to 
be the dominant influences on behaviour. Using US data, Moore and Viscusi (1989) found 
that increases in workers’ compensation benefits resulted in improved health and safety 
measures by firms and a reduction in the number of fatal accidents.      
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Income replacement 
Periodic payments, which are closely linked to pre-injury earnings, may reduce incentives 
to return to work. The Institute of Actuaries of Australia provide evidence that, beyond a 
certain range, benefit increases lead to a disproportionate increase in claim costs. For 
income replacement rates of between 50 per cent and 75 per cent of pre-injury earnings, 
increases in benefits approximate increases in scheme costs (in other words, there does not 
appear to be a significant distortion in claims behaviour). For income replacement above 
75 per cent of pre-injury earnings, there is evidence that an increase in benefits results in a 
more than proportionate increase in claims: 
The utilisation of weekly benefits depends, in part, on the ratio of those benefits to pre-
injury earnings. If the ratio is low, a proportion of potential claimants will “soldier on” 
and claimants who recover will try to return to work earlier, rather than later. If the 
ratio is high, there is a greater incentive to malinger and there will be less incentive to 
return to work early. 
Analysis of disability insurance data collected by the Society of Actuaries in the US has 
suggested that, over a range of perhaps 50% to 75%, the utilisation rate is proportional 
to the income replacement ratio … When the income replacement ratio approaches 
100%, the utilisation rate can increase quite sharply. 
… This effect is strongest where job satisfaction is low, in unattractive, low-paid jobs, 
and can be exacerbated if there is a fixed minimum weekly benefit. (Institute of 
Actuaries of Australia, sub. 88, p. 10) 
As all schemes initially replace at least 80 per cent of lost income (see table 9.1) there may 
be disincentives to participate in rehabilitation and return to work. However, the schemes 
also have design mechanisms to deal with this moral hazard — in particular, benefit step-
downs and caps. 
Benefit step-downs 
Compensation for lost earnings typically starts at a level related in some way to pre-injury 
earnings and tapers down over time before falling to some ‘minimum’ support level (or 
ceasing altogether). As noted earlier, in most schemes, initial step-downs occur at either 
26  weeks or 52  weeks. In Western Australia, the step down occurs after 4  weeks 
(cumulative) away from work; while in South Australia the only step-down occurs at 
52 weeks. Tasmania reduces benefits twice — at 13 and 52 weeks. 
Empirical evidence from Australian workers’ compensation schemes suggests that step-
downs provide incentives for return to work:  
... evidence that the timing of changes in benefit levels are ... significant in determining 
duration. In both workers’ compensation and social security schemes, high exit rates by     
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beneficiaries are typical just prior to the time at which benefits are significantly 
reduced. (Sloan and Kennedy 1993, p. 16) 
Woolworths also believes that step-downs provide positive incentives: 
Anecdotally, our Rehabilitation staff in all states confirm that the knowledge of an 
impending reduction in benefits motivates workers to progress towards a full return to 
work, where there was previously a lack of motivation. (sub. 156, p. 2) 
As part of its preferred benefits structure, HWCA (1997, p.16) recommended that full 
income replacement occur for the first 13 weeks before stepping down to 70 per cent of 
pre-injury normal weekly earnings. Benefits would continue at this level for five years and, 
possibly, until retirement age if an impairment threshold was met. 
Employers and employees can negotiate ‘make-up’ pay to compensate workers for benefit 
step-downs. This occurs mainly in unionised sectors and as part of enterprise bargaining 
agreements. ‘Make-up’ pay can reduce incentives to employees to return to work (Aon, 
sub. 73, p. 9). However, since the ‘make-up’ is paid for by the firm directly, there are also 
strong incentives on the employer to prevent illness or injury and facilitate return to work. 
Benefit caps 
Benefit caps place an upper limit on scheme liability and are intended to encourage injured 
employees to return to work. The caps are usually expressed as a multiple of average 
weekly earnings in the particular jurisdiction (either state or national). HWCA (1997, 
p. 16) recommended that weekly benefits be capped at 150 per cent of average weekly 
earnings once the step-down in benefits occurred.  
‘Notional’ earnings 
In Victoria and South Australia, rehabilitated workers unable to return to their previous job 
are deemed able to earn income from alternative employment. Compensation payments are 
reduced to reflect the difference between pre-injury earnings and these deemed earnings. 
Notional earnings apply irrespective of whether the worker is able to find employment in 
the alternative occupation. The concept of ‘notional’ earnings is a method of limiting the 
cost to the scheme of long-term claimants. In its preferred benefits structure, HWCA 
(1997, p. 16) recommended that benefits be reduced to take account of notional earnings 
six days after the workers’ compensation claim was lodged. 
Method of payment 
Although periodic payments can weaken return to work incentives, lump sum payments, 
which depend on the severity of the injury, can delay rehabilitation (PWC 2001, p. 10).     
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The relationship between lump sum payments and rehabilitation were discussed in 
chapter 8. 
Cost shifting 
Basic safety nets for dealing with social dislocation, injury and illness are provided by the 
social security and health systems. These are jointly provided by all Australian 
governments. Where injuries and illnesses are demonstrably work-related, it is appropriate 
that the cost be attributed to employment.  
In some cases, the attribution of cost is not obvious. This may occur where the attribution 
of the injury or illness to the workplace is itself problematic, such as with degenerative 
musculo-skeletal conditions. For injuries of a very minor nature, coverage under workers’ 
compensation may not be cost-effective (although these injuries should still be reported to 
ensure that the complementary OHS system is fully effective).  
For a number of reasons (including convenience or concern about the impact of a claim on 
their employment) injured or ill workers may use Government-provided income support 
and medical benefits that should properly be provided by workers’ compensation schemes. 
Benefit structures reflect a number of competing influences, including the need to provide 
appropriate incentives for rehabilitation and return to work. Where these incentives are not 
provided, unintended cost shifting may result.  
Cost shifting can occur either away from, or to, workers’ compensation schemes. The IC 
made extensive estimates of the distribution of costs of work-related injuries and illnesses: 
The Commission estimates that the total cost to injured employees, their employers and 
the rest of the community of work-related injury and disease is at least $20 billion a 
year. This estimate is conservative as it does not include any allowance for pain, 
suffering and anguish.  
Around 30 per cent of the total cost has to be met by injured workers and their families. 
Employers bear about 40 per cent in workers’ compensation costs, lost productivity and 
extra overtime. The community funds around 30 per cent, mostly in social security 
benefits and health subsidies. However, the community’s share increases with the 
severity of the consequences — it is about 40  per cent for permanent disability 
compared with around 10 per cent for temporary disability. (IC 1995, pp. xviii – xix) 
Using the methodology of the IC, the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission (NOHSC) estimated the cost of workplace fatality, injury and illness to be in 
excess of $31 billion annually (2003c, p. 2). In 2003, this figure represented a little over 
4 per cent of GDP. If the distribution of costs between employers, employees and the wider 
community remained essentially unchanged from the IC’s 1995 estimates, this would 
imply that:     
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•  around $9 billion is borne by workers and their families3; 
•  around $12 billion is borne by employers; and  
•  around $9 billion is borne by the general community.  
Insurance Australia Group expressed the view that the distribution of costs was unlikely to 
have changed greatly since the IC’s estimates were produced: 
Since that time, [the Industry Commission’s 1995 Inquiry] little has changed although 
the extent of cost shifting may well be greater as a result of further restrictions on 
benefits since that time. (sub. 89, p. 39) 
Based on IC methodology, the community cost includes extra spending by the Australian 
Government of $5  billion (of which $3 billion represents additional social security 
payments and the remainder health, medical and rehabilitation expenses). The cost to State 
and Territory budgets would be around $1 billion (health and medical payments; costs 
related to inspection and investigation; and travel concessions). The remainder of the 
community cost is an estimate of the value of lost human capital. 
However, the potential for cost shifting on to workers’ compensation schemes was also 
noted: 
It is also important to recognise that this analysis is likely to identify significant areas 
of hidden cost shifting from Commonwealth programs to state and territory workers’ 
compensation schemes. Insurance Australia Group believes this to be an important and 
growing issue for workers’ compensation reform.  
There is also some evidence in at least some schemes, including Comcare, that the 
overall ageing of the population is beginning to be felt in workers’ compensation. As 
the average age of claimants increases, so does the time for recovery and the odds of 
achieving a sustainable return to work. Questions increasingly arise in individual 
claims as to the extent to which degenerative factors, as distinct from work-related 
factors, have contributed to the condition. (Insurance Australia Group, sub. 89, p. 39) 
In general, the potential for cost shifting exists whenever the benefits offered by workers’ 
compensation differ significantly from those offered by alternative accident compensation 
schemes or income support mechanisms. These differences relate not only to explicit 
statutory benefits, but also to other scheme attributes such as access to common law. 
According to the Institute of Actuaries of Australia: 
There may also be a choice between workers’ compensation and other means of 
redress, such as CTP, public liability and Social Security. Such choice can result in 
large diversions of costs between the various schemes, depending on which is the most 
attractive. If Common Law remedies are not available under workers’ compensation, 
they will be sought under public or product liability. If long-term workers’ 
compensation income benefits are less attractive than unemployment or disability 
                                                 
3 This includes an estimate of pain and suffering (IC 1995, p. 118).     
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benefits, for example, most workers’ compensation claimants will discontinue when the 
long-term rate kicks in. Conversely, unemployed workers will seek to establish a 
compensable injury, if this gives better results. (sub. 88, p. 11) 
 The Insurance Council of Australia expressed a similar view: 
There is a disturbing trend emerging whereby cost shifting from workers’ 
compensation to public liability is occurring in certain jurisdictions. The cause of this 
appears to be the alternative benefits structures of these different types of claim and the 
rise of what could rightly be termed “remedy shopping”. Simply put, remedy shopping 
occurs whereby a potential claimant under a workers’ compensation policy, instead 
opts to pursue their claim under an alternative insurance line, such as public liability. 
The motivation for doing this is the ability to gain access to financial recompense that 
he/she would not have had access to, or only limited access to, under the workers’ 
compensation policy, such as common law damages. (sub. 74, p. 36) 
Cost shifting away from workers’ compensation schemes 
Cost shifting away from workers’ compensation schemes can be an indication that injured 
workers are inadequately compensated. According to the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations:  
One result of the design of the State schemes is that the Australian Government’s social 
security schemes have become a ‘de-facto’ workers’ compensation scheme. The 
taxpayer funded income support (mainly the Disability Support Pension, Age Pension 
and Newstart) and health schemes (mainly Medicare), are required to support a 
substantial number of workers who have suffered a work-related injury or disease. 
(sub. 166, p. 4) 
According to HWSCA (2003, p.  8), social security payments were the main source of 
income for one in twenty injured workers. The Department of Family and Community 
Services noted that the extent of cost shifting to the Australian Government’s income 
support programs may be significant: 
… there are many circumstances when an ill or injured person may turn to the 
Commonwealth for support following a work injury. For example they may be waiting 
for periodic compensation payments to start; periodic payments may be insufficient so 
that they remain eligible for partial income support; the claim for compensation may be 
challenged by a workers’ compensation scheme; or they may be waiting settlement of a 
lump sum payment. Each of these can result in cost shifting to the Commonwealth.  
Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services (FaCs) data shows 
that around 250,000 people currently receiving income support have claimed 
compensation at some time. On current estimates, each year around 36,000 people are 
affected by workers’ compensation payments receive social security at a cost to the 
Commonwealth of $180m per annum. An additional (unquantified) number of people 
ill and injured in the workplace who are not covered by statutory schemes, self-insurers 
or private insurance also turn to the income support system for assistance. Social     
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security income support remains a safety net for people that are ill or injured at work 
but its purpose is not to be a de-facto workers’ compensation scheme. People who 
become ill or injured as a result of their employment should be supported by workers’ 
compensation schemes and occupational health and safety arrangements.  
Of concern is that failure of workers’ compensation arrangements can result in long-
term income support receipt for some individuals. Of all customers receiving DSP, 
13.2% have claimed compensation at some point, raising questions both about the 
adequacy of workers’ compensation payments and the effectiveness of rehabilitation. 
(sub. 167, p. 1) [Emphasis in original] 
The Department conceded that cost shifting was not simply a matter of benefit design in 
workers’ compensation schemes alone: 
It is recognised that the framework for some Commonwealth programs, including both 
taxation and social security payments, may also inadvertently provide incentives for 
cost shifting. (sub. 167, p. 1) 
Cost shifting can undermine scheme objectives of providing incentives to prevent work-
related injury or illness; and incentives for early intervention, rehabilitation and return to 
work. When costs are shifted away from scheme participants, incentives to avoid them are 
reduced. Employers who are not required to meet the full costs of work-related injury and 
illness face a reduced incentive to prevent them. Workers who accept a disability support 
pension and sever ties with the workplace may also have poorer rehabilitation outcomes 
(see chapter 6). 
Although compensation for work-related injury or illness can occur from a number of 
sources, there are mechanisms in place to prevent ‘double-dipping’. Private insurance 
benefits are reduced dollar-for-dollar if workers’ compensation benefits are also received. 
Access to Australian Government income support is restricted in a similar manner: 
The Social Security Act (1991) incorporates provisions that seek to limit recipients’ of 
workers’ compensation access to Commonwealth income support. For recipients of 
periodic compensation payments that contain economic loss, compensation paid is 
deducted dollar for dollar from the amount of income support otherwise payable. A 
person whose fortnightly compensation income exceeds $446.10 will not receive any 
pension payment. (Department of Family and Community Services, sub. 167, p. 3) 
However, despite these mechanisms, there is still the potential for costs to be shifted away 
from the workers’ compensation scheme. This potential can be exacerbated by the design 
of the benefits structure. Where benefits are inadequate, additional financial costs may be 
borne by the individual or the income support mechanisms of the Australian Government 
(principally, the disability support pension (DSP)). Weekly benefits which are subject to a 
time or dollar limit may result in an injured or ill worker relying on the DSP if recovery 
does not occur before the limit is reached.      
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The use of lump sum payments — either through common law or commutation — is 
another potential source of cost shifting to the Australian Government. This could occur 
either through a common law settlement or a commutation of weekly benefits. As 
discussed in chapter 8, such lump sums can be dissipated or poorly invested. As a result, 
they can prove inadequate to the longer-term income requirements of recipients, who may 
then fall back on alternative income support:  
Periodic payments provide a continued and reliable source of income, whereas lump 
sums often prove inadequate and are easily and frequently mismanaged. Periodic 
payments enable injured workers to remain connected to support services aimed at 
returning them to employment and longer term financial security. The Periodic 
payments provide better long-term security for the individual and prevent the early 
transfer of individuals to the social security system due to hardship (Department of 
Family and Community Services, sub. 167, p. 4) 
The Australian Government has mechanisms in place to minimise cost shifting from this 
source: 
Recipients of lump sum compensation that contains an economic loss component are 
subject to a social security preclusion period during which time they cannot access 
income support. When a matter settles by consent, half the gross settlement money is 
divided by the amount a single person can earn under the social security income test 
before pension is not payable. A preclusion period (in weeks) is calculated in this way. 
As a rule of thumb, each $32,000 of assessable lump sum compensation will preclude 
social security income support payments for 12 months. (Department of Family and 
Community Services, sub. 167, p. 3) 
Nevertheless, incentives to accept a lump sum are provided through the taxation and social 
security systems, which means that the potential for cost shifting from this type of payment 
may not be completely removed: 
… different parts of the Commonwealth treat compensation payments differently 
leading to mixed signals for insurers, lawyers and individuals. The taxation system and 
parts of Social Security Law provide incentives for people to take a lump sum. Under 
current taxation arrangements lump sum payments are not taxed while periodic 
payments are treated the same as wages. Similarly, the social security system treats 
periodic compensation as a dollar for dollar direct deduction to the compensation 
recipient that can impact on partners, whereas for lump sums only the compensation 
recipient is precluded and the preclusion period calculation treats lump sum 
compensation as ordinary income. 
The current different treatment of periodic and lump sum workers’ compensation 
payments means that the same amount of compensation will result in different periods 
of ineligibility. For example, a single person receiving $447 per fortnight in periodic or 
regular compensation for three years would be ineligible for most social security 
payments during that time. However, if that person were to redeem the same amount 
into a lump sum, $34,866 ($447 x 78 fortnights) it would only result in a six month 
preclusion period. In this case, the person would be eligible for income support, 
including concessions, two and a half years earlier than they would have, had they     
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received the same amount in regular instalments. (Department of Family and 
Community Services, sub. 167, p. 4) 
The potential for cost shifting also exists in the area of retirement benefits. The 
government has instituted measures (such as tax advantages for superannuation and the 
superannuation guarantee levy) to encourage workers to save for their retirement. Inclusion 
of superannuation contributions in workers’ compensation benefits could reduce the 
potential cost shifting to the Australian Government once a permanently incapacitated 
worker reaches normal retirement age. According to the Department of Family and 
Community Services: 
The introduction of compulsory superannuation aims to improve the incomes of people 
in retirement. Long-term unemployment can have significant implications on 
superannuation for both workers and their families. As injured workers that have not 
returned to work have a decreased amount of superannuation, many will have increased 
reliance on age pension in retirement and lower overall income, as age pension only 
provides a basic level of support … Periods out of the workforce have a significant 
impact on the capacity of individuals to save for retirement. For example a person 
earning $45,000 per year will have accumulated $521,000 by the time they retire at 65. 
However if they were to leave the workforce for 5 years at age 30 and then return part 
time they will only accumulate just over $300,000. (sub. 167, p. 9) 
Income taxation is another area in which cost shifting can occur. Taxes which would have 
been paid, but for the injury or illness, represent part of the social cost of that injury or 
illness. Under current arrangements, periodic workers’ compensation benefits are taxed in 
the same way as the income they replaced. However, commutations of periodic payments 
are currently not taxed. This provides an incentive for schemes to offer commutations in 
lieu of periodic payments and reduces Australian Government taxation revenue. In a draft 
tax ruling, the Australian Taxation Office has proposed that commutations be taxed as 
income in the year they are received (ATO 2002). The draft ruling has been withdrawn 
pending the outcome of test cases before the Federal Court (ATO 2004). According to the 
Northern Territory Government: 
Current tax arrangements for commutation benefits are an attractive feature of the 
current NT workers’ compensation system for injured employees. The current NT 
commutation arrangements provide for claim settlement for partially incapacitated 
workers in that it provides closure and encouragement for some long term injured 
employees to get on with their lives. The commutation benefit however is currently 
under threat from the Australian Taxation Office which has announced an intention to 
tax such payments as income. (sub. 144, pp. 21–2) 
Taxation of commutations is consistent with the principle that compensation should be 
treated in the same way as the earnings it replaces. It also eliminates the incentives for 
schemes to provide these payments unless genuinely warranted and reduces the potential 
for cost shifting to the Australian Government through the offering of lump sum instead of 
periodic payments.     
    271
 
Lump sum payments which represent compensation for non-economic loss are not taxed. 
This is appropriate since payments for non-economic loss are intended, as far as money 
can, to compensate the worker for the loss of lifestyle they had prior to the injury or illness.  
There is also the potential for medical expenses to be transferred away from the schemes 
and towards to Australian Government. According to the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations: 
There is significant potential for double dipping and cost shifting involving payment of 
Medicare benefits for medical services which are, or should be, covered by workers’ 
compensation. The Health and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995 (HOSCA) 
provides for the recovery of Medicare benefits and residential aged care subsidies 
where medical and aged care expenses are the subject of compensation arrangements. 
The multiplicity of workers’ compensation schemes in Australia prevents tracking of 
compensation cases across jurisdictions, reducing the effectiveness of the HOSCA 
arrangements. (sub. 166, p. 35) 
Cost shifting towards workers’ compensation schemes 
A number of participants noted that costs may also be inappropriately shifted away from 
the Australian Government and on to workers’ compensation schemes (for example, 
DEWR, sub. 166, p. 13; the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission of 
Western Australia, sub. 11, p. 6). Cost shifting towards workers’ compensation schemes 
undermines scheme affordability and limits the ability of schemes to provide for those 
suffering from a work-related injury or illness. Some injuries or illnesses which are 
compensable under workers’ compensation schemes may have been caused or aggravated 
by conditions outside the workplace. Musculo-skeletal injuries, which may be exacerbated 
by ageing, are a notable example.  
However, this is not primarily an issue of benefit design or the interaction between benefits 
and the Australian Government’s taxation/social security system. It relates to the nature of 
these injuries or illnesses and the difficulty in attributing an exact cause. Moreover, it is not 
necessarily an issue of misrepresentation on the part of injured or ill workers. Since the 
onset of these conditions can occur slowly, or represent the cumulation of a number of 
years of stress to the body, both in and out of the workplace, it may be difficult for 
employees to establish the contribution of work to the injury. Since it is impossible to 
attribute an exact share of these conditions to the workplace, it is also impossible to 
quantify the extent of this form of cost shifting. It is also difficult to identify mechanisms 
which would minimise it.  
The issue of cost shifting and coverage was discussed in chapter 6.     
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9.3  National framework issues 
Workers’ compensation benefits vary significantly across schemes, both in terms of the 
levels of benefits paid and the conditions of access. These differences reflect a number of 
influences, foremost of which are the historic trade-offs between key stakeholders. 
Interactions with the Australian Government’s taxation and social security systems and 
with other accident compensation schemes have also impacted on the development of 
benefit structures.  
Some participants argued for equality of benefits across schemes. For example, the 
Department of Family and Community Services contended: ‘Workers with the same 
injuries can receive different levels, forms and duration of assistance depending upon their 
state of residence. This is clearly inequitable.’ (sub. 167, p. 3). Furthermore, differences in 
benefit structures can imply differential access to other forms of income support: 
Variations in policies across schemes means that individuals will be entitled to different 
levels and forms of Commonwealth assistance depending upon their state of residence. 
For example, some States (such as South Australia) include medical expenses in lump 
sums paid to injured workers, thereby increasing the social security preclusion period 
for that individual. Other States do not include medical expenses in the lump sum. 
Individuals and employers in similar circumstances should be treated in the same way 
to ensure a fairer, simpler, more transparent system. (sub. 167, p. 8)  
However, evaluation of statutory benefits should be undertaken in the context of other 
scheme features, in particular access to common law, which can provide an alternative 
means of compensation for seriously injured workers (chapter  8). A uniform benefits 
structure across jurisdictions, in isolation of these other scheme features, would therefore 
not necessarily promote equality of treatment among injured workers. Different wages and 
working conditions between jurisdictions also render any simple comparison of benefits 
problematic. 
For multi-state firms and their employees, different benefits have the potential to increase 
scheme compliance costs. According to Coles Myer Ltd (CML), Australia’s largest private 
employer: 
Under the different Workers’ Compensation systems there is significant impact on 
CML as a national organisation in relation to the payment of weekly compensation … 
Different entitlement payments and step down points affect participation and 
motivation of injured employees in the rehabilitation process affecting overall claims 
cost, Return to Work outcomes and duration rates.  
Varying benefit structures impact significantly on overall cost of claims and hence 
employer premium, dependant on the jurisdiction. (sub. 155, p. 5) 
These additional costs were also identified by a national insurance broker:     
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For employers, the cost is amplified by discrepancies between the various models in 
terms of regulation, compliance, benefits, appeals mechanisms and insurance options. 
For employees, the cost is amplified by discrepancies in benefits for similar injuries or 
diseases, different appeals mechanisms and various limits to geographical coverage. As 
for the price of life, it takes on different values for the surviving family, including any 
dependant children. The result of this complexity is higher derived costs across all 
schemes as employers, employees and insurers all engage legal counsel to establish 
levels of liabilities, opportunities for recoveries from third parties and appropriate 
durations for benefits. (Aon, sub. 73, p. 3) 
The Department of Family and Community Services saw merit in a nationally consistent 
benefits structure which improved transparency for claimants: 
Individuals in similar circumstances should be treated in the same way, rather than 
facing a myriad of different payment types with their confusing array of eligibility 
criteria and conditions. This would ensure a simpler, more transparent system. A 
workers’ compensation scheme with a nationally consistent framework would help to 
overcome problems of consistency between the current schemes and the social security 
system whilst reducing the bewildering complexity of the current arrangements. It 
would provide benefits for both employees and employers by reducing costs, reducing 
complexity and removing cross border coverage issues. (sub. 167, p. 11) 
In contrast to these views, some participants considered differences in benefits as 
necessary to reflect circumstances unique to each jurisdiction: 
Whilst the Law Council readily concedes the need for commonality with respect to 
definitions for key terms and the application of one common policy for employers with 
employees travelling inter-State, it would be inequitable to provide for uniformity 
“across the board” in respect of “benefits” or obligations upon employers for re-
employment. The States substantially differ. We need only contrast: 
(i)  geographically — Western Australia and Tasmania 
(ii)  industrially — Queensland and Victoria 
(iii)  population base — Tasmania and New South Wales. (Law Council of Australia, 
sub. 62, pp. 8–9) 
Ideally, the level of benefits should be sufficiently flexible to reflect regional differences in 
earnings. However, this could be achieved through a nationally consistent benefits 
structure with the same rate of income replacement, step-downs, caps and conditions of 
access in each scheme. Income replacement, through its relationship to pre-injury earnings, 
would reflect much of the economic variation between jurisdictions.  
The development of a benefits structure for a national workers’ compensation scheme 
should support the broader objectives of OHS and workers’ compensation.      
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Firstly, the benefits structure should provide incentives for the prevention of workplace 
injury and illness and, if harm occurs, for early intervention and appropriate participation 
in rehabilitation and return to work.  
Secondly, compensation should be appropriate to the illness or injury. This need not be 
incompatible with scheme affordability. The Commission notes that Comcare benefits 
replace a relatively high proportion of lost income and can be paid until normal retirement 
age. The Comcare scheme is fully funded and in 2001-02 had the lowest standardised 
premiums of any jurisdiction (HWSCA 2003, p.  40). Scheme affordability will be 
determined not only by the level of benefits but also by injury management and claims 
management practices.  
Finally, the benefits structure should minimise the degree of cost shifting, such as to the 
Australian Government’s social security program. This ensures, as far as practicable, that 
the costs associated with workplace injury and illness are attributed to the activity that 
generated them.  
The Commission recommends the following principles be used in the development of 
nationally consistent benefit structures: 
•  the provision of sufficient incentives for injured or ill employees to participate in 
rehabilitation. Benefit step-downs and caps are generally the most appropriate 
mechanisms for providing these incentives; 
•  benefits not to be so ‘low’ as to result in workers bearing an unacceptably high 
burden of workplace injury or illness. Employers to face appropriate incentives to 
promote workplace safety. Income replacement to be related to pre-injury average 
weekly earnings, including any regularly received overtime; 
•  all reasonable medical and rehabilitation expenses to be reimbursed by the scheme; 
•  access to lump sum payments, which are intended to compensate those suffering a 
permanent impairment, to be based on meeting minimum impairment thresholds, 
while minimising the extent to which the availability of such payments delays 
rehabilitation and return to work; and 
•  such structures, and health and income support schemes, to minimise the extent of 
any cost shifting.  
The question of benefit design is not relevant for the proposed first step in the 
Commission’s reform (model  A), since it would utilise the existing Comcare benefits 
structure. The main features of Comcare benefits are a comparatively high level of income 
replacement (see table 9.1); a long period before the step-down in benefits occurs; and 
restricted common law access. Under an alternative national self-insurance scheme 
(model B) either the Comcare benefits structure could be adopted, or some variation to that 
RECOMMENDATION     
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structure should be negotiated which more closely reflects the principles recommended by 
the Commission. 
Should there ultimately be a move to an alternative national insurance scheme (model C), 
this would involve the development of a new benefits structure. The benefits structure 
would be heavily contingent on the other features chosen (for example, whether common 
law access is to be included). Under the national cooperative model (model D), which 
could also commence immediately, the national workers’ compensation body could 
determine an appropriate benefits structure consistent with ‘best practice’ principles and in 
consultation with key stakeholders. A similar exercise has already been undertaken by 
HWCA (1997) in setting out its ‘best practice’ principles of benefit design. 
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10 Premium  setting 
The Commission is required by its terms of reference to report on ‘premium setting 
principles necessary to maintain fully-funded schemes while delivering to employers 
equity, stability and simplicity’ and, in doing so, to identify ‘models that provide incentives 
for employers to reduce the incidence of injury and improve safety in the workplace’.  
Employers (other than self-insured employers) pay insurers a premium based on their total 
wages or remuneration bill. The premium rate (or percentage rate of the wages bill) 
charged to any one employer depends on a range of factors such as the size of the 
employer, the industry in which the employer operates (industry class rating), individual 
claims experience (experience rating), the financial position of the insurer, and the stage of 
the insurance market cycle.1 Small to medium-sized employers are subject to industry 
class rating, whereas large employers are subject to experience rating. 
Premiums are efficient if they are set so as to cover employers’ expected scheme costs of 
work-related injury and illness2. An employer’s expected scheme cost depends on the 
likelihood of work-related injury or illness and includes the: 
•  the medical and income payments made to injured or ill workers; 
•  the cost of rehabilitating and facilitating the return to work of injured or ill workers;  
•  compensation for the pain and suffering of injured and ill workers; and 
                                                 
1 The insurance market is affected by cyclical behaviour. Conditions in the market typically cycle 
between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ as insurers seek to maintain both market position and profitability. In a 
hard market, insurers focus more closely on profit and may decline to insure some risks. As 
profits improve, new insurers may enter the market and premiums fall in the ensuing more 
competitive environment. At some point, the market turns ‘soft’. Here insurers incur losses and 
some may fail. After a time, upward pressure is placed on premiums and insurers withdraw from 
insuring some risks. Conditions will again move towards a hard market (ACCC 2002b and PC 
2002). 
2 An employer’s expected scheme cost is to be distinguished from the expected cost to the 
community of work-related injury or illness. The latter, broader concept, includes not only the 
expected scheme cost, but also the costs to the employer of lost productivity (for example, 
through downtime and lost production) and of recruiting and training replacements for injured or 
ill workers as well as costs to the employee that are not covered by the scheme. These costs are 
not considered when assessing whether premiums are efficient as they are ‘internalised’ to the 
employer in its cost of production or to the employee. There may also be cost shifting, for 
example, from employers to employees and from workers’ compensation schemes to other 
programs (such as other State or Territory programs or the Australian Government’s Medicare 
and social security programs) and vice versa.     
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•  the administration costs for insurers of managing premium pools. 
If insurers do not set premiums efficiently or cost-effectively (so as to achieve scheme 
objectives at least cost to the community) a number of potentially adverse outcomes could 
arise for the stakeholders of workers’ compensation schemes as well as for the wider 
community:  
•  unfunded liabilities, where a scheme’s liabilities are not covered by its assets;  
•  cross-subsidisation between employers of different sizes, within a particular industry, 
in different industries, and over different generations; 
•  insufficient levels of compensation; 
•  distorted incentives on the part of employers to improve workplace health and safety; 
and 
•  distorted prices of final goods and services (as premiums are part of the cost of doing 
business). 
Many participants of this inquiry have expressed concerns about premium setting in both 
publicly and privately underwritten schemes. These are that: 
•  the politically sensitive nature of the premium rates introduces a risk of rates being 
depressed for political purposes and this is clearly a contributing factor to the unfunded 
liabilities and insurance losses seen in all schemes at some point in their history (for 
example, the Institute of Actuaries Australia, IRsub. 182, p. 2); 
•  schemes with unfunded liabilities as a result of ‘inefficient and cumbersome’ 
arrangements are under financial pressure to increase premiums to employers 
regardless of their workplace safety (for example, Sing Tel Optus, sub. 57, p. 9);  
•  premiums are increasing despite safer workplaces and falls in the number of work-
related fatality, injury and illness (for example, Xstrata Coal, sub. 32, p. 1); 
•  employers with a good health and safety record are not being rewarded through lower 
premiums, while those who do not place the same emphasis on health and safety are 
not penalised (for example, Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, sub. 86, p. 12); 
•  premium formulae are complex and difficult to understand (for example, the National 
Meat Association of Australia, Queensland, sub. 83, p. 5);  
•  differences among jurisdictions in premium rates and premium setting methods are 
inconsistent and confusing, and result in increased costs (for example, Pacific 
Terminals, sub. 85, p. 1); and 
•  small to medium-sized employers are ‘penalised’ by premiums despite good safety 
practices and claims records (for example, LMR Roofing Pty Ltd, IRsub. 199, p. 3), 
they have no bargaining power in negotiating premiums (for example, BDS, sub. 36,     
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p.  3) and premiums offer them limited incentive to mitigate and improve the 
management of claims (for example, the Labor Council of New South Wales, sub. 147, 
p. 54). 
This chapter addresses the Commission’s terms of reference on premium setting principles 
and concludes with a discussion on how these principles could be accommodated in a 
national framework.  
10.1  Premium setting objectives 
In setting premiums, consideration must be given to a range of competing objectives of 
workers’ compensation schemes, including to:  
•  ensure an appropriate level of funding to meet the cost of claims;  
•  provide an incentive for employers to invest in safety in the workplace and 
rehabilitation; 
•  be affordable for employers; 
•  be stable; and  
•  be administratively simple to understand and apply.  
An appropriate level of funding 
There are two main approaches to the funding of workers’ compensation schemes (Institute 
of Actuaries Australia, sub. 171).  
Pay-as-you-go funding meets the immediate cash requirements of the scheme. Immediate 
obligations are met such as management expenses and entitlements to weekly 
compensation, medical and hospital costs, and common law settlements. No assets are 
accumulated to meet future compensation entitlements or management expenses, in respect 
of incidents that have already occurred (this approach applies in Europe and New Zealand).  
Full funding is where sufficient assets are accumulated in the scheme to meet all expected 
entitlements to compensation, regardless of when they may be paid, and all costs 
associated with managing claims that have occurred. It is expected that investment income 
earned on the funds set aside to meet future claims will also be available to meet emerging 
costs. These earnings, and changes in them, can have a significant impact on the level and 
stability of premiums. 
Under the Australian Government’s Insurance Act 1973, the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) has made prudential standards which ensure that private     
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insurers in Australia must operate on a fully-funded basis. The prudential standard 
governing liability valuation, for example, requires ‘insurance liabilities’ to be valued by 
an approved actuary on the basis of a 75 per cent probability of adequacy, with allowance 
for discounting at sovereign debt rates (APRA 2002b). Insurance liabilities include both 
‘outstanding claims liabilities’ — all claims incurred whether or not they have been 
reported to the insurer by the calculation date — and ‘premiums liabilities’ — future claim 
payments arising from future events insured under existing policies assessed on a 
prospective basis.  
Indeed, the Insurance Council of Australia expressed the general view that the prudential 
standards imposed a ‘strong control both on the pricing side and on the liability side’ 
which: 
... requires a much heavier focus by insurers on the actual conduct, identification, and 
management of all the risks across the operation of their business and the proper 
pricing of all of those risks, including premium risk. (sub. 174, p. 2) 
Full funding is also generally accepted explicitly or implicitly as an objective for public 
insurers in workers’ compensation schemes in Australia. Under government accrual 
accounting standards, liabilities are required to be reported on a fully-funded basis. 
However, these requirements for both private and public insurers do not require insurers to 
‘price efficiently’ or discriminate between different risks in setting premiums — only that 
the insurance reserves are adequate to meet any present and future claims. Premium setting 
is discussed further in section 10.3. 
Many participants considered that a workers’ compensation scheme should be fully 
funded. Moreover, the Institute of Actuaries Australia recommended that: 
… the difference between the actuarially appropriate premiums and the premiums 
actually charged, must be correctly assessed and made transparent to the financial 
stakeholders in the system. (sub. 88, p. 15) 
However, some publicly underwritten schemes have not been fully funded. The Insurance 
Australia Group noted that: 
… in Australia, all government underwritten schemes are structured on insurance lines 
and usually have an explicit or implicit commitment to full funding in their statutes or 
objectives. Yet we have seen this commitment eroded over time, usually by attempts at 
the political level to balance the competing interests of employers and injured workers.  
It is always easier politically to transfer the costs of the scheme to future premium 
payers than to increase premiums or limit access to benefits. … (sub. 89, p. 41)  
With only partial funding, a number of adverse outcomes can arise. Chief amongst these 
are the creation of inter-generational cross-subsidies and, allied to this, expectations of 
future premium increases irrespective of levels of workplace safety and rehabilitation. The 
Institute of Actuaries Australia noted that:     
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The problem with pay-as-you-go (or partial funding, which lies between the two 
extremes) is that it involves inter-generational cross-subsidies. That is, the current 
generation of employers pays for the costs of past employment. This creates economic 
distortions. These are not too bad in a stable scheme, as the cash flow is not greatly 
different from the incurred cost. In a new scheme, however, or in a partially funded 
scheme which is allowed to slide further towards pay-as-you-go, costs are 
progressively deferred. This creates unreal expectations. If the experience improves, 
then the improvement will not be reflected in premiums until later. 
A pay-as-you-go approach to individual employer premiums is totally unsustainable, 
because claim payments can continue for years after an employer goes out of business. 
(sub. 88, pp. 14–15) 
QBE Insurance noted that: 
Sustained (insurance) losses may result in the withdrawal of the private sector, with the 
resultant loss of competition. In managed fund environments, the unfunded liability can 
sit outside government accounts with no accountability attached to any stakeholders to 
seek to have it managed and returned to a fully funded state. 
Further, there will result a misallocation of resources, which would also ensue from 
cross-subsidisation of industry groups. (sub. 99, p. 51) 
The Insurance Australia Group also noted how claims costs can quickly escalate if full 
funding is not achieved: 
At the time the level of intergenerational transfer of a single decision may seem 
insignificant, but once the principle of full funding is eroded the costs can accumulate 
quickly. In NSW, motorists paid a $43 loading on motor registration for more than a 
decade to fund the losses incurred during a three-year experiment with pay as you go 
funding for compulsory third party motor accident cover between 1984 and 1987. The 
state’s workers’ compensation scheme is now facing a funding crisis of similar 
magnitude due to chronic under-funding through the 1990s. (sub. 89, p. 41) 
The Commission considers that workers’ compensation schemes, whether underwritten by 
public or private insurers, should be fully funded. There should be no inter-generational 
cross-subsidisation between employers. The premiums required to achieve full funding of 
publicly underwritten schemes should be published by insurers in their annual reports. 
Reasons for any differences between these premiums and the levels actually proposed 
should also be given.   
Reducing the incidence of work-related injury and illness  
An important objective of premium setting is to create incentives for employers to improve 
workplace safety as well as to fund the cost of claims. Clearly, premiums are not the only 
way of achieving this. The regulatory measures embodied in occupational health and safety 
(OHS) legislation are also important to this end.      
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For premiums to send clear signals to employers, they should reflect workplace risks (or 
the expected scheme costs of work-related fatality, injury or illness).3 If risks are high, this 
should feed through into premiums, which in turn should signal to employers the need to 
invest in workplace safety and rehabilitation. Where there are improvements in safety and 
rehabilitation, and workplace risks are accordingly lowered, this should be reflected in 
reduced premiums. As Sing Tel Optus said: 
Workers’ compensation schemes need to be more consistent in making sure that their 
premiums accurately reflect the risks posed by the various industry and company 
profiles. This will provide a strong incentive for companies to improve their workplace 
safety so they can reduce their premiums and compliance costs. With clear price signals 
from premiums, workers are likely to see better workplace safety and claims 
management arrangements. (sub. 57, p. 11) 
However, because the fundamental nature of insurance rests on pooling risks among a 
larger group of employers facing similar risks, the potential for premiums to send such 
signals are inevitably blunted.4 Indeed, there is something of an inherent conflict between 
running a workers’ compensation scheme as an insurance scheme, which requires risk 
pooling, and running it to reduce the incidence of work-related fatality, injury and illness, 
which requires ‘user pays’ principles. QBE Insurance expressed this issue as follows:  
There are important design considerations concerning the manner in which the 
premium system is itself structured. Worker’s compensation insurance systems contain 
an inherent conflict between two fundamental principles – the insurance risk and the 
concept of user pays. 
Insurance by its very nature involves sharing of risk and cost. This acts against the 
principles that a party incurring costs will only respond in the proper way to reduce 
these costs if the full impact of its behaviour is allocated to it. (sub. 99, p. 34) 
Quite apart from whether premiums reflected workplace risks, some participants were 
sceptical of their actual incentive effect. For example, Employment Advocacy Solutions 
Pty Ltd said that small to medium-sized enterprises are not equipped or skilled to establish 
the connection between ‘costs savings/premium savings/worker safety and involvement at 
a management level’ (sub. 41, p. 2). The Australian Psychological Society said: 
Generally speaking, in Australia, [workers’ compensation] insurance premiums tend to 
be important considerations only at the top of organisational hierarchies. Even at the 
                                                 
3 Risk is a combination of the likelihood (or probability or frequency) that an adverse event (or 
hazard) will occur and the magnitude of the consequences of the adverse event. Where the 
magnitude is expressed in dollar terms, risk becomes equivalent to an expected cost.  
4 The Insurance Council of Australia described risk pooling as follows: 
  The premiums paid by policyholders to insurance companies are pooled to meet any insurance claims. 
The cost of meeting claims arising from personal injury or property damage or loss, is spread among a 
large number of policyholders. Not all policyholders will make a claim, yet they are all covered for 
certain risks and can lodge a claim if necessary. (sub. 74, p. 8)     
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CEO level, lower [workers’ compensation] premiums are only one of a number of 
“moral” and commercial considerations.  
Middle-level operational managers and supervisors – the levels where the specific OHS 
action takes place – are typically not affected, or even consulted, about premium-
related issues, and are not rewarded for improved premium levels, even though they 
may accept some personal responsibility for safety in the work area. Such a lack of 
personally-meaningful linkage cripples any attempt to use insurance premiums as an 
effective driver of better OHS performance at those middle and lower levels. (sub. 38, 
p. 50) 
Clayton (2002) has expressed particular concerns about the link between premiums based 
on experience rating and workplace safety. These concerns are presented later. 
The Commission notes that premiums, particularly for small to medium-sized employers, 
reflect a balance between maintaining the benefits of risk pooling and signalling workplace 
risks to individual employers. Methods which can achieve this balance are considered in 
section 10.3.  
Employer affordability 
As workers’ compensation schemes oblige employers (other than self-insurers) to purchase 
a compulsory insurance policy to cover their liability for work-related fatality, injury and 
illness, ‘affordable’ premiums are keenly desired. If premiums are too high, employers’ 
competitiveness and financial viability would be affected. They might also encourage 
premium avoidance (Northern Territory Government, sub. 144, p. 23). On this latter point, 
QBE Insurance considered that ‘premiums must ensure equity between employers in 
similar situations and the avoidance of leakage and fraud’ (sub. 99, p. 34). 
Even where premiums are set to reflect the workplace risks facing employers, they may not 
necessarily be affordable for all employers. Cross-subsidisation in premium setting may be 
introduced to ensure affordability across all employers. It should be noted that cross-
subsidisation amongst employers with different workplace risks is quite distinct from risk 
pooling which applies to employers with the same  risk (box  10.1). With cross-
subsidisation, for example, the premium does not fully reflect an employer’s workplace 
risk and the premiums of other employers facing different risks must increase or decrease 
to offset this. In practice, however, it is difficult to detect the precise extent of cross-
subsidisation.  
Nevertheless, some participants supported a degree of cross-subsidisation in premium 
setting. The Australian Industry Group acknowledged cross-subsidisation was a matter of 
‘active debate’ amongst employers which has ‘at its heart the desire to shift costs from one 
sector to another’. It nonetheless considered that cross-subsidies between industries are     
284    
 
‘acceptable to a level just short of what distorts price signals unacceptably’ (sub.  104, 
p. 39).  
However, cross-subsidisation through premium setting dulls the incentive for both high 
and low risk employers to reduce work-related fatality, injury and illness. As the Institute 
of Actuaries Australia said, cross-subsidisation ‘masks the economic signals given by 
charging the actual expected cost’ (sub. 88, p. 19).  
Removing cross-subsidisation does not mean that an employer must always pay premiums 
exactly equal to the cost of claims it generates (say) in a year. This would undermine the 
benefits of risk pooling. QBE Insurance considered: 
... the interest of equity between employers points towards the principle of 
minimalisation, as far as possible, of the element of cross subsidisation between 
employers. (sub. 99, p. 50) 
Some participants made suggestions as to how premium affordability as well as cross-
subsidisation could be better tackled. The Insurance Council of Australia considered that 
cross-subsidies should be transparent and ‘demonstrably necessary’ (sub.  74, p.  11). 
Moreover, it considered that if workers’ compensation insurance is ‘properly priced but not 
affordable for sections of the community, it is incumbent upon government … to address 
the cost drivers of the class of insurance’ (sub.  74, p.  11). The Institute of Actuaries 
Australia recommended that if subsidies are given they should be provided explicitly and 
outside premium setting (sub. 88, p. 19).  
In its response to the Interim Report, WorkCover Queensland, however, considered that it 
would be unrealistic for the Commission to recommend that there be no or minimal cross-
subsidisation: 
... as there will always be some element of cross-subsidisation in any risk-based 
underwritten insurance scheme. Cross-subsidisation exists in order to protect 
businesses particularly small and medium enterprises … from the effect on their 
business of unusually high cost claims. There are various arguments for and against 
cross-subsidisation, which exists in most public utilities. For example, to post a letter 
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Box 10.1  The difference between risk pooling and cross-subsidisation 
A number of participants have expressed the view that workers’ compensation 
insurance necessarily involves cross-subsidisation amongst employers and, indeed, 
equates risk pooling — which is the basis of insurance — with cross-subsidisation. 
From an economic efficiency perspective, however, there is a difference between the 
two concepts and the difference is important. This can be illustrated using the following 
stylised example. 
Risk pooling 
Suppose there are 1000 employers each facing an identical 1 per cent probability of a 
claim for work-related injury or illness involving $10 000 loss a year. On average, there 
would be 10 such claims amounting to $100 000 a year. Each employer thus faces an 
expected loss of $100 (0.1 times $10 000) a year. However, in any give year, most 
employers face no claims, and around 10 employers would be exposed to claims 
amounting to $10  000. Without insurance, employers are in a lottery for significant 
payouts which could threaten their continued viability. 
Each employer could diversify or pool the risk by banding together to insure one 
another. In that case, each employer would pay a certain premium of $100 a year 
(given no transaction costs) into a common fund and an individual employer facing a 
claim would finance its costs from the pooled premiums.  
Cross-subsidisation 
Suppose that there are now two groups of employers with different risk profiles: 
•  group A consists of 500 employers facing a 10 per cent probability of a $10 000 
claim a year. On average, there would be 50 such claims for the group amounting to 
$500 000 a year; and 
•  group B consists of 500 employers facing a 1 per cent probability of a $10 000 claim 
a year. On average there would be 5 claims amounting to $50 000 a year. 
Effective risk pooling would ensure that the premiums charged to the two groups would 
reflect their different risk profiles. Hence, group A employers would pay a premium of 
$1000 a year and the group B employers would pay $100.  
If, however, no account is taken of the different risk profiles of the two groups in setting 
premiums, cross-subsidisation would ensue. Suppose premiums are set to ensure that 
the expected total losses for all 1000 employers of $550 000  ($500 000 for group A 
and $50 000 for group B) were distributed equally. Each employer would then need to 
pay a premium of $550 a year. Group A would be paying far less than was actuarially 
fair given its risk profile (namely, $1000 a year), and group B would be paying much 
more that was actuarially fair for its risk profile (namely, $100 a year). This would 
significantly reduce the financial incentives for employers in group A to reduce 
workplace risks while adding an unnecessary cost burden on employers in group B.  
 
 
from Cairns to Kalgoorlie costs 50 cents, the same as the cost of a letter posted from 
one side of Brisbane to the other. Philosophically, WorkCover Queensland believes     
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there is a social responsibility to ensure that workers compensation is managed so that 
costs and benefits are borne equitably by all participating parties. (IRsub. 205, p. 6). 
However, there is a difference between the pooling of risk and the cross-subsidisation of a 
service through uniform pricing. 
The Commission considers that if systemic cross-subsidisation of premiums is to occur, it 
should be transparent, publicly justified and kept at levels which would not unacceptably 
distort incentives to employers to reduce workplace risks. Independent regulatory 
monitoring of premiums would be a way of achieving this (see section 9.4). Employer 
affordability of premiums should be directly and transparently dealt with through explicit 
subsidies, such as given to implement workplace safety and rehabilitation programs, and 
not through premiums.  
Premium stability 
An objective of premium setting desired by a number of participants is to ensure stability 
— or to reduce ‘volatility’ — in premium changes that result from employers’ claims 
experience, particularly from atypical claims and random variations in claims. Also 
influencing premium stability has been the volatility of investment returns, especially those 
returns earned by private insurers. Premium stability can assist business planning and 
investment for future growth. QBE Insurance said: 
One of the needs of business is for a reasonable degree of transparency, predictability 
and consistency in the operating environment in order to assist budgeting and planning. 
A feature which has characterised most, if not all, Australian and North American 
workers’ compensation jurisdictions over the past two decades has been periods of 
extreme volatility in insurance premium rates. A key design feature, therefore, should 
be to devise premium arrangements which are characterised by reasonable stability and 
predictability. (sub. 99, p. 49) 
Premium stability can also ensure the viability of employers. For example, a small to 
medium-sized employer could have a relatively good record but then encounters a 
particularly expensive claim (say) of the order of $1 million. If the cost of this expensive 
claim has to be met immediately through a substantial increase in premium, it could have 
implications for the viability of the employer.  
In support of premium stability, Australian Business Limited said: 
In our experience one of the key issues for employers with respect to workers’ 
compensation premiums is predictability and stability. We believe most employers 
would prefer a stable premium environment that remains fairly constant over time 
rather than one which is highly volatile where premiums may be low for a period but 
then high as insurers seek to recover losses and restore profitability. (IRsub. 249, p. 15)     
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The Victorian Government commented: 
… premium stability is a key priority for governments and employers. From an 
employer perspective, premium stability is essential to give companies some certainty 
in their business planning. (IRsub. 256, p. 22) 
Most workers’ compensation schemes impose limits on the amount of premium volatility 
that employers — particularly small to medium-sized employers — may face. Volatility is 
suppressed through various forms of premium controls — either directly (for example, 
through caps on premium increases) or indirectly (for example, by placing limits within 
experience rating formulae on the extent to which an employer’s experience is reflected in 
premiums). In the Comcare scheme, for example, premium volatility is dampened by 
capping the highest cost claims and through ‘evolving estimates’ of claim frequency and 
average claim size for each employer (Comcare 2002, p. 6). Suppressing volatility in these 
ways means that employers bear the costs of claims for employers over a long period 
rather than closer to the time the costs of claims are incurred.  
A degree of premium volatility is necessary to transmit incentives to employers about 
workplace safety and rehabilitation. Suppressing volatility through caps and other premium 
controls could mute these incentives.  
The Commission favours a measure of premium volatility in which employers bear a 
greater proportion of the costs of claims closer to the time they are incurred, rather than 
have these costs spread over a longer period.  
Administrative simplicity 
Simplicity is a desired objective of premium setting. It can reduce transaction costs for 
insurers and employers; for example, it takes time and effort to apply complex premium 
formulae. If premiums are reflective of workplace risks, simplicity can increase employers’ 
understanding of the link, thereby strengthening their incentive to invest in workplace 
safety and rehabilitation. Simplicity can also reduce premium avoidance as well as 
mistakes. Moreover, it can ease the compliance burden of multi-state employers for whom 
complexity in an individual jurisdiction can be compounded across many jurisdictions. 
In stressing the importance of simplicity in premium setting, The National Meat 
Association of Australia, Queensland and Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd argued that the 
current complexity results in some cases of premiums being in excess of the amount of 
actual claims paid on behalf of the employer (sub. 83, p. 5; sub. 96, p. 22). QBE Insurance 
noted that premium setting: 
… should be capable of easy comprehension by employers. Undue complexity in 
premium measures, as in similar revenue systems, can lead to increased legalism and 
the search for loopholes. As well, such complexity can also blunt any message, such as     
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an incentive for prevention, which the system can be designed to deliver. (sub. 99, 
p. 50) 
The Commission supports the objective of simplicity in premium setting. Premium 
formulae should be transparent, easily understood and not involve undue costs in their 
application. Unnecessary complexity should be avoided within each jurisdiction, and 
across jurisdictions. However, care needs to be exercised in balancing the desire for 
simplicity with the use of cross-subsidisation. 
10.2  Elements of premium setting  
Setting premiums to meet the range of objectives set out in the previous section requires a 
degree of judgment in achieving the right balance. The Institute of Actuaries Australia 
said: 
An important defining feature of any rating system is the balance between incentives 
and prediction. Actuarial theory aims to maximise the predictive power of the premium 
calculation. This seeks to find the best compromise, between responsiveness to real 
changes and stability in the face of random fluctuation. To this theoretical approach, we 
usually add features, intended to create or enhance incentives for workplace safety, 
injury treatment, and return to work, and to stabilise premium rates, so that rate changes 
are less disruptive. Striking the right balance between these three factors: 
responsiveness, incentives, and stability, is a difficult and often highly political matter. 
(sub. 88, p. 16) 
There is no single method of setting premiums amongst schemes. However, the following 
are a number of common elements of premium setting, with schemes varying in the detail: 
•  the remuneration basis; 
•  rating workplace risk; 
•  bonuses and penalties;  
•  upfront discounts for workplace safety and rehabilitation; and 
•  employer excess. 
Remuneration basis 
All schemes define remuneration (or wages) either in legislation or in administrative 
guidelines. The definition is inevitably linked to who is considered to be a ‘worker’ or 
‘employee’ under the scheme. An example from the New South Wales scheme is given in     
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box  10.2 which notes that the scheme changed its definition of ‘wages’ to ensure 
harmonisation with the definition contained in the State’s payroll tax legislation.  
 
Box 10.2  Definition of wages in New South Wales 
At the beginning and end of each workers’ compensation insurance policy period, an 
employer must supply their insurer (agent) with a declaration of their wages.  
In December 2002, the New South Wales Government passed legislation aimed at 
improving employer compliance with workers’ compensation law. The law now requires 
employers to calculate their wages for workers’ compensation premiums in much the 
same way they do for payroll tax. This led to an expansion of the definition of wages.  
‘Wages’ is now defined as including total gross earnings (before tax deductions) and 
some payments not generally thought of as wages.  
The definition includes: salary/wages; overtime, shift and other allowances; over-award 
payments; bonuses, commissions; payments to working directors (including directors’ 
fees); payments to piece workers; payments for sick leave, public holidays and the 
associated leave loadings; value of any substitutes for cash; employer superannuation 
contributions (including the superannuation guarantee levy); grossed-up value of fringe 
benefits (allowances subject to fringe benefits tax are counted at the grossed up value, 
that is the value of the benefit multiplied by the relevant Australian Tax Office fringe 
benefit formula); long service leave payments (including lump sum payments instead of 
long service leave); termination payments (lump sum payments in respect of annual 
leave, long service leave, sick leave and related leave loadings); trust distributions to 
workers where the distribution is in lieu of wages for work done for the trust. 
The definition of wages does not include: directors’ fees paid to non-working directors; 
compensation under the scheme; any GST component in a payment to a worker. 
When introducing the new definition, the Government attempted to ensure revenue 
neutrality by reducing the average premium rate and altering the factors in the 
experience component of its premium setting formula.  
Source: WorkCover New South Wales (2003b).  
 
 
The main reason for using remuneration as an element of premium setting is that it is 
regarded as a practical and effective estimator of the cost of claims or ‘exposure’ (Institute 
of Actuaries Australia, sub. 88, p. 15).5  
Ideally, remuneration should be defined as broadly as possible. This would reduce the 
opportunity for employers to undertake gaming, such as by offering workers a salary 
                                                 
5 There is a question about whether remuneration is in fact appropriate. In principle, to be efficient, 
premiums should reflect the expected scheme costs of work-related injury and illness. A major 
driver of scheme costs are the statutory benefits that are payable to injured or ill workers as well 
as common law determined damages. Remuneration is not necessarily a perfect mirror of these 
and other costs.      
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package that reduces their total declared remuneration bill and, hence, their premium. 
Indeed, the Institute of Actuaries Australia said that: 
Given the prevalence of salary packaging, care is needed to ensure that the actual 
measure [of remuneration] chosen is not open to manipulation and reasonably reflects 
the relative sizes of similar employers. (sub. 88, p. 15)  
Participants drew attention to the compliance problems caused by differences amongst the 
schemes in their definitions of remuneration. Areas of difference include the treatment of: 
•  various types of leave (for example, long service leave and lump sum payments for 
annual leave and sick leave); 
•  apprentice and trainee wages; 
•  directors’ fees; 
•  employee share schemes; 
•  reimbursements;  
•  superannuation; and 
•  allowances (for example, for overtime means, car/motor vehicle/travel, tools, clothing, 
living away from home and meals) (The Association for Payroll Specialists, sub. 15, 
attachment, pp. 1–3). 
The Association for Payroll Specialists noted that these and other differences ‘lead to the 
likelihood of payments and calculations being incorrect’ (sub. 15, p. 1). The Association 
elaborated on the nature of the differences in the definitions of wages:  
New South Wales has a very good list of what is ‘wages’ for workers’ compensation, 
but we found, for example, Western Australia, they have I think about three paragraphs 
on their web site about what ‘wages’ is, and when you ring them and you say, “ Well, 
we know fringe benefits is supposed to be included in your definition of wages, but 
what sort of fringe benefits and what is the value? do we use the taxable value, do we 
use the grossed-up taxable value, do we use any other sort of value?” We know the 
answer in New South Wales. The answer from WorkCover in Western Australia was, 
“Call the Tax Department.” We thought, well, the Tax Department can tell us how to 
value the fringe benefits, but they can’t tell us what value you want us to include in our 
wages declaration for premium calculation. So that’s the problem that payroll officers 
often face, is the lack of information available just to make a good decision, even 
though the definition may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. (trans., pp. 1194–5) 
Reflecting on the impacts of this complexity on multi-state employers, Sing Tel Optus 
noted that it is: 
… subject to audits by a number of governments on wages declarations for workers’ 
compensation. The different wages definitions in each jurisdiction make it extremely 
difficult for a national organisation like Optus to respond to these audits as efficiently 
as possible. (sub. 134, p. 1)     
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While supporting the use of remuneration as the basis for calculating premiums, 
WorkCover Queensland said that the: 
… remuneration base should be consistent between jurisdictions. (IRsub. 225, p. 32) 
An option to harmonise definitions of remuneration across schemes is to adopt the 
terminology used in Australian Government income taxation legislation. It could also align 
the remuneration base with a definition of employee that could be used for determining 
coverage of workers by all jurisdictions, as discussed in chapter 6. The opportunity to do 
so is presented by the introduction by the Australian Government of tax reforms in 2000, 
particularly the introduction of the Australian Business Number together with the Business 
Activity Statement.6 
In their review that led to the recent change in the definition of wages in New South Wales, 
Le Couteur and Warren considered that: 
After the wages definitions for NSW pay-roll tax and workers’ compensation purposes 
have been aligned, compliance costs for employers could be further reduced. 
Harmonisation with the Commonwealth definitions [in income taxation legislation] has 
the potential to further increase the effective use of data for compliance and in the 
longer term, collection and assessment of taxes and workers’ compensation premiums 
could be administered by one central agency. (2002, p. 41) 
In addition to compliance cost savings, there would also be other potential benefits from 
harmonisation with income taxation legislation, such as improving the comparability of 
premium rate information (for example, Clark, sub. 127, p. 15). If the Australian Taxation 
Office were to be involved in cooperation or administration, another benefit would be 
greater scope for dealing with employer fraud. Also, if such harmonisation were to occur, 
the jurisdictions may need to adjust other scheme elements (such as premium rates) to 
maintain revenue neutrality.  
As an alternative, The Association for Payroll Specialists considered that the various 
schemes could provide a more detailed and comprehensive list of what is contained in their 
definitions of ‘wages’ (trans., p. 1194). 
Risk rating 
Insurers in all schemes set premiums by differentiating or classifying employers in terms 
of their workplace risks. Various approaches to risk differentiation are used.  
                                                 
6 When registering for an Australian Business Number, a business needs to provide information 
such as the ultimate holding company, the type of company, business activity details and industry 
classification (ANZSIC). When lodging a Business Activity Statement, businesses are required to 
supply information on the Australian Business Number, sales (for GST and other taxes), purchase 
of inputs (for GST) and wages paid (for Pay As You Go withholding).     
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Industry class rating 
Insurers, both public and private, frequently use some form of industry class rating for 
setting premiums. For example, in most publicly underwritten schemes: 
•  in New South Wales, industry class rates are based on the last three years’ claims 
experience of each class. Rates are calculated by actuaries using ‘objective, data-based 
rating methodology’. An actuarial credibility model is applied to small industry classes; 
•  in Queensland, industry class rates are determined by taking the aggregate industry 
claims performance into account, and also include a provision for outstanding claims 
liabilities. The average rate paid by all employers in a particular industry is used as a 
base rate for new employers; and 
•  in South Australia, levy rates for each industry class are calculated on rate relativities 
taking account of an employer’s individual experience over a 30  month period to 
produce rates (with a rate scale between 0.4 and 7.5 per cent, increasing in increments 
of 0.10 percentage points) that weigh claims cost and claim frequency in a ratio of 3 to 
1 (HWCA 2002, pp. 42–4).  
Industry classification systems vary from scheme to scheme, but are generally based on the 
Australia and New Zealand Standard Industry Code (ANZSIC). The Victorian and South 
Australian schemes, however, rely on the ABS Australian Standard Industrial 
Classification code (ASIC) which predated the ANZSIC.  
Industry classification systems, such as the ANZSIC and ASIC, are not specifically 
designed for the purpose of risk rating, but to differentiate industries on an economic basis. 
This means that employers with appreciably different risk profiles are grouped together in 
a particular class. As the Insurance Australia Group said: 
Where ANZSIC is used as a proxy for workers’ compensation risk identification, there 
is an inherent problem in that it does not adequately differentiate between different 
levels of risk within the same industry. The roles and occupations within a single 
industry such as forestry can be wide ranging, from clerical to logging, and have quite 
different risks. (sub. 89, p. 38) 
Other examples given by participants included the construction, labour hire and group 
training industries. The Housing Industry Association noted that residential construction 
has a lower incident rate than commercial construction and argued that it should be subject 
to a separate statistical classification (sub. 35, p. 15). The Institute of Actuaries Australia 
noted that with labour hire, the industry mix was fluid, depending on client demands 
(sub.  88, p.  15). And Group Training Australia noted that insurers rate group training 
organisations in the high risk labour hire category, despite the actual industries in which 
they operate, or their claims history (sub. 65, p. 11).      
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With broad industry classification systems, there is scope for cross-subsidisation among 
employers with different workplace risks. This mutes the incentive effect of different 
industry class rates for employers to reduce workplace risks. 
Perversely, industry class rating can create incentives for employers to avoid high rate 
classes. For example, the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union observed that one 
of the reasons for the trend in the meat industry for companies to replace their employees 
with workers provided by labour hire companies is that the industry ‘is always at the top 
end of the premiums and labour hire firms are at a much lower level of premiums that are 
paid’. Taking on workers from labour hire companies is a way of ‘avoiding workers’ 
compensation for them’ (trans., p. 839).  
A better way of classifying employers would be according to discrete risk-based categories 
defined by occupations (Institute of Actuaries Australia, sub. 88, p. 15). However, this has 
proven unworkable, largely because of the difficulty of collecting relevant detailed data 
such as remuneration at this disaggregated level.  
Participants made several suggestions to improve the overall use of industry class rating. 
The Institute of Actuaries Australia suggested: 
Because standard classifications such as ANZSIC are not primarily intended as risk 
classification systems, some subdivision may be needed to reflect risk differences, 
particularly in the residual or “not elsewhere classified” classifications, or when 
different processes are used to produce similar products. Equally, it can be helpful to 
use a common rating for some groups of classifications where the activities are 
essentially the same. ... we believe that a common risk classification system, 
compatible with ANZSIC, is needed. (sub. 88, p. 15)  
The Insurance Australia Group was of the view that the introduction, in 2001, of the New 
South Wales WorkCover Industry Classification System, which modified the ANZSIC: 
... has removed many of the issues under the previous ANZSIC system. [The 
WorkCover Industry Classification System] provides many more categories than 
previously available, meaning that most organisations can be appropriately assigned a 
category. The significant issue with this method is the lack of information available in 
each category which can mean that the rating assigned to a category may not always be 
appropriate. However, [the WorkCover Industry Classification System] is a much more 
effective system than ANZSIC, as it was specifically designed for workers’ 
compensation. (sub. 89, p. 38) 
The New South Wales Bar Association endorsed the Insurance Australia Group’s view that 
the WorkCover Industry Classification System provides for many more categories of 
industry, which may enhance premium setting and employer response (sub. 64, p. 36). 
The Commission considers that industry class rating is a practical, albeit imperfect, 
mechanism for assigning employers to categories of workplace risks. Industry classes, for     
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which cross-subsidisation among employers is a concern, could be disaggregated further to 
reflect more meaningful risk categories (for example, occupational groupings).  
Experience rating 
Experience rating takes account of the recent claims experience or history of the employer 
(for example, in Queensland claims experience includes three years of statutory claim 
experience and the two years prior to that of common law claim experience). Although 
there is substantial commonality amongst schemes in their overall approach to experience 
rating, there are quite significant and, at times, fundamental differences in the detail 
(Clayton 2002, p. 15). 
Full or partial experience rating can apply. Full experience rating means that the previous 
period’s premium (which is assumed to already contain information about the employer’s 
past periods of experience) is adjusted by recent claims experience weighted according to a 
sizing (or ‘credibility’) factor’ (see next). Partial experience rating uses the industry class 
rate rather than the previous year’s premium as the base to be adjusted.  
Factors such as sizing factors and F-factors are included in the experience rating formulae 
of some schemes.  
•  Sizing factors reflect an employer’s size which, as discussed later, is considered to be 
linked to the credibility of its claims experience. For example, in New South Wales, the 
larger the employer, the greater the sizing factor (called the S factor) and the greater the 
weight placed on the employer’s own claim experience. The S factor is currently set so 
that the very largest employers have their premiums reflect 90 per cent on their own 
experience and 10  per cent on the basic tariff premium (or industry class rate) 
(WorkCover New South Wales 2003d, p. 7).  
•  F-factors are used generally to rescale the claims costs for each employer so that they 
sum to the value of a scheme’s actuarially assessed claims costs. For example, in 
Victoria, they apply to employers who have reported claims to an agent as a loading to 
claims costs to: standardise differences in premium estimates between agents; adjust for 
the costs of claims that are excluded from individual employer’s premium calculations; 
and ensure that the claims costs reflect the underlying system costs as valued by 
actuaries (Victorian WorkCover Authority 2003a, p. 4). 
The Institute of Actuaries Australia noted that these factors are not well understood. 
Neither are they arbitrarily determined nor easily simplified: 
•  The most common formula can only be simplified at the expense of fairness, as 
between new and established employers, or by using a shorter experience period, which 
makes it less reliable.      
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•  The credibility factors are set on the basis of actuarial advice, resting on a well 
established theoretical foundation. They are intended to provide an appropriate balance 
between stability in the face of the random variation that dominates the experience of 
smaller employers and sensitivity to the real differences seen in the experience of 
larger employers. 
•  The F-factors are calculated to achieve the required total levy collection. 
•  A key issue with F Factors is that they become distorted by cross-subsidies, implicit 
loadings, etc. The problems associated with F factors might therefore be attributed to 
them being used for purposes other than those consistent with the pricing principles of 
transparency and equity, which in turn leads to problems in communicating their nature 
and function. (IRsub. 182, p. 2) 
Compared with industry class rating, experience rating is more tailored to the risk profile 
of an individual employer and is more likely to create a greater incentive to reduce risk. 
For these reasons, many participants were supportive of experience rating. For example, 
Centennial Coal Company Ltd said: 
Methods of determining premium should be focused on being experience based. This 
provides rewards for companies who have in place good safety management plans and 
also provides an incentive to continually strive to improve health and safety systems 
and to promote structured return to work programs. By adopting an experience based 
system it ensures that cross-subsidisation between companies and industries does not 
occur and keeps a focus on the individual business unit to continually improve its 
safety performance. (sub. 145, pp. 7–8) 
These views were echoed by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (sub. 81, 
p.  5), the Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association (sub.  114, p.  34), Business SA 
(sub. 53, p. 20) and LMR Roofing Pty Ltd (IRsub. 199, p. 6). 
However, the application of experience rating is not without difficulty. For example:  
•  complex formulae frequently apply, which may reduce the capacity of employers to 
understand the link between premium changes and levels of workplace safety and 
rehabilitation, and which may compound the compliance loads of multi-state 
employers; 
•  the factors used in experience rating formulae could be inappropriate and reduce the 
full extent to which individual claims experience is reflected in premiums for an 
employer; 
•  experience rating is not able to be applied to small to medium-sized employers because 
they lack ‘credibility’;     
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•  experience rating is unlikely to work well for occupational diseases which typically 
have a long latency period (often fifteen or twenty years or even longer), a poorly 
understood causation and uncertain prognosis; 
•  experience rating does not deal with future risks (or prospective claims) or involve an 
assessment of current workplace safety; and 
•  experience rating can encourage claims suppression rather than risk reduction or 
improvements in safety. 
The Australian Industry Group expressed concern about the sensitivity of experience rating 
to wages increases: 
... there’s a general acceptance of the principle [of experience rating for large 
employers] but one of the cynicisms that creeps in from our members is the levels at 
which things are set, and the other question about how often that is adjusted with rising 
wages and things like that.  
So I would describe it in a way that’s not unlike bracket creep. As your wages level rise 
from time to time with wage rises, inflation and those effects, then slowly more and 
more employers become more and more prone to the experience rating portion of the 
thing. (trans., p. 1062) 
Clayton noted there was little empirical support for the view that experience rating 
achieved safer workplaces and, in any event, there were inherent limitations in it 
‘constituting a generalised vehicle for injury and illness prevention’ (2002, p. 20). The 
following were among the limitations noted: 
•  Australian and United States studies indicate that a high proportion of compensable 
injuries and illnesses do not find their way into workers’ compensation schemes and 
hence into claims data;  
•  claims data, upon which experience rating depends, are not a proxy for incidence of 
injury and illness; and 
•  indirect costs for employers (such as disruption to the production process and the costs 
of recruiting and training replacements) are a more powerful driver for action than 
direct claims costs (2002, pp. 20–5). 
A number of participants considered that better data would improve the application of 
experience rating. The Insurance Australia Group said: 
Better data about actual claims experience would lead to more accurate assessments of 
risks and more accurately priced premiums. Most states collect some claims data but a 
more realistic and accurate picture of different industries and occupations would 
emerge if national data could be made available. This is currently not possible due to 
differences in schemes and in reporting methods. (sub. 89, p. 38)     
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Size of employers 
The risk properties of small and large employers differ and, thus, insurers apply different 
risk rating approaches to each.  
A small to medium-sized employer suffers from a lack of ‘credibility’ of their claims 
experience. Analysis of claims statistics show that, as a group, small to medium-sized 
employers are expected to have a low number of claims with a smaller proportion of large 
claims. These ratios are relatively stable. However, an individual employer faces a far 
more changeable claims experience. It is difficult for an insurer to interpret an individual 
employer’s claims experience7.  
Accordingly, as the Insurance Council of Australia noted, it is often necessary for insurers 
to pool small to medium-sized employer risks such that the premium reflects a category 
based on some common element such as size or industry. Small to medium-sized 
employers are thus often charged the industry class rate.  
While this has risk pooling benefits, as QBE Insurance said, the rates charged to small to 
medium-sized employers: 
... may not have a high degree of flexibility. While this is sufficient from an 
insurance/funding perspective, it does not generate prevention incentives for 
employers. (sub. 99, p. 52) 
Moreover, as noted earlier in relation to industry class rating, the industry classes may be 
too broad to capture the statistically average risk for small to medium-sized employers 
engaged in a common activity.  
There may be scope for insurers to pool more directly the experience of small to medium-
sized employers in order to gain the advantages of experience rating. The Institute of 
Actuaries Australia observed: 
The idea is that the group could work together on occupational health and safety and 
return to work, and could share resources, such as a safety manager. Groups could be 
based on existing industry, employer, district, service provider or union organisations. 
Care would be needed to avoid manipulation, however, such as if the group expels  
employers on the basis of one or a small number of claims. (sub. 88, p. 18) 
Premiums charged to small to medium-sized employers could also include additional 
financial incentives for reducing workplace risks such as bonuses and penalties for claims 
performance, and explicit financial incentives for workplace safety and rehabilitation.  
                                                 
7 For example, suppose a small- to medium-sized employer in an industry is statistically likely to 
have two claims in every ten years. If an individual employer actually has two claims in one year, 
does this mean that the employer is riskier than others in the industry, and thus its premium 
should rise commensurately, or has all the employer’s claims for the next ten years come at once?     
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Some participants accepted the difficulties in extending experience rating to small to 
medium-sized employers. The Housing Industry Association Ltd said: 
Whilst our preference is for experience rated premiums to be across the board, we 
accept that this would be very difficult to implement.  Therefore HIA supports industry 
based premium settings for small to medium employers, providing the cost effective 
financial incentives are also available. (IRsub. 193, pp. 7–8) 
In applying experience rating to small to medium sized employers, WorkCover 
Queensland said: 
WorkCover Queensland uses a sizing factor to ensure small to medium size employers 
are more closely aligned to the rates of their industries whereas large employers are 
closely aligned to their own claims experience. In this way, both groups are encouraged 
to reduce and minimise claims cost and ensure injured workers return to work. For 
SME’s, the small variation in premium rate allowed by the sizing factor is still 
significant enough to achieve this objective. (IRsub. 225, p. 43) 
The credibility problem associated with a small to medium-sized employer does not apply 
to the same extent for a large employer. Being large, its risk is in effect internally pooled 
and more predictable over time. Thus, for this group of employers, experience rating can 
be applied.  
If large employers are subject to experience rating, then their exit from a scheme (say to 
become self-insurers) should not unduly affect the financial position of insurers who 
administer the premium pool. They would be paying their own way, including paying 
appropriate amounts towards the fixed administration costs of managing the pool. This of 
course might not be the case if large employers were cross-subsidising others in the pool 
and/or are not contributing appropriately towards the fixed costs. This is discussed further 
in chapter 5 on national frameworks for workers’ compensation. 
The Commission considers that, for premium setting, large employers should be subject to 
experience rating. Some of the deficiencies of experience rating could be dealt with 
explicitly to ensure it works better. For example, consideration could be given to 
simplifying formulae. For small to medium-sized (and new) employers, for whom claims 
experience is not a good proxy of workplace risk, industry class rating should apply, 
accompanied by well designed explicit financial incentives for achieving workplace safety 
and rehabilitation. 
Bonuses and penalties for claims experience 
Some schemes provide for specific bonuses or penalties to be deducted from, or added to, 
premiums which are linked to the claims experience of employers or a class of employers. 
For example, in South Australia, a bonus/penalty scheme applies to employers with a 
minimum of two years claims experience and who pay over $200 a year in levy. Under the     
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scheme, WorkCover adjusts the base industry rate of an employer according to its 
individual claims experience. Employers who maintain lower claims costs through safe 
work practices and providing suitable alternative employment for injured workers are 
rewarded with a lower levy. Penalties collected under the scheme for poor claims 
performance are redistributed. In addition to any penalty under the scheme, a levy of up to 
50 per cent of the employer’s base industry levy is imposed under the Supplementary Levy 
Program for poor claims performance. Payment of the levy can be avoided by employers 
meeting a formal OHS program. 
Although an improvement on reliance on industry class rating alone, bonus/penalty 
schemes are not without problems and are generally inferior to experience rating. For 
example, if bonuses and penalties are awarded on the basis of intra-pool (or industry class) 
comparison: 
•  an individual employer may have little control over factors determining the claims 
experience of other employers in the pool; and 
•  an employer’s premiums may increase even if its individual claims experience has 
improved on previous years. This would happen if the employer’s claims experience 
was still inferior to others in the class. 
WorkCover Queensland considered that: 
Bonuses and penalties for claims experience … are not necessary with the proper 
application of Queensland’s EBR [experienced based rating] system. (IRsub.  225, 
p. 44) 
Explicit financial incentives for workplace safety and rehabilitation 
Some schemes currently offer upfront discounts on premiums for prescribed achievements 
in workplace risk reduction or improvements in safety and rehabilitation. For example, in:  
•  New South Wales, a premium discount scheme was introduced in 2001 for employers 
who implemented programs to improve workplace safety and injury management for 
injured workers (box 10.3);     
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Box 10.3  The New South Wales Premium Discount Scheme 
The Premium Discount Scheme provides incentives for employers to implement 
programs for improved workplace safety, and return to work strategies for injured 
workers. The primary incentive is a discount on the employer’s premium, for a 
maximum of three years.  
To receive the discount, an employer must pass several audits of their OHS and injury 
management systems that are measured against WorkCover New South Wales 
benchmarks. Service providers, known as premium discount advisers, are responsible 
for conducting the audits. At an audit, the adviser verifies an employer’s entitlement to 
a discount. 
Source: WorkCover New South Wales (2003c). 
 
 
•  South Australia, the SafeWork Incentive provides lower levy rates for those large 
employers who have successfully implemented safe work strategies; and 
•  Western Australia, a 15 per cent discount on premium is available to farmers if: they 
undertake a Managing Farm Safety Course; they implement a plan; and there are no 
accidents on the farm for 12 months (National Farmers’ Federation, sub. 94, p. 24).  
The main advantages of explicit financial incentives, such as an upfront premium discount, 
are their immediacy. Employers know that if they implement changes, their premiums will 
be reduced now, rather than eventually when their better experience feeds through 
experience rating or bonus/penalty formulae. Also, as small to medium-sized employers 
are largely unaffected by experience rating, they may be potentially advantaged by upfront 
discounts. The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry said: 
Given the difficulties associated with applying a fully experience rated premium system 
to small businesses, it is important that all workers’ compensation schemes contain 
additional incentives which will encourage accident prevention in small businesses. 
These incentives need not be included in the premium system. (sub. 81, p. 6) 
Similarly, Skilled Engineering commented: 
… workers compensation premiums should be fair and reflective of an employer’s risk, 
based principally on claims experience. However, strong incentives should be available 
to all employers who improve and maintain their occupational health and safety and 
injury management performance. (IRsub. 208, p. 4) 
Some participants expressed reservations. For example, the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Western Australia said of incentive schemes established in some jurisdictions 
that: 
Structured incentives are underpinned by procedural requirements on participating 
employers that frequently cost as much and in some cases more than the premium     
    301
 
reduction or return. In such cases, employers are often reluctant to make or continue the 
investment. (sub. 55, p. 21) 
The Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission (Western Australia) did not 
support: 
… the use of direct financial incentives for employers because in a privately 
underwritten scheme, market forces will apply and there is usually no direct 
relationship between the financial incentives offered and improved OHS and claims 
performance. Depending on the funding arrangements, incentive schemes can also 
involve significant cross-subsidisation. (sub. 111, p. 4) 
The Insurance Australia Group noted two ‘unwanted’ outcomes of incentive programs 
were the under-reporting of claims and incidents and the inadvertent ‘rewarding of good 
luck’ (IAG 2003, p. 5). 
Other participants were of the view that small to medium-sized employers were unable to 
take advantage of upfront discounts. Pacific Terminals (Australia) Pty Ltd said that 
strategies to encourage employers to adopt ‘systematic approaches’ to managing OHS and 
workers’ compensation claims ‘have little or no impact’ on small to medium-sized 
employers and provide little or no real financial benefit (sub. 85, p. 1). The Workplace 
Injury Management Services said such schemes: 
... tend to be attractive and feasible for large employers only. For example, the low 
level of discounts available under the NSW Premium Discount Scheme and former 
South Australian Safety Achiever Bonus Scheme are not likely to outweigh the 
considerable costs to small to medium employers of establishing and maintaining the 
required workplace safety and injury management systems. (sub. 37, p. 7) 
Also, reservations were expressed by some participants that upfront discounts would not be 
offered willingly in privately underwritten schemes. The Northern Territory Government 
noted: 
Due to the size of the system within the NT and the prevalence of a large small 
business sector characterised by most employers engaging less than 10 employees, 
approved insurers provide little incentive in their premiums to encourage improved 
OH&S systems, including in reducing claims performance or in promoting 
rehabilitation or return to work objectives. 
The same is not the case for large employers who generally enjoy greater resources and 
improved flexibility in terms of focussing on such matters as well as more relevant 
premium incentives for improved OH&S management and performance. (sub.  144, 
p. 23) 
If upfront discounts are given, then care is required by insurers to ensure that they are 
subject to adequate actuarial costing. Otherwise, there is a danger that the discounts are 
given at the expense of full funding or cross-subsidisation between employers. This could 
be avoided through adequate premium monitoring (see later).     
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The Commission supports the use of appropriately costed explicit financial incentives for 
specified achievements in workplace safety and rehabilitation for all employers, and 
particularly small to medium-sized employers. This is provided that the costs of 
implementation are not high relative to the benefits intended to be achieved by the 
discount.  
Employer excess 
Most schemes (including the Tasmanian privately underwritten scheme) require the 
employer to pay some part of the cost of claims directly. Employer excess can take the 
form of the first few days or weeks of income payments and/or the first few hundred 
dollars of the medical costs (table 10.1). Excess buyouts may also be possible whereby the 
employer eliminates the excess in exchange for a higher premium.  
The main advantage of an employer excess is that it creates an incentive for employers to 
deal directly with small claims. This in turn provides a more timely cost feedback for 
employers on their workplace safety as well as assists them in building a closer 
relationship with their workers.  
Table 10.1 Employer  excess 
Jurisdiction  The nature of the excess 
Comcare No  excess. 
Seacare  Varies between employers. 
NSW  Category A employers (annual premiums greater than $3000) pay the first 
$500 of weekly payments for each claim. 
Category B employers (annual premiums less than $3000) pay the first $500 
or payment of excess surcharge on premiums of 3%. 
Vic  First 10 days of incapacity and first $480 of medical costs. Buy out option  
also exists (25% of premium). 
Qld  Four days excess plus day of injury. Option to buy out excess at the greater 
rate of 8.5% of premium or $10.  
WA No  excess. 
SA  First two weeks of incapacity per worker per calendar year. Option for buy  
out first two weeks by paying an extra percentage of the levy rate (8% in 
2002-03). 
Tas  First five working days of each injury and first $200 of other benefits. 
ACT No  excess. 
NT No  excess. 
Source: HWCA (2002).  
There are some disadvantages of excesses. First, cost-shifting may result if an employer 
tries to avoid paying an excess. Excesses on medical costs are particularly open to cost-
shifting, because of the ease of access to the Australian Government’s Medicare system.     
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Second, and allied to this, there may be some incentive on employers not to report small 
claims within their excess, as this could convey information about their safety to their 
insurer, with possible adverse ramifications for their premiums. Third, employers with 
little experience in administering claims may not provide quality service to workers.  
However, measures could be applied to deal with these problems: 
•  restrict excesses to income payments, not medical costs — this would reduce the 
potential for employers to cost-shift onto the Medicare system;  
•  impose effective penalties on employers for failure to notify claims within a certain 
time limit — this could deal with under reporting by employers of small claims; and  
•  ensure that appropriate claims management requirements apply and that there is 
provision for the resolution of disputes about employers’ management of small claims 
— this would reduce concerns about the quality of claims management. 
The different use of excess payments across jurisdictions was an issue for some 
participants. The Association for Payroll Specialists said: 
… Payroll professionals face some difficulty in knowing what payment will be made 
for claims due to the differences in excess amounts and the ability of employers in 
some states to buy out that excess. (IRsub. 227, p. 4) 
Some participants recommended certain changes to employer excess. Clark considered that 
excess buyouts were undesirable and enabled ‘employers to avoid’ all excess payments and 
that there is scope for selective phased increases in the excess in all schemes. This would: 
… facilitate employer handling of the larger numbers of minor claims while focusing 
insurer handling and administration on longer duration claims and to improve the social 
and economic performance of the workers’ compensation system overall. 
(sub. 127, pp. 15–16) 
Increases in the excess, along with other measures, were also supported by Workplace 
Injury Management Services which said: 
Consideration should be given to increasing the maximum claim excess amount, and 
providing for a range of excess reductions to promote and reward desired behaviours on 
the part of small and medium-sized employers. For example, recently legislative 
changes in NSW provide for claims excess amounts to be varied according to the 
timeliness of initial injury notifications.  
This approach could be extended to provide for lower excess payments, or excess 
payment refunds for specific actions such as timely participation in a facilitated case 
management process and timely preparation of an agreed return to work plan. (sub. 37, 
p. 7) 
The Commission considers that excesses serve a valuable role in increasing the incentive 
for employers to reduce workplace risks and develop closer relationships with their     
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workers. Their effectiveness in creating incentives for risk reduction could be enhanced by 
increasing the amounts of excess available under the scheme, reducing the tendency for 
‘paper swapping’ to occur for low level claims, and permitting employers the flexibility to 
purchase their own preferred level of excess. However, measures to deal with certain of 
their disadvantages would need to be taken.  
10.3 Premium  controls 
In the publicly underwritten schemes, controls are applied to premiums directly (through 
premium caps) and/or indirectly (through caps on claims costs that are included in 
premium calculations). One objective for premium controls, as noted in section 10.1, is to 
seek premium stability. Another is to ensure affordability for employers.  
In Victoria, for example, caps are applied to protect employers from sharp increases in 
their premium rates. For small to medium-sized employers, the cap prevents the premium 
rate from increasing by more than 20  per cent from one year to the next (Victorian 
WorkCover Authority 2003b, p. 4). In New South Wales, the average premium rate has 
been set at 2.8 per cent of wages (net of GST) since 1997-98 to ensure that employers 
‘remain competitive’ (sub. 151, p. 14).  
As noted earlier, premium controls have real costs. They can: mute signals and incentives 
to improve workplace safety and rehabilitation; create cross-subsidies; and lead to the 
underfunding of schemes. The Insurance Council of Australia described the problems as 
follows: 
•  adverse selection — as state workers’ compensation schemes are subject to price 
controls, only “bad risks” have an incentive to seek insurance [rather than self 
insurance] though government providers. This adverse selection leads to unfunded 
liabilities in state schemes. 
•  moral hazard arising from under pricing — where price caps and price floors exist 
there does not exist either an incentive for poor performers to improve their workers’ 
compensation outcomes, nor rewards for those who have exemplary records. ... The 
economic effect of such practices is an increase in workers’ compensation claims. 
•  cross-subsidies — where price controls are in place, it is inevitably the case that the 
poor risks are subsidised by the good risks. Again, this practice distorts and retards the 
economic incentives which would exist in the private market. ... 
•  under-reserving — the … effect of a non-market based pricing mechanism is that the 
liabilities exceed the revenues or assets. By failing to properly price policies initially, 
the flow on effect is that liabilities are unfunded. 
•  cost-shifting — as a state scheme fails to fund itself, the costs are borne by other 
programs, such as public health, or by future policy holders, so that past losses become 
a burden for new businesses and employers. (sub. 74, pp. 17–18)     
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The Commission considers that the use of premium controls should be avoided as far as 
practicable. More transparent measures should be employed to achieve objectives such as 
premium affordability and stability for employers. These measures include direct subsidies 
to particular groups of employers.  
10.4  Premium monitoring  
The argument for the independent regulatory monitoring of premiums is that, if left to 
themselves, insurers (both public and private sector) might charge premiums based on 
factors not directly related to risks.  
In privately underwritten schemes, the problem may be manifested by private insurers: 
•  discounting premiums to obtain market share which, in turn, could reduce their 
financial viability and drive the more efficient insurers out of the market. For example, 
the Institute of Actuaries Australia said: 
Unless proper controls are in place, private insurers have a demonstrated ability to 
indulge in self-destructive competition: under-reserving and under-pricing. Strong 
competition for large employer accounts and the influence of brokers add to this 
risk. This was the underlying cause of the NEM and Palmdale failures in the 1980s 
and the more recent failure of HIH. (sub. 88, p. 22); 
•  cross-subsidising between employers with different risk profiles and between their less 
profitable workers’ compensation business and their more profitable lines of insurance 
business, when they have market power to do so; and  
•  offering incentives for large employers, but not for small to medium-sized employers, 
because the latter have less bargaining power and there is less margin to be traded in 
their premiums.  
In publicly underwritten schemes, premiums can also be based on factors other than risks: 
•  cross-subsidising between different employers with different workplace risks;  
•  a lack of competition leading to complacency; and 
•  political pressure on public insurers to suppress premium increases when workplace 
risks increase to meet objectives such as premium affordability and stability or when 
elections are imminent.  
In commenting on the politicisation of premium setting by public monopoly insurers, Clark 
observed: 
A significant problem with government monopoly insurance — and government 
oversight — in industrial relations-related areas such as workers’ compensation is the 
superimposition of political agendas unrelated or only indirectly related to the arguably 
key scheme objectives of prevention, equity, care and revenue neutrality. For example,     
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political intervention to skew premiums outside responsibly-determined levels has been 
an adverse feature of some current Australian schemes. The ‘conventional wisdom’ of 
criticising private sector insurers for ‘unsustainable discounting of premiums’ applies 
equally to government and government-controlled insurers, who can rely on legislation 
to recover any losses. The combination of legislatively-enforced insurance and 
monopoly market control is not necessarily associated with optimal public utility. 
(sub. 127, p. 11) 
Insurers, both public and private, might not closely relate premiums to risk where the 
transaction costs of doing so are too large (particularly in respect of small to medium-sized 
employers). 
The Commission agrees that there is scope for some type of independent regulatory 
premium monitoring of both private and public insurers. However, this should be light-
handed. Regulatory monitoring should seek to ensure that workplace risks are reflected in 
premiums and to make transparent the basis for setting premiums, including exposing any 
cross-subsidies. It is to be distinguished from the monitoring that should occur under 
prudential regulation. The objectives of the latter include ensuring that long-term financial 
commitments can be met. 
Premium monitoring occurs in some of the privately underwritten schemes (for example, 
in Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory). The Northern 
Territory scheme, for example, establishes a premiums monitoring committee which is 
required, among other things, to monitor the viability and performance of the scheme, and 
the premium rates offered for workers’ compensation. The committee is also required to 
consider and report on the effectiveness of the premiums offered by insurers: in 
encouraging employers to develop and maintain safe working practices; and in penalising 
employers which do not ensure the maintenance of safe working practices (Work Health 
Act 1986, division 4).  
One form of premium monitoring favoured by the Law Council of Australia and the 
Insurance Council of Australia for private insurers is ‘file and write’. This means that 
insurers file, with the appropriate regulatory body for approval, the details of their 
proposed premiums prior to writing business in accordance with that premium schedule. 
The Insurance Council of Australia considered that file and write: 
... gives underwriters some flexibility in the pricing of policies and government the 
capacity to reject prices that may be too low to properly fund the liabilities being 
underwritten by the insurer, or too high in terms of affordability and fair returns. 
(sub. 74, p. 19) 
Actuarial certification can also play a useful role in regulatory monitoring. The Institute of 
Actuaries Australia noted in relation to premiums set in a ‘competitive’ environment that:      
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… actuarial certification should be required for workers’ compensation premium 
structures set in a competitive environment and that, as is current practice, supervisory 
authorities should seek actuarial advice on those aspects of the premium setting process 
that they control. (sub. 88, p. 19) 
Although independent monitoring of premiums set by public insurers is not as widespread 
as that for private insurers, there are moves in this direction. The Victorian Essential 
Services Commission, an independent economic regulator of utility services, has reported 
on premiums set by the Victorian Traffic Accidents Commission and is about to review 
premiums set by the Victorian WorkCover Authority. In Queensland, the regulator, Q-
Comp, conducts independent reviews of the premiums set by WorkCover Queensland. 
Such independent monitoring has the potential to depoliticise the process of premium 
setting by public insurers.  
The Commission supports the use of light-handed independent regulatory monitoring of 
premiums as set by both public and private insurers. ‘File and write’ is one way in which 
this could be achieved for private insurers. The premiums set by public insurers should be 
reviewed by an independent body.  
10.5  National framework issues 
Although Australian workers’ compensation schemes differ in their premium setting, the 
case for national uniformity is not clear cut.  
Workers’ compensation schemes should be seen in their entirety. While there is diversity 
in the characteristics of the various schemes, national uniformity in premium levels 
(including rates, levels of penalties and bonuses, and levels of up front discounts for 
workplace safety) is not appropriate. For example: 
•  There is an inextricable link between premium levels and the levels of statutory 
benefits and common law damages available to workers. It would be difficult to 
achieve national uniformity in premium levels alone, in the absence of uniformity of 
these other scheme elements.  
•  As jurisdictions have different industry structures and, hence, different workplace risk 
profiles, variations in premium levels should reflect these differences, although under 
more consistent scheme benefit structures, premiums for the same level of risk category 
across jurisdictions could converge.   
•  In a competitive insurance market, variation in such aspects as premium rates, upfront 
discounts for workplace safety and employer excess are, not only expected, but also 
desirable attributes of price competition.      
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On the other hand, differences in elements of premium setting do involve extra compliance 
costs for employers and insurers who operate across jurisdictions. Standardisation in the 
technical aspects of premium setting, therefore, would not only be achievable, but also 
beneficial. Participants identified several such areas: 
•  the definition of remuneration (for example, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, sub.  81, p.  4; Clark, sub.  127, p.  15; the Institute of Actuaries Australia, 
sub. 88, p. 8; The Association for Payroll Specialists, trans., p. 1195) ; 
•  aspects of premium setting formulae, including industry classification as part of 
industry class rating and experience rating (for example, QBE Insurance, sub. 99, p. 53; 
Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd, sub. 96, p. 23; the Insurance Council of Australia, 
sub. 74, pp. 21–2; and the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, sub. 81, 
p. 4; Skilled Engineering, IRsub. 208, p. 6); and 
•  the number and timing of premium assessments undertaken for employers (for 
example, the Australian Industry Group, sub. 97, p. 5). 
Of the models identified in chapter  5, two provide some scope to promote national 
consistency in these areas of premium setting: 
•  an alternative national (insurance) scheme (model C) — this would ideally embody the 
premium setting objectives identified earlier and endorsed by a number of participants 
in their response to the Interim Report. As the model is predicated on private 
underwriting, compliance with prudential standards set by APRA under the Insurance 
Act would be a necessary feature (chapter 11). Consideration could also be given to 
premium monitoring by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. This 
body is already monitoring, for a limited period, pricing in the general insurance sector, 
including public liability and professional indemnity insurance (two classes of 
insurance business which, like workers’ compensation insurance, involve long-tail 
claims); and 
•  a national cooperative body (model  D) — jurisdictions could seek to resolve the 
differences on the technical areas of premium setting such as on definitions of 
remuneration. 
Models centred on the Comcare scheme (model A) and on an alternative national self-
insurance scheme (model B) propose that employers who meet certain requirements are 
issued a self-insurance licence. Thus premium setting has no role in either of the models.  
Nonetheless, how premiums are set under State and Territory schemes may (other things 
equal) affect an eligible employer’s decision to seek national self-insurance. For example, 
a factor attracting Sing Tel Optus to self-insurance under a national scheme is premium 
costs and, in particular, the prospect of rising premiums in schemes under financial 
pressure (sub. 57, p. 9).      
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As noted earlier, if there are currently cross-subsidies between employers within the State 
and Territory schemes, such as between large employers and small- to medium-sized 
employers, the exit of premium payers from schemes into either the Comcare scheme or a 
new national self-insurance scheme could affect the premiums charged to those employers 
who do not exit. These impacts are considered more fully in chapter  5 on a national 
framework for workers’ compensation.  
The Commission recommends the following be used as premium setting principles to 
meet the objectives of: the full funding of schemes; incentives to prevent workplace 
fatality, injury and illness and to promote rehabilitation and return to work; stability; 
and administrative simplicity for employers:  
•  no cross-subsidisation between employers through premiums as it distorts pricing 
signals. If cross-subsidisation is to exist, it should be minimal and transparent;  
•  premiums be set efficiently. In essence, premiums for large employers to be based on 
experience rating. Premiums for small to medium employers to be based on industry 
class rating (where the classes reflect common risk profiles) accompanied by 
experience rating to the degree appropriate, and by explicit, cost-effective financial 
incentives for preventing workplace fatality, injury and illness, and for promoting 
rehabilitation and return to work;  
•  compliance by private insurers with relevant requirements under the Insurance Act 
1973 (particularly the prudential standard governing liability valuation for general 
insurer), to ensure full funding of schemes. There should be separate but light-
handed regulatory monitoring of the premiums set by private insurers; and 
•  premiums be set by public insurers so as to achieve full funding, with independent 
monitoring by a separate body to ensure transparency of any differences between 
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11  The role of private insurers 
This chapter reports on the Commission’s investigation into ‘a regulatory framework 
which would allow licensed insurers to provide coverage under all schemes’ and, in doing 
so, it identifies and assesses the ‘likely impact on employers, employees and the wider 
community from the introduction of competition, including on the level of premiums’.  
Insurers, whether public or private, play an important role in workers’ compensation 
schemes in Australia. In providing policies to employers, the specific functions that 
insurers undertake include any or all of the following:  
•  underwriting the risk of claims liabilities; 
•  setting, calculating and collecting premiums; 
•  managing claims, including rehabilitation and return to work programs; 
•  paying benefits; and 
•  managing investments. 
There is considerable variation among the schemes in the degree to which private insurers 
are involved in these functions. Individual schemes can be seen as fitting along a 
continuum from monopoly provision to competitive provision of workers’ compensation 
insurance (figure 11.1 and table 11.1). For example: 
•  monopoly schemes — in the Queensland and the Comcare schemes, most if not all 
insurer functions, including underwriting, are provided by a public monopoly insurer; 
•  competitive schemes — in the Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory, 
Tasmanian, Western Australian and the Australian Government’s Seacare schemes, the 
private sector provides most, if not all, insurer functions, including underwriting. In the 
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Table 11.1  Workers’ compensation insurance industry structure 
Insurers that underwrite   
 







Publicly underwritten schemes   
Qld WorkCover 
Queensland 
- -  24 
Comcare  Comcare (the 
Australian and ACT 
Governments only)b 
- -  10 
NSW WorkCover  New 
South Walesc 
22 specialised insurers 













of South Australia 
- 4  claim 
management 
agents 
67 (and all 
State agencies) 
Privately underwritten schemes     
Tas  -  9 licensed insurerse -  17 
ACT  -  8 approved insurers  -  9 
Seacare  -  4 authorised insurers 




NT Territory  Insurance 
Officeg 
3 approved insurers  -  6 





10 approved insurers   -  29 
a  Reflects separate licence holders some of which are related or part of the same corporate group. For 
example, CGU and Insurance Australia Group are separate licence holders. However, the two merged late in 
2002 (ACCC 2002a). b Comcare administers the workers’ compensation arrangements of the Australian and 
ACT Governments only. The Australian Government effectively acts as self-insurer and ultimately the 
underwriter for all premium-paying agencies under the scheme. c WorkCover New South Wales does not 
have statutory responsibility for underwriting the New South Wales scheme. d This consists of 6 specialised 
insurers which have a restricted licence to underwrite workers’ compensation risks specific to a particular 
industry or class of business or employer and 16 specialised domestic workers compensation insurers. Coal 
Services, StateCover Mutual, Catholic Church Insurances and Guild Insurance are among the specialised 
insurers. Specialised domestic workers’ compensation insurers underwrite risks associated with domestic 
workers employed in the home. e Two of the seven licensed insurers traditionally restrict the issuing of policies 
to specific types of industry. f Two of the four authorised insurers offer workers’ compensation policies to 
specific employers only. g The Territory Insurance Office is an approved insurer which manages claims for the 
self-insured Northern Territory Government. h  The Insurance Commission of Western Australia is an 
approved insurer which manages the State public sector workers’ compensation arrangements on behalf of 
the Western Australian Government. 
Sources: Workcover authorities, submissions, annual reports and websites.     
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•  hybrid schemes — in the Victorian and South Australian schemes, there is a mixture of 
public and private sector involvement. Underwriting, funds management and premium 
setting are undertaken by public monopoly insurers, and other functions, such as claims 
management, are undertaken by private insurers operating as agents. In New South 
Wales, the public agency WorkCover New South Wales sets premiums and manages 
the fund.  
In schemes where private insurers operate as agents, the range of functions they undertake 
can vary. Agents are responsible for:  
•  in the New South Wales scheme, issuing and administering insurance policies, 
managing the collection of premiums, informing employers of their responsibilities, 
and administering most claims processes;  
•  in the Victorian scheme, collecting premiums, lodging claims, and delivering benefits 
and rehabilitation; and 
•  in the South Australian scheme, managing and coordinating the rehabilitation and 
return to work of an injured worker, determining the eligibility of claims for 
compensation, managing an injured worker’s claim for compensation, providing an 
advisory service for employers and workers on rehabilitation and compensation, and 
providing an advisory service for employers on health and safety in the workplace.  
Private insurers also provide services — such as reinsurance policies and claims 
management — to employers which self-insure.  
The crucial issue regarding the role of private insurers in schemes is the underwriting of 
workers’ compensation insurance. Due to the arrangements in the larger States, the public 
sector dominates in underwriting. Data collected by the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) show that, of an Australian total premium revenue for the ‘employer 
liability’ class of insurance in 2001-02 of $6.3  billion, public insurers1 collectively 
accounted for $5.5  billion or around 85  per cent (APRA 2002e, section  1 (authorised 
general insurers) table  6 and section 2 (public sector insurers (table 3)). This compares 
with compulsory third party insurance, another class of long-tail statutory insurance, where 
public insurers accounted for around 45 per cent of total premium revenue collected.  
Jurisdictions with public monopoly insurers (or public agencies that control fund 
management and premium setting) have reviewed this restriction on competition as part of 
their National Competition Policy Agreement commitments (National Competition 
Council 2003). The results have been as follows: 
                                                 
1 APRA treats as public insurers Workcover New South Wales, WorkCover Queensland, the 
Victorian WorkCover Authority and WorkCover Corporation of South Australia.      
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•  Although a review of the Comcare scheme was completed in 1997, the Australian 
Government has not responded to it.  
•  The review of the New South Wales scheme (Grellman 1997) recommended private 
underwriting. In response, the Government legislated for private underwriting to 
commence in October 1999. However, it deferred the introduction of private 
underwriting until 2001, at which time it repealed the enabling provisions. A recent 
report by McKinsey & Company, while not a review under National Competition 
Policy, recommended that privatisation be ruled out until the scheme achieves full 
funding and financial stability as well as changes to outsourcing arrangements (2003, 
p. 8). 
•  In Victoria, a review of the scheme completed in 1997-98 recommended private 
underwriting. The first review was rejected by the Government. A second review 
completed in 2000 recommended maintaining the public monopoly insurer but a third 
party review of premiums and ‘market testing’. The Government accepted the second 
review.  
•  The review of the Queensland scheme completed in 2000 recommended the retention 
of the public monopoly insurer, the creation of a separate regulatory entity and a review 
of the scope for the competitive outsourcing of claims management. The Government 
responded by enacting legislation establishing Q-Comp in 2002. 
•  A national competition policy review of the South Australian scheme was completed in 
mid 2002 and recommended the retention of the public monopoly insurer. A 
subsequent review of the scheme by Stanley et al. (2002) recommended that 
outsourcing of claims management revert to the monopoly provider. The Government 
has yet to respond to either of the reviews. 
In this chapter, the role of private insurers in workers’ compensation insurance 
underwriting and other functions is examined. A guiding criterion for assessment is cost-
effectiveness. This asks whether the manner, or industry structure, in which workers’ 
compensation insurance is provided achieves scheme objectives at least cost to the 
community.  
Also considered in the chapter are the regulatory arrangements to which private insurers 
are subject and national framework issues.  
11.1  Public monopoly versus competitive private 
provision 
Proponents of public monopoly and competitive private provision of underwriting and 
other functions put forward numerous arguments to support their respective cases. The key 
ones are examined below.     
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The case for public monopoly provision 
Some participants argued that a public monopoly insurer is needed to capture potential 
economies of scale and scope as well as achieve the potential benefits of being a single 
purchaser (monopsonist) of services. The Victorian Government noted that the ability of 
the Victorian WorkCover Authority to underwrite all the State’s workers’ compensation 
insurance enables the Authority ‘to take advantage of the benefits of scale and 
intermediation through the pooling of risk’ (sub. 164, p. 25). The Queensland Government 
drew attention to the relatively high proportion of its labour force based in regional and 
remote areas (compared with other States and Territories) and the importance of delivering 
high quality services to these areas. It said: 
… WorkCover Queensland is able to deliver the State’s objectives of low cost service 
provision through economies of scope and ensure the provision of consistent, high 
quality and medical/para-medical services to injured workers. WorkCover’s market 
structure allows it to focus on the development of workers’ compensation services as 
the sole purchaser of services from a number of sellers such as the Host Employment 
Program, without distractions such as market share issues, shareholder distributions and 
brokerage issues. (sub. 154, p. 11) 
In its previous report, the Industry Commission noted that the evidence for scale 
economies was largely confined to administration and that this of itself would not justify 
sole provision (1994, p. 209). The Commission also notes that private insurers manage 
small risk pools in Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory 
and have demonstrated long term viability.  
Another argument is that, given that workers’ compensation insurance is mandatory, public 
monopoly provision would ensure that premiums are affordable and stable for employers. 
Competitive private provision, on the other hand, is argued to lead to significant 
fluctuations in premiums for employers, particularly small employers. This would be a 
consequence of private insurers responding to long term insurance market cycles, premium 
competition with each other and the inability to cross-subsidise between non-tied 
employers. The Victorian Government noted: 
The mandatory nature of workers’ compensation insurance imposes a corresponding 
burden upon the Government to ensure that workers’ compensation insurance 
premiums are available and affordable to all employers. This requirement suggests 
limitations upon the role and benefits of competition. (sub. 164, p. 25) 
Australian Industry Group, which recommended against the privatisation of workers’ 
compensation insurance, said: 
Workers’ Compensation is a social system designed to provide workers with protection 
if they are injured at work. To protect small employers from the impact of a single very 
expensive claim, cross-subsidies need to be in place. Financial incentives are also 
needed to facilitate return to work and improved OHS performance. This cannot be     
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achieved in a scheme that does not have central control over premium setting 
mechanisms. (sub. 104, p. 41) 
However, in the pursuit of such objectives as affordability and stability, public monopoly 
insurers can end up setting premiums which under fund schemes and create cross-subsidies 
among employers, with attendant adverse consequences. The Insurance Council of 
Australia noted the size of unfunded liabilities in New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia and said: 
It has been demonstrated that a major cause of “failures” in statutory insurance schemes 
has been the method of pricing or setting of premiums by governments, which has led 
to the development of significant unfunded liabilities in some schemes. (sub. 74, p. 16) 
It also considered that the exposure of governments to ‘significant unfunded liabilities’ 
creates a ‘risk to public funds and implications for the financial rating of a jurisdiction’ 
(sub. 74, p. 16).  
The problems of using premium setting to achieve affordability and stability were 
considered more generally in chapter 10. 
Another argument by proponents of public monopoly provision is that, because of the 
long-tail claims nature of workers’ compensation insurance, claimants could be exposed to 
private insurer failure or private insurers could avoid catering for certain workplace risks 
by (say) setting prohibitively high premiums. Long-tail claims arise, for example, where 
symptoms of many diseases may not become apparent for years after an incident occurred 
or where injured or ill workers require compensation for the rest of their lives. The 
Victorian Government noted: 
The long-tail claims structure [of workers’ compensation insurance] means that 
capacity to meet claims liabilities must be maintained for decades. This claims structure 
involves risks that private insurers are reluctant to accept. In addition, this claims 
structure also means that claimants are, potentially, exposed to a high risk of insurer 
insolvency. (sub. 164, p. 25) 
The risk of private insurer failure and underwriting avoidance by private insurers could be 
addressed in a competitive scheme by way of appropriate prudential regulation backed up 
by a ‘nominal insurer’ arrangement. In this respect, the Tasmanian Government observed 
that when private insurers in its State withdrew reinsurance for acts of terrorism, it 
extended its nominal insurer arrangements to fill this gap (sub. 135, p. 10).  
A final key argument is that public monopoly insurers are better at injury management 
outcomes, including rehabilitation, than private insurers in a competitive scheme. The 
Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association considered that public monopoly insurers 
are better than private insurers at ensuring that the expertise of the rehabilitation provider is 
‘recognised, valued and appropriately remunerated’ and that this in turn leads to lower     
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claims costs and continuance rates (sub. 160, p. 35). OT Australia, Victoria noted that, in 
Victoria, where claims are managed by different insurers: 
To the detriment of rehabilitation, varying approaches are less likely to be shared 
between agents competing with each other. It can be expected that a lack of sharing 
prohibits the building up of a body of professional knowledge within WorkCover to 
highlight strengths and weaknesses of different approaches and thus their association 
with more effective outcomes. (sub. 16, p. 5) 
The case for competitive private provision 
Proponents argue that competitive private provision brings choice to employers, leads to 
more efficient premiums, encourages greater innovation in service provision and drives 
cost-efficiencies. The Insurance Australia Group said: 
A competitive market ensures that the benefits of risk reduction and efficient scheme 
management flow through the economy as and when they arise. Insurers will 
aggressively market to employers with a good track record and there will be clear 
economic incentives for insurers to develop innovative strategies to support employers’ 
efforts to change workplace culture and reduce risks. (sub. 89, p. 42) 
The Insurance Council of Australia argued that private underwriting is more likely to lead 
to full funding of schemes:  
Licensed insurers are best placed to assess, price and underwrite risk to fully fund 
statutory lines of insurance, free of the political imperatives placed on government 
insurers or schemes to price in a way that does not reflect the real cost of the risk. Risk 
reflective premiums provide a fair economic incentive to minimise risky behaviour, 
which in turn reduces costs for the scheme and ultimately for policy holders. (sub. 74, 
p. 17) 
However, as noted in chapter 10, private insurers can set premiums to reflect non-risk 
factors, with attendant adverse consequences. For example, the desire to acquire market 
share could lead to unsustainable premium discounting which in turn could lead to insurer 
insolvency or inadequate funding to meet claims’ liabilities. WorkCover Queensland 
expressed the concern that there is a ‘continued’ risk that private underwriters would cross-
subsidise across their different lines of business and, indeed, ‘utilise workers compensation 
insurance on a loss leader basis to acquire other more viable business from their customers’ 
(IRsub. 225, p. 8). 
It is also argued by proponents that, with competitive private provision, the financial risks 
are taken by private insurers rather than governments on behalf of their taxpayers. This can 
introduce a measure of financial discipline and accountability. The Insurance Australia 
Group argued: 
Importantly, competitive underwriting … provides real financial discipline and 
accountability to the regulatory framework. If it loses control of costs, the effects on     
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price will create immediate pressure for remedial action. Postponing reform to suit a 
political timetable will destroy the market. (sub. 89, p. 42) 
Although not supportive of competitive private provision, the Labor Council of New South 
Wales acknowledged that: 
… In a privately underwritten system insurers are financially accountable for the 
financial status of the scheme. If premium rates are inadequate then insurers fund any 
shortfall, not employers as in publicly managed schemes. ... insurers bear the risk for 
the financial performance of the scheme whether it is good or bad. 
Different financial accountability changes the financial incentives on insurers to 
manage claims and other aspects of their responsibilities. For example private 
underwriting creates greater incentives on insurers to reduce the cost of claims than in a 
public system. (sub. 147. p. 58) 
However, WorkCover Queensland argued that the performance of private insurers was not 
necessarily superior to that of the public insurers: 
WorkCover does not believe that private insurers necessarily provide a better service 
delivery of workers’ compensation functions compared to that of a well managed 
public insurer. (IRsub. 225, p. 35) 
That said, when a large private insurer collapses, this can have ramifications for 
governments, the industry and the rest of the community. The Australian Council of Trade 
Unions were of the view that it was the taxpayers who would ultimately meet the risk of 
the failure of a privately underwritten scheme: 
… the political reality is that ultimately the public purse will pay the bill for workers’ 
compensation. The spectre of incapacitated workers’ denied benefits would be too 
difficult for any government to contemplate. As a result the taxpayer will ultimately be 
at risk if private underwriters default. (IRsub. 186, p. 74) 
This view was endorsed by the Community and Public Sector Union/ State Public Services 
Federation Group (IRsub. 246, pp. 1–2). 
The Victorian Government maintained that: 
The majority of risk is borne by employers, whether they are located in a public or 
private scheme while the State or Territory remains the insurer of last resort under both 
a public or private underwriting structure. (IRsub. 256, p. 14) 
The Tasmanian Government noted that the collapse of HIH highlighted how ‘privately 
underwritten, multi-insurer schemes do face difficulties in dealing with losses of high 
magnitude’ and outlined how it introduced a levy as a result (sub. 135, p. 10).  
Another argument put forward by the Insurance Council of Australia is that competitive 
private provision of workers’ compensation insurance would enable the industry as a 
whole to become more competitive:     
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Ongoing exclusions of general insurers as underwriters of many workers’ 
compensation schemes have a significant effect on the size of the insurance market in 
Australia, and therefore its capacity to be competitive. If general insurers were able to 
underwrite all lines of statutory insurance in all jurisdictions, the size and strength of 
the insurance market would increase, and significant economies of scale could be 
achieved. (sub. 74, p. 18) 
A final argument is that private underwriting can impose pressure on governments to 
rectify flaws in scheme design. At the public hearings on the Interim Report, the Insurance 
Council of Australia noted: 
… where there is a design defect or a benefit blow-out or a major problem within the 
scheme, the private insurance process actually forces governments to examine the issue 
and hopefully to remedy the issue … . (trans., p. 1281) 
Assessment 
Several participants reflected on the competing merits of public monopoly provision and 
competitive private provision in achieving scheme objectives. The Institute of Actuaries 
Australia noted that: 
There is a long history of reviews and analyses of various approaches to risk 
underwriting and claim servicing for workers’ compensation, both in Australia and 
abroad. None of these has clearly shown any particular model to be the best. (sub. 88, 
p. 22) 
And WorkCover New South Wales observed that: 
Views on whether privately underwritten or publicly managed workers’ compensation 
schemes are better usually come down to philosophical differences as does the criteria 
for assessing performance. North American researchers have for many years attempted 
to determine whether competitive or monopolistic systems are more cost effective.  
One study concluded that “private and competitive systems have been able to maintain 
benefit levels while placing a lighter burden on employers through lower average 
premiums per employee”. 
Another suggested that “cost reductions need not occur — indeed costs may increase 
— by shifting from monopoly provision to a US model of private insurance”. 
The research studies find it difficult to compare the different systems and often draw 
inconsistent conclusions. What is notable is that protagonists on either side of the 
debate seem to select specific aspects from comparative studies that support their 
particular argument. (sub. 151, pp. 15–16) 
The Commission notes that there have also been significant failures under each approach 
(box  11.1). These failures are not necessarily evidence of inherent flaws in public or 
private underwriting. For example, at the public hearings on the Interim Report, the 
Insurance Council considered that the difficulties encountered by the Western Australian     
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scheme were due to defects in scheme design rather than private underwriting per se 
(trans., p. 1281).  
The lack of clear evidence in favour of either public monopoly provision or competitive 
private provision is evident in recent United States research (Thomason, Schmidle and 
Burton 2001). The researchers used cost, benefit, and injury data from 48 states for 1975–
1995 to analyse how the manner of insurance provision affected such aspects as 
employers’ costs and workplace safety. They found that: 
•  employers’ costs in states where the ‘state fund’ is the sole provider of workers’ 
compensation insurance were comparable to those where there was a private market. 
On the other hand, employers’ costs in states where the state fund competes with 
private insurers were substantially greater than in those where there were no state 
funds; 
•  the behaviour of the regulatory agency and the stage of the insurance cycle affected 
differences in employers’ costs among the states; and 
•  there was little evidence that workplace health and safety (measured by lost-time injury 
rate) was affected by the manner of insurance provision. 
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Box 11.1  There have been problems on both sides 
Competitive private provision — Western Australia 
The Western Australia scheme was amended in 1993 to deal with the high cost of 
common law claims. Private insurers, optimistic about the projected impact of the 
amendments and seeking greater market share began to significantly discount 
premium rates below the recommended rates. This resulted in average discounts of 
around 30  per cent. Although the Statutory Premium Rates Committee increased 
recommended premium rates as soon as adverse claims trends became apparent, the 
insurance industry continued the unsustainable level of discounting. This resulted in 
significant underwriting losses for many insurers over the period 1996–99. 
Central fund management — New South Wales 
WorkCover New South Wales does not have statutory responsibility for underwriting 
workers’ compensation insurance. Until recently, private insurers were required to 
establish statutory funds, the assets of which were limited to workers’ compensation 
business. New legislation (the Workers Compensation Amendment (Insurance Reform) 
Act 2003) was introduced recently which provides for the establishment of a Workers 
Compensation Insurance Fund to replace the current managed funds of private 
insurers. The fund will be subject to a statutory trust. The State Government will have 
no responsibility for liabilities and no entitlement to assets or surplus. The fund will be 
audited by the Auditor-General but will not form part of the Total State Sector 
Accounts. The legislation also establishes nominal insurance arrangements with 
WorkCover New South Wales to act as nominal insurer.  
WorkCover New South Wales recommends premiums which are subject to ministerial 
approval, licenses private insurers or administrators to manage claims and scheme 
funds, and establishes investment criteria (for example, in relation to asset allocation 
and security selection) for the management of scheme funds.  
The scheme experienced an accumulated deficit for the best part of ten years. At 
December 2002, the accumulated deficit was $3.2 billion which was reduced 
marginally to $2.9 billion as at 30 June 2003 (Hepworth 2003). Between 1992-93 and 
2001-02, there were significant increases in real terms in claims costs (‘net claims 
incurred’) as well as outstanding claims liabilities. Reforms enacted in 2001 have led to 
an estimated $1.5 billion reduction in scheme liabilities, due almost entirely to savings 
in legal and other dispute-related costs. Since 1996-97, it has been Government policy 
to cap increases in average premium rates to a level of 2.8 per cent (excluding GST). 
For 2003-04, a broader definition of wages was introduced and, to compensate, the 
average premium rate was reduced to 2.57 per cent (excluding GST). 
Sources: WorkCover New South Wales; WorkCover Western Australia. 
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Each scheme is a complex set of interacting elements, reflecting the outcome of a history 
of negotiations between various stakeholders. Factors which will have a significant 
influence on cost-effectiveness are those elements and their interactions. WorkCover New 
South Wales said: 
A range of factors affecting the system dynamics have been identified as important to 
effective performance, including reinforcement of the relationship between prevention, 
compensation, return to work and claims administration. (sub. 151, p. 16) 
Although the structure of the scheme is important, the quality and culture of management 
is another factor that has a major influence on cost-effectiveness.  
The literature does not provide a powerful case for either public monopoly or competitive 
private provision of workers’ compensation insurance. However, the Commission 
considers that, on balance, private provision is preferred on grounds that: private capital is 
directly at risk; competition in the marketplace is likely to generate incentives for 
efficiency and innovation; and there is greater transparency of any governmental influence 
over premiums. Further, the risk of private insurer failure can be reduced by prudential 
regulation. However, even in competitive schemes, the Commission notes that pressure can 
be applied to governments as funders of last resort in the case of significant market failure.  
11.2  Private insurers as agents 
Where there is public monopoly provision (or control by a public agency) of workers’ 
compensation insurance, claims management and other non-underwriting functions can be 
contracted out to private insurers, or other appropriate service providers, on a competitive 
basis. As noted, this already occurs to a limited extent in schemes in New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia. Self-insurers also may be permitted under some schemes (but 
not in Queensland) to outsource claims management. 
Recent reviews of the South Australian and New South Wales schemes recommended 
changes to the role of agents and outsourcing. McKinsey & Company (2003, pp. 11–16) 
proposed a number of significant changes to the role of agents and outsourcing in the New 
South Wales scheme, including the creation of specialist agents to deal with specific 
classes of claims (claims less than three years old, claims older than three years, and 
catastrophic claims), the outsourcing of assets management, the replacement of open-ended 
licences for insurers with contracts, and the introduction of tendering for work. On the 
other hand, Stanley et al. (2002, vol. 2, p. 81) expressed a number of concerns about the 
performance of claims management agents in the South Australian scheme and 
recommended that outsourced claims management revert to the public monopoly insurer. 
Competitive outsourcing can, in principle, capture some of the benefits that would arise 
from the full competitive provision (and underwriting) of workers’ compensation     
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insurance. These benefits include greater choice for employers and cost-efficiencies in 
service provision.  
Outsourcing can also enable some private insurers to achieve economies of scale in 
specific functions such as claims management across different classes of insurance. 
However, outsourcing can give rise to a principal-agent problem. As the contract is 
between the public monopoly insurer (the principal) and its agent, there may be insufficient 
incentive for the agent to deliver services satisfactorily to those outside the contract — 
namely, employers and workers. Australia Meat Holdings observed:  
As agents of WorkCover in many states, the private insurers’ primary customer is 
WorkCover and not the policyholder paying the premiums – the employer. Therefore 
there is a lack of incentive for these insurers to perform. (sub. 96, pp. 23–4) 
Another problem with outsourcing is that, as their risk capital is not at stake, it can lead to 
lack of ‘ownership’ by insurer agents and, thus, reduce their incentive to achieve efficient 
service provision. The Insurance Australia Group said that: 
The means of management of the schemes often leads to lack of “ownership”. For 
instance, outsourcing of claims management creates difficulties in creating the 
motivation for achieving efficient claim settlement outcomes. (sub. 146, appendix D, 
‘Prudential Supervision of Government Monopoly Schemes’, p. 2)  
Participants gave examples of problems with contractual arrangements in specific schemes. 
The South Australian Rehabilitation Providers’ Association noted the difficulties in 
ensuring good rehabilitation outcomes under South Australian contracts and said: 
… there are no measures of Agents that lead to bonuses based on restoration and 
recovery indicators other than reduction in claims liability. Despite their need to 
conform to the legislation, Agents must be under commercial pressures to refer to 
rehabilitation services that deliver their bonuses, rather than those that may assist 
injured workers, their employers or even the scheme. (sub. 67, p. 8) 
Injuries Australia said of insurers under contract to WorkCover New South Wales that: 
… attempting to rehabilitate work injured employees to return to work was not a 
priority. It was to [the insurers’] advantage to not practice early return to work and they 
were paid in full even when they failed. This is a clear case of conflict of interest and 
should not have been allowed to be practiced. (sub. 125, p. 3)  
Accordingly, careful attention is required to the appropriate design of contracts including 
the identification of measurable performance indicators, and the appropriate linking of 
these indicators to incentive structures such as financial remuneration or penalties. QBE 
Insurance considered that: 
Service delivery arrangements should be enduring over time and provide for continuous 
improvement. Service delivery needs to include standards of service (both outcomes     
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and process) against which current practice can be measured (benchmarked) and 
improvements identified. (sub. 99, p. 59) 
WorkCover New South Wales were of the view that: 
In publicly underwritten schemes outsourcing to service providers through the use of 
contracts should be accompanied by appropriate remuneration measures linked directly 
to scheme outcomes. This will allow transparency of outcomes so employers can more 
easily judge the relative performance of providers. (IRsub. 255, p. 5). 
The Institute of Actuaries Australia said: 
An effective control and incentive system for claim managers is both vital and elusive. 
Controls are essential to ensure that insurers strike a proper balance between the needs 
of claimants and the need to control costs. Unless there are incentives that align insurer 
and scheme motivation, those controls are unlikely to be fully effective. (sub. 88, p. 23) 
Performance monitoring could be enhanced by surveys of employers and workers as to the 
level of their satisfaction with agents. Employers and workers should also be able to 
express concerns about agents to an appropriate independent body.  
One participant argued that, while private insurers should be able to participate in all 
schemes where possible, there was no reason why outsourcing of functions, such as claims 
management, should be restricted to them. Australian Business Limited considered that:  
… scheme performance is likely to be enhanced by the introduction of new skills and 
approaches to injury management. Services to both employers and injured workers 
would be improved by increased and varied competition. (sub. 106, p. 17) 
Other participants questioned the quality of claims management provided by agents. 
WorkCover Queensland noted: 
There is a perception that private external claims managers deliver a better service than 
a publicly funded insurer. WorkCover Queensland sees this as incongruous with the 
profit-driven requirement of a private company compared to the cost recovery basis of 
a public entity. The results of the National Return to Work Survey … prove that 
WorkCover Queensland is on par or better than those states that outsource claims 
management and underwriting. 
WorkerCover Queensland believes that its service provision on claims management to 
injured workers is unsurpassed and accordingly has no intention of outsourcing this 
fundamental and successful component of its business. (IRsub. 205, p. 6) 
The Commission considers that competitive outsourcing to appropriately skilled and 
resourced service providers has merit, provided that contracts are carefully designed and 
monitored and that incentives are properly aligned.      
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11.3 Industry-specific  schemes 
The shipping and New South Wales coal industries are each covered by specific workers’ 
compensation schemes.  
The Australian Government’s Seacare scheme, administered by the Seacare Authority, 
covers seafarers employed on prescribed ships engaged in intra-territorial, interstate or 
overseas trade or commerce. The scheme was first put in place at the beginning of the last 
century. The scheme is currently modelled on the Australian Government’s Comcare 
scheme. However, a significant difference between the two schemes relates to insurance 
provision. The Seacare scheme has competitive private provision, whereas the Comcare 
scheme involves a monopoly public insurer. 
The New South Wales coal industry scheme, formerly operated by the Joint Coal Board, is 
administered by Coal Services which is an incorporated body owned jointly by the New 
South Wales Minerals Council and the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
(CFMEU). Workers’ compensation insurance is provided by a private monopoly insurer, 
Coal Mines Insurance, which is a subsidiary of Coal Services. The scheme was first put in 
place in the late 1940s under joint Commonwealth-New South Wales legislation. It now 
has quite different provisions to that applying under the mainstream New South Wales 
scheme, particularly in respect of statutory benefits and access to common law settlements. 
The current arrangements have been in place since 1 January 2002. A review of the 
scheme, scheduled for completion at the end of March 2004, is addressing whether the 
monopoly should continue (Coal Services, IRsub. 232, p. 3).  
The Commission received a number of submissions from participants on the New South 
Wales coal industry scheme. Industry participants were critical of the industry-specificity 
of the scheme (and how it substantially differed from the mainstream New South Wales 
scheme) and the performance of the private monopoly insurer.  
BHP Billiton considered that the New South Wales coal mining industry was financially 
penalised by having an industry-specific scheme with a monopoly insurer and no provision 
for self-insurance. In particular, it observed substantial differences in premiums in 
Queensland and New South Wales as well as a recent tripling in premiums in New South 
Wales despite improved safety performance: 
No Australian ... industry, other than NSW coal industry, has industry specific workers 
compensation legislation and its own mandatory insurer to administer claims. BHP 
Billiton finds the cost of workers compensation in New South Wales unsustainable and 
submits that all workers in New South Wales, irrespective of the industry they work 
should be covered by the same piece of Workers Compensation legislation. (sub. 110, 
p. 6)     
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Centennial Coal Company expressed the view that the current arrangements are becoming 
‘cost prohibitive’ and that ‘irrespective of what industry people work in they should be 
covered by the same workers compensation legislation’ (sub. 145, p. 8).  
Xstrata Coal Australia was concerned that reforms to ‘engender positive behaviour’ of 
workers in respect of return to work and rehabilitation under the mainstream New South 
Wales scheme have not been applied to the industry scheme (sub. 32, p. 2).  
The New South Wales Minerals Council was of the view that: 
The implications of this unnecessary industry based workers compensation scheme, 
coupled with the industry’s monopoly arrangements, is that the industry cannot 
continue to afford this scheme. The coal industry scheme is increasingly out of kilter 
with: 
•  The workers compensation scheme in NSW; 
•  Workers compensation schemes in Australia; 
•  Community standards for NSW citizens seeking damages under tort law (eg motor 
accidents; public liability; medical negligence; professional negligence); and 
•  International workers compensation schemes (with comparable economies). (sub. 172, 
p. 12) 
The Minerals Council of Australia put forward similar views at the public hearings on the 
Interim Report (trans., pp. 1363–66).  
The CFMEU (Mining and Energy Division) supported the retention of Coal Mines 
Insurance as the single industry insurer (sub. 153, p. 2). It noted that the administration of 
the company had recently been handed from the New South Wales Government to the 
industry with full agreement of all stakeholders. It further noted that the reasons for the 
substantial premium increases included: the need to improve the prudential margin within a 
short time frame of three years; to cover the cost of claims lodged following major 
retrenchment in the industry in the last five years; and the inadequacy of company-based 
opportunities for return to work, alternative employment and rehabilitation management. 
In response to these various comments, Coal Services (IRsub. 232) submitted that: 
•  premium setting under the scheme is experientially based with the cost of premiums 
correlated to the cost of claims for each policy holder; 
•  the current scheme rate is 9.8  per cent compared with the New South Wales 
WorkCover rate for underground mining of 9.9 per cent; and 
•  scheme solvency has improved by about $70 million. 
The Commission notes that the New South Wales coal industry and the Australian 
Government’s Seacare schemes, like more broadly applicable workers’ compensation 
schemes, are the product of a long history of development and stakeholder negotiations. 
However, it sees little justification for workers in one industry to be subject to substantially 
different scheme requirements compared with other workers in that State.      
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11.4  Regulation of private insurers 
Private insurers who are licensed to operate in workers’ compensation schemes, whether as 
underwriters or agents, are required to comply with a range of Australian Government, 
State and Territory regulatory requirements. Among the Australian Government 
requirements are those contained in the Insurance Act 1973 and the Corporations Act 
2001. Under workers’ compensation schemes, private insurers must also comply with 
requirements pertaining to, for example:  
•  prudential and financial matters; 
•  premium setting or supervision of prices;  
•  compensation and benefits; 
•  those providing services for a scheme, such as the medical, health and legal 
professions; 
•  claims handling;  
•  dispute resolution; and 
•  dealings with non-insured parties (Insurance Council of Australia, sub. 74, p. 7). 
The compliance burden in meeting these varying regulatory requirements was a major 
concern for private insurers. The Insurance Council of Australia noted: 
… The absolute cost of compliance as well as the potential for wasted resources due to 
regulatory overlap is a significant concern for the industry in the field of statutory 
insurance. As such, regulatory duplication and associated costs should be eliminated 
where possible. (sub. 74, p. 10) 
It also noted that where governments provide specific types of insurance, this causes 
‘fragmentation in the Australian insurance market and adds to the complexity of the market 
to those who do business in it’ (sub. 74, p. 13). 
The Insurance Australia Group provided the Commission with estimates of the added 
compliance costs to it of meeting different scheme requirements (sub. 89, p. 10). These are 
presented in chapter 2.  
Of particular concern to private insurers and considered next are prudential regulation and, 
to a lesser extent, nominal insurer arrangements under the schemes.  
Prudential regulation 
Prudential regulation seeks to reduce the likelihood that private insurers will become 
insolvent and be unable to meet contractual commitments to those with whom they deal — 
that is, to pay claims as they arise — especially over the long term.      
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Private insurers are regulated for prudential purposes under the Australian Government’s 
Insurance Act, which is administered by APRA (box 11.2). They are also subject to limited 
prudential requirements as part of their licence to underwrite in workers’ compensation 
schemes (an example of requirements under the Western Australian scheme is given in 
box 11.3). The regulators of the schemes generally rely on APRA’s prudential supervision 
of the private insurers with which they are concerned.  
 
Box 11.2  Prudential requirements under the Insurance Act 
The Australian Government amended the Insurance Act in 2001 to reform the 
prudential regulation of the general insurance industry. The reforms created a three-
tiered regime involving the Act (high order principles), prudential standards determined 
by APRA (key regulatory requirements) and guidance notes (the practical application of 
the standards).  
APRA issued prudential standards that came into effect from 1 July 2002 which, 
among others, govern: capital adequacy; liability valuation; risk management; and 
reinsurance.  
Capital adequacy 
•  An insurer may choose one of two methods for determining its minimum capital 
requirement — internal model-based method or prescribed method. Insurers with 
sufficient resources are encouraged to develop an internal model based method 
which is then subject to approval by APRA and the Treasurer. 
(Continued next page) 
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Box 11.2  (continued) 
•  An insurer’s minimum capital requirement is determined having regard to a range of 
risk factors. Under the prescribed method, these are insurance risk (the risk that the 
true value of net insurance liabilities could be greater than the value determined 
under the standard governing liability valuation), investment risk (the risk of an 
adverse movement in the valuation of an insurer’s assets and/or off-balance sheet 
exposures) and concentration risk (the risk associated with an accumulation of 
exposures to a single catastrophic event).  
•  An insurer must at all times have ‘eligible capital’ in excess of its minimum capital 
requirement. 
Liability valuation 
•  The insurer must obtain written advice from an approved actuary on the valuation of 
its insurance liabilities. 
•  Insurance liabilities include both the insurer’s outstanding claims liabilities (all claims 
incurred prior to the calculation date) and its premium liabilities (future claim 
payments arising from future events insured under existing policies). 
•  The valuation of insurance liabilities must include a risk margin to give a 75 per cent 
probability of sufficiency. 
•  Insurance liabilities must be discounted at the risk-free rate of return.  
Risk management 
•  Persons occupying key positions within the insurer must have the degree of probity 
and competence commensurate with their responsibilities. 
•  Each insurer must obtain APRA’s approval for its appointment of an auditor 
(approved auditor) and, if required, an actuary (approved actuary). 
•  The minimum composition of the board is prescribed. 
Reinsurance 
•  The insurer must have a reinsurance management strategy, appropriate for its 
operations, to ensure that it has sufficient capacity to meet obligations as they fall 
due. The strategy must be approved by APRA. 
In November 2003, APRA issued a discussion paper which outlined proposals for 
another round of general insurance reforms. The proposals are to: revise the existing 
prudential standards and guidance notes in light of experience and market 
developments since their introduction; and increase disclosure about the activities of 
general insurers to promote market discipline.  
In addition, APRA intends in 2004 to release a separate consultation paper and draft 
prudential standard on ‘fit and proper’ requirements in the general insurance, life 
insurance and the authorised deposit-taking sectors.  
Sources: APRA (2002a, b, c, d; 2003a, b, c). 
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In contrast to private insurers, public insurers are not subject to Australian Government 
prudential requirements under the Insurance Act. However, they are subject to financial 
oversight, such as by government auditors. In Victoria, for example, the Victorian 
WorkCover Authority (like other Victorian public agencies) is subject to oversight by the 
Auditor-General and through the engagement of independent actuarial services (Victorian 
Government, sub. 164, p. 27).  
The concerns of participants about prudential regulation were chiefly focused on: 
•  overlap between the Insurance Act and the schemes; and 
•  the non-application of prudential requirements to public insurers. 
 
Box 11.3  Prudential requirements under the Western Australian scheme 
The Western Australian Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981 provides 
that approved insurers must have ‘material and financial resources’ available ‘sufficient’ 
to enable them to discharge their legislative obligations (section  161(3)(a)). In 
guidelines prepared by WorkCover Western Australia, there are, among others, 
provisions applying to solvency and credit rating.  
Solvency 
Approved insurers are required to: 
•  comply with the minimum solvency margins stipulated for authorised general 
insurers as prescribed by APRA; and 
•  provide specific information annually such as an actuarial assessment of non-
current outstanding claims reserves and an independent auditor’s certification 
attesting that the approved insurer’s assets have been properly assessed at ‘net 
market value’ according to an Approved Accounting Standard (Accounting 
Standards Review Board 1023). 
Credit ratings 
Approved insurers must maintain a satisfactory credit rating (where applicable) as 
determined using the credit ratings agency Standard and Poors. Approved insurers 
that do not have a credit rating are required to comply with APRA requirements.  
Source: WorkCover Western Australia (2003b).   
 
Overlap with the Insurance Act 
Participants from the insurance industry were critical of the overlap between the Insurance 
Act and workers’ compensation (and other statutory insurance) schemes. They considered 
that prudential regulation should be administered by APRA alone. The Insurance Council 
of Australia accepted:     
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… that State and Territory regulators may rely on an approval regime for general 
insurers and other underwriting entities to underwrite workers’ compensation insurance 
in a particular jurisdiction to ensure that objects of the scheme and minimum standards 
are met. 
However, general insurers and other underwriting entities should only be required to 
gain authorisation from APRA in order to underwrite insurance, including workers’ 
compensation. This logically flows from the above proposal that APRA should be the 
only regulator for the prudential regulation of general insurers and other underwriting 
entities in their capacity as underwriters of insurance, including workers’ compensation 
insurance. (sub. 74, p. 15) 
They supported the recommendation of the HIH Royal Commission that the States and 
Territories not undertake any prudential regulation of general insurance and that APRA be 
the ‘sole prudential regulator’ (2003, vol.  1, ch.  11, rec.  49, p.  264). The HIH Royal 
Commission also recommended that, if such regulation is to continue, the States and 
Territories should ensure that it is consistent with requirements of the Insurance Act and 
that relevant information be exchanged between the States and Territories and APRA 
(rec.  49 and rec.  50). The Commission notes that the Government has referred the 
recommendations to the States and Territories for their consideration (Costello 2003).  
Governments have a legitimate role in licensing private insurers to provide underwriting 
and other functions under their schemes. Licensing arrangements seek to ensure that 
private insurers are able to meet scheme objectives and provide a minimum quality of 
service. They additionally require that prudential standards are met. 
The interest of governments in the financial viability of private insurers arises both from 
ensuring that workers’ compensation will be funded and because of nominal insurer 
arrangements under the schemes. If the nominal insurer arrangements were unfunded, then 
that may constitute a potential argument for extra prudential requirements. However, as 
seen later, nominal insurance arrangements are typically funded by contributions from 
private insurers through the imposition of levies. The Commission notes that the Australian 
Government’s Seacare scheme does not impose additional prudential requirements on 
insurers authorised under the Insurance Act, despite having nominal insurance 
arrangements in place.  
There is a concern that the requirements, which are imposed for workers’ compensation 
insurance alone, can affect the entire business of the private insurer as well as undermine 
the ability of APRA to regulate for the private insurer as a whole. The HIH Royal 
Commission said: 
The imposition of additional prudential requirements by a state or territory for the 
protection of policyholders in a particularly statutory class may undermine APRA’s 
ability to regulate for the benefit of policyholders of a general insurer as a whole. … the 
actions of a state or territory regulator can impact on the entire business of the insurer,     
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even though the interest of that regulator is on a single line of business. (2003, vol. 1, 
ch. 11, p. 264) 
The Insurance Council of Australia illustrated how the duplication of prudential 
requirements affected two specialised insurers in New South Wales which were permitted 
to underwrite insurance outside of the State scheme: 
Under the scheme in NSW, CCI [Catholic Church Insurances] and Guild [Guild 
Insurance and Financial Services] are required to lodge a deposit with, or provide a 
bank guarantee to WorkCover which, when calculated in accordance with 
WorkCover’s Licensing Policy, can exceed $50 million. This means that both insurers 
must apply a considerable amount of their reserves against WorkCover’s security 
requirements, which security is held by WorkCover in a limited range of government 
bodies. The effect of this is that investment portfolios may become heavily skewed and 
the insurers’ investment management performance and risk profile can be undermined.  
Further, under APRA’s capital adequacy requirements so much of the amount held on 
security by WorkCover as exceeds APRA’s capital adequacy calculation is excluded 
from APRA’s solvency calculations. This has a potentially adverse effect on CCI and 
Guild’s solvency for APRA’s purposes. (sub. 174, p. 3) 
The Insurance Council of Australia also questioned the capacity of the States and 
Territories to prudentially regulate and supervise private insurers: 
… state authorities that are only concerned with one line of insurance do not have the 
technical capacity or proper access to necessary information to undertake prudential 
regulation. This type of regulation requires significant resources and technical expertise 
which should rightly reside with APRA as the regulator of general insurers and the 
industry overall. (sub. 74, p. 15) 
The Commission considers that it would be sufficient for government regulators to rely on 
APRA’s authorisation of private insurers under the Insurance Act as evidence that 
prudential concerns are satisfied. It notes that this already occurs in respect of the 
Australian Government’s Seacare scheme.  
Public insurers 
Several participants, for example, the Insurance Australia Group and the Insurance Council 
of Australia, submitted that public insurers be subject to prudential regulation under the 
Insurance Act or equivalent. They argued that such regulation would add financial 
discipline to public insurers, particularly monopoly providers, help to ensure full funding 
of schemes, promote greater transparency and consistency in the public insurers’ 
accounting statements, and enable comparisons to be made with private insurers’ 
performance.      
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The Institute of Actuaries Australia was of the view that APRA’s prudential standard 
governing liability valuation would be most relevant to public insurers and that the other 
standards would need to be applied where appropriate:  
... premium and claim liabilities should be determined by an Approved Valuation 
Actuary in accordance with the principles set out in [General Prudential Standard] 210 
[governing liability valuation], for all providers of workers’ compensation insurance. 
Since a public sector insurer is supported by the taxing power of the State, it may be 
appropriate to adopt a lower standard of adequacy than for private sector insurers.  
For the same reason, the minimum capital requirements set out in [General Prudential 
Standard] 110 are not applicable. It is possible for a public sector insurer to operate for 
some time with a funding ratio of less than 100%, but there should always be a rigorous 
and transparent actuarial calculation of scheme costs, so that the true economic cost is, 
in the long run, fully funded.  
The other prudential standards are less directly applicable than [General Prudential 
Standard] 210, but the issues that they address need to be considered in the public 
sector context. (sub. 88, pp. 25–6)  
The Insurance Australia Group acknowledged that it would not be feasible in the short 
term to impose APRA standards directly on public monopoly insurers because of the 
‘magnitude of their under-capitalisation’. Nonetheless: 
As an alternative to direct capital injections, it is open to governments to require their 
insurance authorities to be subject to APRA assessment of their minimum capital 
requirement and then provide an explicit guarantee to cover the capital shortfall. 
(sub. 146, p. 4) 
Participants from the insurance industry supported the recommendation of the HIH Royal 
Commission that the States and Territories apply relevant prudential requirements to public 
insurers and statutory fund schemes (2003, rec. 52, p. 268). The HIH Royal Commission 
considered that requirements could apply to the valuation of liabilities and risk and 
reinsurance management processes. It noted that capital adequacy requirements could also 
be imposed, although these would need to acknowledge the implicit capital backing of the 
relevant State or Territory government. The Commission notes that the Government has 
referred this recommendation to the States and Territories for their consideration (Costello 
2003). 
On the other hand, the Victorian Government was of the view that prudential regulation is 
an essential feature of private insurance markets and is inappropriate for public insurers 
(sub. 164, p. 27). 
There are constitutional limits on the ability of the Australian Government to extend the 
Insurance Act to State and Territory public insurers. Section 51 (xiv) of the Constitution 
enables the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to ‘insurance, other than State 
insurance; also State insurance extending beyond the limits of the State concerned’.     
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According to advice provided by the Australian Government Solicitor, ‘State insurance’ is 
insurance carried out by a State or Territory as insurer. Thus, the Australian Government 
would not be able to extend the Insurance Act to State and Territory public insurers, but 
could to its own insurers such as Comcare. (Currently, Comcare is not required to apply 
the Insurance Act.)  
While recognising there are constitutional limitations, the Commission considers that there 
are sound public policy grounds for public insurers applying the principles inherent in 
APRA’s standard governing liability valuation (box  11.2). This would make their 
operations more transparent and enhance their competitive neutrality vis-a-vis private 
insurers.  
Nominal insurer and policyholder arrangements 
A number of competitive schemes have established nominal insurer, or nominal defendant, 
arrangements.2 The nominal insurer meets the liability involved when the employer is not 
insured or cannot be located or in cases where a private insurer is unable — because of 
insolvency, for example — to meet the costs of a claim. Private insurers (and self-insurers) 
may be required to contribute to a fund into which claims against the nominal insurer are 
made. Box 11.4 provides an example of a nominal insurer arrangement.  
Following the collapse of HIH Insurance in 2001, some workers’ compensation schemes 
(Western Australia and Tasmania) introduced policyholder-funded arrangements whereby 
additional levies were imposed on employers and self-insurers. The Tasmanian 
Government noted: 
To fund the liability arising from the HIH collapse, the Government was forced to 
introduce a levy (special contribution). Without this levy, insurers and self-insurers 
would have been subjected to an unsustainable cost burden in contributing to funding 
the HIH liability which could lead to the withdrawal of some insurers from the market 
and dramatic increases in premiums. The levy is currently set at 4% of premium 
(notional premium for self-insurers) and is subject to annual review. It is expected that 
the levy will be required for approximately nine or ten years to cover the HIH liability. 
(sub. 135, p. 10) 
                                                 
2 Nominal insurance arrangements do not typically apply to publicly underwritten schemes. 
However, the New South Wales Government introduced legislation (the Workers Compensation 
Amendment (Insurance Reform) Act 2003) in November 2003 which establishes such 
arrangements, with WorkCover New South Wales to act as the nominal insurer.      
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Box 11.4  The nominal insurer arrangement in the Tasmanian scheme  
The Tasmanian scheme provides that where an employer is not insured, is bankrupt, 
has left the State or where the employer or private insurer is being wound-up, then the 
employee’s claims are made against the nominal insurer. (Similar provisions apply to 
self-insurers.)  
The nominal insurer is a body corporate established under the Act. It consists of four 
members appointed by the Minister following consultation with licensed insurers and 
self-insurers, a member nominated by the Minister (without consultation), and a 
member nominated by the Treasurer.  
The nominal insurer fund meets claims made in the circumstances listed above as well 
as the nominal insurer’s expenses. Insurers and self-insurers make contributions to the 
fund. Where claims are paid out of the fund, the nominal insurer will then attempt to 
recover the amount paid from the employers or insurers involved.  
Sources: CCH (2003b); WorkCover Tasmania (2003b). 
 
 
Participants, such as the Insurance Council of Australia and the Insurance Australia Group, 
supported the HIH Royal Commission’s recommendation that the Australian Government 
introduce a national scheme to support insurance policyholders in the event of the failure 
of any insurer (2003, vol. 1, ch. 11, rec. 61, p. 301).  
Essential elements of the HIH Royal Commission’s proposal are that: 
•  the scheme would extend to all policies issued by general insurers authorised under the 
Insurance Act including (with agreement of State and Territory governments) policies 
issued by licensed insurers under workers’ compensation and other statutory insurance 
schemes; 
•  the scheme would take over the nominal insurer role of the State and Territory 
governments in this respect; 
•  the scheme would be limited to individuals and small businesses who hold policies or 
who have claims against holders of policies issued by licensed general insurers; 
•  the level of support would be limited to counteract the problem of moral hazard. For 
example, support could be unlimited in respect of salary-continuance policies, and 
personal injury claims or payments could be limited to 90 per cent of the cost of an 
eligible claim; 
•  funding would be provided through a post-event levy on all licensed insurers and be 
based on their premium income; and 
•  all providers of insurance and insurance-like products would be required to disclose to 
potential policyholders the extent of the support provided by the scheme (2003, 
pp. 301–2).     
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A desirable feature of the HIH Royal Commission proposal is that it involves a post-event 
levy. This obviates the need to estimate the anticipated cost of an insurer insolvency that 
has yet to occur and is of unknown probability, to tie up capital for an indeterminate period 
as well as to put in place administrative arrangements to manage the capital. An additional 
benefit is that it reduces the likelihood of moral hazard among insurers. Moral hazard 
arises where insurers adjust their commercial decisions in response to the existence of the 
fund and, in particular, take on financial risks that they would not otherwise have borne. 
However, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry noted that a policyholders 
support scheme would: 
... introduce an extra levy on employers over and above any premiums payable and 
over and above any financial arrangements for self-insurers. This is a potential cash 
flow issue for employers. (IRsub. 196, p. 24) 
The Commission notes that the Government has responded to the recommendation of the 
HIH Royal Commission by commissioning a technical study of financial system 
guarantees (Costello 2003 and the Treasury 2003). The study is to consider the merits of 
introducing an explicit guarantee of part or parts of the Australian financial system (not 
just for general insurers), and the merits of possible coverage and design options. The 
Commission understands that a discussion paper is intended to be released in March 2004.  
Should the HIH Royal Commission’s proposed policyholders support scheme be 
implemented by the Australian Government, the Commission considers there would be 
little need for the various State and Territory schemes to continue nominal insurer 
arrangements to cater for the consequences of insurer insolvency. However, the proposed 
policyholders support scheme would not obviate the need for individual schemes to have 
nominal insurer arrangements where (say) an employer has not taken out a policy of 
workers’ compensation insurance. 
11.5  National framework issues 
In considering the desirability of developing a national framework for workers’ 
compensation which addresses private sector involvement in the schemes, it is useful to 
distinguish between the: 
•  industry structure that should govern the provision of workers’ compensation 
insurance; and 
•  specific requirements within licensing arrangements that should apply to private 
insurers.      
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In relation to industry structure, there were calls by participants from the insurance 
industry for a ‘genuine national market’ involving full private sector participation in all 
statutory schemes. The Insurance Council of Australia said: 
The creation of a genuine national market for lines of statutory insurance including 
workers’ compensation has the potential to enhance the stability of the industry as a 
result of economies of scale and incentives for innovation by insurers through: 
•  increased market size 
•  increased knowledge and expertise in the line of insurance 
•  better quality and consistent data collection and 
•  greater incentives for insurers to fund national research and development initiatives. 
(sub. 74, p. 10) 
The Insurance Australia Group noted that the benefits from across-the-board private sector 
growth in underwriting workers’ compensation insurance would include an increase in 
domestic capacity to service the broader liability insurance market, a ‘significant 
proportion’ of which is currently either insured overseas or serviced through the use of 
discretionary trusts, as well as ‘less tangible’ but ‘significant spinoffs’ such as ‘greater 
depth of expertise in commercial underwriting and claims management’ (sub. 89, p. 40). It 
estimated that: 
In the event that the capital base of the industry grew as a result of a national move to 
private underwriting in workers’ compensation, there is potential for Australian 
capacity in the public liability and professional indemnity insurance market to grow by 
50 per cent. This is the equivalent of an increase in capital supporting these lines by 
around $1 billion to $2 billion on a stand alone basis. (sub. 89, p. 40) 
However, as some participants observed, seeking national consistency in industry structure 
for workers’ compensation insurance across schemes may not be feasible. The Institute of 
Actuaries Australia said:  
While there are substantial advantages in a high degree of consistency throughout 
Australia, these are greatest in relation to the benefit structure, definitions and claim 
management practices. While a single national scheme, whether public or private sector 
based, does offer advantages, these may not be sufficient to over-ride the desire of each 
state, as determined by its representative government, to choose the underwriting 
system which it believes best balances the competing needs and demands of its 
stakeholders. (sub. 88, p. 22)  
The view of the Institute of Actuaries Australia is consistent with the Commission’s 
assessment that there are benefits and costs applying to both public monopoly and 
competitive private provision of workers’ compensation insurance.  
In relation to certain of the licensing requirements that apply to private insurers under the 
schemes, however, national consistency seems desirable and possible. Notably, the HIH 
Royal Commission recommended that the States and Territories ‘implement a process     
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designed to reduce inconsistencies in their statutory schemes’ (2003, vol.  1, rec.  51, 
p.  266). The Commission notes that the Government has referred the HIH Royal 
Commission’s recommendation to the States and Territories (Costello 2003). Participants 
from the insurance industry identified prudential regulation as one area within licensing 
requirements where national consistency would be particularly beneficial (for example, the 
Insurance Council of Australia, sub. 74, p. 10).  
The HIH Royal Commission also recommended that the Australian Government identify 
or establish a ministerial council (or other similar body) to provide a forum for discussion 
and resolution by governments of matters relevant to general insurance and possibly other 
financial services. It should consider measures to: 
•  avoid duplication in the prudential regulation of general insurers 
•  remove regulatory inconsistencies 
•  achieve a consistent approach to the prudent management of state and territory 
monopolies. 
It could also play a part in: 
•  moves to introduce greater price flexibility in statutory schemes 
•  the introduction of a policy holder support scheme 
•  the removal of anomalies in the taxation arrangements applicable to general insurers. 
(2003, vol. 1, rec. 54, p. 270) 
The Commission notes that the Australian Government has accepted the recommendation 
and that since March 2002, has convened a meeting between the Australian Government, 
State and Territory ministers with portfolio responsibility for insurance to discuss issues 
generally (Costello 2003). The forum is to continue.  
Participants from the insurance industry considered that policyholder protection should be 
an element of a national framework. For example, the Insurance Australia Group 
considered the HIH Royal Commission recommendation to establish a policyholder 
protection schemes should:  
… be a critical element of any national framework as it will allow the rationalisation of 
existing state-based guarantee schemes for workers’ compensation. Responsibility for 
arrangements for payment of claims in the event of an insurer insolvency must be 
clearly aligned with the Commonwealth’s prudential functions. (sub. 89, p. 8) 
In the Interim Report, the Commission recommended the establishment of a national 
policyholders’ support scheme to deal with insurer insolvency as proposed by the HIH 
Royal Commission. It considers it appropriate for this matter to be considered within a 
wider context by the current study on explicit financial guarantees for the financial sector.     
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Issues as to the degree and regulation of private sector involvement in workers’ 
compensation insurance are relevant to each of the national framework models identified in 
chapter 5.  
Under the Comcare-based model (model  A) and the alternative national self-insurance 
model (model B), private insurers could play a role in providing reinsurance policies and 
claims management services to self-insured employers. At the public hearings on the 
Interim Report, the Insurance Council of Australia considered that greater reliance on 
insurance by self-insurers would address the prudential concerns of the Australian 
Government ‘by transferring the financial risk into the insurance process’ which is then 
fully regulated by APRA’ (trans., pp. 1266–7). 
If an alternative national insurance scheme (model C) were to eventuate, both industry 
structure and licensing requirements could be approached from a fresh perspective. As 
noted earlier, however, industry structure is not in itself the major driver of the cost-
effectiveness of a scheme. Other important features are the management culture, operation 
and elements of the scheme.  
A number of participants, in their responses to the Commission’s Interim Report, were 
opposed to the private provision of workers’ compensation through the establishment of an 
alternative national scheme. WorkCover Queensland said: 
… there could be a number of drawbacks to privatisation of the workers’ compensation 
insurance market. These include: 
•  loss-leader and cost-subsidisation strategies that may be employed by private insurers 
in an effort to gain product, industry or regional market share 
•  price-setting or ‘cartel-like’ operations once market dominance is achieved 
•  profit-taking by commercial insurance companies, adding around 15 % to existing 
prices 
•  multiplier effect, as private insurance companies outsource claims management and 
rehabilitation to other private providers, who also take a 15 % profit margin  
•  additional supervision required to monitor and regulate privatised insurers will result in 
additional costs being passed on to employers. (IRsub. 225, p. 19) 
The Queensland Council of Unions commented that: 
There is no evidence that the private sector can provide a more efficient system with 
greater prudential protections than the public system. (IRsub. 241, p. 6) 
ABL were also not supportive of an alternative national scheme based on private insurance 
providers: 
… in the event such a scheme was to be created we remain to be convinced that a 
privately underwritten model is appropriate … Further, we are not aware of any 
compelling evidence to suggest that the underwriting model is the primary determinant     
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of scheme performance, rather how the scheme is structured and managed seems to 
have more influence on the scheme results. (IRsub. 249, p. 16) 
The Victorian Government maintained that taxpayer and employer capital would be at 
greater risk under a private scheme:  
Victoria’s position is that private underwriting does not provide one of the key benefits 
identified by the PCIR [Productivity Commission Interim Report], as experience 
suggests that where there has been a significant market failure in privately underwritten 
workers’ compensation schemes, there may be significant community pressure on 
governments to act as a financial safety net. (IRsub. 256, p. 15) 
In its response to the Commission’s Interim Report, the Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry expressed strong support for opening up an alternative national scheme to 
private insurers, but considered that: 
... the selection and use of private insurers should be based on their prior performance 
and expertise as appointment of private insurers does not in itself always guarantee the 
implementation of effective claims management process and/or outcomes (IRsub. 196, 
p. 24).  
The Australian Meat Industry Council, in expressing support for such a scheme, said: 
Any national framework for workers’ compensation should be underwritten by private 
insurers. In a privately underwritten scheme it should be sufficient for insurer licensing 
based on APRA requirements. (IRsub. 234, p. 4) 
Should a new national scheme be developed at some point in the future competitive private 
provision has certain benefits. Private insurers would be placing their capital directly at 
risk. Further, private underwriting offers greater scope for competition among insurers, 
with the ensuing benefits in terms of the level of premiums, innovation and administrative 
efficiencies in service delivery. Private underwriting is also likely to bring greater 
transparency to any governmental influence over premiums. To deal with any residual 
risks to the Australian Government, a nominal insurer arrangement could be introduced.  
The Commission envisages that private insurers would be required to obtain a licence to 
supply the market. Among the conditions of that licence would be APRA authorisation in 
respect of prudential concerns under the Insurance Act and compliance with injury 
management provisions set out in the scheme itself.  
An issue raised by participants in response to the Interim Report is whether the insurance 
industry has the necessary capital to underwrite a national insurance scheme. The 
Insurance Australia Group, after noting that the public sector accounts for 85 per cent of 
premiums collected, said: 
... competitive underwriting in just the NSW workers compensation market would 
gradually require — over a period of five years or so — between $1.5 and $2.5 billion     
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in additional market capital on a “stand alone” basis. If all the national public sector 
workers compensation schemes were opened to the underwriting market, the additional 
capital required would be more than double the amount required for the NSW scheme 
alone. (sub. 89, p. 40) 
The Insurance Council of Australia noted that as workers’ compensation would require, as 
a general rule of thumb, capital to the level of 100 to 150 per cent of premium income, 
there would not be ‘sufficient surplus capital in the market at the moment to cover’ the full 
privatisation of public sector schemes (trans., p. 1269). However: 
By following the steps that the Commission has recommended in the interim report, it 
would ... give the insurance sector a gradual increase in exposure to ... financial risks 
over time. It would mean that significant amounts of capital would not be required 
immediately. It would also mean that insurers and self-insurers could gain experience 
of a new framework or a new system for covering workers’ compensation, and as 
experience was gained and as the experience was observed, hopefully that experience 
would be seen to be stable and predictable and manageable over time. That would 
provide strong encouragement for further support to become available from the 
insurance industry over time. So the phasing-in through the progressive steps that the 
Commission has recommended would actually make a huge amount of sense for the 
providers of capital in an insurance context. (trans., p. 1267) 
Under the model involving the establishment of a national workers’ compensation body 
(model D),  jurisdictions  could  seek to achieve national consistency in certain of the 
licensing requirements applying to private insurers, including in relation to prudential 
requirements. Prudential requirements applying to public insurers could also be considered 
by the body.  
The Commission recommends the following regulatory framework which would allow 
licensed insurers to provide coverage under all schemes:  
•  in privately underwritten schemes, it should be sufficient for insurer licensing 
requirements to rely on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority authorisation 
under the Insurance Act 1973 as evidence that prudential concerns are satisfied;  
•  in publicly underwritten schemes, competitive outsourcing to appropriately skilled 
and resourced service providers to be supported by carefully designed and monitored 
contracts; and 
•  were the Australian Government to establish a national insurance scheme as an 
alternative to existing schemes, it should be privately underwritten by insurers 
authorised by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority under the Insurance 
Act 1973.  
 
RECOMMENDATION      
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12 Self-insurance 
This inquiry has been asked to identify and report on a regulatory framework which would 
allow suitably qualified employers to obtain national self-insurance coverage that is 
recognised by all schemes. 
Under self-insurance, employers are responsible for handling and paying for all their 
employees claims for work-related fatality, injury and illness, rather than paying premiums 
to insurers to take on those responsibilities. There are 165 employers that currently hold a 
self-insurance licence in at least one State or Territory, of which 32 are self-insured in 
more than one jurisdiction. 
 
Self-insurance is seen by some participants to hold broad advantages. The Australian 
Industry Group argued that:  
It [self-insurance] provides strong incentives for employers to provide safe workplaces, 
since a greater proportion of the costs are borne internally. It encourages ownership of 
the process of rehabilitation and return to work and facilitates the development of an 
internal culture that prioritises safety, minimising work related injury and illness. 
(sub. 104, p. 11)  
However, other participants raised concerns. The Shop Distributive and Allied Employee’s 
Association argued that self-insurance was inherently flawed because:  
The concept of having self-insurers is premised upon the belief that an employer can 
dispassionately administer a workplace injury compensation and rehabilitation system 
without regard to the overriding need of the employer to reduce costs and increase 
profits. (SDAEA 2003, p. 2) 
To self-insure, employers must meet certain requirements. Although jurisdictions vary, 
their self-insurance requirements cover the following four broad areas: 
•  prudential standards; 
•  claims management capability; 
•  OHS performance; and 
•  in some jurisdictions, a requirement that the employer has a minimum number of 
employees in that jurisdiction. 
A number of participants (particularly employers and self-insurance associations) have 
expressed concerns about particular aspects of these legislative requirements, as well as the     
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extent of inconsistency across jurisdictions. Many supported the incorporation of self-
insurance into a national framework. Indeed, some employers (including premium-paying 
employers) operating across different jurisdictions have attempted to obtain a single self-
insurance licence under the Australian Government’s Comcare scheme.  
The next section examines in more detail each of the four broad self-insurance 
requirements. Consideration is then given to a regulatory framework that would allow 
eligible employers to obtain a single self-insurance licence.  
12.1 Prudential  requirements 
As self-insurance provides for the risk of workplace fatality, injury and illness to be paid 
for by employers on a pay-as-you-go basis, there are legitimate concerns about their ability 
to meet all claims costs in all circumstances in the future. Kate McKenzie, former General 
Manager of NSW Workcover, said: 
[Workers’ compensation] is a long term business. Some of these claims might not 
occur in 40-50 years, and out there in the business world businesses often do not last 
quite that long, so there is a big challenge for regulators to ensure … that the money is 
always there. (sub. 147, p. 27)  
These concerns are met by imposing prudential requirements on employers as part of 
licensing their right to self-insure. The employer must demonstrate that they have adequate 
financial capability to meet the costs of self-insuring and obtain a range of financial 
safeguards to ensure that they, or financial instruments in their name, can pay their claims 
liability under any circumstance. These requirements are assessed at the initial licence 
application, and then through annual reporting and periodical licence renewals (table 12.1). 
They include: 
•  Financial capability — jurisdictions impose principle-based and/or prescriptive 
financial requirements on employers, to minimise the risk that a self-insurer will fail to 
pay their claims liability (such failure would force the scheme to rely on other financial 
safeguards, such as bank guarantees). 
•  Bank guarantee — jurisdictions1 require self-insurers to obtain a bank guarantee or 
equivalent security deposit. This is essentially a bond that the self-insurer lodges and 
which the scheme can draw on if the self-insurer fails to pay its claims liability. The 
size of the bank guarantee is based on the self-insurer’s predicted present and future 
claims liability. 
 
                                                 
1 For some employers, the Northern Territory does not require a bank guarantee.     
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Table 12.1 Prudential  requirements 
State Financial  capability requirements  Bank guarantee  Reinsurance policy 
Comcare  Principle based, with the following 
as indicative financials required:  
net worth of $50m, liquidity ratio  
of 2:1, gearing ratio of less than 1, 
a positive net profit trend over 3-5 
years, return on equity of 10% or 
more. Also take into account 
industry risk, management quality 
and organisational structure.  
Outstanding claims 
liability calculated to 
95
th percentile, plus one 
reinsurance retention 
amount, or $2.5m which 
ever is greater. The 
above requirements 
apply from July 2004. 
Based on Actuary’s 
recommendation and 
SRCC’s view. 
NSW  Adequately capitalised, strong net 
tangible assets, financial position 
and cash flow. 
Outstanding claims 
liability calculated to  
the 50
th percentile plus 
a 30% margin. 
Within the range: 
$100 000 to $1m per 
event. 
Vic  Financial viability to meet claims 
liability. 
Outstanding claims 
liability calculated to  
the 50
th percentile plus 
a 50% margin. 
Adequate reinsurance. 
Qld  Net tangible assets of $100m and 
long term financial viability. 
150% of claims liability, 
or $5m which ever is 
greater. 
Adequate reinsurance. 
WA  Principle based and consider: 
current assets / liabilities, debt/  
total assets, total assets /total 
liabilities. 
At least $1m, 
consideration given  
to financial position  
and size and type of 
industry. 
Appropriate catastrophe 
and common law 
insurance. 
SA  Net worth of $50m (or greater), 
gearing ratio of 2 (or lower),  
liquidity ratio of 1.3:1 (or higher), 
profitability ratio of 10% per  
annum on shareholders funds, 
positive rating by Mercantile  
agency of risk lower than the 
industry average. 
150% of estimated 
outstanding claims  
plus estimated claims 
for forthcoming year 
minus payments 
estimated to be paid  
in the forthcoming year. 
A sum insured not less 
than $100m and an 
excess amount no less 
than $300 000 per 
incident. 
Tas Principle  based.  Notional premium 
multiplied by 100%  
in year 1, 140% in  
year 2, 180% in year 3, 
plus a 30% margin or 
reinsurance deductible, 
which ever is greater. 
An excess amount no 
less than $1m per 
incident. 
ACT Principle  based.  Outstanding claims 
liability plus a 30% 
margin, or $750 000 
whichever is the 
greater. 
An excess amount no 
less than $500 000 per 
incident. 
NT Principle  based.  Principle based.  Principle based. 
Source: Scheme sources. 
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•  Reinsurance policies — all jurisdictions require self-insurers to obtain a reinsurance 
policy (or excess of loss, or catastrophe insurance) to ensure coverage for a large claim, 
or a series of large claims from one incident. The reinsurance policy requirements 
differ between the jurisdictions according to the amount which must be reinsured, 
measured in terms of the total policy value and the size of the excess. 
•  Security fund — self-insurers in South Australia are required to pay 1 per cent (subject 
to a discount based on the self-insurer’s safety performance) of the industry premium 
rate into a security fund. The fund can be used by WorkCover South Australia if the 
scheme is exposed to a self-insurer’s claims liability. For example, if a self-insurer 
were to collapse and the bank guarantee was not sufficient to cover all the claims 
liability, then the security fund would provide the funds to pay the claims. This security 
fund was established in 1996 and as of 30 June 2003 had accumulated approximately 
$13  million. It is the Commission’s understanding that, once the fund reaches 
$17 million, self-insurers which have contributed since 1996 would not be required to 
make further contributions. The fund is managed by WorkCover South Australia. 
Multi-state self-insurance and mutual recognition 
Employers self-insuring in more than one jurisdiction are required to comply with the 
specific prudential requirements of each jurisdiction in which they self-insure. This 
involves considerable cost replication in meeting the different financial capability 
requirements, bank guarantees and reinsurance policies, both initially and on an on-going 
basis. Each bank guarantee requires a separate actuarial report with different requirements. 
Different processes are involved in taking out the reinsurance policies. As a guide to the 
potential costs to multi-state employers, Pacific National argued that ‘the introduction of 
insurance on a national basis could represent a saving of 50-70% on recurrent financial 
costs alone’ (sub. 169, p. 6).  
Several participants considered that both mutual recognition of, and an agreed national 
standard on, self-insurance licensing arrangements (or specific aspects of them such as 
prudential requirements) should also be considered as models of a national self-insurance 
framework. The National Council of Self Insurers said that it would ‘... want to pursue in 
greater detail the concept and definition of mutual recognition, and consistency in self-
insurance licensing requirements between jurisdictions’ (IRsub. 223, p. 2). The Queensland 
Workers’ Compensation Self Insurers Association said that members were in broad 
agreement on the concept of ‘a national licensing standard or mutual recognition 
arrangement and that this arrangement must be voluntary’ (IRsub. 253, p. 1). WorkCover 
New South Wales drew attention to the benefits of ‘harmonisation of self-insurance 
arrangements, such as capital requirements, between the States ...’ (IRsub. 255, p. 4).     
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Mutual recognition requires that a self-insurer which meets the mutually agreed aspects of 
licensing requirements of one jurisdiction would be able to have them recognised in all 
jurisdictions in which it operates. Once the agreed aspects are licensed, however, the self-
insurer would then need to satisfy the other licence requirements of each jurisdiction in 
which it operates, such as those governing claims management and the payment of 
benefits. As the Australian Business Limited put it: 
An alternative approach [to models A to C] would be to accept that there will be 
continuing differences between States, let businesses that operate across jurisdictional 
boundaries self insure nationally, but still apply the provisions of the relevant 
jurisdiction for purposes of workers’ compensation benefits. This outcome could be 
achieved by jurisdictions agreeing to recognise self insurance arrangements in other 
jurisdictions. For example a business with its principal operations in NSW and self 
insured under NSW arrangements would be recognised as a self insurer in other 
jurisdictions notwithstanding the fact the businesses operations in other States may not 
meet self-insurance requirements in those States. Any claims paid by the business 
would be under the relevant state legislation. (IRsub. 249, p. 7)  
One specific difficulty with mutual recognition of prudential requirements derives from 
each jurisdiction assessing and providing only for the potential liability from self-insurance 
to its scheme and not the total liability to all State and Territory schemes. Also as indicated 
in table  12.1, each jurisdiction has different prudential requirements and supports its 
requirements with differing arrangements that would apply if the self-insurer failed.  
The various options to overcome these issues would require extensive legislative action. 
For example, one prudential regulator could be empowered to consider all self-insurance 
operations of a firm. Alternatively, jurisdictions could agree on a single set of prudential 
requirements and contract out the prudential regulation to an approved public or private 
body. 
It would also be necessary to consider provisions that would apply if prudential regulation 
failed, restrictions, if any, that should be imposed on self-insurers’ choice of jurisdiction 
and the relevance of minimum employment requirements.  
Mutual recognition for prudential purposes would not eliminate the need for self-insurers 
to comply with the different operational requirements of individual schemes, such as 
access and coverage, claims handling and injury management.  
As compared to mutual recognition, a single national standard would require that all 
jurisdictions agree to, and adopt legislatively, all of the necessary elements of a single 
scheme. Such a national standard would lead to national uniformity in aspects of self-
insurance licensing, whereas mutual recognition would lead to ‘harmonisation’ which 
could eventually become nationally consistent, but not necessarily uniform.      
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Both mutual recognition and a national standard could be achievable under model D, or 
under existing cooperative arrangements through HWCA or the WRMC. The advantage of 
relying on the existing cooperative arrangements is that the implementation of elements of 
a national self-insurance framework could occur immediately, and not be delayed by the 
need to establish a new national body for workers’ compensation. However, much depends 
on the willingness of jurisdictions to use existing cooperative arrangements to this end.  
Overall, the Commission considers that mutual recognition and a single national scheme 
are inferior proposals to an alternative national self-insurance option for large firms.  
Residual risks 
A number of participants raised concerns that the prudential requirements were insufficient 
to reduce the risk which self-insurers would bring to a scheme. The most probable risk is 
that the company self-insuring collapses and the bank guarantee is not sufficient to cover 
all the claims liability. The Institute of Actuaries of Australia argued that: 
Let’s say for instance Telstra falls over tomorrow, you’ll get a huge swag of claims 
come out, and there won’t necessarily be enough money in the bank to pay the 
compensation entitlement, and that’s done normally through a bank guarantee, and all 
I’m saying there is the bank guarantees probably aren’t the right level at this stage 
anywhere … (trans., p. 907) 
The degree of risk the scheme is exposed to is more readily identifiable in some schemes. 
Under the Comcare scheme, the amount of the bank guarantee is set at 100 per cent of 
claims liability calculated to the 95
th percentile.2 This means that according to the actuarial 
assumptions, there is a 5 per cent probability that the bank guarantee will be insufficient if 
the self-insurer collapses, exposing Comcare to the difference between the bank guarantee 
amount and the actual claims liability. However, a number of jurisdictions require a 
multiple of the estimated claims liability. The Government Actuary, in the context of 
advice on the SRC Act, referred to this as a blunter approach which may be considered 
when the adequate regulatory resources are not available (appendix B). An example of this 
approach is New South Wales which requires 130 per cent of outstanding claims liability 
estimated to the 50
th percentile.  
Apart from the choice of percentile to which the claims liability is to be calculated and the 
required multiple of this, a bank guarantee may prove to be insufficient because of the 
inadequacy of the past data used to predict future claims liability. There is anecdotal 
evidence that, when firms fail, this brings forth additional workers’ compensation claims. 
The CFMEU drew attention to the cost of claims which have been lodged in the NSW coal 
                                                 
2 These are the current requirements, different bank guarantee requirements will apply from July 
2004 (see table 12.1).      
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industry following retrenchments initiated by companies in that industry in the last five 
years (sub. 153, p. 2). If there are more claims than expected for a failing self-insurer, the 
predicted outstanding claims liability may be underestimated and the bank guarantee may 
be insufficient.  
There is also the possibility of new claims liability arising from work-related fatality, 
injury or disease that have not been included in past data. For example, actuaries had not 
predicted the extent of claims arising from asbestos-related diseases when advising on 
levels of premiums some 30 or more years ago. If a similar event were to incur in the 
future, then the actual claims liability could be well above that provided for.  
In addition, there is the outside possibility that the provider of the bank guarantee and the 
self-insurer could collapse simultaneously, exposing the scheme to all the claims liability 
of a self-insurer. Other risks include the possibility of a self-insurer experiencing a large 
claim and the reinsurer collapsing, or of there being an actuarial error. For example, the 
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2002) reported that an actuarial 
error was made in calculating the premiums for Commonwealth and ACT government 
agencies. There is also potential exposure to claims liability after a self-insurer has exited 
the scheme, or had their licence revoked, if the payment received on exit was insufficient 
to manage continuing claims.  
Instruments to deal with residual risks 
If the bank guarantee and reinsurance policy are insufficient to cover the claims liability of 
a collapsed self-insurer, then, in the absence of other prudential arrangements, injured 
workers would bear the burden of not having their claims met. To avoid this, all the State 
and Territory schemes explicitly guarantee to pay claims arising from a collapsed self-
insurer. Although the Australian Government does not explicitly provide such a guarantee, 
it is very likely that there would be pressure for it to take responsibility if such an event 
occurred.  
The available Australian and international evidence suggests that the probability of the 
Australian Government being exposed to the claims liability of a self-insurer under the 
Comcare scheme is relatively low. The most likely exposure would first require a self-
insurer to collapse and then for the bank guarantee to be insufficient. Although such a 
combination of events is unlikely, it is important to recognise that it is still possible.  
Collapse of self-insurer. Only two licensed self-insurers have failed in all the Australian 
schemes since self-insurance was offered (box 12.1). Similarly, in the United States of 
America, where self-insurance is also available, only a small number have collapsed. 
Moreover, the collapse of the Australian self-insurers occurred in schemes which, at the     
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time, had much weaker prudential requirements than those which apply currently 
(table 12.1).  
 
Box 12.1  Australian experience of self-insurer failure 
The Commission is aware of two self-insurers that have failed in Australia.  
Blue Ribbon Meats collapsed in 2001 whilst self-insured under the Tasmanian scheme, 
leaving a claims liability of $575 379. The bank guarantee, which was 150 per cent of 
claims liability estimated at the 50
th percentile was $438 248. The administrator has 
agreed to pay the outstanding liability.  
T O’Connor & Sons Pty Ltd collapsed in 1991 whilst self-insured under the South 
Australian scheme, leaving a claims liability of $2.1  million. The required bank 
guarantee was specified at 150  per cent of claims liability estimated at the 50
th 
percentile. However, only $797 000 of the specified $950 000 had been provided at the 
time of the collapse.  
In response to the collapses, the schemes strengthened their prudential requirements 
to those outlined in table 12.1.  
Sources: Tasmanian Nominal Insurer, SA WorkCover, National Council of Self Insurers.   
 
 
Under Comcare, there has been no failure of a self-insurer since self-insurance was first 
permitted in 1992. However, all self-insurers are either current or former government 
owned agencies and could be considered to have been financially stronger than some of the 
corporations which may apply for self-insurance under the Commission’s proposed 
reforms. As noted in chapter  5, the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation (SRC) 
Commission has introduced more stringent prudential requirements. These are intended to 
alert the SRC Commission earlier to the possibility that a self-insurer could no longer be 
able to meet its future liability to its injured workers and allow for that liability to be 
covered in another manner before its collapse jeopardised its injured workers’ entitlements.  
Insufficiency of bank guarantee. The Australian Government Actuary noted several 
conceptual reasons why a bank guarantee may be insufficient, including that the self-
insurer experiences an increased number of claims and that there are claims which are 
unforeseen. There is some evidence of bank guarantee insufficiency, as this occurred in the 
cases of both of the Australian self-insurers which collapsed (box 12.1).  
Given that there are residual risks, the Commission considers it prudent for the Australian 
Government to consider additional risk management instruments. It is recognised that such 
instruments involve a transfer of risk from the Australian Government to the remaining 
self-insurers, at their cost, and that the efficacy and efficiency of the transfers are important 
considerations. The three instruments considered are: scheme reinsurance; a security fund; 
and a post-event levy.      
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Scheme reinsurance 
The scheme (Comcare) as a whole could take out a reinsurance policy to cover any 
residual claims liability not met by the existing prudential requirements. Whilst this 
approach has the advantage of low administrative cost for the scheme, the reinsurance 
market is characterised by sharp cyclical swings in the availability and price of insurance. 
Advice to Commission is that such reinsurance could be difficult to obtain and expensive, 
the current reinsurance market being a case in point. A large part of the likely high price of 
reinsurance reflects the uncertainty involved in estimating the probability and 
consequences of the prudential arrangements failing.  
Apart from high cost, the scheme is still relying on a third party and, as the Government 
Actuary has noted, insurers may not pay under some circumstances (appendix B). Further, 
there would also be the cost of reviewing the reinsurance arrangement whenever self-
insurers enter or exit the scheme.  
Security fund 
As an alternative to taking out an insurance policy with a third party insurer, the 
government could act as the insurer. It would levy self-insuring employers so as to 
accumulate funds which could be drawn on if there was a need to pay unfunded liabilities. 
An example is the security fund operated by WorkCover South Australia for self-insurers. 
In effect, the government is performing the same function as an insurance company 
providing scheme reinsurance. It is collecting premiums and earning a rate of return on the 
funds until called on to meet the claims liability arising from failed prudential 
arrangements. The government faces the same difficulties in forecasting the risk and 
promising to meet it as an insurance company.  
Relevant issues include the size of the required fund, the method used to levy self-insurers, 
administrative costs and the opportunity cost of the capital tied up in the fund.  
The size of the fund must strike a balance between fully covering the financial risk to the 
government and ensuring that self-insurers do not contribute more than necessary. This is 
the analogous problem of insurance companies determining the actuarially fair premium 
for scheme reinsurance, and it suffers the same limitations. As the probability and size of 
the risks are not quantifiable, it is not possible to accurately determine the size of the 
required fund. As the HIH Royal Commission noted:  
Because the funding for a pre-event scheme is necessarily calculated without reference 
to the known dimensions of a future event, the amount held in the fund will almost 
certainly be either too much or too little to cope with a specific failure. (2003, vol. 1, 
ch. 11, p. 296)     
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The contributions by self-insurers to the fund can be based on the risk that the self-insurer 
brings to the scheme. This has the advantage of allocating the cost of risk to the party that 
generates the risk. Whilst this has desirable incentive effects to manage risk efficiently, it is 
administratively costly. For example, the risk-based contributions of self-insurers to the 
Californian security fund requires significant actuarial input and a seven member board to 
run the fund.  
To reduce administrative costs, the contributions could be based on more readily available 
information. For example, the South Australian security fund requires employers to 
contribute 1 per cent of the premium they would have paid had they not self-insured. This 
may not accurately allocate the cost of the risk to the party generating it. An alternative 
comprise between risk-based contributions and low administration cost would be to base 
the contribution on the proportion of payroll according to the credit rating of the self-
insurer.  
For a new fund (or a fund which has experienced a draw-down), the time taken to reach its 
prudent size still represents a risk of financial exposure to government. 
There are also costs in managing the pool of funds and in dealing equitably with firms 
entering and exiting the scheme. For example, once the fund has reached a prudent size, 
what processes, if any, should there be to ensure equity between self-insurers that 
contributed to the fund’s accumulation and more recent members.  
For the above reasons, the efficacy and efficiency of security funds are questionable as a 
means of transferring the financial risk of prudential failure from governments to self-
insurers.  
Post-event levy 
The cost of financing any liabilities arising from the failure of a self-insurer and their 
guarantees/reinsurance can be recouped by way of a levy on the remaining self-insurers. 
There is increased certainty as to the amount of funds required and the administration cost 
can be relatively low. 
While it would add a cost to the remaining self-insurers, it internalises the cost of self-
insurance failure to self-insurers as a category. If the prudential arrangements operate as 
intended, the costs are likely to be small and imposed infrequently. The internalisation of 
the costs would act to ensure individual and mutual support for prudential regulation 
among self-insurers.  
The post-event levy does not require the ongoing administration of a pool of funds or the 
continual purchase of insurance scheme reinsurance. The administrative costs that would 
be incurred, however, would arise from the scheme administrator being empowered to     
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accept and pursue recovery of the self-insured’s scheme liability; determining and 
enforcing collections of the levy; and accessing funds to enable timely settlement of the 
liability of the self-insured’s injured workers while sufficient funds were being collected 
from other self-insurers to extinguish the debt and pay for the administration of the post-
event levy. The funding could be dealt with in a variety of ways, such as by a Government 
loan or guarantee of loans (as occurred for Ansett employee entitlements). 
Under post-event funding, the issue of potential avoidance would need to be addressed. In 
the event of a self-insurer failing, some remaining self-insurers could seek to avoid the 
payment of the levy by moving from the Australian Government scheme to State and/or 
Territory scheme(s) and vice versa. This could be dealt with by making a condition on 
voluntary exit that self-insurers pay the expected value of any levy owing at the time of 
exit. 
In the Commission’s view, a post-event levy is the most suitable approach.  
A combination of instruments 
The Australian Government could adopt one or more of these risk management 
instruments. By way of illustration, it is possible to combine limited pre-event funding 
with a condition that if the fund is insufficient, there will be a post-event levy. An example 
is the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation for terrorism cover.  
Implementation  
There is an issue about whether government-owned businesses self-insuring under the 
Comcare scheme should contribute to a post-event levy, security fund or scheme 
reinsurance. At one level, even if they are not explicitly guaranteed by the Australian 
Government, it is unlikely that the Government would let them fail (in effect, the risk of 
collapse has been transferred to the taxpayer). However, in terms of allocating resources 
through prices, and having regard to competitive neutrality policy, the cost base of 
government owned business should be comparable to an equivalent private sector firm.  
The Commission recommends that the contribution of government owned businesses to 
additional risk management instruments should be based on the same criteria as would be 
private firms.  
For a post event-levy, it would be a condition of the self-insurance licence that businesses 
would pay a levy to be determined by the SRC Commission (or new regulator), if there is 
outstanding claims liability that is not otherwise covered by the existing prudential 
arrangements. There could be an exit provision clause that the firm must contribute the net 
present value of its contributions to the post-event levy.     
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In implementing prudential requirements, some participants suggested that self-insurers 
should be subject to the same requirements as general insurers and be regulated by the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). However, the Commission does not 
favour such an approach (box 12.2).  
In conclusion, the Commission supports the adoption of stringent prudential requirements 
based on financial capability, supported by bank guarantees and reinsurance policies. 
Residual risks (however unlikely) could be further provided for by a post-event levy (such 
as for a national policyholders’ support scheme) as recommended by the HIH Royal 
Commission.  
12.2 Claims  management  requirements 
The jurisdictions require self-insurers to have appropriate procedures for managing 
workers’ compensation claims. Most jurisdictions allow for self-insurers to engage third 
parties to manage the claims. However, in Queensland, only local governments are allowed 
to contract out their claims management processes. Self-insurers are required to 
demonstrate that they employ suitable staff and engage service providers approved by the 
scheme. This is to ensure that employees of self-insuring employers have their claims 
managed in a professional manner in accordance with scheme benefit structures. The 
differing requirements generate compliance problems and costs for multi-state employers.     
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Box 12.2  Comparison with general insurer prudential requirements 
The requirements of the Insurance Act and the Corporations Act, which currently apply 
to private insurance companies, could apply to workers’ compensation self-insurers, 
with APRA and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission the relevant 
regulators. Insurance Australia Group argued that: 
self-insurers should be required to meet the same minimum standards as insurers, including 
prudential standards, to ensure a level playing field and to protect long term claimants from 
future insolvency. (sub. 89, p. 18)  
The main prudential requirements regulating private insurance companies are: 
actuarial evaluation of claims liability; minimum capital adequacy; reinsurance policies; 
and a risk management plan. These requirements are based solely on managing the 
insurance risks they are exposed to and minimising the risk that they will collapse as a 
result of these insurance risks.  
Whilst this is appropriate for private insurance companies who typically have more than 
80  per cent of their balance sheet involving insurance risk, self-insuring employers 
typically have less than 10 per cent of their balance sheet involving insurance risk. The 
insolvency risk of a self-insurer is largely from their primary business activity and the 
current prudential requirements for private insurance companies do not address this 
risk. Although capital adequacy requirements may reduce the probability of self-
insuring employers becoming insolvent, it is not appropriate to apply the capital 
adequacy requirement of insurance companies to other businesses, such as retail and 
mining operations.  
The current reinsurance requirements for self-insurers are determined by the scheme, 
whereas private insurance companies require their reinsurance policy arrangements be 
approved by APRA. Whilst it may be appropriate for insurance companies exposed to 
different insurance risks to be required to have their reinsurance policy arrangements 
approved by APRA, it does not seem an efficient use of APRA’s resources to approve 
the reinsurance polices of over 160 self-insuring employers who have a known form of 
insurance risk which is only a small proportion of their overall operations.  
Moreover, whereas APRA requirements do not require the insurer to post any form of 
security deposit (eg bank guarantee) that the scheme could use to pay claims liability if 
the insurer collapses, this is a requirement of self-insurers.  
 
 
Most jurisdictions require self-insurers to have claims managers located in that jurisdiction. 
A number of self-insurers noted that this prevents them from operating a national claims 
management centre, which would reduce claims management costs. For example, CSR 
estimated that it would save $150  000 per annum if it could have a single claims 
management centre (sub. 109, p. 7). The Western Australian Chamber of Commerce, on 
the other hand, expressed concern that claims outcomes could deteriorate if decision 
making is centralised, or claims and injury management are separate (sub. 55, p. 23).      
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Multi-state self-insurers are required to have detailed knowledge of up to eight different 
claims management processes and benefit structures, with the associated information 
technology (IT) costs. Coles Myer (CML) stated:  
The IT systems to manage different payment structures are expensive and time 
consuming given the complexities involved in the calculation processes and variations 
between jurisdictions. In addition there are constant legislative changes which impact 
on the payment of entitlements. 
CML businesses are currently moving to national, consistent payroll processes, 
however cannot easily achieve equivalent efficiencies in Workers Compensation 
payments because of the jurisdictional differences in benefit structure. Additional costs 
and resources are therefore involved to ensure payments are accurate. (sub. 155, p. 5) 
The employer may also need a different claims manager in each jurisdiction (and perform 
its own claims management in Queensland). Telstra notes that ‘there is a shortfall of 
national claims managers who are accredited in each State/Territory jurisdiction. As a 
result, a national company would be required to have different claims managers in various 
States’ (sub. 136, p. 2).  
Concerns about quality 
Some Union participants raised concerns about the claims management practices of self-
insured employers. For example, the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) 
argued:  
[I]n Victoria, a high return to work rate is not associated with self insurance 
and … processing of claims is no quicker with self insurers than under the legislative 
requirements. (IRsub. 188, p. 4) [emphasis in original] 
Moreover, based on anecdotal evidence, the AMWU raised concerns that self-insurers did 
not fulfil their legislative claims management requirements, saying: 
The system is deficient in that it fails to adequately audit employers and establish 
limitations to ensure the employers cannot manipulate the system. (AMWU 2003, 
p. 22) 
In part, this is seen as being a consequence of the strong incentive self-insured employers 
face to minimise the occurrence of workplace injury, fatality and illness and the subsequent 
cost of any accidents. Whilst the Commission has received other anecdotal evidence of 
self-insured employers inappropriately managing claims, there is no evidence of systematic 
failure. Robust administration of claims management practices, however, remains 
important.      
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12.3 OHS  requirements 
OHS regulations apply to all employers, irrespective of whether or not they self-insure. 
However, most jurisdictions place an added requirement on self-insurers to demonstrate, 
through an audit, that they have appropriate OHS management systems to prevent work-
related injury and illness. These systems and audit processes differ between the schemes 
(table 12.2). They constitute an added cost for multi-state employers.  
Table 12.2  Additional OHS requirements for self-insurers 
State  Additional OHS requirements for self-insurers 
NSW  NSW developed model and Audit based on Aus 4801. The self audit is annual, 
the Workcover audit is on a 3 year cycle.  
Vic  Safety Map Audit. 
Qld Tri-Safe  audit. 
SA  SA performance standards based on Aus 4801. 
WA  No additional OHS requirements for self-insurers. 
Tas  Safety Map Audit. 
NT  No additional OHS requirements for self-insurers. 
ACT  OHS management system based on Aus 4801. 
Comcare  No additional OHS requirements for self-insurers. 
Source: Scheme sources.  
In terms of justifying these additional requirements, the Institute of Actuaries of Australia 
argued: 
…  it’s just purely a risk from the scheme’s view that if you’re going to let go of 
someone, let’s make sure they’re running better than even we would expect them to be 
under our scheme. (trans., p. 902)  
Expressing concerns about their appropriateness, CSR (sub. 109) argued that the additional 
OHS requirements are inefficient because they do not target employers with the greatest 
risk of work-related fatality, injury and illness (which is somewhat independent of whether 
they are self-insuring or paying premiums). The National Council of Self Insurers argued 
that OHS management systems should be determined on the risks of an organisation, rather 
than general OHS management systems applied to all employers:  
… it’s really about assessing the risks and putting in place systems to address the risk 
for your organisation … we need to establish systems which apply to our particular 
organisations. (trans., pp. 70–1) 
For multi-state employers, the problem of additional OHS requirements are exacerbated 
with the additional expense of multiple audits and the differences between audit 
requirements. This makes it difficult and costly for multi-state employers to develop 
uniform OHS management systems. For example, Woolworths has different OHS     
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management systems in each state because of the difficultly of developing a single OHS 
management process that meets the different requirements. Woolworths estimates they 
could save approximately $400 000 per annum if they could have a single national OHS 
management system (sub. 156, p. 3). 
The Commission does not support OHS requirements for self-insurers that are additional to 
those applying to other employers.  
12.4  The minimum employee requirement 
In order to self-insure in some jurisdictions, employers are required to have a minimum 
number of employees in that jurisdiction (table 12.3). Where such a requirement is not 
specified, the number of employees of a self-insurance applicant may be taken into account 
when assessing eligibility for a licence.  
Table 12.3  Minimum employee requirement by jurisdiction 
State  Minimum employee requirement 
NSW 500 
Vic not  specified 
Qld 2000 
SA 200 
WA not  specified 
Tas not  specified 
NT not  specified 
ACT not  specified 
Comcare 500 
Source: Scheme sources.  
Justifications for a minimum employee requirement include: that it helps gauge the 
financial strength of the employer; that a minimum number of employees is required for 
self-insurance to be cost effective; and that the quality of claims management will not be 
assured in firms with small numbers of employees.  
A central concern with the requirement is that, if it is set too high, it can restrict otherwise 
eligible employers from obtaining the benefits of self-insurance. Employers who can 
obtain a self-insurance licence in one jurisdiction may not be able to obtain a licence in 
another jurisdiction because they do not meet the minimum employee requirement in that 
particular jurisdiction. The Australian Industry Group gave the example of an employer 
who can self-insure in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia but not in 
Queensland, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory or Tasmania, based solely on     
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the issue of employee numbers. It estimated that being denied self-insurance in those 
jurisdictions increased their costs by $500 000 per annum (sub. 104, p. 12). 
The justifications for a minimum employee requirement are not strong given that:  
•  there is no direct link between the number of employees and the financial strength of 
an employer. There are financially strong employers who have only a small number of 
employees; and 
•  the cost effectiveness of self-insuring does not depend on employee numbers. Clearly 
the high fixed costs of self-insuring (such as arranging bank guarantees and reinsurance 
polices and capacity to manage claims) mean that it is only likely to be cost effective 
for large firms to self-insure. If prudential regulations focus on the ability of the 
employer to meet all future claims and manage them effectively, then the individual 
employer, not the regulator, should decide whether it is cost effective to self-insure. 
Whilst a minimum number of employees may act as a guide for the scheme to assess the 
appropriateness of self-insurance for an organisation, on balance, the Commission 
concludes that setting a minimum number of employees as a requirement to self-insure is a 
poor proxy for the more fundamental requirements of effective prudential standards and 
claims management processes.  
12.5 Other  requirements 
There is a range of other self-insurance licensing requirements which, although they may 
not be individually significant, can have a collective impact.  
Self-insurers are required to pay an application fee and ongoing levies for each licence. 
These fees and charges include the recovery of self-insurance administration costs and 
contributions to OHS functions. For employers self-insuring in more than one state, there 
may be unnecessary replication in the payment of some components of these fees. There is 
also concern from self-insurers that the fees and levies are not based on the administration 
cost they bring to the scheme. As an example, the contribution fees Pacific National pays 
to the New South Wales and Comcare schemes are ‘very different’ despite there being 
almost the same number of employees covered by each licence.  
Self-insurers are required to supply data to the regulator on an ongoing basis. Whilst the 
collection of data is appropriate, self-insurers feel that the schemes do not adequately use 
the data that is collected. The Self Insurers Association of Victoria argued:  
[T]hat while extensive data is provided to the VWA and on to  NOHSC … little is 
provided back to self-insurers for use either in in-house safety and injury management 
initiatives; or in comparative form with other companies in the same industry. 
(sub. 163, p. 9)      
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The collection of data imposes costs on multi-state self-insurers because each scheme 
requires a different data set and software to supply the data, thus preventing self-insurers 
from operating an integrated computer system to satisfy the various scheme requirements. 
BHP stated that each State system costs $50 000 to purchase and is required to be tailored 
to each scheme’s definitions, which themselves vary (sub. 110, p. 5).  
12.6  National framework issues 
For multi-state employers, the costs generated by the replication and differences in self-
insurance requirements provide a justification for a regulatory framework that would allow 
them to obtain a single self-insurance licence to cover all of their workers.  
In chapter 5, the Commission recommended that eligible employers be allowed to obtain a 
single self-insurance licence under the Comcare scheme, or under an alternative national 
self-insurance scheme, to cover all their workers throughout Australia. However, not all 
self-insurers or multi-state employers would apply to self-insure under an alternative 
national scheme. The recommended new national workers’ compensation body could 
address the concerns of self-insurers remaining in the State and Territory schemes. The 
recommendations of how self-insurance should be regulated under a national self-
insurance scheme are outlined below.  
The Commission recommends the following principles be used for assessing self-
insurance licence applications under the national self-insurance scheme:  
•  self-insurers to demonstrate appropriate prudential and claims management 
requirements, to ensure that they can adequately fund and manage claims;  
•  prudential requirements to be based on financial capability (including actuarial 
evaluation of claims liability), bank guarantees and reinsurance policies;  
•  remaining risks to be reduced further by making provision for a post-event levy; 
•  occupational health and safety requirements to apply equally to all employers; and 
•  there to be no explicit minimum employee requirement as it adds no prudential or 
operational value. 
Self-insurers under the national scheme should withdraw from, rather than be 
recognised under, any or all other schemes. 
The Commission envisages that this recommendation would be incorporated into the 
national frameworks, as set out in chapter 5, in the following ways.  
Model  A. The existing self-insurance requirements of the SRC Act administered by 
Comcare would apply. The Commission, along with advice from the Australian 
RECOMMENDATION      
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Government Actuary, has assessed the self-insurance requirements of the SRC Act and 
have found them to be sound. It is also noted that the prudential requirements have been 
strengthened in response to the advice from the Government Actuary.  
Model B. As new legislation would be required to implement an alternative national self-
insurance scheme, the Australian Government could use the current Comcare self-
insurance requirements as a sound base and take the opportunity to refine certain of its 
requirements. Although the most important prudential and claims management 
requirements may not need to be changed, the minimum employee requirement should be 
dispensed with. 
Model C. If the proposed alternative national insurance scheme is introduced, the self-
insurance arrangements under model B would be incorporated in it.  
Model  D. Self-insurers have argued the benefits of common licensing and audit 
requirements. The above recommendations could form a basis for the States and Territories 
to develop consistent requirements across their schemes.  
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13  Dispute resolution in workers’ 
compensation 
This chapter is concerned with the term of reference which asks the Commission to 
identify and report on ‘alternative mechanisms to manage and resolve disputes in workers’ 
compensation matters’.  
Dispute resolution systems are concerned with ensuring integrity in the provision of 
workers’ compensation. Their objective is to resolve disputes about its provision in an 
equitable and cost-effective manner. As submitted by the Queensland Council of Unions, 
they should use processes that are ‘transparent, consistent, equitable and low cost’ 
(IRsub. 206, p. 5).  
Cost effectiveness embraces scheme legal and administrative costs as well as costs borne 
by workers and employers. The major source of such costs is delay. Delays caused by 
disputes: create uncertainty and frustration; hinder early treatment and reduce the prospect 
of rehabilitation; and create financial costs for employers and workers. 
The nature of workers’ compensation schemes influences the type of disputes that arise. 
Being no-fault, determining negligence is not a major source of dispute. However, all but 
the South Australian and Northern Territory schemes have a common law option where the 
question of fault is relevant and where the resolution of the issue of negligence can incur 
high costs.  
Disputes in no-fault schemes tend to arise from questions of the access to, or extent of, 
coverage. These include: 
•  the work-relatedness of the injury; 
•  the extent of injury, including threshold access to common law settlements; and 
•  access to entitlements. 
As each workers’ compensation scheme is unique, the significance of these causes of 
disputes vary among schemes. This is one of the factors leading to jurisdictions adopting 
differing approaches to dispute resolution.      
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Significant costs are involved in dispute resolution and the reform of dispute resolution 
procedures has been an important component of the more general changes to workers’ 
compensation schemes over recent years.  
13.1  Causes of disputes  
Identifying the causes of disputes is a critical element in the design of dispute resolution 
systems. In work done for the Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities, 
Transformation Management Systems Pty Ltd (TMS 1995a) suggested that disputes fall 
into two broad categories: 
•  artificial — those that are generated by the handling of claims, including mistakes and 
misunderstandings; and  
•  genuine — when the parties have shared all the information, but remain at odds and 
require the intervention of a third party.  
Artificial disputes 
Transformation Management Systems has suggested that the major cause of artificial 
disputes is the lack of information when decisions are made. Ideally, workers’ 
compensation schemes should be structured so as to bring all the relevant information to 
the initial decision, to improve the quality of that decision and thereby prevent unnecessary 
disputes from entering the system.  
Once a dispute is in the system, poor procedures and information management can make 
resolution more difficult and costly to achieve. There are two sources of information delay, 
in addition to discovery time, which the design of dispute resolution systems must 
overcome. These are: 
•  attempts to prevent cases being settled early in order to obtain larger pay-outs in court. 
Such behaviour is aimed at raising the stakes for the other party — settlements at the 
court door being an example; and 
•  inadequate or loose requirements which allow ‘last minute’ revisions of information 
(including premeditated intent). 
Another source of artificial disputes is the management and culture of the system. People 
are less likely to reach agreement if they feel the system does not address their needs. Early 
and open communications are more likely to uncover those needs. An example of simple 
desires driving disputes was highlighted by the Australian Health and Medical Council 
Legal Process Reform Group. It reported on a survey of claimants initiating medical     
    367
 
litigation in the United Kingdom which found that, in addition to the quest for money, the 
action was being undertaken: 
… to stop the same thing happening to someone else (52%); the provision of an 
apology (44%); and opportunity to make the other side understand their concerns 
(40%); and to be told what had happened to them (38%). (AHMAC Legal Process 
Reform Group 2002, p. 27) 
Genuine disputes  
Employer disputes  
The relationship between employers and workers’ compensation scheme 
administrators/insurers is one source of genuine disputes. These disputes can arise when 
there is disagreement about whether employers are adequately meeting the requirements of 
the scheme, including whether:  
•  employers need to cover particular workers. This can arise from differing views as to 
whether the workers are employees, deemed employees or independent contractors; 
•  the correct basis was used for determining premium. This may involve disagreements 
about industry classification or definitions of salary and remuneration; and 
•  employers have made acceptable provisions for return to work.  
Employer disputes, however, are not covered by the formal dispute resolution schemes, 
which are set up to deal with disputes about claims. 
Disputes about claims  
The majority of genuine claims disputes are generated by specific issues relating to claims 
assessment and management. These issues are highly dependent on the nature of the 
individual workers’ compensation scheme. At the beginning of claims assessment process, 
areas of dispute can include:  
•  whether the injured party is an employee; 
•  whether the injury was work-related; and  
•  the extent of injury.  
Other disputes arise where people are already receiving benefits — assessments of fitness 
for work being a common example. While all these factors may cause disputes, the nature 
of disputes of each scheme is also affected by its approach to the provision of benefits and 
injury management.      
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Over time, dispute systems also have to contend with causes of injury that emerge from 
new work-patterns or changing societal norms. For example, in Western Australia there 
was a 114 per cent increase in claims relating to stress between 1995-96 and 1999-2000 
(Guthrie 2001, p. 73). Such a change may require the dispute resolution system to consider 
new approaches — for example, the use of psychologists/psychiatrists to assess stress 
claims.  
13.2  Resolution of disputes  
The many different elements employed in dispute resolution across the jurisdictions 
include internal review, early exchange of information, alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR), courts and legislated models.  
Internal review  
The purpose of internal reviews (or reconsideration) is to assess the initial claim decisions 
and determine whether the original officer made a correct judgment. This may prevent 
artificial disputes from entering the formal dispute resolution system, thereby avoiding a 
waste of time and money.  
The requirement for firms to provide for, and for customers to first use, internal review 
procedures is an integral part of formal industry-based dispute resolution schemes 
elsewhere in the economy. It is a requirement in the financial services industry before the 
use of external complaints resolution under the Financial Industry Complaints Service, in 
the banking industry before use of the Banking Industry Ombudsman and in areas of 
general insurance before use the General Insurance Enquires and Complaints Service. The 
coverage and integrity of those industry-based internal complaints services is ensured by a 
requirement under the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 for corporations to subscribe to 
them and by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to approve and 
monitor them (ASIC 1999). 
Early information exchange 
Information exchange is an important part of any dispute resolution process, as the absence 
of full information can render attempts at resolution ineffective. Access to information can 
provide both sides with a clearer indication of where they stand on the matter — meaning 
that disputes are less likely to escalate through confusion. If parties know that they have all 
relevant information, it will give them confidence to make decisions during these first steps 
of dispute resolution.      
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Many systems that use ADR order a compulsory exchange of information before any 
resolution commences. Sometimes these exchanges are enforced by ‘evidence caps’, which 
impose time limits for the evidence to be presented, and after which no further admission is 
allowed. For example, section 84J of the WA Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation 
Act 1981 provides that a worker’s statement in relation to their disability is not to be 
admitted in evidence or used by an employer or insurer unless supplied to the worker, or to 
a solicitor or agent acting on their behalf, at least 28 days before the dispute resolution 
proceedings.  
Alternative dispute resolution 
As its name suggests, ADR has been developed as a substitute forum to address problems 
identified with court-based resolution. In addition to workers’ compensation, ADR 
processes have gained wide use in many specialised forums —such as for family and 
commercial disputes — as well as within the courts themselves to better utilise expensive 
legal resources.  
There are two distinct motivations for the uptake of ADR. The first is that ADR is 
designed to provide a forum which is conciliatory. Parties are allowed and encouraged to 
speak for themselves, and explore solutions to their problems. It is hoped that this gives a 
feeling of empowerment which will result in greater acceptance of the process and, hence, 
outcome.  
The other advantage of ADR is lower cost. The informality of the process means that it can 
commence quickly. As such, steps can be taken toward resolution before they would in a 
court system. This, coupled with a less-adversarial approach, can help maintain the 
relationship between the parties to a dispute. Failure to do so can create financial and social 
costs, and compromise rehabilitation and return to work.  
While these objectives are common to ADR, the means to achieve them differ greatly. 
ADR can comprise a number of different steps, some of which differ only slightly. The 
following explains some of the more common features. 
ADR processes 
A wide number of dispute resolution options fall under the umbrella of ADR and there is 
some confusion about what terms can mean. The Australian National Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Advisory Council provides a categorisation which places elements of ADR into 
three broad groups (NADRAC 1997). Those that:     
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•  assist the parties to come to their own agreement, where the third party merely aids the 
discussion between them. Many types of mediation fall into this category. Other 
examples include case-management meetings or negotiation; 
•  advise the parties toward an agreement, where the third party can propose solutions or 
provide advice on the facts. Most types of conciliation use this approach; and 
•  determine the agreement for the parties, where the third party makes a decision which 
settles the matter. Arbitration is the most common example. 
Mediation, where a mediator attempts to guide the parties toward agreement, is widely 
used because it allows the parties a high degree of involvement in the process. To aid open 
discussion, most mediation is conducted in confidence. This means that information which 
is raised can not be used against the party in other forums or courts.  
In the advisory step, the outside party can have a wide ranging role — providing advice, 
evaluating claims or proposing solutions. Conciliation is the most common example of this 
element, though some mediators also play such advisory roles. In the advisory step, the 
third party must tread a fine line between providing advice and issuing determinations. As 
highlighted by the Insurance Australia Group, ‘in some situations in Victoria, the Accident 
Compensation Conciliation Service by default becomes an arbitration when the conciliator 
expresses a view’ (sub. 89, p. 30). 
The determinative step in the ADR process is most similar to a court. The arbitrator is 
charged with weighing the evidence presented to him/her and ruling on the dispute. The 
approaches taken within this step — for example, the ability to call or question witnesses 
— vary widely in practice.  
Some systems place a heavy reliance on conciliation and then use courts for matters that 
need further determination. Others use what is known as a ‘med/arb’ model, where 
arbitration commences immediately after unsuccessful mediation and often the same third-
party convenes both processes. 
Courts  
Courts have been the traditional mechanism for resolving disputes. However, court-based 
systems can run counter to the objectives of dispute resolution. Namely, they can be slow 
and costly, and many participants find the process adversarial.  
Court-based systems can also generate incentives that hinder early resolution. Legal fees 
tend to accumulate with the length of the process, with court appearances being 
particularly costly. This fee structure can encourage delay by some parties. In addition, 
court processes can engender a victim mentality in the injured worker. This can stifle the 
desire to engage in rehabilitation. The generally adversarial nature of court-based     
    371
 
resolution can also jeopardise positive return-to-work relationships. The Australian 
Plaintiff Lawyers Association submitted to the Commission that the above criticisms could 
be overcome as demonstrated by ‘… well-run and well-funded common law schemes’ 
(IRsub. 252, p. 7).  
Assessing points of law is one area where the specialist expertise of courts is required. 
Failure to use courts on such issues would remove an important layer of public 
accountability from the schemes.  
Legislative models 
All workers’ compensation schemes have legislated dispute resolution systems that 
comprise elements of both ADR and court-based resolution. However, there is wide 
variation in both the balance between these two approaches and the type of ADR that is 
used. A snapshot of this variation is depicted in table 13.1.  
In addition, table  13.1 includes information on the use of medical panels and the 
availability of provisional liability. Typically, medical panels are used to provide 
determinative findings and avoid further disputation on medical matters. Provisional 
liability enables the treatment of injury and illness to be undertaken without delay, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of successful rehabilitation and reducing the overall cost 
(chapter 7).  
It is also important to recognise that the majority of schemes have evolved, some 
considerably, since the early 1990s. Often these changes have stemmed from a recognition 
of the significant impost and unproductive nature of legal costs — the recent changes in 
New South Wales being an example. In broad terms, across the various jurisdictions, the 
power of the courts have been reduced (in many cases to the level of ruling only on points 
of law) and the role of ADR has been elevated. It is suggested that Australia has the 
highest involvement of any country of ADR in workers’ compensation disputes (Jackson 
2001, p. 264).  
Data on current systems 
The most comprehensive information publicly available on dispute resolution under the 
current workers’ compensation schemes is that published by the Workplace Relations 
Ministers’ Council (WRMC 2003). Figure 13.1 provides data on disputation rates (new 
disputes as a proportion of new claims) across the jurisdictions. For example, in Tasmania 
in recent years, there has been one new dispute for every three to four new claims. A 
similar high disputation rate applied under Comcare and Seacare in 2001-02. In contrast, in     
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Queensland it has been one dispute for every 20 claims. All jurisdictions, except Western 
Australian and Tasmania, experienced an increase in dispute rates in 2001-02.  
Table 13.1  Legislative dispute resolution processes 
 Comcare  NSW    Vic  Qld 
Internal review  Yes Informal  Yes  Yes 
ADR: Assisted  Optional mediation. Tele-conference. 
After this, WCC can 
make decision ‘on  
the papers’. 
None None 
ADR: Advisory  1 or more conciliation 
conferences. 
Conciliation Conciliation  Mediation and case 
appraisal. 
ADR:  







None. The County 
Court is used 
instead. 
None 
Court access  Appeals on points of 
law to federal Court. 
Appeal to President 
of the WCC then,  
on questions of law 
only, to the Court of 
Appeal. 
After County Court, 
points of law can  
be appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 
After Q-Comp 
review, matters can 
be appealed to 
Magistrate of the 
Industrial Court. 
Medical panels  No. Expert witnesses 
are used. 
Approved medical 
specialists are used 
(whose decisions  
can be appealed to 
panels). 
Yes. Final and 
binding.  
Yes. Final and 
binding. 
Legal access  Yes  Yes (except for 
during medical 
assessments). 
No (unless all 
parties agree). 
Yes, for all 
elements. 
Provisional  
  liability 
No  Insurance company 
must begin 
provisional payments 
within 7 days and  
can continue to a 
max. of 12 weeks. 
WCC can order 
interim payments  







  dispute  
  resolution time  
  limits  
Advisory times which 




within 21 days and 
WCC determined. 
Only conciliation  
(60 days).  
Internal review must 
occur within 35 
days. 
Initial decision  
  time limits  
[second number  
  from claim to  
  decision] 
No fixed time limit 
(advisory only). 
21 days for insurer. 
[28 days] 
28 days  3 months 
 (Continued next page)     
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Table 13.1 (continued) 
 WA  SA  Tas  ACT  NT 
Internal  
  review 
Informal Yes  Informal Informal  Informal 
ADR:  
  Assisted 





  Advisory 
Conciliation 
conference 






other disputes it 




ations to the 
parties. 
ADR:  





Arbitration Arbitration Arbitration    None 





Points of law first 
to Workers’ 
compensation 
Tribunal, then to  
full bench and 
finally to the 
Supreme Court. 
Points of law to  
the Supreme  
Court. 
Magistrates Court 








  panels 
Yes. Final and 
binding. 
Yes, though not 
final (worker may 
not be assessed 
more than once 
every 2 months). 
Yes. Final and 
binding. 
Medical referee 
whose decision  
is final. 
 
Legal access  No (unless all 
parties agree  
or for points of 
law in review). 







only if otherwise 




  liability 
Yes. Conciliator 
may order 10 
weeks pay and 
medical 
expenses. 
No  Yes. To start within 
14 days of claim. 
Can be stopped  
by conciliator. 










  dispute  
  resolution  
  time limits  
For all steps 
(conciliation, 
review and 
appeal to court). 
For all steps 
including ADR and 
court. 
For conciliation.   No  14 days for 
mediation. 
Initial decision  
  time limits  
[second  
  number from  
  claim to  
  decision] 
17 days (up to 
27 days on 
extension). 
Guidelines only 
(apart from 10  
days for income 
maintenance). 
[15 days] 






for up to 56 
days. 
Source: Information from individual schemes.     
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Figure 13.1 Disputation  rates 

















1998-99 20 13 11 6 8 10 24 5
1999-00 23 15 11 5 10 11 32 8 13
2000-01 24 15 11 5 12 12 32 8 13
2001-02 27 28 20 13 6 10 15 23 9 15
C'care S'care NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas NT ACT
Source: WRMC (2003, p. 55). 
Care is required in making comparisons across jurisdictions as several states (New South 
Wales, South Australia and Tasmania) ‘deem’ claims to be disputes if a decision is not 
made on them within a specified time frame. This inflates the number of reported disputes 
as not all settlement offers made subsequently would be disputed. Also, the propensity to 
dispute claims is influenced by many factors, including satisfaction by the injured worker 
with the handling of the claim, expectations about the compensation available, excess 
provisions and the costs of lodging a dispute.  
Available data on the costs of legal involvement in disputes (including those associated 
with common law claims) are depicted in figure 13.2, where legal expenses as a proportion 
of total claims costs, excluding costs of administration associated with dispute resolution, 
are given for each jurisdiction. The proportion of claims costs accounted for by legal 
expenses varies considerably among the jurisdictions. Under the Seacare scheme and in the 
Australian Capital Territory, the cost of legal expenses has exceeded 25 cents in the dollar 
of total claims costs in recent years. In contrast, in South Australia the cost has been as low 
as 3 cents in the dollar. In Queensland, there has been a significant decline in legal costs as 
a proportion of total claims costs over recent years. In 2001-02, statutory claim disputes 
accounted for some 56 per cent of disputes but only 4 per cent of the legal costs. The 
average legal cost of common law claims was $13 978.  
na  na 
na 
na     
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Figure 13.2  Legal costs as a proportion of total claims costs  

















1998-99 8 15 6 14 6 3 11 9
1999-00 7 16 6 12 7 3 11 9 26
2000-01 7 1 6 6984 1 1 1 1 3 0
2001-02 7 3 2 1 2 7784 1 0 9 2 6
C'care S'care NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas NT ACT
Source: WRMC (2003, p. 58). 
New South Wales has recently reformed its disputes handling procedures (box 13.1) and 
initial information indicates that there had been significant reductions in both the number 
and legal cost of disputes. However, the Law Council of Australia cautioned against using 
it as an exemplar for dispute resolution. It reported that a recent review of the NSW 
Workers’ Compensation Commission by John Hunter Management Services Pty Ltd had 
found that, with the closure of access to the NSW Compensation Court, the Commission 
was facing difficulty in meeting its legislative obligations as a result of concerns about a 
number of matters, including, ‘…communication and consultation, work structures, the IT 
system, staffing levels and the role of dispute assessment managers …’ (IRsub. 250, p. 16).  
The costs of legal involvement are variously managed and regulated among the 
jurisdictions. As mentioned above, legal costs are proportionately high for Seacare and in 
the Australian Capital Territory, both of which allow access to common law. Two other 
previously high-cost common law schemes, New South Wales and Queensland, have 
experienced recent reductions. 
na na 
na 
na     
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Box 13.1  New South Wales dispute resolution 
From 1  January 2002 the New South Wales workers’ compensation scheme 
introduced new procedures to prevent and resolve claims disputes. To prevent 
disputes, WorkCover established a claims assistance service whereby injured workers 
and their employers could obtain impartial advice about the scheme. It also involved a 
system of provisional liability under which insurance companies that handle claims for 
WorkCover are required to commence weekly compensation payments and injury 
management within seven days of initial injury notification. The early indications are 
that the prevention activities are acting as intended and achieving worthwhile 
improvements in the operation of the scheme. 
To resolve disputed claims, a new independent Workers’ Compensation Commission 
has been established. It provides a complete and integrated dispute resolution service 
that includes conciliation, arbitration and medical assessment. It has been 
progressively replacing the Workers’ Compensation Resolution Service and New South 
Wales Compensation Court in settling disputes. The Resolution Service had been 
established in 1995-96 ‘to provide a fast and inexpensive method of resolving disputes’ 
and replaced a voluntary conciliation service previously provided by WorkCover. Use of 
the Resolution Service was a requirement before matters were considered by the 
Compensation Court. In the event, the Resolution Service was able to settle only some 
10 per cent of disputes and, in effect, became a ‘stepping stone’ on the way to the 
Court. Of the disputes lodged with the Courts, less than 10  per cent proceeded to 
judgment, with over 90 per cent being settled ‘on the steps of Court’. 
The new Commission encourages the parties directly involved to resolve their disputes 
and uses a five-step process to facilitate this, namely after acceptance:  
1. Notice to parties explaining the processes to be followed, timelines, etc.  
2. An ‘on the papers’ review undertaken by the assigned arbitrator.  
3. Preliminary telephone conference with the parties establishing the facts and the 
prospects of settlement of the dispute ‘on the papers’.  
4. The conciliation conference where the arbitrators use their best endeavours to bring 
all parties to a settlement.  
5. If the parties do not reach an agreement at the conciliation stage, on the same day 
and after a short break, the arbitration hearing and determination.  
In the first year of operation, the Commission reported a marked decrease in the 
number of disputes filed and time taken to resolve them (to an average of 91 days after 
receipt). Some 41 per cent of cases were settled, 27 per cent were discontinued by the 
applicant or by agreement of the parties, 10  per cent were determined by the 
arbitrators, either ‘on the papers’ or at hearing, 12 per cent were closed by registration 
of a s66A agreement (an agreement between an insurer and a worker for the payment 
of lump sum compensation for permanent loss) and 3  per cent as a result of a 
workplace injury management recommendation by the Registrar of the Commission. 
Sources: HWCA (2002b); Workers Compensation Commission (2003).  
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13.3  Directions of reform 
There was general support amongst participants that dispute resolution systems can assist 
the objective of delivering equitable and cost-effective outcomes. Of particular importance 
to this objective has been the speedy resolution of points of difference. This can make the 
outcome more acceptable to the parties, lower the waiting costs and facilitate expeditious 
return to work.  
With such objectives in mind, Transformation Management Systems outlined a number of 
what it considered to be ‘best practice essentials’ for the design of dispute resolution 
schemes (sub. 108, p. 12). These include:  
•  detailed information which explains to stakeholders their benefits and rights;  
•  informed initial claims decisions, including early information exchange (if not already 
done for the initial decision); 
•  internal review;  
•  assisted or advised ADR to resolve 80 per cent of disputes;  
•  determination; and 
•  legal review. 
To provide both equity and cost effectiveness, this approach has two broad aims. These are 
to prevent disputes from arising and solve those that do arise using the least invasive 
methods first. Allied to these aims are the issues of legal access and use of medical panels.  
Preventing disputes and the interaction with claims processing  
In preventing disputes, the initial handling of claims is most important. The Heads of 
Workers’ Compensation Authorities in their 1997 report, Promoting Excellence, said:  
The decision to accept or reject a claim for compensation is one of the most crucial 
trigger points within the workers’ compensation system … failure to apply quality 
decision making practice at this stage can lead to anger and a process of antagonistic 
confrontation and disputation. A decision to deny a claim, made on proper information 
and communicated to the worker in an appropriate manner, does not have to lead to 
further disputation. (HWCA 1997, p. 150) 
Or, as the Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association put it, sound claims 
management involves:  
•  Rapid claim determination (and payment of entitlements); 
•  Open, respectful communication including provision of information about rights and 
responsibilities; and     
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•  Minimisation of dispute triggers. (IRsub. 228, p. 2) 
Early claims determination reduces not only the likelihood of disputation arising, but also 
the success of rehabilitation and return to work, as discussed in chapter 7.  
The role of information in claims assessment is paramount. Best practice claims 
management includes requirements on the parties to a claim to submit all relevant 
information as early as possible and includes incentives for this to occur.  
Of course, delays in accessing relevant information can still occur — perhaps due to 
tardiness of the parties or the sheer volume of claims to be handled. In these circumstances, 
many claims managers will simply make the best decision they can. This can involve 
letting some claims go to dispute. 
As Guthrie noted, in Western Australia: 
… at present there is no cost disincentive to deter insurers letting matters go to the 
Directorate. … in respect of a certain category of small claims, the Directorate operates 
as some form of quality control for some insurers, by providing a review service at no 
extra cost. (2001, p. 140) 
In other jurisdictions (South Australia and Tasmania), missing a claim deadline results in 
the matter being deemed a dispute. As a consequence, avoidable cost is added to claims. It 
is borne by the parties and the scheme overall. In Tasmania in 1998-99, deemed disputes 
accounted for half of total disputes.  
An alternative to using ‘hard’ time limits is to allow extension of the deadline coupled with 
the commencement of provisional payments. This approach, which is currently used in 
New South Wales and Western Australia, provides an incentive for assessors to determine 
claims expeditiously and allows extra time for claims to be assessed without passing an 
additional burden on to injured workers. In addition, provisional payments for medical 
expenses could assist faster rehabilitation. The use of limited provisional payments has 
been cited by several inquiry participants as removing an incentive for insurers to 
inappropriately deny claims.  
Provisional payments can, however, result in overpayments and difficulties of recovery 
where subsequently the scheme is found not to have liability for the costs. It was on this 
basis that they were not supported by the Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western 
Australia Inc. (IRsub.  237, p.  6). Similarly, the Australian Industry Group cautioned 
against recommending provisional liability. This was on the basis that it ‘… weakens the 
work relatedness nexus for claims’ and, when combined with problems in notifying claims, 
‘… the problems associated with provisional liability outweigh the benefits’ (IRsub. 240, 
pp. 27, 28). Australian Business Limited reported that, while it was early days, the new 
provisional liability provisions in New South Wales were facilitating earlier interventions     
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and return to work. It considered, ‘Effective use of provisional liability requires the 
application of appropriate systems and processes to manage potential abuse’ (IRsub. 249, 
p. 12).  
Transformation Management Systems suggested that out-sourced primary decision makers 
faced additional incentives to pass difficult decisions onto dispute resolution systems:  
… where insurers are seeking market share ... [they] ... quite often will not want to pass 
the bad news of the claims decision to their clients … they can allow the dispute 
resolution body to play that role. (trans., p. 942) 
Contracting disputation rates into agreements with claims managers, as happens in South 
Australia, can help reduce the incentive to pass responsibility. 
The communication of claims decisions can also influence disputation rates. Without a 
careful explanation of the reason for rejection, frustration may build-up which could result 
in a dispute. In the Comcare scheme, Wallace found that:  
… if a claims officer picked up the telephone and contacted a worker he or she would 
reduce the chances of that claim being disputed by 20%. In contrast, if a claim were 
referred to an expert doctor, without first contacting the worker, the chance of dispute 
would increase by 33%. (2001, p. 5) 
Finally, internal reviews can provide an invaluable feedback for the claims assessment 
process. Reviews may aid identification of systematic flaws in claims processes, and may 
identify emerging issues or training needs for primary decision makers.  
Solving disputes 
ADR has been promoted as solving disputes in the most cost-effective and least invasive 
manner. Its informality allows people to express their own concerns and do so early in the 
process. Such features can produce enduring resolution with minimal damage to the 
relationships between the parties. Ballantyne and Mazingo, in their review of empirical 
literature that analysed the efficacy of ADR in American workers’ compensation schemes, 
concluded that: 
Mediation is the most promising form of informal dispute resolution … Most studies 
show that mediation produces high levels of participant satisfaction and perceptions of 
fairness; it also resolves cases faster than formal hearings. (1999, p. 81) 
These benefits arise where the parties trust the ADR process and take it seriously. Where it 
is compulsory, ADR may, on occasions, be regarded by some as a stepping stone that must 
be endured before ‘having their day in court’. As the Insurance Australia Group suggested, 
the processes can become:      
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… long and complicated, consisting of several non-binding stages that act as stepping 
stones to judicial determination. While there is ample opportunity to achieve a 
settlement, there is little incentive to do so. (sub. 89, p. 32) 
In most schemes, where ADR is legislated, it is compulsory. To encourage its use and to 
provide an incentive for its use in settlements, some schemes empower conciliators to 
prevent the matter proceeding further if they believe a party is not making ‘reasonable’ 
attempts to reach a settlement. Cost penalties are a related incentive used in many schemes 
to discourage late settlement. They are awarded against appellants whose appeals achieve 
only marginal increases. 
ADR will not be able to resolve all disputes. As a consequence, its efficacy can be 
enhanced if it includes suitable screening. For example, some cases, such as those which 
turn solely on complex medical matters or points of law, require special consideration. 
Through screening, it is possible to identify them at the outset. Sending them to a medical 
panel or for judicial determination immediately is likely to be the most efficient approach. 
The identification of such cases, however, is better made by the dispute resolution service, 
which has the experience to identify such issues, than by the parties themselves. 
Finally, it needs to be recognised that ADR processes are an administrative system and like 
all such systems require regular monitoring in order to maintain their relevance and 
efficacy. This involves the training of staff, systems reviews that identify potential 
problems and appropriate funding.  
Legal access 
Several schemes have restricted access to legal representation. Motivating this is a view 
that lawyers can benefit financially from prolonging disputation. This increases costs and 
makes ADR confrontational, rather than conciliatory. The Law Society of New South 
Wales’ guidelines provide that during mediation ‘Legal advisors are not present at 
mediation as advocates, or for the purposes of participating in an adversarial court room 
style contest with each other, still less with the opposing party. A legal advisor who does 
not understand and observe this is a direct impediment to the mediation process’ (2003, 
p. 14). Nonetheless, McCarthy considered that, when lawyers attend mediations, while in 
the midst of litigation, it is hard for them ‘to allow their clients to speak, let alone take part 
in the mediation in the independent manner the ADR theorists would idealise’ (2001, 
p. 46).  
While it may be ideal for parties to represent themselves, it is widely accepted that a power 
imbalance exists between workers and insurers or employers. In general, workers come to 
negotiations with limited experience, legal knowledge or financial capacity. This power     
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imbalance between ‘one-shotters’ and ‘repeat players’ has long been recognised to produce 
unbalanced outcomes between unrepresented parties (Galanter 1974).  
In addition to interests of equal representation, the legal skills of lawyers can enable quick 
identification of relevant information, or when more is required. Without such professional 
assistance, the burden of information collection is passed onto the parties.  
In assisted and advisory forms of ADR, the mediators or conciliators endeavour to have 
parties speak for themselves. The power asymmetry can be overcome where workers have 
recourse to sources of knowledge and advice available on an ‘as needs’ basis. In addition 
to lawyers, union representatives and other experienced advocates can play this role.  
Several participants called for schemes to establish an advocate’s office to provide an 
additional source of information (Henderson, trans., p.  287; QBE Insurance sub.  99, 
pp.  61–2). The Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees’ Association Victorian Branch, 
which provides an advisory service to their members on workers compensation claims and 
support during disputation, considered Victoria has a good system of conciliation 
(IRsub. 239, p. 15). While it considered that there should be a greater understanding of the 
conciliation process, it pointed out that the Victorian Accident Compensation Commission 
directed claimants to free advisory services, such as those provided by WorkCover Assist 
(funded by the Victorian Government), Victoria Union Assist and by the Branch to its 
members. These providers operate throughout the State and support workers attending 
conciliations.  
In Canada (where there is virtually no access to courts for settlements), all schemes except 
Quebec’s have an advisory or counselling function to assist workers through the claims 
and disputes processes. Similar provisions apply for employers in some of the provinces 
(AWCBC 2003).  
To provide legal representatives with a financial incentive for speedy outcomes, cost 
schedules have been advocated by several participants (Australian Industry Group 
sub. 104, p. 36; Insurance Australia Group sub. 89, p. 32; Guthrie, trans., p. 171). Guthrie, 
who has reviewed dispute resolution on a number of occasions, considered legal 
representation was fraught with problems. He said:  
… workers and employers and insurers are entitled to legal representation, but that 
there should be very strict guidelines on the time limits placed to actually achieve 
certain tasks … If those tasks are not completed within time there should be financial 
penalties which can be sheeted home to their legal practitioners and that any costs 
which are available to legal practitioners in the system should be subject to a very rigid 
scale and that legal practitioners shouldn’t be able to exploit and contract out of a 
system. (trans., pp. 170–1) 
An interesting example was provided by the NSW scheme which used a ‘negative fee’ 
scale whereby lawyers received proportionally higher fees for earlier settlements. This     
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approach encourages more intensive information gathering and analysis to occur at the 
beginning of the process.  
Medical assessments 
Many disputes rest on questions of medical opinion. Over the past decade, most 
jurisdictions have moved from relying on participant provision of expert testimony to using 
panels of medical experts to rule on medical matters. This has reduced expert testimony 
disputation and medical panels have become valued for their independence as well as the 
time and cost-savings they can deliver. The criticism of relying on expert testimony has 
been that when required to adjudicate on divergent opinion, judges have ‘split the 
difference’ (Boden 1992). This in turn encourages the use of ambit claims which can 
undermine confidence in the whole process.  
Many stakeholders find the process of determining medical opinion adversarial. Worse, 
some view expert witnesses as partisan and their decisions as being ‘up for sale’. Similar 
views are held by some judges. Freckelton, in reviewing Australian judicial perspectives 
on expert evidence, reported that: 
•  70% regularly heard expert witnesses representing the same side; and 
•  40% thought the partisanship in testimony was a significant problem for the quality of 
fact finding in court. (Freckelton 1999, p. 154)  
It was suggested by Dr Niall, chief medical officer of the Compensation Court of New 
South Wales, that as an alternative to formal statutory mechanisms, there could be scope 
for joint medical consultations to provide a non-statutory method of resolving medical 
disputes. He noted that it had been used by self-insurers and by insurers. He considered 
that ‘In the right circumstances … [it could form] … an excellent adjunct to formal 
medical panel assessments’ (IRsub. 198, p. 7).  
Typically, joint medical consultations involve two doctors consensually appointed by the 
parties to answer specific medical questions. Dr Niall considered that it was likely to be 
successful where adversarial feeling was not high and where the parties could negotiate 
arrangements for themselves. While not specifically excluded by existing formal dispute 
settlement arrangements, the issue remains as to whether there should be formal 
recognition of its role in dispute resolution legislation and the nature of its recognition, if 
any. The Commission also notes that a form of this has been trialled by the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal (appendix F).  
Transformation Management Systems (1995b, p. 5) has suggested that there are several 
‘best practice’ principles which ought to be employed when designing medical panels, 
namely:     
    383
 
•  appointments should be independent and by peer — to ensure that panels are trusted 
and treated as experts; 
•  cases should be screened so medical panels deal with only complex medical issues;  
•  medical panels should address medical fact only (away from fitness for work 
assessments — an example that blurs medical and legal issues) such that appeals can be 
limited without inhibiting the right to due process; and 
•  their decision on such matters should be final. 
On the scope for medical panels, Dr Niall advised:  
… you really ought not to ask doctors other than what you might call pure medical 
questions. If you do — you want a medical slant on some issues which may not be 
entirely medical [for example, treatment disputes and causation disputes] — then you 
should be cautious about making the doctor’s opinion in those circumstances 
conclusive. (trans., p. 1085)  
It was because of such concerns that the Queensland Council of Unions advocated medical 
review panels ‘… must be used on questions of medical opinions only …’ (IRsub. 241, 
p. 9). Concerns about using medical opinions conclusively on other than medical matters 
were also raised by BDS Recruit Pty Ltd (IRsub. 213) and by The Workers Compensation 
Support Network (IRsub. 212).  
13.4  National framework issues 
Dispute resolution schemes in the different jurisdictions share several common features. A 
form of conciliation is used in all jurisdictions and the use of arbitration is almost as wide 
spread. Despite these similarities, some participants advocated moves toward a more 
standardised dispute resolution system. Greater standardisation was sought by the 
Insurance Council of Australia so as to minimise compliance costs and to prevent the 
differences acting as ‘a catalyst for increased disparities in outcomes between jurisdictions’ 
(ICA, sub.  74, p.  29). Others, such as the Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees’ 
Association Victorian Branch, saw strengths in State-based systems of dispute resolution 
which could not be replicated nationally (IRsub. 239, p. 15–17). 
For inter-state firms that have their employees covered under a number of workers’ 
compensation schemes, the associated dispute resolution procedures raise added 
compliance issues and costs. These derive from the need to: 
•  conform to the particular dispute resolution procedures specified in each jurisdiction; 
•  prepare the appropriate material in a timely manner; and 
•  engage a variety of legal resources who are expert in the various jurisdictions.     
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While the preparation costs would be incurred irrespective of the jurisdiction in which the 
dispute was heard, with a common dispute resolution system, the added costs from meeting 
the differing requirements of each existing system would be avoided.  
However, as several participants have reinforced, dispute resolution must be designed with 
the details of each scheme in mind. Insurance Australia Group considered that it was: 
… difficult to compare the various approaches as the results may reflect broader 
scheme design and cultural issues … The success of the scheme is dependent on the 
ability to resolve disputes and the appropriate ADR mechanism is dependent on the 
type of scheme. (sub. 89, p. 30) 
Another factor that mitigates against rapidly moving to a simple national system is that, in 
order to work effectively, a well designed scheme has to be understood and respected by 
the people that use it. As BDS Recruit Pty Ltd added, ‘Each participant should also 
understand the role others have in the system’ (IRsub. 213, p. 6).  
Dispute resolution schemes have gone through considerable change in the past ten years, 
often in response to unintended consequences of previous reforms. Thus when determining 
if further changes are warranted, the cost of added confusion should not be ignored.  
Queensland reports the lowest rate of disputation (figure  13.1). Transformation 
Management Services suggested that : 
… [the reason] we think it’s so successful in keeping its disputes down … is that they 
have had longstanding entitlements and there is a strong cultural understanding of what 
their rights are and how the system works. Everybody knows what to do. (trans., 
p. 937) 
Some features of the Queensland system which contribute to its success in achieving 
equitable outcomes that the Queensland WorkCover drew attention to were: its non 
adversarial nature; reasonable timeframes for review of decisions; independent review of 
decisions by the regulator; and independent assessment of medical decisions by medical 
assessment tribunals (IRsub. 225, p. 39).  
Differences between jurisdiction can also provide scope for innovation and development. 
Recognising successful new approaches elsewhere could result in schemes iterating toward 
best practice. For example, the Insurance Australia Group saw merit in combining the 
mediation/conciliation step of the WA scheme and the determinative aspects of the 
Workers Compensation Commission in New South Wales (trans., pp. 609–10).  
The following recommendation, prefaced in the interim report, was generally supported by 
a range of participants (Australian Business Limited, IRsub.  249, p.  18; Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, IRsub. 196, p. 26; Australian Meat Industry Council, 
IRsub. 234, p. 7; Housing Industry Association, IRsub. 193, p. 8; Queensland Council of 
Unions, IRsub. 241, p. 9). Those that sought maintenance of a substantial role for common     
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law in the operation of workers’ compensation schemes also saw the use of the courts as 
the last resort and were supportive of mandatory pre-litigation procedures (K M Splatt & 
Associates, IRsub. 197, p. 2).  
Willis considered that, while the recommendations were excellent in theory, they could be 
improved if there was ‘A formal system of feedback and evaluation by claimants …’ 
(IRsub. 244, p. 4). There was general recognition that to operate effectively, any dispute 
resolution system needed to be adequately resourced with appropriately qualified and 
experienced people. 
The Commission recommends the following features of mechanisms to manage and 
resolve disputes about claims in an equitable and effective manner:  
•  be tailored to deal with the disputes arising from the specific workers’ 
compensation scheme that it supports and the broader dispute resolution 
culture of the jurisdiction within which it operates;  
•  be supported by claims handling methods that minimise the likelihood of 
disputes arising in the first place. These include:  
–  the provision of information about the scheme to stakeholders which explain their 
benefits and rights;  
–  informed initial claims decisions based on an early exchange of all available 
information; and 
–  use of provisional liability/payments for a limited period; and 
•  applications to be screened, using the least invasive methods first. These 
include: 
–  a requirement for claims managers to provide for, and injured workers to first 
use, internal review procedures;  
–  use of alternative dispute resolution procedures involving mediation/ conciliation 
and arbitration, with incentives for the use of the least invasive; 
–  identification and, as appropriate, rectification of informational and power 
imbalances; 
–  appeals allowable to a suitable court on points of law; and  
–  use of independent medical panels to provide final and binding determinations on 
questions of medical opinion.  
Under the national framework model D as outlined in chapter 5, there would be no change 
initially in current disputes settlements arrangements. Over time, if the recommendation 
was adopted by the individual jurisdictions and the national body achieved more formal 
information sharing and cooperative policy formulation in workers’ compensation among 
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the jurisdictions, then there could be a greater consistency of disputes settlements among 
the existing schemes.  
Under model A (self-insurance under Comcare), dispute resolution would be as currently 
applies under the Comcare scheme. It involves an independent review within Comcare, 
followed, if needed, by Administrative Appeals Tribunal case conferences, mediation, 
conciliation and a Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal’s determinations are conclusive, except 
on points of law where appeals to the Federal Court are permitted. Details of the dispute 
resolution system are given in appendix F.  
In terms of Comcare’s existing dispute resolution procedures, the existing mechanisms 
which do not already reflect those recommended are the use of provisional 
liability/payments and determinations on questions of medical opinion. Model  B (an 
alternative national self-insurance scheme) and model C (an alternative national premium-
paying insurance scheme) both require new legislation to be implemented. This provides 
an opportunity to review Comcare’s dispute resolution procedures and adopt procedures 
that more closely implement the mechanisms recommended above.  
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A  Conduct of the inquiry 
A.1 Introduction 
The Commission received a total of 262 submissions during the inquiry — 177 were 
received prior to the release of the interim report in December 2003 and a further 85 
following its release. All submissions are listed in section A.2. In addition, those who 
provided comment on the interim report at public hearings are shown in section A.4. 
Following receipt of the terms of reference, the Commission placed advertisements in 
national and metropolitan newspapers and appropriate publications inviting public 
participation in the inquiry. Information about the inquiry was circulated to people and 
organisations likely to have an interest in it. The Commission also released an issues paper 
to assist parties in preparing their submissions. Subsequent information about the progress 
of the inquiry has been sent to those who have expressed an interest. All of this 
information has been made available on the Commission’s website 
(http://www.pc.gov.au). 
A.2  List of submissions 
The following table lists submissions received. Submissions containing commercial-in-
confidence information have been denoted with an asterisk (*). 
Participant Submission  no. 
ACROD Limited  IR 242 
ACT Government  IR 243 
ACTU  133, IR 186 
AMP  121 
Aon  73 
ARIMA Ltd, Victoria  25 
Association of Rehabilitation Providers in the Private Sector, ACT  139 
Participant Submission  no.     
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Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union  117 
Australian Business Limited  106, IR 249 
Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd   96, 170, IR 247 
Australian Bankers’ Association  101* 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry  81, 116, 138, IR 196 
Australian Clinical Psychologists  34 
Australian Dental Association, Victoria  46 
Australian Industry Group  104, IR 240 
Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union  119, IR 188, IR 231 
Australian Meat Industry Council  
(formerly The National Meat Association of Australia)  IR 234 
Australian Medical Association  54 
Australian Nursing Federation  70 
Australian Physiotherapy Association  20 
Australian Plaintiff Lawyers’ Association   69, IR 252 
Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association  160, 175, IR 183, IR 228 
Australian Services Union, South Australia and Northern Territory  33 
Ausworks 161 
Bates,  Ms Julie Marie  IR 179 
BDS Pty Ltd  36 
BDS Recruit Pty Ltd  IR 213 
Belle Design and Manufacturing  2* 
BHP Billiton Ltd  110 
Boyer,  Ms Ros    50 
Burnie City Council  18 
Business Council of Australia  143 
Business SA  53, IR 187 
Buys,  Associate Professor Nicholas  92 
Bywater,  Mr Kevin   56* 
Carnegy,  Mr Ivan  115 
Centennial Coal Company Ltd  145 
CFMEU (Mining and Energy Division)  153, IR 257 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Western Australia  55 
Chiropractors’ Association of Australia (National) Limited  IR 230 
Participant Submission  no. 
Clark,  P S  127, IR 254 
Coal Services Pty Limited  IR 232     
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Coles Myer Ltd  155 
Commonwealth Safety Management Forum  IR 258 
Community & Public Sector Union/State Public Services  
Federation Group  52, IR 246 
Congress of Occupational Safety and Health Association Presidents  45 
Council of Small Business Organisations of Australia Ltd  7 
CSR Ltd  109 
Defence Personnel  6 
Dept of Consumer and Employment Protection, Western Australia  58, IR 219 
Dept of Employment and Workplace Relations  166 
Dept of Family and Community Services  167 
Dial-An-Angel Pty Ltd  149 
Direct Selling Association of Australia Inc  100, IR 209 
Employment Advocacy Solutions Pty Ltd  41 
Field,  Ms Evelyn  1 
Flint Forensics Pty Ltd  150 
Geoff McDonald & Associates Pty Ltd  IR 192, IR 226 
GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd  158 
Green Triangle Injured Persons Support Group Inc  21 
Group Training Australia Ltd  65 
Henderson,  Ms Terri  4 
H.R. Nicholls Society  140 
HMV Australia Pty Ltd  30 
Hollis-Watts,  Mr Phillip  173 
Housing Industry Association Ltd  35, IR 193 
Injuries Australia  43, 125, IR 200, IR 221, IR 248 
Institute of Actuaries of Australia  88, 171, IR 182 
Insurance Australia Group  89, 146 
Insurance Council of Australia  74, 162, 174, IR 260 
Insured Persons Action & Support Association  90 
Jim Pearson Transport  IR 224 
Kamalaharan,  Dr & Associates  118 
Participant Submission  no. 
K M Splatt & Associates  IR 197, IR 210, IR 214, IR 216 
Labour Force Australia Pty Ltd  26 
Labor Council of New South Wales  147 
Law Council of Australia  62, IR 194, IR 250     
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LMR Roofing Pty Ltd  87, IR 199 
Lucire,  Dr Yolande  102 
Mak,  Mr Hing Kwok  44 
Manpower Services (Australia) Pty Ltd  IR 178 
Master Builders Australia Inc  79, IR 217 
Master Cleaners Guild of Western Australia Inc  24 
May,  Mr John and Burl, Ms Margo  60 
Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance  86, 122* 
Merse, FitzGerald & Nichols Pty Ltd  5 
Millen,  Mr Jed  61 
Minerals Council of Australia  63, 141 
MS Australia, Victoria  77 
National Australia Bank Ltd  42 
National Council of Self Insurers  72, 168, IR 223, IR 261 
National Farmers’ Federation  94 
National Insurance Brokers Association  59, 129, IR 204 
National Research Centre for OH&S Regulation,  
Regulatory Institutions Network  22 
National Tertiary Education Industry Union  68 
NatRoad Limited  IR 236 
Niall,  Dr Paul  IR 198 
Northern Territory Association of Rehabilitation Providers  152 
Northern Territory Government  144 
NSW Minerals Council  172, IR 235 
O’Donnell,  Ms Carol  10, 13, IR 184 
Objective Claims Solutions  17 
OccCorp  49, IR 195 
Oddy,  Mr Trevor  95 
OT Australia, Queensland  159 
OT Australia, Victoria  16, 131 
Participant Submission  no. 
Pacific National  169 
Pacific Terminals (Australia) Pty Ltd  85 
Peak Conditioning Pty Ltd  142 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association  114, IR 222 
QBE Insurance  99 
Queensland Council of Unions  91, IR 206, IR 241     
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Queensland Government – Dept of Industrial Relations  154 
Queensland Law Society  97, IR 207, IR 245 
Queensland Workers’ Compensation Self Insurers’ Association  IR 253 
Quinlan,  Professor Michael  93 
Recovre 157 
Recruitment and Consulting Services Association Ltd  47, 177 
Rehab One Physiotherapy  IR 218 
RSI & Overuse Injury Association of the ACT  113 
Safety Institute of Australia  48 
Sandilands,  Mr P A  23, 176, 181, IR 191, IR 211, IR 259 
Self Insurers Association of Victoria  107, 163 
Self Insurers of South Australia  71 
Sherryl Catchpole Medical Pty Ltd  128 
Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees’ Association, 
Victorian Branch  IR 239 
Sing Tel Optus Pty Ltd  57*, 134, IR 189 
Skilled Engineering  IR 202, IR 208 
SoftLaw Corporation Ltd  132 
South Australian Rehabilitation Providers’ Association  67 
Specpipe Group  IR 215 
Spencer,  Ms Geraldine  3, 9, 11, 12, 148, IR 180, IR 185, IR 201 
Spooner,  Mr Michael  103 
Statewide Group Training South Australia  80 
Tasmanian Government  135 
Taylor,  Mr Robert Richard  126, IR 203 
Taylor,  Ms Charmaine  78* 
Telstra Corporation Limited  136 
Territory Insurance Office  27 
Participant Submission  no. 
The Association for Payroll Specialists  15, IR 227 
The Australasian Faculty of Occupational Medicine  29 
The Australian Psychological Society Ltd  38, 165 
The Australian Workers Union, Greater South Australian Branch  112 
The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia Inc  IR 237 
The Ergonomics Society of Australia Inc  123, 86 
The National Meat Association of Australia  82 
The National Meat Association of Australia, New South Wales  84     
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The National Meat Association of Australia, Queensland  83 
The New South Wales Bar Association  64, IR 190 
The RiskNet Group  120 
Transformation Management Services  108 
United Group Limited  31, IR 238 
Valued Independent People Inc  14 
Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce  105 
Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry  66 
Victorian Government  164, IR 256 
Westpac Banking Corporation  75, 130, IR 229 
Wigglesworth,  Dr Eric  8 
Willis,  Ms Judith S  124*, IR 244 
Winsen,  Dr J K  76 
Winzer,  Mr Neil  39, IR 220 
Woolworths Ltd  98, 156 
WorkCover New South Wales  151, IR 255 
WorkCover Queensland  IR 205, IR 225 
Workers’Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission  
of Western Australia  111, 137, IR 262 
Workers Compensation Support Network  19, IR 212 
Working Amour  28, IR 251 
Workplace Injury Management Services Pty Ltd  37 
Worksafe Western Australia Commission  51 
Wright MP,  The Hon Michael   IR 233 
Xstrata Coal Australia Pty Ltd  32, 40* 
A.3 Visits 
During the course of the inquiry, 120 meetings were conducted covering each state and 
territory. 
Australian Capital Territory 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association 
Australian Taxation Office 
Chief Minister’s Department     
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Coal Services Pty Limited 
Comcare Australia 
Council of Small Business Organisations of Australia Ltd 
Defence Personnel 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 
Department of Family and Community Services 
Department of Finance and Administration 
Department of Health and Aged Care 
Department of the Treasury 
Master Builders’ Australia Inc 
National Farmers’ Federation 
National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
National Safety Council of Australia 
Seacare Authority 
Standing Committee on Employment and Workplace Relations 
The Australian Psychological Society Ltd 
The Government Actuary 
WorkCover Authority 
New South Wales 
Australian Employers Federation 
Australian Industry Group 
ANZ 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association 
BHP Billiton Ltd 
GIO 
Injuries Australia 
Insurance Australia Group 
Insurance Council of Australia 
New South Wales Minerals Council 
Pacific National 
Professor Michael Quinlan 
Self Insurers Association 
Sing Tel Optus Pty Ltd 
University of NSW, Centre for Tax Studies 
Westpac Banking Corporation 
WorkCover New South Wales 
Workers’ Compensation Commission     
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Northern Territory 
Australian Medical Association 
Australian Nursing Federation 
Commonwealth Public Sector Union 
Department of Corporate and Information Services 
Department of Employment, Education and Training 
Department of Workplace Relations 
Department of the Chief Minister 
Northern Territory Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Northern Territory Law Society 
Northern Territory Treasury 
Northern Territory University, Law School 
Office of the Commissioner for Public Employment 
Territory Insurance Office 
United Trades and Labor Council 
Queensland 
Australian Plaintiff Lawyers Association 
Brisbane City Council 
Council of Unions 
Department of Industrial Relations 
Department of Premier and Cabinet 
Inergise Australia 
Nevin,  Mr Bill  
Q-Comp 
Queensland Council of Unions 
Queensland Mining Council 
Self Insurers Association 
Shine Roche McGowan 
Woolworths Ltd 
WorkCover 
Workers Medical Centre 
Work Health Safety 
South Australia 
Business SA 
Department of Administrative and Information Services 
Department of Business, Manufacturing and Trade 
Department of Premier and Cabinet 
Department of Treasury and Finance     
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Office for the Commissioner for Public Employment 
Origin Energy 
Peakcare 
Self Insurers Association 




Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources 
Department of Premier and Cabinet 
Kirwan & Associates 
Self Insurers Association 
Workplace Standards Australia 
Victoria 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Australian Council of Trade Unions 
Bracton Consulting Services 
Carter Holt Harvey Aust 
Coles Myer Ltd 
Department of Premier and Cabinet 
Department of Treasury and Finance 
GIO 
National Road Transport Commission 
Self-Insurers Association 
The Australian Psychological Society Ltd 





Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Coles Myer Ltd 
Department of the Treasury 
Insurance Australia Group 
Insurance Commission     
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Self Insurers Association 




A.4 Public  hearings 
Public hearings were held during June 2003 in all States and the Australian Capital 
Territory, Darwin’s hearing was held via video link. Interim Report hearings were held in 
December 2003 in Victoria, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory. 
 
Table A.1 Public  hearings 
Participant  Transcript page no.
Hobart Hearing – 10 June 2003 
Safety Institute of Australia  2 – 19 
Merse Fitzgerald and Nichols Pty Ltd  20 – 30 
Mr Robert Pearce  31 – 40 
Ms Sharon Hyland  41 – 48 
Adelaide Hearing – 12 June 2003 
Congress of Occupational Safety and Health 
Association Presidents  50 – 63 
Self Insurers Association  64 – 88 
Rehabilitation Providers Association of SA  89 – 109 
Mr Kevin Purse  110 – 137 
Perth Hearing – 13 June 2003 
Mr Neil Robert Winzer  139 – 147 
Mr Robert Guthrie  148 – 172 
Mining and Resources Contractors Safety 
and Training Association  173 – 183 
Mr David Massey  184 – 187 
Mr Les Reid  188 – 191 
Group Training Australia  192 – 193 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Western Australia  194 – 210     
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Darwin Hearing – 16 June 2003 
Worksafe  212 – 231 
Law Society of the Northern Territory  232 – 236 
Canberra Hearing – 18 June 2003 
Ms Terri Henderson and Mr Graeme Rodda  238 – 250 
Geraldine Spencer (assisted by Terri Henderson)  251 – 255 
RSI and Overuse Injury Association of the ACT  256 – 272 
Trevor and Maree Oddy  273 – 286 
Ms Terri Henderson  287 – 288 
Sing Tel Optus Pty Ltd  289 – 305 
Participant  Transcript page no.
Brisbane Hearing – 23 June 2003 
Queensland Council of Unions  307 – 320 
Queensland Law Society  321 – 332 
National Meat Association  333 – 354 
Mr Jed Millen  355 – 366 
Workers Compensation Support Network  367 – 373 
Housing Industry Association Ltd  374 – 393 
Sydney Hearing – 24 June 2003 
Australian Industry Group  395 – 418 
Law Council of Australia  419 – 431 
National Meat Association of Australia and New South Wales  432 – 448 
Injuries Australia  449 – 461 
QBE Insurance  462 – 481 
Westpac Banking Corporation  482 – 491 
RiskNet Group  492 – 513 
Employers First  514 – 528 
Self Insurers Association  529 – 543 
Woolworths Ltd  544 – 557 
Sydney Hearing – 25 June 2003 
LMR Roofing Pty Ltd  559 – 574 
National Insurance Brokers Association  575 – 592 
Insurance Australia Group  593 – 618 
Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance  619 – 627 
United Group Limited  628 – 644 
Group Training Australia Ltd  645 – 652 
Insurance Council of Australia  653 – 671 
CSR Ltd  672 – 684 
Australian Business Limited  685 – 698 
Dr S Kamalaharan/Therese Daubras/Graeme Osborne  699 – 715     
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Forest Product Association  716 – 718 
Melbourne Hearing – 26 June 2003 
Self Insurers Association  720 – 739 
Australasian Faculty of Occupational Medicine  740 – 750 
Dr Eric Wigglesworth  751 – 761 
OT Australia  762 – 774 
Participant  Transcript page no.
Mr Michael Spooner  775 – 789 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry  790 – 811 
MS Australia  812 – 819 
The Australian Psychological Society Ltd  820 – 836 
Meat Industry Employees Union  837 – 851 
Working Armour  852 – 864 
Melbourne Hearing – 27 June 2003 
National Farmers Federation  866 – 882 
Institute of Actuaries of Australia  883 – 914 
Australian Manufacturing Workers Union  915 – 929 
Transformation Management Services  930 – 946 
Recruitment and Consulting Services Association  947 – 965 
Melbourne Hearing – 1 December 2003 
Mr Philip Clark   967 – 979 
Ms Evelyn Field  980 – 991 
Australian Council of Trade Unions  ) 
Queensland Council of Unions  ) 
Unions Tasmania  992 – 1027) 
National Union of Workers, Victoria Branch  ) 
Skilled Engineering  1028 – 1038 
Australian Faculty of Occupational Medicine  1039 – 1047 
Sydney Hearing – 4 December 2003 
Australian Industry Group  1049 – 1068 
Accident Compensation Committee of The Queensland  
Law Society  1069 – 1083 
Dr Paul Niall  1084 – 1094 
Law Council of Australia  1095 – 1113 
Australian Plaintiff Lawyers’ Association – Qld  1114 – 1133 
Mr P A Sandilands  1134 – 1138 
K M Splatt & Associates Pty Ltd  1139 – 1151 
Geoff McDonald and Associates  1152 – 1161     
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NSW Minerals Council  1162 – 1171 
Direct Selling Association of Australia Inc  1172 – 1178 
LMR Roofing Pty Ltd  1179 – 1193 
The Association for Payroll Specialists  1194 – 1197 
Australian Manufacturing Workers Union  1198 – 1211 
Sydney Hearing – 5 December 2003 
Housing Industry Association Ltd  1213 – 1230 
Crane Group  1231 – 1240 
Injuries Australia  1241 – 1252 
Ms Carol O’Donnell  1253 – 1260 
Insurance Council of Australia  1261 – 1285 
Canberra Hearing – 8 December 2003 
Office of Industrial Relations, ACT Chief 
Minister’s Department  1287 – 1305 
Geraldine Spencer (assisted by Terri Henderson)  1306 – 1310 
Australian Rehabilitation Providers Association  1311 – 1322 
Ms Terri Henderson  1323 – 1330 
Australian Nursing Federation  1331 – 1343 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry  1344 – 1362 
Minerals Council of Australia  1363 – 1375 
Australian Physiotherapy Association  1376 – 1382 
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B Australian  Government  Actuary 
As part of its inquiry process, the Commission requested advice from the Australian 
Government Actuary as to the financial impact on the Australian Government if private 
sector employers were encouraged to seek self-insurance under the Safety, Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Act 1988. This appendix provides a copy of the Actuary’s advice. 
The appendix is structured as follows: 
B.1 Introduction   
B.2 Background   
B.3  The nature of financial risk to the Commonwealth  
B.4  Existing prudential arrangements  
B.5  Possible changes to the prudential framework  
B.1 Introduction 
1.1   We have been asked by the Productivity Commission to provide advice in relation 
to its ‘Inquiry into National Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety 
Frameworks’. 
1.2  Specifically, we have been asked to consider the impacts on the Commonwealth 
which might arise if private sector employers were encouraged to seek self-insurance 
licences under the Safely Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (‘the Act’). In 
particular: 
•  The nature of financial risks to the Commonwealth were applications to be approved; 
•  The adequacy of existing prudential arrangements under the Act; 
•  How existing prudential arrangements could be changed to reduce to an acceptable 
level the financial risks to the Commonwealth. 
1.3  We provided related advice on this matter to the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations in 2002. We understand that the Productivity Commission has a copy 
of that paper.     
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1.4  This current report only considers the specific issues above. A number of other 
issues fall outside the scope of this report. However, they are important and would also 
require careful consideration. Some of these issues are: 
•  OHS performance assessment, audit, and management 
•  Workplace relations issues associated with self-insurance 
•  Scheme design under the Act 
•  Possible downstream impacts on State schemes 
1.5  The findings in this report are based on our: 
•  Examination of the Act and of the prudential conditions in some other jurisdictions 
•  Discussions with the Commission and examination of a number of documents provided by 
them 
•  Discussions with APRA about the operation of bank guarantees. 
B.2 Background 
2.1  Under the Act, the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (‘the 
Commission’) can grant ‘licences to enable Commonwealth authorities and certain 
corporations to accept liability for, and/or manage, claims’. 
2.2  There are at least three reasons why a large employer may want to self-insure under 
a single licence: 
•  Administration and compliance cost savings 
•  Workplace relations 
•  Anticipated claims cost savings 
Administration and compliance 
2.3  Large firms which operate nationally may have to comply with up to eight different 
workers' compensation regimes. Depending on their employee distribution, they may self-
insure in some jurisdictions and pay premiums in others. If these firms were able to operate 
under a single workers' compensation licence and a single set of workers' compensation 
benefit provisions, then they would probably benefit from some administration and 
compliance savings.     
    405
 
Workplace relations 
2.4  A further motivation to self-insure (and the reason most often put by employers) is 
the desire to have full control over the whole workplace safety process — from injury 
prevention, to rehabilitation, to return-to-work, and to compensating genuinely injured 
employees. ‘Serious’ firms will argue that worker well-being is a fundamental aspect of 
running the business properly. They would say, for example, that they have a stronger 
interest in return-to-work than an insurer or a scheme and this is in the interests of the 
worker. Bottom line benefits arise consequentially through increased productivity, better 
staff morale, as well as reduced claim costs. 
Claims cost savings 
2.5  Claims cost savings could arise if the Commonwealth Scheme provides lesser 
benefits than the aggregate of the benefits provided under the State Schemes. Based on our 
knowledge of the arrangements, it would seem unlikely that there would be significant cost 
savings because of this. 
2.6  There may be a financial incentive for employers who are premium payers to a 
State Scheme which is in deficit to look for a national option. How strong an incentive this 
is will depend on transitional arrangements. 
2.7  There can also be a perception, which may or may not turn out to be real, that there 
will be other claims cost savings if an employer does not participate in a pool. A variation 
on this is that employers may tend to think that they have better than average workplace 
practices. Accordingly, if they self-insure and have control of their destiny, they will not be 
dragged down by the bad practices of other employers. 
B.3  The nature of financial risk to the Commonwealth 
3.1  This section considers direct financial risk to the Commonwealth which may arise 
if self-insurance licenses are granted to employers. It does not consider indirect financial 
risk (for example, associated with possible flow-on effects to State Schemes). Nor does it 
consider non-financial risk (for example, perception risk which may arise if employers 
with inadequate workplace safety systems are granted licences). 
Background 
3.2  Self-insurers have to meet the full cost of their own workers' compensation claims 
from within their own balance sheet.     
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3.3  Reinsurance can help to smooth the costs somewhat over time, and is a particularly 
important risk management tool in respect of very big claims. Under the Act, claimants 
may be entitled to fortnightly income replacement benefit up to age 65, reimbursement of 
out-of-pocket expenses for medical treatment, attendant care, etc and lump sums for 
permanent impairment. A very large claim (say for quadriplegia or brain injury) could run 
well into the millions of dollars over the lifetime of the claimant. 
3.4  Some benefits under the Act (eg medical) are payable for life. Therefore, a self-
insurer's outstanding claims liability may have a very long tail. For a newly-licensed self-
insurer, the liability will take some time to mature, but for some employers could 
conceivably grow to around 50% of their payroll. This could happen especially if there is 
poorer than expected claims experience. Balance sheet movements in the workers' 
compensation liability may have a material impact on the employer's overall bottom-line 
performance. 
3.5  So long as a self-insurer is able to meet its accrued workers’ compensation 
obligations from within its balance sheet, there is no direct financial exposure to the 
Commonwealth. 
Problem areas 
3.6  Should things go wrong, there may be a financial risk to the Comonwealth. Things 
are most likely to go wrong if a self-insurer goes out of business, particularly because of 
insolvency. The extent of the risk to the Commonwealth (associated with self-insurer 
insolvency) depends on the security systems (ie prudential arrangements) that are in place. 
3.7  Related to this, it is instructive to consider the case where the Commission decides 
to revoke a self-insurer's licence. This might happen for any one of a number of reasons, 
for example: 
•  Failure to meet a licence condition, eg renewal of bank guarantee. (This may in turn be 
associated with worsening financial health of the self-insurer or ballooning 
compensation costs.) 
•  Inadequate OHS performance 
3.8  It is fair to assume that the revocation of a licence may be inked to financial 
pressure on the licensee, even though the financial pressure may be less than in the event 
of insolvency (at least it the short term). Thus, to understand the nature of the financial 
risks to the Commonwealth associated with expanding the group of self-insurers, it is 
instructive to consider what might happen if a licence is revoked. 
3.9  If a self-insurance licence is revoked, we understand that the ‘legal liability’ 
remains with the self-insurer. The liability in this case refers to the cost of claims arising     
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during the period of the self-insurance licence. This seems appropriate. However, there is 
likely to be an expectation, at least amongst claimants, that the Commonwealth will take 
steps to ensure that the liability is satisfactorily discharged. Certainly it would be expected 
that the Commission would have an active role in managing the orderly exit of a self-
insurer whose licence had been revoked. 
3.10  Therefore, it is necessary to see what prudential arrangements are in place to secure 
the liability, 
3.11  The cornerstones of the arrangements are requirements to: 
•  obtain regular actuarial evaluation of the claims liability 
•  maintain a bank guarantee of a specified amount 
•  obtain reinsurance protection as directed by the Commission. 
3.12  The Commonwealth will be most directly exposed if these arrangements fail. 
3.13  Of particular relevance is the adequacy of the bank guarantee. 
3.14  The Commission has advised us that the bank guarantee is: 
•  in favour of the Commission; 
•  up to a specified amount; and 
•  irrevocable. 
3.15  All of this provides comfort. Other jurisdictions have broadly similar bank 
guarantee requirements for self-insurers. APRA has confirmed that when these sorts of 
bank guarantee are offered, they would normally be fully collateralised. 
3.16  The Commission requires bank guarantees to be renewed at a higher amount if 
liabilities increase. The effective requirement for full collateral means that it will more 
difficult for a firm which is in financial trouble to obtain a renewal. This is another 
example of a circumstance where a licence may be revoked. 
3.17  It seems likely that if a licence were revoked because of assessed financial 
difficulties, the Commission would call the bank guarantee (however the Act does not 
specify what the sequence of events is). It is worth noting that this would occur even 
though the licensee would retain the legal liability as described in paragraph 3.9. 
3.18  This would provide an amount of funds (presumably held in trust by the 
Commission for the benefit of relevant injured workers). These funds could be drawn on 
by the licensee. If the application of the funds were limited to the discharge of workers' 
compensation entitlements (which we understand would be intended), then this provides an 
additional layer of comfort. In effect, it quarantines the funds so that they can only be     
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applied to the claims of injured workers and not to the claims of other creditors. This 
would be particularly relevant in the case of wind-up of the company.  
3.19  On balance, as suggested above, it is not unreasonable to assume that if a licence is 
revoked, the firm may be in some financial trouble and the main source of funds to meet 
the relevant claims liability will be the bank guarantee. The Commonwealth will be 
exposed if the bank guarantee is inadequate. This may happen for a number of reasons, 
primarily: 
•  Expected inadequacy 
The bank guarantee is set at the intended 95
th percentile. So, it is to be 'expected' that 
occasionally it will be inadequate, even if it has been properly calculated. 
•  Large event risk 
Large events with low probabilities will result in substantial increases to the liability. 
Fortunately this increase in liability is usually passed onto the reinsurer. However this 
will not always be the case. For example, terrorism related claims would typically be 
excluded from the reinsurance contract. This sort of event could lead to the true liability 
being well in excess of the amount of the bank guarantee. It is also likely that this type 
of event would place the employer in financial stress for other reasons. 
•  Estimation error 
This type of claims distribution is not always well understood. In particular, the tail of 
this type of distribution is not well understood. Reliable evaluation at the 95
th percentile 
requires a sound understanding of the distribution, particularly the tail. The notion that 
the distribution has been evaluated at the 95
th percentile may appear to provide more 
comfort than it actually does. 
•  Inadequate allowance for latent exposures 
In some cases, large latent exposures may exist which have not been identified or 
reserved for. There is a good chance that such exposures will also fall outside of the 
reinsurance contract. A historical example is asbestos-related claims. Australia-wide, 
outstanding asbestos-related liabilities are probably several billion dollars. A future 
example might be claims relating to sun-cancer. 
•  Insolvency ‘creates’ claims 
In the event of insolvency leading to unemployment of the licensee’s workforce extra 
claims are likely to be reported. Workers with reduced employment prospects can ‘find 
reasons’ to make compensation claims. 
•  Reinsurance failure 
The bank guarantee relates to the liability, net of reinsurance. If this has been 
misjudged (for example, if certain recoveries are wrongly assumed, the reinsurer 
disputes claims, premiums have not been paid, or simply if the reinsurer fails) then the 
true net liability may be understated. 
•  Non-compliance with the prudential rules     
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For example, the bank guarantee is not kept up to date. Employers in financial trouble 
are likely to have poor record keeping or even keep deliberately wrong records, which 
lead, for example, to an inadequate bank guarantee. 
•  Value of money erodes over time 
The bank guarantee is related to a discounted present value of the liabilities. Unless 
properly invested by the Commission, the value may erode over time and ultimately 
prove unable to keep pace with benefit inflation. 
3.20  The Commonwealth would also be exposed in the very unlikely event of bank 
failure, but it is more likely to be exposed as a result of fraud, eg falsifying bank guarantee 
documents. 
3.21  The list above describes the various risks. The purpose was to identtfy them rather 
than to conclude that they are unreasonable or unacceptably high. The next chapter looks at 
the prudential arrangements, which are, of course, designed to address the financial risks. 
3.22  Finally, a side issue. If a licence is revoked, it is not totally clear what the fall-back 
position would be for employees. For the period that the licence is in place, employee 
compensation benefits are governed by the provisions of the Act. However, once a licence 
is revoked, it seems likely that the fall-back position would be to the relevant State scheme 
provisions. This is likely to create administrative and workplace relations headaches. We 
suspect that there may be pressure on the Commission to maintain licences for longer then 
they would like in some circumstances. If this is the case, then any financial risk to the 
Commonwealth would be increased. 
3.23  As mentioned in Chapter 1 we have not considered possible indirect financial risk 
to the Commonwealth, which may arise if this measure were (argued) to lead to financial 
pressure on the State schemes. For example, State schemes may complain that the costs of 
their schemes have increased as a result and the Commonwealth should compensate them. 
This may be particularly so for a State Scheme with a deficit which is being funded over 
time. 
B.4  Existing prudential arrangements 
4.1  The current Commonwealth prudential arrangements are built around the 
following: 
•  Licensing process. This is intended to ensure that only firms with adequate financial 
capacity and OHS systems are granted a licence. 
•  Active and regular actuarial evaluation of the outstanding claims liability and the 
expected accruing liability.     
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•  A requirement to effect reinsurance for large claims with a licensed insurer and a 
requirement to obtain certain actuarial advice on the reinsurance arrangements. 
•  A requirement to maintain a bank guarantee of an amount equal to the 95
th percentile of 
the claims liability distribution, with a reputable bank. 
•  A requirement to demonstrate the financial capacity to withstand one catastrophe and a 
requirement for the actuary to express an opinion on this capacity. 
•  Some reporting requirements. 
4.2  The context within which these rules are applied is currently limited to firms with a 
strong Commonwealth connection. This contextual feature is a relevant consideration 
when assessing the current prudential framework. A different set of relationships would 
apply if licenses were granted to a wider group of employers. 
4.3  The prudential framework has some structural similarities to the frameworks in 
other jurisdictions, but some significant differences in detail.  
4.4  All jurisdictions have some or all of: 
•  Licensing requirements, including financial capacity requirements 
•  Requirements for actuarial valuation of the liabilities 
•  Reinsurace requirements 
•  Bank guarantee requirements 
•  Reporting requirements 
4.5  The Table below tries to compare the Commonwealth’s framework with the 
frameworks in place in other jurisdictions. 
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Item Commonwealth  Other 
Bank Guarantees  Based on 95
th pecentile of the 
claims distribution 
Typically 130% to 150% of the 
central estimate of the claims 
distribution 
Reinsurance  Per event excess-of-loss 
attaching at a level determined 
by the Commission (typically 
$750 000) 
Actuary required to recommend 
an attachment point 
Various attachment points 
Financial capacity  Withstand one large ‘event’ 
Actuary to give opinion on 
capacity to withstand one  
large event 
Customised case-by-case 
assessment by the 
Commission 
Various — minimum level of 
Net Tangible Assets, minimum 
number of employees 
Actuarial valuation of liabilities  Central estimate and 95
th 
percentile 
Qualified and experienced 
actuary 
Most require actuarial valuation 
of the central estimate 
At least one jurisdiction requires 
actury to be approved by the 
regulator 
Reporting requirements  Minimal explicit requirements, 
more possibly included in 
licence conditions 
In some cases very detailed 
requirements, designed to 
support a comprehensive level 
of data capture 
Counterparty risk  Standards for bank and insurer 
counter-parties 
 
Revocation of licence  Not explicit  In one jurisdiction a very explicit 
statement of subsequent 
process 
4.6  It is instructive to look at some of these items. Firstly, the Commission requires the 
amount of the bank guarantee to be based on the 95
th percentile of the claims distribution. 
Other jurisdictions require the amount of the bank guarantee to be based an the central 
estimate of the claims distribution plus a fixed percentage (between 30% and 50%). 
In concept, the Commission’s requirements are better tailored to the individual claims 
distribution and provide a more easily understood level of comfort than the fixed 
percentage approach. 
In practice, however, workers’ compensation claims distribution are poorly understood, 
particularly in the tail. Therefore, evaluation at the 95
th percentile may not be reliable. The 
level of comfort provided by this approach may be more illusory than real.     
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The alternative approach (fixed percentage added to the central estimate) may be regarded 
as blunt, but objective. 
On balance, we regard the 95
th percentile approach as appealing providing the regulator has 
some way of ‘validating’ the actuarial calculations. 
4.7  The Commission's requirement that the actuary recommend an attachment point for 
the excess-of-loss reinsurance is sensible. I would extend this requirement — see next 
chapter. 
4.8  In relation to demonstration of financial capacity, the SRCA requires that the 
Commission be satisfied that the applicant has sufficient resources. However, no guidance 
is provided to assist the Commission in making its judgements. 
In some jurisdictions, certain requirements are explicit. In Queensland, for example, net 
tangible assets have to be at least $100m. Another approach is to set a minimum number of 
employees (perhaps as well as a minimum net tangible asset requirement). Again, in some 
jurisdictions there is an explicit minimum. This would limit the risk that a single large 
claim would cause a lot of problems. It would also mean that only substantial firms would 
need to be regulated. 
We understand that the Commission makes assessment of the financial capacity of licence 
applicants on a case by case basis using a range of measures and hurdles. It may, in fact, 
require a minimum number of employees (500), although this requirement does not appear 
in the SRCA nor the prudential licence conditions. 
Interestingly, in relation to demonstration of ongoing financial capacity, the Commission 
requires the actuary to give an opinion on the company's capacity in this regard, although it 
is not clear precisely what form that opinion has to take. Nor is it clear that the actuary 
would have access to all of the necessary information. An alternative approach would be to 
add the catastrophe retention (the amount that the self-insurer would be exposed to in the 
event of a catastrophe before reinsurance cover kicked in) to the bank guarantee and to 
have a different ‘financial capacity’ hurdle. 
4.9  All jurisdictions have a requirement for actuarial evaluation of liabilities. This is an 
important piece of the prudential framework. One jurisdiction has a requirement that the 
actuary be approved by the regulator. This is similar to the approach taken by APRA for 
general insurers. This has some appeal, provided that the regulator has the resources to 
properly carry out the approval process. 
4.10  It will be very important to ensure that there is a sufficient volume of high quality 
data provided by self-insurers under the Act. The current reporting requirements appear to 
be fairly minimal, although there may be further requirements set out as licence conditions.     
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4.11  Counterparty risk is addressed by the requirement to deal with banks and insurers 
which meet certain conditions. Bank counterparties must be at least AA-rated and insurer 
counterparties must be licensed by APRA. The standard for insurers is lower than for 
banks, but probably the best approach in practice. Having a AA requirement for insurers 
would greatly restrict the range of available market participants. 
4.12  Finally, it is important that the processes that would be undertaken in the event of a 
licence being revoked are understood by all relevant parties. It would be very worthwhile 
having this documented, so that both sides ‘knew where they stood’. Perhaps, such a 
process could be incorporated into the governing legislation to add certainty, although it 
would be important to give the Commission enough flexibility to be able to ‘stand where it 
needs to’ in any particular situation. 
B.5  Possible changes to the prudential framework 
5.1  This section considers possible changes to the prudential framework. should the 
level of self-insurance under the Act be increased. 
5.2  Firstly, it is important to note that a prudential system consists of: 
•  a set of rules or standards; 
•  a regulator responsible for administering the rules; and 
•  a set of firms who are regulated. 
5.3  The rules and the regulator have to be appropriate for the regulated. Currently, the 
firms who are regulated all have a strong Commonwealth connection. Opening the system 
up to private firms with no Commonwealth connection may mean that the rules need to be 
reviewed, or at least reassessed in light of the new target employers. 
5.4  The regulation process involves monitoring and ensuring compliance, collecting 
data and reporting on Scheme performance, and also, importantly, managing problems 
when they arise. It is clear that the level of regulatory resources would have to be properly 
aligned with the number of self-insurers. This section of the report assumes that the level 
of regulatory resources will be adequate for the purpose. 
5.5  We have considered the main elements of the framework as described in chapter 4. 
The table below comments on the existing provisions, including some possible changes. 
These suggestions fall short of recommendations, rather they should be taken as 
suggestions for consideration. 
5.6  There is a dear connection between the level of sophistication and complexity in the 
prudential arrangements and the level of regulatory resources to administer the Scheme. A     
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sophisticated set of rules in theory should be economically efficient. However, it requires a 
particular level of regulatory resource to administer it properly. 
5.7  Initial conditions may need consideration. For example, an explicit requirement for 
some combination of a minimum level of net tangible assets and a minimum number of 
employees seems worth thinking about. It is important to get the right balance between 
objectivity and flexibility. However, there may be merit in considering some blunt, explicit 
minima, below which a licence will not be granted under any circumstances and above 
which consideration may be given to granting a licence. 
In particular, it would be important to ensure that only substantial and soundly motivated 
employers were eligible to be granted a licence. Financial motivation may not be soundly 
based for some smaller employers who do not have a proper appreciation of all of the risks 
associated with self-insurance. 
5.8  The current framework relies heavily on the role of the external expert (the 
actuary). This is a good thing, and I think the role could be extended in respect of 
reinsurance. A requirement for the actuary to include a section in the liability valuation 
report which discusses the reinsurance arrangements in some detail (contract terms, 
premium basis etc) would provide a useful piece of information for the regulator. 
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Item Comment 
Bank Guarantee based on 95
th 
percentile of claims distribution 
Conceptually sound, provided that adequate regulatory 
resources to validate the adequate calculations. 
Might consider a floor requirement, eg at least $5m. 
Might consider adding the catastrophe reinsurance 
retention. 
Without adequate regulatory resources, might consider a 
blunter approach — eg central estimate plus 40%. 
Reinsurance  Might consider extending the role of the actuary to 
advise on the whole arrangement and to include a 
section in the liability valuation report which covers the 
reinsurance arrangements in some detail (including a 
discussion of the nature of the arrangements). 
Financial capacity  Might consider a different/additional hurdle — eg a 
minimum level of Net Tangible Assets, minimum wage 
roll, or some combination of these. 
Might consider the need to publish existing tests and any 
specific hurdles used by the Commission. 
Actuarial valuation of liabilities  Might consider an approved actuary model. Again relies 
on adequate regulatory resources. 
Reporting requirements  There seems to be room for considerably enhanced 
reporting requirements, particularly to support Scheme 
performance reporting efforts. 
Again, need adequate regulatory resources to compile 
and present statistical information. 
Revocation of licence  Might consider making the process explicit. Eg, upon 
revocation, the Commission will exercise the bank 
guarantee, and place the funds in trust until it is satisfied 
that the liability has been adequately discharged or 
separately funded. 
In order to be able to rely on the actuary’s work, it is important for the regulator to be able 
to ‘validate’ the actuary’s advice. That is, the regulator will need to understand the 
limitations and uncertainties that will inevitably be involved. 
We are not convinced of the merits of the actuary opining on the company’s financial 
capacity to withstand one ‘major’ event. The form of the opinion required is not clear. It 
requires the actuary to look at a lot of other aspects of the company's financials apart from 
the workers’ compensation liabilities. It is not clear that the actuary is well placed to do 
this. For example, Telstra’s actuary would not necessarily be well placed to comment on 
the realisability of Telstra’s fixed infrastructure assets (which make up a large part of 
Telstra’s balance sheet).     
416    
 
5.9  A more detailed set of reporting requirements would facilitate both Scheme 
performance reporting and internal benchmarking, to enable the regulator to monitor 
individual self-insurer performance. 
5.10  There may be merit in making explicit the process that the Commission must 
undertake in the event of a licence being revoked. This could be incorporated into the 
governing rules. Such an approach is likely to be beneficial to both sides (Commission and 
self-insurer) as both will better understand where they stand. Care would be needed, 
however, to ensure that the Commission had enough flexibility to stand where it needed to 
in any given case. The Commonwealth is potentially most exposed at the point where a 
licence is revoked. An explicitly stated case management process would help in 
understanding the extent of the exposure. 
5.11  Finally, with respect to the whole package of rules, consisting of: 
•  The SRCA; 
•  The prudential conditions of licence; and 
•  Internal guidelines and interpretations for applying the rules 
the Commission is responsible for the last two components. Should the number of self 
insurers be expanded beyond the current small number of employers with a close 
Commonwealth connection, some consideration could usefully be given to ensuring the 
right balance between: 
•  objectivity and flexibility in the governing rules and their application; and also between 
•  transparency and confidentiality of any particular conditions of licence. 
For example, the SRCA requires that the Commission be satisfied that the licensee has 
the financial capacity to fulfil its obligations under licence but does not incorporate any 
explicit minima. Whilst the Commission is developing its own internal tests of financial 
capacity, which can in theory be tailored to particular circumstances, there may be 
merit in considering certain explicit and objective minima, below which a licence will 
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C Australian  Government  Solicitor 
As part of its inquiry process, the Commission requested legal advice from the Australian 
Government Solicitor as to the powers available to the Australian Government to operate 
an alternative national workers’ compensation scheme and occupational health and safety 
regime. This appendix provides a copy of the Australian Government Solicitor’s response.  
 
15 September 2003 
Productivity Commission  
PO Box 80 
BELCONNEN ACT 2616 
Productivity Commission inquiry into national workers’ 
compensation and occupational health and safety 
frameworks 
1.  We refer to your request for advice dated 6 August 2003.  
Background 
2.  The Productivity Commission is inquiring into occupational health and safety and 
workers’ compensation national frameworks. It is considering the following two options. 
Option 1 
3.  The Commonwealth would establish a new national self-insurance scheme for 
which all eligible employers could apply for a licence. (Self-insurance means that 
employers, rather than insurers, bear the direct responsibility for managing their workers’ 
compensation claims liabilities.) The Commonwealth would, in effect, be providing an 
alternative to the existing State and Territory worker’s compensation schemes. It would 
have provisions on self-insurance licensing criteria (such as prudential matters and claims 
management); definitions of ‘employee’, ‘work-related injury or illness’ and ‘employer’; 
statutory benefits; access to common law damages; injury management (claims     
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management, return to work and rehabilitation); and dispute resolution. These provisions 
could be modelled on the existing Comcare scheme with modifications as appropriate (for 
example, as to dispute resolution and statutory benefits). To administer the scheme, an 
independent regulator would be established (alternatively, the existing regulator for 
Commonwealth self-insurance, the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, 
could be utilised). 
Option 2 
4.  The Commonwealth would establish a new national workers’ compensation scheme 
for all employers. It would provide an alternative to the State and Territory schemes. It 
would have provisions for self-insurance (identical to those canvassed for option 1 above), 
as well as for premium-based insurance. Private underwriting would be a necessary 
element of the scheme. Thus, scheme provisions would govern insurer licensing 
arrangements (including prudential criteria), as well as premium supervision. An 
independent regulator would also be established to administer the scheme. 
5.  You seek our advice on the Commonwealth’s constitutional power to implement 
either of these two options. 
6.  You understand that were the Commonwealth to establish a new national self-
insurance or worker’s compensation scheme, or even to issue self-insurance licences to 
private sector employers under the existing Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 
1988 (the SRC Act), employers would continue to be subject to existing State and 
Territory occupational health and safety legislation. (We mention that this would appear to 
be correct in relation to private sector employers under Part VIII of the SRC Act: see 
paragraph  108D(1)(e).) You seek our advice on whether it would be possible for the 
Commonwealth to permit employers who join its national scheme (or are self-insured 
under the existing SRC Act) to elect to opt out of State/Territory jurisdictional 
occupational health and safety coverage and, instead, be covered by the Occupational 
Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991 (the OHSCE Act) or, if 
necessary, new Commonwealth occupational health and safety legislation. 
7.  As employers will not be compelled to enter into the schemes under options 1 and 2 
and the schemes are intended to operate as alternatives to existing State and Territory 
schemes, we assume for the purposes of this advice that options 1 and 2 will not apply to 
State and Territory government employers and employees (for example, State Departments 
and their officials).     
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Short advice 
8.  The corporations power in paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution would, in our view, 
provide scope for Commonwealth legislation implementing either options 1 or 2, as well as 
providing for Commonwealth occupational health and safety laws, to extend to trading or 
financial corporations. The insurance power would also support key aspects of option 2 
(other than State insurance not extending beyond the limits of the State concerned). 
Whether the related scheme for occupational health and safety should be implemented by 
extending the OHSCE Act or by new legislation is essentially a policy and drafting matter. 
To the extent particular corporations were made subject to Commonwealth law, 
inconsistent State laws would not apply to them. 
9.  Although other constitutional powers (such as the interstate and overseas trade and 
commerce power) could be relied upon (in combination with the corporations power and 
the insurance power) to further extend the scope of options 1 or 2 and the related scheme 
for occupational health and safety, it is likely that, even with a combination of powers, 
legislation implementing the options could not be comprehensive in scope (that is, in terms 
of the categories of employers and employees to whom the options would apply). For 
example, the legislation could not extend to all individual (that is, non-corporate) 
employers or partnerships that carry on businesses only within States. A reference by the 




10.  The Commonwealth does not have specific constitutional power over workers’ 
compensation or occupational health and safety generally. There are, however, a number of 
constitutional powers over other subject matters that could be relied upon to support 
Commonwealth legislation to implement option  1 or 2, particularly in relation to large 
corporate employers, and the related scheme for occupational heath and safety. Although 
the Commonwealth legislation could not, in the absence of a reference from all States 
under paragraph  51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, cover all employers and employees, it 
could achieve a high level of coverage in practice. 
11.  For options 1 and 2 and the related scheme for occupational health and safety, the 
chief constitutional powers would be the corporations power and, in relation to option 2, 
also the insurance power. The interstate and overseas trade and commerce power and the 
territories power would also offer significant support. The external affairs power may 
possibly also be available but any legislation based on that power would be significantly     
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constrained by the need to be consistent with relevant treaty obligations. These 
constitutional powers are discussed in more detail below. 
Corporations power 
12.  Under paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth has power to make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to 
‘foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth’ (‘constitutional corporations’). Most large non-government employers are 
likely to be trading or financial corporations. 
13.  For the purpose of paragraph  51(xx), ‘foreign corporations’ are legal entities 
formed under the law of a foreign country and accorded a corporate legal personality either 
by that law or by Australian law. A corporation will be a ‘trading corporation’, within the 
meaning of paragraph 51(xx), if its trading activities form a significant or substantial part 
of its overall activities. It is not necessary to establish that trading is the corporation’s 
predominant or characteristic activity; even if the corporation carries out its trading 
activities so that it may carry on some other primary or dominant undertaking (which is not 
trading), it may nevertheless be a trading corporation. ‘Trading’ is not limited to buying or 
selling at a profit; it extends to business activities carried on with a view to earning 
revenue. Certain incorporated associations and certain State statutory corporations 
(including a public utility and a university) have been held to be ‘trading corporations’ 
within the meaning of paragraph 51(xx) (see Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 
1 and Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 184 ALR 260). 
14.  A corporation will be a ‘financial corporation’ within the meaning of 
paragraph 51(xx), if it engages in financial activities or is intended to do so. Financial 
activities need not be the predominant or characteristic activity of the corporation; a 
corporation which engages in financial activities in the course of carrying on its primary or 
dominant undertaking will be classified as a financial corporation. ‘Financial’ activities 
include transactions the subject of which is finance (such as borrowing or lending money). 
15.  The power in paragraph 51(xx) extends to the regulation of a wide range of matters 
relating to constitutional corporations, after their formation, including their trading or 
financial activities. It is irrelevant, for the purposes of this power, whether a constitutional 
corporation carries out activities such as trade within or between States (contrast the 
interstate and overseas trade and commerce power discussed in paragraphs 27 and 28 
below). In order to be within the scope of the corporations power, a law must have a 
sufficient connection with the subject-matter of the power (Re Dingian; Ex parte Wagner 
(1995) 183 CLR 232 (Re Dingian)). The judgments in Re Dingian (the most recent High 
Court decision in which the scope of paragraph 51(xx) was considered in detail) contain a 
range of different approaches on the appropriate test to determine whether a law reveals a     
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sufficient connection with the subject-matter of constitutional corporations as to be a law 
with respect to that subject-matter. In addition, the composition of the High Court has 
changed almost entirely since Re Dingian was decided. However, we think it is probable 
that a majority of the current High Court would hold that the Commonwealth can make a 
law, in reliance on paragraph  51(xx), conferring rights or imposing obligations on a 
constitutional corporation, including their officers and employees in their capacity as 
officers and employees of constitutional corporations. 
16.  The corporations power would support key elements of options 1 and 2 and the 
related scheme for occupational health and safety. Under option  1, for example, 
Commonwealth legislation could give constitutional corporations the right to apply for a 
self-insurance licence and could impose obligations and liabilities on licence-holders in 
respect of their employees. It could provide for statutory benefits and limit access to 
common law damages, injury management and dispute resolution. There would, in our 
view, be a sufficient connection between such legislation and the subject matter of 
constitutional corporations. To the extent Commonwealth law applied, this would displace 
inconsistent State requirements (Constitution, section 109). 
17.  In so far as the dispute resolution arrangements involved the exercise of the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth, that judicial power could only be conferred and exercised 
consistently with Chapter III of the Constitution. However, this would not preclude use of 
administrative tribunals or other dispute settlement mechanisms (as in the case of the 
existing SRC Act scheme) provided there was provision for judicial review of their 
decisions. 
18.  In addition, the variation of existing rights (arising from work-related injury or 
illness occurring prior to the commencement of legislation implementing the options) 
would raise issues in relation to the constitutional guarantee in paragraph 51(xxxi) of the 
Constitution against acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms. For this reason, 
the legislation may need to be limited to apply in relation only to claims based on work-
related injury occurring in the future and not claims arising from past events. 
19.  In relation to option 2, the corporations power would also support provision for 
dispute resolution arrangements between constitutional corporations and workers’ 
compensation insurers (other than State insurers in so far as they were not conducting 
insurance business beyond the limits of the State: see paragraph  23 below). The 
corporations power would support the imposition of requirements directly on insurers 
(other than State insurers not carrying on insurance beyond the limits of a State) in relation 
to insurance they made available, such as in relation to insurance coverage and premium 
setting in relation to constitutional corporations. 
20.  The functions and powers of the independent regulator needed to regulate either of 
the schemes would be supported by the corporations power or, possibly, by the express     
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incidental power in paragraph 51(xxxix) of the Constitution. Options 1 and 2 could be 
implemented by amendments to the SRC Act or by a new Act applicable to constitutional 
corporations. 
21.  Recent examples of Commonwealth legislation enacted an the basis of the 
corporations power include the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (section 6), the Environmental 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (see, for example, subsection 21(1)), 
the Gene Technology Act 2000 (paragraph 13(1)(a)) and the Research Involving Human 
Embryos Act 2002 (paragraph 4(1)(a)). The Workplace Relations Act 1996 also relies on 
the corporations power for certain of its provisions, eg, for Australian workplace 
agreements (section  17OVC(a)). This reliance on the corporations power reflects the 
expanded scope given to that power in recent years by decisions of the High Court like Re 
Dingian. The recent references by the States under paragraph  51(xxxvii) of the 
Constitution of power to enact the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to the extent not otherwise 
supported by Commonwealth power were necessary, in part, to overcome constitutional 
problems arising from use of Commonwealth bodies to carry out functions under 
substantive State corporations laws under the previous co-operative scheme. There is no 
reason to doubt the wide potential of the corporations power to regulate activities of 
established constitutional corporations, including benefits provided to employees. It is not 
necessary, as a matter of constitutional law, for the consent of the States to be obtained in 
order for Commonwealth law to apply to constitutional corporations. There is a political 
agreement requiring consent to be obtained from a majority of States for any amendment to 
the  Corporations Act 2001. The requirement in that area does not, however, apply to 
reliance in other Commonwealth laws on the corporations power. 
Insurance power 
22.  Under paragraph 51(xiv) of the Constitution the Commonwealth has power to make 
laws with respect to ‘insurance, other than State insurance; also State insurance extending 
beyond the limits of the State concerned’. Leaving aside the scope of the exclusion in 
relation to State insurance, this power extends to the activity of ‘insurance’, the essential 
characteristic of which is a relationship of indemnity between an insured and an insurer. 
While this relationship may be created by statute rather than by contract, not all statutory 
compensation schemes may amount to insurance (for example, a statutory scheme which 
confers a no-fault benefit unrelated to insurance). Whether a statutory scheme or indeed 
any other kind of scheme, albeit described as insurance, is insurance for constitutional 
purposes will depend on the details of the scheme. Self-insurance is not ‘insurance’ for the 
purpose of paragraph 51(xiv) (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above). 
23.  Again leaving aside the scope of the exclusion in relation to State insurance, and 
assuming that arrangements amount to ‘insurance’ for constitutional purposes, the     
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insurance power extends to the regulation of all aspects of the relationship between an 
insurer and the insured, in particular: 
•  regulating the conduct of insurance business in Australia, including the premiums 
charged by insurance companies; 
•  controlling the nature and content of insurance products that insurers offer (although altering 
rights under existing policies could raise issues in relation to the constitutional guarantee 
in paragraph 51(xxxi) against acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms); 
•  regulating the conduct of insurance intermediaries;  
•  establishing the Commonwealth’s own insurance business; 
•  prohibiting the provision of insurance by any particular persons either specifically or 
generally, for example, the Commonwealth could prohibit the provision of insurance 
subject to a broad range of conditions which do not need to be directly related to 
insurance; 
•  controlling the acquisition of shares in insurance companies or purchasing assets from 
insurers, and possibly even dealing with the management and staffing of insurers; 
•  regulating the non-insurance activities of insurers, in so far as such regulation is 
necessary in order to ensure the effective prudential regulation of insurers. 
24.  The insurance power does not extend to ‘State insurance’, other than State 
insurance extending beyond the limits of the State concerned. By analogy with the banking 
power in paragraph 51(xiii) of the Constitution, which is similarly limited, State insurance 
is insurance carried on by a State as insurer and not as customer. A law with respect to 
insurance cannot legally encroach on State insurance, except to the extent that any 
interference with State insurance is so incidental as not to affect the character of the law as 
one with respect to insurance other than State insurance (Bourke v State Bank of New 
South Wales (1990) 170 CLR 276). If the interference is significant, the legislation will be 
invalid. Over the last decade or so the States have mostly gone through a process of 
corporatising and then privatising their State insurance offices. It is not clear to what extent 
the States currently carry on insurance. It is possible, therefore, that this restriction on 
Commonwealth legislative power may have only limited practical effect. 
25.  In our recent discussions you asked whether, in relation to the scheme in option 2, 
the insurance power would support legislation requiring payments to be made by the 
Commonwealth (or the independent regulator) to a relevant employee for work-related 
injuries or illness in circumstances where an insurer was unable to meet the relevant 
employer liabilities under the scheme (for example, by reason of the insurer’s insolvency). 
Although such payments by the Commonwealth may not involve insurance in the 
constitutional sense, they may be supported by the ‘incidental’ aspect of the insurance 
power (namely, the implied power to make laws governing or affecting many matters 
incidental or ancillary to insurance; see Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955)     
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93 CLR 55 at 77). In any event, we think it would be possible to rely on the appropriations 
power in section 81 of the Constitution to support the payments in these circumstances. 
The corporations power may also be relevant, given that the employees would be 
employed by constitutional corporations and that the relevant liabilities were liabilities 
incurred by constitutional corporations. Other heads of power may also be available (for 
example, the benefits and pensions powers in paragraphs 51(xxiii) and (xxiiiA) of the 
Constitution). 
26.  The insurance power would provide considerable support for those aspects of 
option  2 involving premium-based insurance, whether involving the Commonwealth or 
private insurers as providers of coverage. Legislation to implement the option could, under 
the insurance power, govern insurer licensing arrangements (including prudential criteria), 
as well as premium supervision. The insurance power (and the corporations power to the 
extent corporations were involved) would support the imposition of requirements directly 
on insurers (other than State insurers not carrying on insurance beyond the limits of a 
State) in relation to insurance they made available, such as in relation to insurance 
coverage and premium setting. 
Interstate and overseas trade and commerce 
27.  Paragraph 51(i) of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth Parliament 
may make laws with respect to ‘trade and commerce with other countries, and among the 
States’. 
28.  To the extent that the options and the related scheme for occupational health and 
safety did not involve constitutional corporations or insurance, a Commonwealth 
legislative framework could be made available to employers and employees in inter-State 
or overseas trade and commerce (see, for example, Australian Steamships Ltd v Malcolm 
(1914) 19 CLR 298, which upheld the validity of seaman’s compensation legislation). 
Territories power 
29.  Under section 122 of the Constitution the Commonwealth Parliament ‘may make 
laws for the government of any territory surrendered by any State to and accepted by the 
Commonwealth ...’. This includes the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern 
Territory. Under this head of power, the Commonwealth has a general power of legislating 
for a Territory. This would support legislation implementing the options in relation to all 
employers and employees in the Territories. In relation to the self-governing Territories, 
policy considerations may dictate that they be treated similarly to States. This may limit 
reliance on the Territories power.     
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External affairs 
30.  The Parliament’s power in paragraph 51(xxix) of the Constitution to make laws 
with respect to ‘external affairs’ will support Commonwealth legislation which discharges 
an obligation imposed on Australia by an international treaty or instrument, whatever the 
subject matter of that obligation (see, for example, Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 
CLR 416 (Industrial Relations Act Case) at 486-488). In such a case, the legislation must 
be reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the 
treaty or instrument. 
31.  Our examination suggests that the 1981 International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention 155 (the Occupational Safety and Health Convention) could, if Australia 
became a party, support a reasonably comprehensive Commonwealth legislative scheme 
concerning occupational health and safety. Similarly, the 1964 ILO Convention 121 
(Employment Injury Benefits Convention) could, if Australia became a party, support 
Commonwealth workers’ compensation legislation prescribing particular entitlements. 
However, the Convention is fairly prescriptive and also envisages either public 
administration of the scheme or ultimately public responsibility. Any scheme which relied 
constitutionally on Australia’s treaty obligations, would need to conform relatively rigidly 
to the Convention requirements. The Conventions appear unlikely to provide any particular 
constitutional assistance in relation to Options 1 or 2 beyond that already provided by the 
corporations or insurance powers, unless some more comprehensive coverage was desired 
(such as sole traders and partnerships). Further advice on the external affairs power can be 
provided, as necessary. In particular, we would be willing to consider any particular 
treaties or instruments in greater detail. 




Henry Burmester QC  Damian Page 
Chief General Counsel  Counsel 
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D  Consultant actuaries’ reports of 
impacts on State and Territory 
schemes  
During the conduct of the inquiry, the Commission requested advice from consulting 
actuaries as to the possible impacts of its proposals for national frameworks on State and 
Territory workers’ compensation schemes. Following selection by tendering, Taylor Fry 
provided initial advice as to the potential impact on State and Territory workers’ 
compensation schemes of providing access to self-insurance on a national basis. The 
advice was published in the Interim Report and the Law Council of Australia 
commissioned professional comment on that advice from Bateup Actuarial + Consulting 
Services (IRsub. 250). Responses to the Bateup comment was sought from am actuaries, 
who were also asked to report on the sensitivity of scheme average premiums rates to 
varying levels of loss of premium revenue from State schemes and levels of cross subsidies 
provided by exiting premium-paying employers. Finally, the Victorian WorkCover 
Authority made data available about their scheme and analysis of that data was 
commissioned from am actuaries to more accurately assess the impact which alternative 
national self-insurance could have on the Victorian scheme. This provided a cross check of 
the previous Taylor Fry results.  
The appendix is structured as follows:  
D.1  Taylor Fry advice;  
D.2  am actuaries’ report on the impact on scheme average premium rates from large 
employers exiting;  
D.3  am actuaries’ response to the comment of Bateup Actuarial + Consulting Services; 
and  
D.4  results from the analysis of Victorian WorkCover Authority data.  
D.1  Taylor Fry advice 
8 October 2003     
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Productivity Commission   
L3 Nature Conservation House  
Cnr Emu Bank & Benjamin Way   
Belconnen  ACT  2617 
Impact of national self-insurance on State schemes 
You have requested that we estimate the potential impact on the State workers 
compensation schemes of widening access to self-insurance on a national basis. This letter 
details the investigation undertaken to determine the potential loss of premium revenue to 
State workers’ compensation schemes from large employers becoming self-insurers under 
the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act). 
Scope 
The focus in this investigation has been to consider the potential premium losses to State 
and Territory schemes of granting insurance licences to private sector companies under the 
existing access provisions of the SRC Act. We have considered two factors in determining 
which employers may potentially become national self-insurers. 
Firstly, Section 100 of the SRC Act defines which corporations may be eligible for 
national self-insurance. The key for private sector corporations lies in sub-section (c) 
which provides discretion for the Minister to declare a corporation eligible to be granted a 
licence if it ‘is carrying on business in competition with a Commonwealth authority or with 
another corporation that was previously a Commonwealth authority’.  
Secondly, we understand that Comcare1, the statutory authority charged with managing 
SRC Act self-insurers, uses (as an internal guide) 500 employees as the lower limit on the 
size of organisation that could be considered for eligibility. 
Our investigation has adopted these criteria to quantify the potential reduction in the 
overall premium pool from premium paying employers becoming national self-insurers. 
Our estimates rely on these criteria, however, it should be noted that the final impact of any 
national self-insurance system will depend on the actual criteria adopted, as well as other 
factors addressed in this letter. We also consider the impact on employers remaining in the 
State schemes. 
                                                 
1 Comcare is a Commonwealth statutory authority covered by the Commonwealth Authorities and 
Companies Act 1997 and established under the SRC Act. Comcare administers the 
Commonwealth's workers' compensation scheme under the SRC Act and also administers the 
Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991 OHS(CE) Act.      
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Information sources 
As you are aware, information was requested of three State schemes; Victoria (a large 
centrally managed no fault and common law scheme), Queensland (a large centrally 
managed scheme that predominantly compensates injured workers through common law) 
and Tasmania (a smaller scheme that is underwritten by commercial insurers). Information 
was sought from these three schemes as they were considered a representative selection 
from which the nation-wide impact of national self-insurance could be extrapolated and 
time constraints made wider data collection impracticable. 
At the time of writing only Tasmania was able to provide all the requested information. 
Queensland provided the scheme statistics requested and information on current self-
insurers but no information on organisations that may have the potential to self-insure 
under the SRC Act. Victoria is still seeking legal advice on their ability to release the 
information. 
Due to the lack of access to scheme data we had to seek other sources of data. We have 
therefore extracted information from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (refer 
D.1 Appendix B) and Dunn and Bradstreet (D&B)2. The information extracted was:  
•  average weekly earnings subdivided by industry and jurisdiction; and  
•  numbers of employees employed for large corporations. 
We estimated remuneration for each employer by multiplying employee numbers by 
average weekly earnings. We then estimated premiums by multiplying remuneration by 
industry premium rates.  
It is important to note that this information is not directly related to workers’ compensation 
and so a number of inferences had to be made. For example, the D&B information only 
permitted us to allocate each company to the jurisdiction in which its head office is 
registered. As it does not reflect the dispersal of the workforce across the country, the 
estimated wage roll and premium derived for each jurisdiction does not correspond exactly 
to each scheme. The numbers of employees may include casual workers or part-time staff. 
The premium rates apply to an industry and may not be representative for an employer. 
Key assumptions 
In order to quantify the potential reduction in the overall premium pool we first needed to 
identify those employers that may be eligible to access the existing national self-insurance 
                                                 
2 D&B List of organisation, ANZSIC industry code, number of employees, ABN and post code 
(employers with more than 200 employees).      
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arrangements and then estimate the wage roll of those employers so that their workers 
compensation premium could be estimated. 
The key assumptions required to achieve this are:  
•  Industries likely to satisfy the ‘competition’ criteria for self-insurance under the SRC 
Act;  
•  Employee numbers in each State and Territory;  
•  Average weekly earnings per employee; and  
•  Premium rates applicable to each employer.  
Each assumption is described in the appendices to this letter together with the source and 
use of each assumption. Over 3500 companies were included in the D&B list and so we 
have not reproduced the list and calculations. Further details can be provided on request.  
Comments on assumptions 
The most difficult assumption is which employers are likely to satisfy the competition 
criteria. We have classified each industry as likely, unlikely or potentially able to satisfy 
this criterion. Details are shown in D.1 Appendix A. 
The second assumption is that employees recorded in the D&B statistics are employed (for 
the purpose of workers’ compensation premiums) in the State shown. We know that the 
D&B statistics relate to the State in which the head office is registered. The assumption 
implicit in our analysis is that, taken across all employers, the numbers outside each State 
will offset each other. The preponderance of NSW registered head offices means this 
potentially introduces significant error. 
The third assumption regarding average wages may lead to under- or over-statement of 
remuneration and hence premium for each employer.  
The further assumption regarding premiums is dependent on average industry premium 
rates being applicable to large employers. 
We have tested the effects of the assumptions by:  
•  Comparing remuneration for large employers estimate for each State with details 
extracted from the 4
th CPM report3; and 
•  Comparing remuneration for a sample of employers with available information on 
remuneration. 
                                                 
3 Comparative Performance Monitoring Fourth Report, Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council, August 
2002.     
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The results of these comparisons were mixed. For some individual employers, the 
estimates produced very close agreement with available information. At the State level, the 
estimates produced higher remuneration for large employers than would have been 
expected for insured employers in the State. The discrepancy has not been sufficiently 
explained and suggests that our estimates may overstate actual remuneration and premiums 
for these large employers. 
Impact assessment 
Once we had estimated the premiums payable by large employers, and had allocated the 
proportion anticipated as eligible to be granted a national self-insurance licence, we 
compared the results with total premium income of each jurisdiction. The following 
section outlines the estimated premiums that could potentially transfer. It then discusses 
the impact on premium payers and comments on the likely impact on existing self-insurers. 
Comment is also made on funding scheme deficits, tail management and funding, cross 
subsidies and the impact on remaining employers. 
Premium payers 
Table D.1 summarises the results of our investigation. The figures have been distilled from 
a list 3561 employers with 200 or more employees. The list covers 5.4 million employees 
with an estimated wage roll of $237 billion.  

















 $m  $m  $m  $m
ACT  8 901  6 509  629  15
NSW  127 880  77 701  24 562  377
NT 4  268  183  40  2
QLD  58 448  13 608  3 755  45
SA  22 777  7 325  759  11
TAS  6 159  1 484  118  3
VIC  89 668  38 777  14 165  288
WA  33 953  9 670  1 814  30
Total  352 055  155 256  45 841  771
1 ABS Cat 5220.0 Australian National Accounts - State Accounts 2001-02 Index by 4%. 
The wage roll of existing premium payers with more than 500 employees (a threshold for 
eligibility to self-insurance under the SRC Act) has been estimated to be $155 billion. This 
represents 44 per cent of the total wage roll for Australia of $352 billion.     
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For private sector corporations, access to national self-insurance is restricted to those 
employers that carry on business in competition with a Commonwealth authority. In 
table D.3 we list those industries that may be considered eligible. Typically, they represent 
the banks, transport and logistics companies, telecommunications and utilities. 
In the event that all such employers apply for a national self-insurance licence, then we 
have estimated that 30 per cent of remuneration of current premium payers with more than 
500 employees or $46  billion may be deemed eligible to be granted. Multiplying this 
remuneration by average industry premium rates produces an estimate of the maximum 
possible reduction in premium for the schemes Australia-wide of $771 million. 
Propensity to self-insure 
As evidenced by the operations of existing State and Territory schemes, all eligible 
employers do not seek to become a self-insurer.  
Statutory benefits under the SRC Act are generally considered to be more generous than 
those under the State and Territory schemes due to payment of weekly entitlements at 
100 per cent of pre-injury earnings. In addition, employers have very limited recourse to 
settle weekly compensation claims through restricted access to common law. The cost of 
self-insuring under the SRC Act is likely to be more costly than other schemes, which may 
act to reduce the numbers of employers seeking to self-insure under the current national 
framework.  
The potentially higher cost of the benefit structure could be reduced by those firms with a 
strong commitment to workplace safety and claims management. In addition, larger 
employers usually have a greater ability to provide injured workers with alternative duties 
and hence greater return to work potential. 
No firm statistics exist upon which to base rates of application or approval to self-insure. 
Accordingly, we have illustrated the effect of a different level of approval to self-insure. If 
only one in five eligible employers apply and are successful, then the potential reduction in 
rateable remuneration for the workers’ compensation schemes would be $9.2 billion and 
around $154 million in premium revenue.  
Table D.2 summarises the maximum reduction in premium revenue of $771 million and 
the reduction in premium revenue of $154 million in the event that one in five of those 
considered eligible actually elect to transfer. The table also shows scheme premium 
revenue for 2000-01.     
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Table D.2  Maximum and illustrative premium reduction compared to 





(all possible exits) 
Premium reduction 
(1 in 5 potentially 
 eligible to transfer) 
Scheme
premium revenue
 $000  $000  $000
ACT  14 847  2 969  187 000
NSW  377 276  75 455  2 269 000
NT  1 894  379  58 000
QLD  44 601  8 920  506 000
SA  11 228  2 246  341 000
TAS  3 091  618  117 000
VIC  287 512  57 502  1 591 000
WA  30 374  6 075  636 000
Total  770 823  154 165  5 705 000
1 Comparative Performance Monitoring Fourth Report, Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council, August 2002. 
CPM statistics relate to the 2000-01 financial year. 
The estimated premium reduction is concentrated in New South Wales and Victoria due to 
the limitations of the data which allocated all employees to the jurisdiction in which the 
head office was registered. However, the total premium reductions and total scheme 
premium revenues are comparable. This indicates that the maximum premium reduction 
that can be expected is 13.5 per cent and, in the event that one in five of those employers 
considered eligible actually elect to transfer to national self-insurance, then the premium 
reduction would be 2.7 per cent. These percentages will be lower if scheme revenue has 
increased since 2000-01. 
Deficit funding 
For those schemes currently in deficit (a funding ratio of less than 100 per cent), removal 
of a part of the remuneration base could mean that any increased funding to reduce the 
deficit would be spread over a smaller group of remaining employers.  
In the event that employers are able to self-insure under national arrangement, then it 
would be advisable for any scheme currently in deficit to investigate options for obtaining 
deficit funding contributions from transferring employers. 
This is only an issue for the centrally managed schemes as, by their nature, privately 
underwritten schemes are fully funded.     
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Tail management and funding 
The question of employers exiting from the centrally managed schemes (South Australia, 
Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland) raises issues of how claims incurred up to the 
date of transfer (‘tail’ claims) are managed and, if the scheme is unfunded, how the deficit 
should be funded. 
Possible management options and a brief description of deficit funding considerations are: 
1.  State schemes retain and manage the ‘tail’ — Benefits are preserved and accrued 
entitlements are not altered. The critical issue will be how any existing deficit in the 
scheme is funded. This issue is discussed above under the heading Deficit funding. 
2.  ‘Tail’ is transferred to the self-insuring employer — This approach is similar to how 
most schemes currently treat employers who change to self-insurance within their 
jurisdiction. Transferring the ‘tail’ acts to crystallise any deficit in the scheme which 
only transfers assets equal to the funded proportion of the assessed liability being 
transferred. Provided the liability assessment is accurate, the scheme would suffer no 
financial loss and the self-insurer becomes responsible for managing and paying claims 
3.  Entitlements remain as per State scheme — Accrued entitlements for injured 
workers would not be affected. However, the self-insurer would become responsible for 
managing benefits under the SRC Act for new claims as well as the benefit structures 
of the South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland schemes for those 
transferring ‘tail’ claims which remain active. It is anticipated that the ‘tail’ would take 
many years to runoff and form a strong disincentive to self-insure under a national 
framework. We understand that only NSW has the legislative ability to transfer the tail 
in such circumstances. 
4.  Entitlements convert to the design of national scheme — Although a common 
benefit structure would reduce the administrative burden for national self-insurers, it 
raises questions as to accrued entitlements and possibly ‘jurisdiction’ shopping, both of 
which would require extensive legal investigation.  
Insurance companies in the privately underwritten jurisdictions would continue to be 
responsible for all claims arising up to the date the employer transfers to national self-
insurance.  
Cross-subsidies 
By its nature, insurance means that every employer will be either paying more or less than 
their associated cost of claims and expenses. Ideally, these ups and downs will average out. 
However, sometimes the premium basis may result in an employer (or group of employers) 
paying more than their share of claims and expense and others less. The existence or extent     
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of cross subsidies in the various premium systems in Australia is not known and so it is not 
possible to quantify the impact on the schemes. 
Cross sub-subsidies are not expected to affect the States and Territories in the privately 
underwritten schemes (Tasmania, Western Australia, Northern Territory and the Australian 
Capital Territory). Rather, it may be an issue for insurance companies if they have cross 
subsidies within their workers’ compensation book.  
For the centrally managed funds, large employers exiting a scheme would have a negative 
financial impact if large employers as a group cross subsidise smaller employers. Although 
the claims costs of the large employer would also transfer out of the scheme, premiums 
would reduce by an even large amount. This would mean that the premium rates for 
remaining employers would need to increase or, if unchanged, the funding position of the 
scheme would deteriorate over time.  
Larger employers tend to have ‘experience’ rated premiums. This means that the premium 
is based on the employers own claims experience and the larger the employer the closer the 
premium is to the ‘true’ cost of claims and expenses. In this event, the exit of these large 
employers should be relatively neutral to the scheme.  
Current self-insurers 
A large number of employers across Australia currently self-insure in more than one 
jurisdiction. For example, ANZ, CBA, CSR, NAB, Qantas, and Westpac may be eligible to 
self-insure under the SRC Act and already self-insure in two or more jurisdictions. This 
suggests a commitment to self-insurance that is likely to lead to each at least examining 
their options under a national self-insurance system. 
Current self-insurers with more than 500 employees nation-wide have been estimated to 
have a wage roll of $57.4 million. Details are shown in table D.7. A significant proportion 
of these companies are likely to transfer to a national self-insurance arrangement in the 
event they consider it to be in their financial interest.  
These self-insurers contribute to the overall costs of workers’ compensation in many States 
via a levy. The impact of their transfer to national self-insurance on the State and Territory 
schemes would be to significantly reduce this contribution or to increase the levy rate on 
the remaining self-insurers. It would also significantly reduce, although not remove, the 
obligation to regulate, monitor and report on self-insurers under their legislation. 
As an example, we have been provided with data on current self-insurers in Tasmania. 
Recent contributions from 15  self-insurers in Tasmania totalled $285  127. Access to 
national self-insurance could potentially result in the number of State self-insurers 
reducing to four. If self-insurers fully fund the regulatory function then a consequence of     
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maintaining the same level of services to the remaining State self-insurers would be to 
significantly increase the licence fee to a level that covers the fixed costs of regulation and 
oversight.  
The impact on the larger schemes would not be as great as that indicated for Tasmania. 
Provided sufficient State-based self-insurers remain, they are likely to cover the fixed costs 
of regulation while the service requirements (and hence scheme costs) are likely to reduce 
in a similar proportion to the number of self-insurers. 
Limitations 
No checks have been performed on the data as to its completeness or accuracy. It is 
possible that some employers with over 500 employees are excluded, which may lead to an 
understatement of the potential movement to national self-insurance. Incorrect industry 
codes could result in significantly different estimates of wage roll and hence premiums. 
The calculations are approximations. Average wages have been applied to average industry 
premiums to estimate wage roll and premiums for large employers. While the calculations 
for individual employers may differ significantly to their actual wage roll and workers’ 
compensation premium, the aggregate results are still expected to provide a reasonable 
estimate of these statistics. 
Assessment of eligibility for national self-insurance is based on broad industry grouping. 
Actual granting of licences will be assessed on a case-by-case basis that may result in some 
corporations being granted a licence not envisaged in our assessment and some being 
denied that satisfied the criteria used in our investigation. 
The actual reduction in wages and premiums due to corporations being granted a licence 
will differ to that estimated. This is normal and to be expected.  






 Martin  Fry 
Fellows of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia     
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D.1 Appendix A  Eligibility for national self-insurance  
Our investigation was restricted to organisations with more than 500 employees as we 
understand that this is a guide used by Comcare when assessing access to self-insurance. 
Potential for organisations to compete with a Commonwealth body was examined at the 2-
digit industry code level. This assessment, necessarily, was qualitative and primarily based 
on our experience of existing self-insurers under the SRC Act and knowledge of those 
seeking to self-insure. We classified each industry code as one of: 
•  False    Competition unlikely 
•  Maybe  Potential may exist for organisations to build a case that competition exists 
•  True    Competition highly likely 
The results of this assessment are shown in table D.3. In our analysis weightings of 0 per 
cent (False), 50 per cent (Maybe) and 100 per cent (True) were applied to our estimates of 
wage roll and premiums. 
Table D.3  Competition with Commonwealth bodies 
Industry Competition?  Example 
1   FALSE   
2   FALSE   
3   FALSE   
4   FALSE   
11 Coal  mining  FALSE   
12  Oil and gas extraction  FALSE   
13  Metal ore mining  FALSE   
14 Other  mining  FALSE   
15  Services to mining  FALSE   
21  Food, beverage and tobacco manufacturing  FALSE   
22  Textile, clothing, footwear and leather manufacturing  FALSE   
23  Wood and paper product manufacturing  FALSE   
24  Printing, publishing and recorded media  FALSE   
25  Petroleum, coal, chemical and associated product  TRUE  ADI/CSL 
26  Non-metallic mineral product manufacturing  FALSE   
27  Metal product manufacturing  FALSE   
28  Machinery and equipment manufacturing  FALSE   
29 Other  manufacturing  FALSE   
36  Electricity and gas supply  TRUE  ACTEW 
37  Water supply, sewerage and drainage services  TRUE  AGL 
    (Continued next page)     
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Table D.3  (continued) 
Industry Competition?  Example 
41 General  construction  FALSE   
42 Construction  trade  services  FALSE   
45  Basic material wholesaling  FALSE   
46  Machinery and motor vehicle wholesaling  FALSE   
47  Personal and household good wholesaling  FALSE   
51 Food  retailing  FALSE   
52  Personal and household good retailing  FALSE   
53  Motor vehicle retailing and services  FALSE   
57  Accommodation, cafes and restaurants  FALSE   
61 Road  transport  TRUE   
62 Rail  transport  TRUE  Pacific 
    National 
63 Water  transport  FALSE   
64  Air and space transport  Maybe  Qantas 
65 Other  transport  Maybe   
66  Services and transport  TRUE  Aae 
67 Storage  TRUE  Australia  Post 
71 Communication  services  TRUE  Visionstream 
72   FALSE   
73 Finance  TRUE  CBA/RBA 
74 Insurance  Maybe  CBA 
75  Services to finance and insurance  Maybe   
77 Property  services  FALSE   
78 Business  services  TRUE  Telstra 
81 Government  administration  FALSE   
82 Defence  TRUE  ADI 
84 Education  FALSE   
86 Health  services  FALSE   
87 Community  services  FALSE   
91  Motion pictures, radio and television services  FALSE   
92  Libraries, museums and the arts  Maybe  Australia Post 
93  Sport and recreation  FALSE   
95 Personal  services  FALSE   
96 Other  services    FALSE   
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D.1 Appendix B  Average weekly earnings 
Average weekly earnings (AWE) for each industry and jurisdiction were sourced from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Initial figures related to Full Time Adult Earnings4 
subdivided by industry and jurisdiction but these were considered likely to significantly 
overstate the calculated wage roll. Subsequently, we obtained All Employees Total 
Earnings by Industry5 which were apportioned across the jurisdictions according to the 
statistics available for Full Time Adult Earnings. The results of this adjustment are shown 
in table D.4. 
AWE statistics were also provided by the ABS at the 2-digit ANZSIC industry code level; 
however, these figures are subject to considerable statistical variation when divided across 
jurisdictions.  
Remuneration was determined as the product of average weekly ordinary time earnings 
and the number of employees from the D&B statistics. The treatment of casual and part-
time workers has not been fully investigated and the results may require some revision. 
ABS statistics are not available for industry code A (Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing). 
Therefore, were assumed the average weekly earnings for this industry to be the 
jurisdictional average. 
The resultant wage rolls are considered to provide a reasonable indication of actual wage 
roll. Several individual employers were checked against known wage rolls and agreed 
within 5 per cent. Although AWE were revised from Full Time Adult to All Employee 
Earnings, the aggregate remuneration from large employers for State schemes still 
appeared large relative to total scheme remuneration. 
 
 
                                                 
4 ABS May 2003 Individual request for AWE by Industry and Jurisdiction. 
5 Source: ABS May 2003 AWE by Industry Cat 6302.0.  
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Table D.4  Average weekly earnings by jurisdiction and industry 
Code Industry  NSW  VIC  QLD  SA  WA  TAS  NT  ACT 
B  Mining  1 605.34  1 458.54  1 717.84  1 647.24  1 828.46  1 429.61  1 569.52  887.45 
C Manufacturing  952.92  891.40  767.47 807.01 893.11 817.55 880.27 880.67 
D  Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
1 205.22  1 207.11  1 179.98  1 151.18  1 200.20  1 184.49  1 100.38  1 165.84 
E Construction  998.22  908.00  910.82 684.97 868.64 731.96 986.21 876.78 
F Wholesale  trade  883.69  747.30  745.92 682.42 753.28 648.46 704.69  1  143.04 
G Retail  trade  478.71  425.58  407.99 410.81 432.93 389.90 444.05 447.63 
H  Accommodation, cafes and 
restaurants 
383.78 380.38 407.41 364.68 384.69 362.07 448.05 352.94 
I  Transport and storage  919.76  801.61 868.29 858.54 835.54 895.78 786.70  1  028.17 
J  Communication services  1 002.40  997.84 796.50 815.66 953.95 874.90 982.40 937.95 
K  Finance and insurance  1 227.88  1 146.98 878.89 944.32  1  035.22 672.71 915.33 956.27 
L  Property and business 
services 
770.66 843.74 675.18 814.59 759.62 667.64 656.20  1  000.38 
M Government  administration 
and defence 
843.92 874.32 744.96 832.21 810.40 787.69 861.35  1  015.56 
N Education  801.68  779.23  717.86 761.32 732.60 719.83 723.38 757.69 
O  Health and Community 
services 
656.06 781.41 652.73 671.53 658.80 657.54 644.00 633.94 
P Cultural  and  recreational 
services 
668.57 626.59 537.16 637.04 526.78 520.92 561.62 546.91 
Q  Personal and other services   648.20 591.22 613.24 576.27 617.26 668.49 676.38 752.95 
Source: ABS May 2003 AWE by Industry Cat. 6300.0. 
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D.1 Appendix C  Workers compensation premium rates 
Premiums rates for each jurisdiction and industry group were derived from the last published Comparative Performance Monitoring (CPM) 
report published by the Department of Workplace Relations. 
The premium for each potential national self-insurer was determined as the total wage roll (refer above) multiplied by the adopted premium 
rate.  
Table D.5  Adopted premium rates by jurisdiction and industry  
Code  Industry  NSW  VIC  QLD  WA SA  TAS NT  ACT 
    % % % % % % % % 
A  Agriculture, forestry and fishing  5.5 4.2 3.0 5.5 4.0 7.3 9.4 8.7 
B Mining  3.2  2.9  2.7  2.9 3.7 6.5 2.6 6.1 
C Manufacturing  4.0  4.3  2.5 4.7 4.3 3.7 3.3 4.2 
D  Electricity, gas and water supply  1.7 1.1 0.8 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.8 4.7 
E Construction  4.9  4.1  2.7 4.4 4.5 4.2 4.2 6.6 
F Wholesale  trade  1.9  1.8  1.0 2.6 1.9 2.4 3.1 3.2 
G Retail  trade  2.4  1.9  1.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.7 
H  Accommodation, cafes and 
restaurants 
2.8 2.5 1.4 3.0 2.8 2.0 2.6 3.5 
I  Transport and storage  3.7  3.8  2.5 3.5 4.4 4.2 4.1 5.1 
J Communication  services  0.9  0.9 0.6 1.4 1.5 2.4 3.1 2.3 
K  Finance and insurance  0.5  0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.2 1.4 1.3 
L  Property and business services  1.0 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.2 1.4 
M  Government administration and 
defence 
1.5 1.3 1.1 2.5 0.5 3.2 2.1 1.7 
N Education  1.0  1.0  0.4 1.2 1.0 1.2 2.3 1.8 
O  Health and community services  2.4 2.2 1.4 3.0 2.6 3.8 3.1 3.1 
P  Cultural and Recreational 
services 
1.7 1.9 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.3 2.5 2.2 
Q  Personal and other services  3.1 4.1 1.3 3.6 2.5 3.6 3.5 2.3     
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D.1 Appendix D  Licence types, licensees and expiry dates (as at 1 July 
2003)  








1. licence commencement date 




Part VIII   Self-insurance  ADI Limited  In license, with claims  
Corporations Self-claims  1.    7/02/1196  Review function by 
  management (with  2.  31/12/2005  Comcare 
  capacity to arrange     
  for a 3
rd party  Australian Air Express Pty Ltd  GIO General Ltd 
  claims manager)  1.  1/07/1999   
    2.  31/12/2005   
      
    Pacific National (ACT Limited)  In house, with claims 
    1.  1/07/2001  Review function by 
    2.  31/12/2005  Australia Post 
      
    Telstra Corporation Limited  GIO General Ltd 
   1.  30/06/1992   
    2.  30/06/2006   
      
    Visionstream Pty Ltd  GIO General Ltd 
    1.  1/07/1999   
    2.  30/06/2004   
      
Part VIII  Self-insurance  Australian Postal Corporation  In house 
Commonwealth Self-claims  management  1.  30/06/1992   
Authority    2.  30/06/2006   
      
Part VIIIB  Self-insurance  Network Design and  GIO General Ltd 
Corporation Self-claims  management Construction  Limited   
(Class B)  (with capacity to arrange  1.  15/04/1999   
  for a 3
rd party claims  2.  31/12/2004   
 manager)     
      
Corporations Self-insurance  CSL Limited  Comcare subsidiary 
(Class A)  Claims management by  1.  1/06/1994  (QWL Corporation 
  Comcare subsidiary  2.  30/06/2004  Pty Ltd) 
      
    JRH Biosciences Pty Ltd  Comcare subsidiary 
    1.  1/06/1994  (QWL Corporation 
    2.  30/06/2004  Pty Ltd) 
      
Part VIIIA  Self-insurance  Reserve Bank of Australia  In house 
Commonwealth Self-claims  management  1.  1/07/1996   
Authority  
(Class III) 
  2.  30/06/2004       
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D.1 Appendix E  Remuneration for current self-insurers  
(> 500 employees) 
Wage roll for self-insurers with more than 500 employees was estimated based on the 
number of employees listed in the D&B statistics multiplied by the average weekly 
earnings detailed in table D.4.  
Table D.7  Estimated remuneration of large self-insurers 
Jurisdiction  Wage roll (self-insurers >500 employees)   
 $m   
Australian Capital Territory  0   
New South Wales  19 808   
Northern Territory  0   
Queensland 2  386   
South Australia  1 978   
Tasmania 95   
Victoria 30  218   
Western Australia  2 963   
Total 57  449   
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D.2  am actuaries’ report on the impact on scheme 
average premium rates from large employers 
exiting 
16 February 2004 
Productivity Commission 
PO Box 80 
Belconnen  ACT  2616 
Re: Impact on scheme average premium rates from large employers 
exiting 
You requested advice from am actuaries as to the possible impacts to a workers’ 
compensation scheme’s average premium rate caused by large employers exiting by self-
insuring under Comcare.  This letter sets out the range of possible impacts on average 
premium rates. 
Influencing factors 
The impact on the average premium rate will be influenced by: 
•  The level of exiting employers as a proportion of premium income to the existing 
scheme. 
•  The level of cross subsidisation that the exiting employers currently provide to the 
scheme. 
These factors are examined below. 
Proportion of Premium Income Relating to Exiting Employers 
The types of employers that could join the Comcare scheme are limited to those in 
competition with a present or former Commonwealth authority and who meet the 
minimum employee requirement of 500. Taylor Fry estimated that across all states there 
are around 500 employers paying $771 million in premiums which meet the requirements, 
of which it was assumed that 100 ($154  million in premiums) may self-insure under 
Comcare. Table D.8 summarises the maximum and expected level of exiting employers by 
State and Territory.      
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    Projected maximum exiting 
          Premium 
      Expected level of exiting 
          Premium 
 $’000  $’000  %  $’000  %
ACT 187  15  7.9  3  1.6
NSW 2  269  377  16.6  75  3.3
NT 58  2  3.3  0  0.7
QLD 506  45  8.8  9  1.8
SA 341  11  3.3  2  0.7
TAS 117  3  2.6  1  0.5
VIC 1  591  288  18.1  58  3.6
WA 636  30  4.8  6  1.0
Total 5  705  771  13.5  154  2.7
Table D.8 shows large percentages of exiting premium for Victoria and NSW. This is 
influenced by the data due to the use of head office addresses for the larger employers 
although many would have employees across other states. Hence, we consider that it is 
more appropriate to apply the overall percentages.  
From this table we conclude that the percentage of exiting employers would represent less 
than 10 per cent to scheme revenues and probably less than 5 per cent. 
Extent of cross subsidy from exiting employers  
To determine the impact on average scheme premiums for remaining employers requires 
the extent to which their premiums are subject to cross subsidisation. However, the 
information to determine the cross subsidisation of these employers is not readily 
available, mainly because of the difficultly in determining the “true” or expected cost for 
each employer.  
Centrally managed schemes use experience rated formula to apply to large employers 
which generally take the form of:  
Assessed Premium = E x Z + IP x (1-Z)  
where:  
•  E is the experience rate of the large employer based on their own claims costs;  
•  Z is a credibility factor, probably at least 80 per cent for the larger employers; and  
•  IP is either an industry premium or the rate applied the prior year for the large 
employer.      
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Based on our experience of these formulae, the underlying claims ratio (present value of 
claims divided by premium) for large employers are often around 50 per cent to 60 per 
cent. Premiums and claims are all net of GST impacts. Hence, with expense rates in the 
order of 25 per cent the level of cross subsidisation by large employers could be in the 
range of 15 per cent to 25 per cent. 
Influencing factors 
We have calculated the impact on remaining employers’ average premium rate on different 
scenarios. Given that the extent to which employer will self-insure under Comcare is not 
known and the exact level of cross subsidy is also not known, we have illustrated the 
impact under a range of assumptions. The results are shown in figure D.1 which illustrates 
the impact on the scheme premium rates for various levels of cross subsidisation and exits.  



















































Each line in figure D.1 represents a level of cross subsidisation ranging from 10 per cent to 
30 per cent. For example, with 10 per cent of premium income exiting the scheme, with 
cross subsidisation of 20  per cent means that the average premium for remaining 
employers would increase by less than 2 per cent. This represents the percentage increase 
in premium rate and is not an addition to the existing average premium rate. 
The results show that using plausible values for cross subsidisation, the impact on the 
premium levels of remaining employers is small. Even assuming that all eligible employers 
exit (representing 13.5  per cent of premium revenue as shown in table  D.9) and cross 
Level of 
cross 
subsidy    
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subsidise the scheme at the rate of 30 per cent of their premiums, the average premium 
increase is 3.6 per cent. It is expected that the number of employers exiting and the actual 
level of cross subsidy would be considerably less resulting in an increase in average 
premiums for remaining employers of perhaps 0.5 per cent to 1.5 per cent. 
The percentages shown in figure D.1 are detailed in table D.9. 
Table D.9  Impact on scheme average premium for remaining employers 







6  8 10 12 14 16 
 
18 20
  % % % % % % % % %  %
10%  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.0  2.3
15%  0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.9  3.3
20%  0.3 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.7  4.2
25%  0.4 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.3 3.8 4.4  5.0
30%  0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.1 3.8 4.4 5.1  5.8
Reliances and limitations 
The change in average premium rate for remaining employers is based on maintaining the 
current funding ratio of the schemes. It is noted that run-off claims for employers exiting a 
scheme require further funding for those schemes in deficit. However, no future revenue 
would be available from those employers. In our calculations we have assumed that any 
unfunded liability would be recovered from the exiting employer. This could be achieved 
by transferring the ‘tail’ to the exiting employer (provisions currently exist under NSW 
WorkCover legislation).  
It is not possible to predict the number of employers that will seek to self-insure under the 
SRC Act. Although our estimates have been prepared on a conservative basis (more likely 
to overstate the extent of employers exiting than understating) it is still possible that more 
employers may exit than illustrated in the scenarios illustrated.  
The scenarios presented were designed to encompass the possible range of cross subsidies 
that may exist. We note, however, that the actual level of cross subsidies is not known and 
could be higher than that illustrated. 
The impact is shown on the average premium rate for remaining employers. The impact on 
individual employers will differ from the average. Some can expect considerably higher     
    449
 
increase and some may experience reductions. The range of increases would depend on the 
various policies and strategies implanted by each scheme. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Clive Amery  Greg Moran 
Fellows of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia     
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D.3  am actuaries’ response to the comment of Bateup 
Actuarial + Consulting Services 
26 February 2004 
Productivity Commission 
PO Box 80 
Belconnen  ACT  2616 
Bateup review of Taylor Fry report 
This letter responds to Robyn Bateup’s review of the Taylor Fry report contained in 
Appendix  D of the Productivity Commission’s Interim Report on ‘National Workers’ 
Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety Frameworks’. am actuaries was 
requested by the Productivity Commission to undertake this work as Clive Amery was the 
principal author of the Taylor Fry report. No comment is made in relation to her review of 
the Australian Government Actuary’s report. 
The main comments and issues raised are addressed below. 
Further investigation 
Bateup suggested that several areas may benefit from further investigation. Each is 
considered below. 
While more detailed analysis may provide greater insight into the impact of self-insurance 
on various schemes, we consider that it is unlikely to significantly alter the results of the 
assessment already conducted. 
Cross subsidies 
Large employers are mainly experience rated and so their premium is expected to reflect 
their cost of claims and contribution to administration and claims management. Even if 
exiting large employers were subsidising the cost of claims of smaller employers it was not 
expected to have a material impact on the average premium rate for remaining employers. 
That view was confirmed in separate advice recently provided to the Productivity 
Commission in our letter dated 16 February 2004. Further analysis is unlikely to result in a 
more accurate assessment of the impact on the average premium rate for remaining 
employers as it is not possible (except in hindsight) to determine the actual level of cross 
subsidy.     
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Propensity for large employers to self-insure 
Further analysis is unlikely to provide a better estimate of the ultimate number that will be 
successful in applying for national self-insurance. Although, as suggested by Bateup, a 
survey of identified employers could be undertaken, in the absence of a feasibility study, it 
is unlikely that employers would be in a position to indicate if they would apply to self-
insure under a national licence. Even if employers could respond, at this stage, the ultimate 
number seeking to self-insure under a national framework can only be a matter of 
conjecture. 
In the original impact assessment of self-insurance, the premium pool of all potential 
exiting employers, as well as a more likely one in five, was illustrated. This clearly 
provides the possible range of outcomes. 
Impacts other than premium revenue 
Bateup suggests that an assessment of the loss of subsidies and economies of scale on 
small to medium sized employers be undertaken by industry and jurisdiction.  
The key difficulty with undertaking the original assessment relates to knowing which 
employers are likely to exit the scheme. The original assessment based this on the 2-digit 
ANZSIC industry code (refer table  A.1 (table  D.3 above) of the Taylor Fry report). 
Although not directly referred to in the report, it was assumed that each company with 
more than 500 employees in the industry with ‘TRUE’ shown under the ‘Competition?’ 
heading would self-insure. Fifty percent of those shown as ‘Maybe’ were also assumed to 
self-insure. This provides an indication of the industries likely to be affected by national 
self-insurance arrangements. 
The level of examination suggested by Bateup could only be performed with detailed 
scheme data. Although requested, only limited information was made available for the 
original review. This issue is discussed further below. 
Access to scheme data 
It was originally intended that the impact on jurisdictions would be assessed by 
considering Tasmania (impact on a smaller and privately underwritten scheme), Victoria 
(impact on a large centrally funded scheme) and Queensland (due to the different 
characteristics of that scheme). However, only limited information was made available. 
Although scheme data was not available, the alternate source of information was 
considered useful. Checks were performed on the data that provided the necessary 
confidence that it was adequate for the purpose of the investigation.     
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The lack of scheme specific data does not invalidate the analysis undertaken. The results of 
the analysis on the alternate data sources are soundly based and provide a reasonable 
indicator as to the impact on the various workers compensation schemes.  
Since the original report, the Victorian WorkCover Authority has made information 
available. This is currently being analysed and will be the subject of a separate report.  
Comments on assumptions  
When undertaking the analysis, as observed by Bateup, it was necessary to make several 
subjective assumptions. These assumptions were carefully chosen to clearly illustrate the 
range of likely outcomes and inform the reader of their significance. For each assumption 
we adopted a cautious approach that was aimed at not understating the impact on the 
workers’ compensation schemes. As such, the results are considered to more likely to over-
state than under-state the impact on the schemes.  
It is true to say that considerably uncertainty exists in the assessment; this point is clearly 
acknowledged and largely quantified in the original report. However, it is not correct to say 
that the use of the assumptions ‘significantly increases the uncertainty in the results 
produced’. As indicated in the sections above concerning the suggested areas of further 
investigation, we do not consider further investigation would yield more accurate 
assumptions. 
Conclusion 
Our opinion is that the overall assessment undertaken in the original report remains valid. 
Bateup has reiterated the limitations of the analysis undertaken. However, we do not 
consider that the further investigations suggested would produce better assumptions or 
result in a material change to the original assessment. 
We do consider that analysis on scheme specific data would provide more insight into the 
impact on each scheme.  
Yours sincerely 
Clive Amery   Greg Moran 
Fellows of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia     
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D.4  Analysis of Victorian WorkCover Authority data 
1 March 2004 
Productivity Commission 
PO Box 80 
Belconnen  ACT  2616 
Impact of national self-insurance on State schemes (Victoria) 
The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) recently provided information that had been 
requested by the Productivity Commission to assist in the assessment of the impact of 
national self-insurance under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC 
Act) on the State schemes.  
This letter examines the information provided by VWA and quantifies the impact that 
national self-insurance may have on VWA’s remuneration base and premium pool. Other 
issues such as accrued unfunded liabilities and cross subsidies are not discussed as they 
have been considered in separate advices. 
Approach 
Our investigation follows along similar lines to that conducted in the initial Taylor Fry 
report that examined this issue and formed part of the interim report by the Productivity 
Commission. The potential to self-insure under the national framework was considered for 
each industry and each company was then categorised according to their industry group. A 
list of the industries considered having some ability to meet the competition criteria is 
listed in Appendix A of the Taylor Fry report. 
The main difference from the initial assessment is that VWA provided the ANZSIC 
classification for each workplace rather than the overall corporation. In this assessment we 
have assumed that a corporation will be eligible to transfer to national self-insurance if any 
workplace6 satisfies the competition criteria. This approach has been adopted to minimise 
the potential for understating the impact on VWA. 
In this assessment we have assumed that State government departments and agencies, 
authorities, councils and health service providers will remain premium payers under VWA. 
                                                 
6 Workplaces with ANZSIC codes 78 – Business Service and 67 – Storage were excluded from this 
adjustment where they provided a relatively minor part of an organisation’s operations.     
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These organisations represent 21 per cent of remuneration and 16 per cent of premium 
revenue of the companies listed by VWA7. 
Impact of national self-insurance on VWA 
In 2002-03, 1173 ‘large’ employers (employers with remuneration exceeding $7.5 million) 
represented 42  per cent ($32  468  million / $76  681  million) of total remuneration and 
40 per cent ($723 million / $1799 million) of premium for the Victorian scheme.  
The same criteria for assessing a company’s potential to self-insure under the SRC Act was 
used in this assessment to that employed in the initial investigation (refer Appendix A of 
the Taylor Fry report). Using these criteria, 179 or 15  per cent of the 1173 ‘large’ 
companies, were considered to have potential to self-insure under the SRC Act. 
Aggregated remuneration and premium information is shown in table D.10. 
Table D.10  Potential for national self-insurance 






 No  $m  $m
Potential for national self-insurance  179  7 643  146
Total ‘large’ employers  1 173  32 468  723
Scheme total 2002-03    76 681  1 799
The figures in table D.10 indicate that VWA’s remuneration base would reduce by 10.0 per 
cent ($7643 million / $76 681 million) and premium revenue by 8.1 per cent ($146 million 
/ $1799 million) if all companies with the potential to self-insure actually transfer to the 
national scheme. These percentages represent the maximum  reduction in scheme 
remuneration and premium as it is considered unlikely that all eligible employers will 
pursue self-insurance.  
The initial report illustrated the impact on remuneration and premiums in the event that 
only one in five eligible employers transferred to national self-insurance. Utilising this 
same assumption suggests that VWA’s remuneration pool could reduce by around 2.0 per 
cent and the premium pool by around 1.6 per cent. 
In the initial Taylor Fry report, the maximum reduction in premium was estimated to be 
13.5 per cent (compared to the current estimate for VWA of 8.1 per cent) and, assuming 
one in five actual transfer to national self-insurance, the premium reduction was estimated 
                                                 
7   VWA provided a list of 2938 workplaces in respect of 1173 companies whose aggregate 
remuneration each exceeded $7.5  million. This remuneration floor equates to around 200 
employees.     
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to be 2.7 per cent (compared to the current estimate for VWA of 1.6 per cent). The current 
assessment is considered to provide more reliable estimates of the impact on the VWA as 
the analysis is based on actual scheme data. 
The reduction in premium pool resulting from exiting employers is not expected to result 
in a material change in premiums for remaining employers. This issue has been addressed 
in separate advice to the Productivity Commission in our letter dated 16 February 2004. 
Removal of competition criteria 
The impact of broadening access to national self-insurance by removing the ‘competition’ 
criteria has been assessed by assuming that all companies in the list provided by VWA 
with at least 500 employees would be eligible to self-insure under the SRC Act, except for 
State government departments and agencies, authorities, councils and health service 
providers.  
If all organisations (apart from the identified exclusions) transfer to national self-insurance, 
then the VWA could expected scheme remuneration and premiums to reduce by 23 per 
cent. However, as discussed in the initial review, it is unlikely that every eligible company 
will seek to self-insure on a national basis. Assuming that one in five companies will 
transfer to national self-insurance, then it is expected that both scheme remuneration and 
premiums would reduce by around 4 per cent to 5 per cent. 
Current self-insurers 
As noted in the initial Taylor Fry report, current self-insurers in Tasmania are mostly large 
national employers that would be likely to consider transferring to a national self-insurance 
arrangement. It was expected that access to national self-insurance could potentially result 
in the number of Tasmanian self-insurers reducing from 15 to 4, which could act to 
increase the licence fee for remaining self-insurers. This fee is charged by the state 
authority to meet the costs of regulation and oversight of self-insurers. 
VWA reported that there were 35 licensed self-insurers in 2002-03. Based on existing 
eligibility conditions, we consider that most could self-insure under the national 
framework. If all eligible organisations elect to transfers to national self-insurance only 
seven would remain under Victorian self-insurance arrangements. This proportion (20% = 
7/35) is a similar order of magnitude to that previously assessed for Tasmania (27% = 
4/15). It is expected that the cost of supervising self-insurers will decrease in proportion to 
the number of remaining self-insurers and is unlikely to affect the finances of the scheme.     
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Limitations 
The impact on the Victorian scheme will differ to the estimates contained in this letter and 
will depend on the actual number of companies that seek national self-insurance. 
The assessment of eligibility for national self-insurance is based on broad industry 
groupings. It is possible that many companies deemed eligible may in fact not be eligible. 
In addition, many companies not considered eligible may be eligible. The figures presented 
in this advice have been prepared to minimise the risk of understating the reduction in 






Clive Amery   Greg Moran 
Fellows of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia 
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E  Institutional arrangements for 
national workers’ compensation 
frameworks 
In the Interim Report, the Commission proposed a number of national framework models 
to overcome the compliance burdens and costs faced by multi-state employers and mobile 
workers arising from multiple workers’ compensation schemes and OHS regimes. 
The proposed models take an incremental approach to changing the existing arrangements. 
As an initial step, they would allow employers meeting specific criteria to self-insure under 
the Australian Government’s Comcare scheme, followed by making the alternative self-
insurance arrangements more widely available. Should the Government be so disposed it 
could then implement an alternative premium paying national workers’ compensation 
scheme. Employers opting into such workers’ compensation arrangements could also seek 
coverage under the Australian Government’s OHS legislation. 
This raises the issue of whether existing institutional arrangements governing the Comcare 
scheme and OHS legislation are appropriate and, if not, what changes are required to deal 
with an expanded national scheme.  
This appendix, after briefly describing the existing arrangements, looks at a continuum of 
appropriate changes to the institutional arrangements to reflect the incremental approach of 
the national framework models proposed by the Commission.  
E.1 Current  arrangements 
The legislative framework for the Comcare scheme is provided by the Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act), while the Occupational Health and 
Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991 (OHS (CE) Act) provides the legislative 
basis for the Australian Government’s OHS regime. Details of the Comcare scheme are 
provided below.  
In broad terms, the administration and regulation of workers’ compensation and OHS is 
undertaken by two agencies, the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission 
(SRCC) and Comcare.      
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The SRCC 
The SRCC, established under the SRC Act, is broadly responsible for providing the 
regulatory framework for the Australian Government’s workers’ compensation scheme and 
OHS regulatory regime. The eleven members of the SRCC are primarily stakeholder 
representatives. The Chair is the CEO of Comcare and other members represent Australian 
Government employers, Australian Government employees, licensed self-insurers, the 
Australian Defence Force and the ACT Government. The CEO of NOHSC is a member of 
the SRCC and two other members are appointed on the basis of relevant qualifications and 
experience. 
The SRCC’s functions include advising the Minister, issuing licences for self-insurance 
and claims management, and issuing guidelines for the determination of premiums and 
regulatory contributions. The SRCC also has regulatory functions under the OHS(CE) Act.  
The SRCC does not have its own staff and relies on Comcare staff to carry out its 
functions. Also, it does not have a separate budget and relies on Comcare for its 
expenditures. Because of these arrangements, the SRCC is more of a stakeholder body 
embedded in Comcare than a stand alone regulator. 
Comcare  
Comcare, a statutory authority also established under the SRC Act, administers the 
Australian Government’s workers’ compensation scheme and administers the OHS (CE) 
Act. Comcare’s governance structure consists of a Chief Executive Officer, Deputy Chief 
Executive Officer and a number of general managers responsible for various divisions 
within the organisation. The Chief Executive Officer reports to the Minister for 
Employment and Workplace Relations. 
Comcare’s functions include determining and collecting premiums and regulatory 
contributions, determining claims from employees of premium paying agencies, applying 
premiums to meet claims, common law liabilities and the cost of managing claims, 
promoting strategies for the rehabilitation of injured employees by employers (who are 
responsible for occupational rehabilitation), and providing administrative support to the 
SRCC. It also enforces the OHS (CE) Act, initiating investigations and prosecutions, and 
appointing investigators who may also initiate prosecutions. 
The Australian Government effectively acts as self-insurer and ultimately the underwriter 
for premium paying agencies under the scheme.     
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Employee coverage. The scheme covers all Australian Government employees, including 
members of the Defence Force, as well as employees of certain corporations and ACT 
Government employees. 
Journeys etc. The scheme covers journeys (for example, between place of residence and 
place of work) and ‘ordinary recesses’ (for example, meal breaks). 
Statutory benefit structure. Weekly benefit rates are payable for the first 45  weeks at 
100  per cent of normal weekly earnings, and after 45  weeks at 75  per cent of normal 
weekly earnings. All reasonable medical and hospital costs are paid. Lump sums are paid 
for permanent impairment (assessed as at least 10  per cent of the whole person). 
Redemptions are paid only where the weekly benefit is below a statutory threshold and 
when the employee’s incapacity is unlikely to change. 
Access to common law damages. Common law damages are limited under the scheme (for 
example, they are only available where there is permanent impairment and for non-
economic loss only, and they are capped). There is no ceiling on third party actions or 
those made by dependants.  
Premium setting. Premiums are set so as to ‘fully fund’ the scheme. Comcare determines 
and applies premiums for each Australian Government agency on an experience-rated 
basis. There are no employer excesses.  
Licences for self-insurance and claims management. Licensing arrangements were first 
enacted in 1992 and were ‘streamlined’ in 2001. The SRC Act provides scope for 
Australian Government authorities and for eligible corporations to be granted a licence to 
self-insure and/or manage claims. The Minister may declare certain corporations as eligible 
to apply to the SRCC for such a licence. Before granting a licence, the SRCC must be 
satisfied that: the applicant has sufficient resources to fulfil the responsibilities imposed on 
it under the licence; the applicant has the capacity to ensure that claims will be managed in 
accordance with standards set by the SRCC; the grant of the licence will not be contrary to 
the interests of the employees; and the applicant has the capacity to meet the OHS and 
rehabilitation standards set by the SRCC. The SRCC applies conditions to the licence that 
may include prudential requirements, and conditions whereby the management of claims 
may be performed by another body. 
Dispute resolution. Applications for a review of claims management decisions involve a 
two-tier process. The first is an internal reconsideration, which may then be followed by an 
application for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (appendix F). A decision of 
the Tribunal may be appealed to the Federal Court on questions of law only.     
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E.2  Institutional arrangements for step 1 
The initial step in the proposed development of a national scheme would involve using the 
Ministerial discretion powers under the SRC Act to enable employers carrying on a 
business in competition with Australian Government authorities, or with corporations that 
were previously Australian Government authorities, to apply for a licence to self-insure 
under the Australian Government scheme. 
As with the current licensing arrangements, the SRCC would be responsible for granting 
the licence to self-insure, subject to certain prudential and other requirements being met, as 
set out above. One concern with the current arrangements is that the SRCC is essentially a 
stakeholder body. As such, the applicants for self-insurance would not be scrutinised by an 
independent regulator. This may not be a major issue for step  1, provided that those 
employers wanting to self-insure are not being scrutinised by a competitor who is also a 
member of the SRCC. 
Given the use of existing legislation and the limited number of employers that would be 
eligible to self-insure under this initial step, the current regulatory regime appears to be 
appropriate. Moreover, as indicated by Comcare in discussions with the Commission, 
additional resources would not be required to administer such minor changes to the current 
arrangements. 
The Australian Government may wish to draft legislation to enable this wider group of 
self-insurers to be covered under its OHS arrangements. 
E.3  Institutional arrangements for step 2 
The second step is more substantial, involving legislative, rather than administrative, 
changes to the current workers’ compensation scheme.  
The establishment of such a broadly based self-insurance scheme, and the increased 
regulatory task it entails, raises a number of issues regarding the structure and functions of 
the SRCC. These include: 
•  the lack of clear separation of the regulatory functions from the service functions; 
•  the ‘stakeholder’ composition of the Commission; and 
•  the SRCC’s reliance on Comcare’s resources.      
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Stakeholder involvement in the SRCC  
At present, the stakeholder nature of the SRCC results in a lack of independence, leading 
to a possible conflict of interest from having those being regulated sitting on the regulator’s 
board.  
The requirement for legislative change to implement step 2 provides an opportune time to 
review the governance structure of the SRCC. Given its expanded regulatory role, it would 
be appropriate to establish its independence by establishing an independent board of 
directors appointed on the basis of their skill and expertise.  
The use of Ministerial discretion, as required for step 1, should be reviewed with a view to 
its removal under the proposed step 2 legislation, given that licences for self-insurance 
would be issued by an independent board based on specific prudential and other eligibility 
criteria being met. 
Separation of the regulatory and service functions 
The separation of regulatory and service functions is a fundamental tenet of good 
governance. At present, however, the regulator, the SRCC, is dependent on Comcare for its 
staffing and financial resources and the chief executive officer of Comcare is the Chair of 
the SRCC. Separation would ensure that there is no conflict of interest between setting the 
appropriate service standards and providing the service. There are a number of options to 
separate these functions.  
‘Ring fencing’ the SRCC 
The minimalist option would be to provide the existing SRCC with dedicated resources 
and separate its operations administratively from Comcare through a ‘ring fencing’ 
arrangement. The current representation on the SRCC would remain. 
Establishing the SRCC as statutory authority 
A second option would be to remove the SRCC from Comcare and create it as a separate 
regulatory authority. This would present the opportunity to ensure that its governance 
structure and functions complied with the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 
1997 and that its executive board possessed relevant skills and experience.  
At present there is some ambiguity as to whether or not those current SRCC members 
representing self-insures, employers and employees are directors for the purpose of the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 and whether they are charged with     
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the responsibilities attached to directors under the legislation. These responsibilities cover 
conflicts of interests, acting honestly, exercising care and diligence and using insider 
information and are in accordance with the duties of directors under Corporations Law. 
Establishing the SRCC as a separate regulatory authority would leave Comcare 
predominantly in a service provider role. 
The separation of the regulatory functions from the service provision functions in relation 
to workers’ compensation has been undertaken in some other jurisdictions. For example, 
following a National Competition Policy review, the Queensland Government introduced 
legislation in early 2003 which established Q-COMP as a stand-alone regulator separate 
from Workcover Queensland, the monopoly provider of workers’ compensation insurance 
in Queensland. Details of the State and Territory institutional arrangements relating to 
workers’ compensation and OHS are provided in box E.1. 
A ‘greenfields’ regulator 
A further option, rather than revamp the SRCC into a separate statutory authority, would 
be to establish a ‘greenfields’ regulator for the alternative national self-insurance scheme 
and leave the SRCC in its current role of regulating and licensing Australian Government 
agencies. The need to establish a ‘greenfields’ regulator is likely to depend on the number 
of employers accepted to join the national self-insurance scheme.  
The roles and functions of a ‘greenfields’ regulator is discussed in further detail in relation 
to the step 3 arrangements. 
As with the step  1 proposal, employers opting to self-insure could be covered by an 
extension of the Australian Government’s OHS legislation. This raises the issue of whether 
the SRCC’s regulatory functions in relation to the Australian Government’s OHS 
legislation should be with the body responsible for workers’ compensation, such as a 
revamped SRCC or ‘greenfields’ regulator, or be separated.      
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Box E.1  State and Territory institutional arrangements  
The institutional arrangements surrounding workers’ compensation and OHS vary 
across jurisdictions. They range from OHS and publicly underwritten workers’ 
compensation being provided under the control of a single statutory authority, such as 
in Victoria, to having separate agencies responsible for OHS and the administration of 
a privately underwritten workers’ compensation scheme such as in Western Australia.  
Regulation and provision of workers’ compensation 
In the case of the publicly underwritten schemes, Queensland is the only jurisdiction 
which has separated the regulatory functions from the provision and administration of 
workers’ compensation. Also, the use of private insurers to provide services under 
these schemes varies across jurisdictions. In New South Wales and Victoria private 
insurers are used extensively to collect premiums, deliver benefits and rehabilitation, 
while in South Australia the role of private insurers is limited to claims management.  
OHS consultation and enforcement 
Consultative bodies representing the government, employers, employees and OHS 
experts provide policy advice and set OHS standards in most jurisdictions. The 
enforcement of OHS is often undertaken by separate bodies, often by a separate 
division within the Department which has overarching responsibility for OHS policy. 
While some jurisdictions operate all OHS functions from a single body, such as in New 
South Wales and Victoria, the responsibility for OHS is fragmented in others, such as 




Regulatory arrangements for workers’ compensation and OHS 
There are different views and practices as to whether the regulation of workers’ 
compensation and OHS should be separate. From the discussion in chapter 4, the use of a 
single regulator is seen to provide benefits through greater coordination and feedback 
between workers’ compensation and OHS matters. Conversely, the different aims and 
issues of workers’ compensation and OHS were seen as reasons as to why they should be 
separated, but with strong informational links. 
Across the States and Territories, the use of single or separate bodies to regulate workers’ 
compensation and OHS varies (table  E.1). New South Wales, Victoria, the Australian 
Capital Territory and the Northern Territory use a single body. For example, in New South 
Wales the Workcover Authority is responsible for both administering and regulating 
workers’ compensation and OHS, while the Victorian Workcover Authority undertakes a 
similar role in Victoria. Single regulator models are used in both publicly and privately 
underwritten workers’ compensation schemes. Those jurisdictions with separate workers’ 
compensation and OHS regulators, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and     
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Tasmania also include both publicly and privately underwritten schemes. For example, in 
Queensland Q-Comp is responsible for regulating workers’ compensation and WorkCover 
Queensland for its administration, while the Division of Workplace Health and Safety in 
the Department of Industrial Relations administers and regulates OHS. 
Table E.1  Institutional arrangements in OHS and workers’ compensation 
by State and Territory 
  Publicly underwritten schemes    Privately underwritten schemes




















yes  yes no no   no no  yes  no
a Workcover NSW does not have the statutory responsibility for underwriting the New South Wales scheme. 
Source: Various. 
Initially, a new self-insurance scheme is unlikely to attract the number of employers to 
warrant the creation of separate workers’ compensation and OHS regulators on 
administrative cost grounds. Further, as is currently the arrangement, some of the OHS 
enforcement and inspection tasks could continue to be undertaken by State agencies or 
other agencies on behalf of the Australian Government. The principal requirement is that 
the regulatory and service functions are separated. 
E.4  Institutional arrangements for step 3 
The establishment of a broad-based alternative premium paying national insurance scheme 
(the Commission’s step 3) would require fundamental changes to the existing institutional 
arrangements. The regulatory task would be significantly greater than that proposed under 
steps 1 and 2. An alternative national insurance scheme would require the regulation of 
self-insurers and those private insurers who would provide workers’ compensation     
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insurance. However, the additional regulatory burden of regulating private insurers may 
not be that great, given that there would be no additional prudential scrutiny of private 
insurers to that undertaken by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
In addition, there would be the need for regulation and administration of the accompanying 
national OHS scheme. 
Such a move raises the question of what a new regulatory body would look like and what 
roles it would undertake. It also raises the issue of the role of Comcare and the regulation 
of its activities in an alternative national insurance scheme. 
A greenfields regulator 
There are several key roles in regard to regulatory frameworks. They include: 
•  the development of policy; 
•  the regulatory role; and  
•  enforcement. 
The development of policy is the preserve of the Government. As to the regulatory role and 
function, there is a number of broad best-practice principles relating to the structure and 
operation of regulatory bodies. The following governance structure draws on a number of 
recommendations from the HIH Royal Commission relating to the structure of the 
regulatory body responsible for general insurers. Most importantly, such a body should be 
independent, with its overarching role being to make decisions in accordance with the 
relevant legislation. To this end it should: 
•  be established by an Act of Parliament; 
•  be required to report to Parliament through the relevant Minister; 
•  have a control body based on at least one full-time commissioner; 
•  have commissioners appointed on fixed terms; 
•  have its own budget voted by Parliament;  
•  employ its own staff as opposed to using a secretariat provided by another agency; 
•  use transparent processes and permit public scrutiny, including publishing details of the 
processes and the basis for the decisions it reaches; and  
•  undertake public consultation dealing with matters of public importance.  
More specifically, but in keeping with the broad principles outlined above, a new regulator 
for an alternative national workers’ compensation scheme and OHS regulatory regime 
should be established as a separate Commonwealth statutory authority and operate in     
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accordance with the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997. Such a body 
should be administered by a board comprised of a chair and a small number of 
Commissioners appointed by the Governor-General. The chair would report to the relevant 
Minister and be accountable to the Government for the performance of the regulator. 
Commissioners would be appointed based on their relevant experience and expertise. The 
chair would also have the power to form an advisory body, which could include 
stakeholders and other relevant parties.  
The role of the regulator 
Broadly, the role of the regulator would be to: 
•  license private insurers providing workers’ compensation based on the appropriate 
prudential (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority) standards and administrative 
requirements; 
•  license self-insurers based on the appropriate prudential and administrative 
requirements (such as under ‘file and write’); 
•  act as a review body for premium settings; 
•  collect relevant data; and 
•  provide advice to the Minister as required. 
In keeping the regulation of OHS and workers’ compensation within the one agency, the 
new agency would also be responsible for the regulation of the Australian Government’s 
OHS legislation. Jurisdictions such as New South Wales and Victoria, which have 
relatively large schemes, use a single regulatory agency for both workers’ compensation 
and OHS. As it is proposed that any new national scheme would be privately underwritten, 
there is also a parallel with the Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory 
arrangements where a single body regulates a privately underwritten workers’ 
compensation scheme and the relevant OHS arrangements. 
Policy formulation would continue to reside with the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations.  
Should it undertake the enforcement of OHS? 
There is some degree of judgment as to how separate the regulatory and enforcement 
functions of OHS should be. Given that Comcare is already in existence and has 
experience in undertaking the enforcement and prosecution of functions in relation to 
Australian Government OHS legislation, these functions could remain with Comcare while 
the regulatory functions of the OHS legislation are moved to the specialist regulator. This     
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would ensure that those responsible for setting the regulatory standards are independent of 
those enforcing the standards and undertaking prosecutions. 
Previous work by the Commission in relation to other areas, such as gambling, suggests 
that there are benefits in having the enforcement and regulatory function undertaken by 
separate agencies (PC 1999). 
The role of Comcare in a national scheme 
Various roles for Comcare have been discussed above in relation to the proposed step 1 
and step 2 schemes. While an alternative national premium paying scheme is a longer term 
possibility, it also raises the issue of the role of Comcare under such a scheme. 
Workers’ compensation 
The Australian Government may consider that its agencies, rather than being part of any 
national scheme, retain separate arrangements and continue using Comcare (and the 
smaller Seacare scheme administered by Comcare) to provide the workers’ compensation 
arrangements for its agencies and the maritime industry. This is the case in Western 
Australia where the Risk Cover Division of the Government Insurance Commission 
provides the workers’ compensation arrangements for government agencies in that 
jurisdictions. 
If there were to be separate arrangements for Australian Government agencies and the 
maritime industry, the most appropriate regulatory agency for their workers’ compensation 
and OHS would be a ‘separate’ SRCC as discussed for step 2. 
OHS 
In regard to OHS, irrespective of whether Australian Government agencies were part of a 
national workers’ compensation scheme, Comcare could continue its role in administering 
the Australian Government’s OHS legislation and its enforcement as under steps 1 and 2.  
Under any of the proposed steps, if it was considered that the Australian Government’s 
OHS legislation did not warrant a specialist OHS administrative and enforcement body, the 
functions could be incorporated into the Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations. In a number of states, such as Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania, 
OHS administration and enforcement is undertaken by the relevant industrial relations 
department. As is the current practice, investigations and prosecutions could continue to be 
undertaken both by the Australian Government and on its behalf by State government 
agencies and other agents.      
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As discussed in chapter 4, were an Australian Government inspectorate to be established 
which reported directly to the SRCC, this body could undertake the enforcement and 
administration of the Australian Government’s OHS legislation.  
Summing up  
The institutional arrangements, discussed above, are part of a continuum of change and as 
such are not ‘welded on’ to each of the steps of the national framework. Indeed, there may 
be arguments for such institutional changes to be undertaken as part of earlier steps in the 
national framework. In particular, while opening up the existing self-insurance 
arrangements to specific employers only involves minor administrative change, given the 
potential conflict of interest in the management of the SRCC it may be worthwhile to 
amend legislation to change its structure in conjunction with the administrative changes. 
This would allow the SRCC time to ‘bed down’ any new administration arrangements 
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F Administrative  Appeals  Tribunal 
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was established by the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. Its powers, functions and procedures are governed by that Act 
and the associated regulations (Administrative Appeals Tribunal Regulations 1976). 
The AAT is an independent body that was set up to review, on the merits, a broad range of 
administrative decisions by Australian Government ministers and officials, authorities and 
other tribunals. The Tribunal also reviews administrative decisions made by some non-
government bodies, including about seafarers’ compensation and mutual recognition.  
An ‘on the merits’ review involves the Tribunal deciding, on the facts before it, whether 
the correct — or in a discretionary area, preferable — decision has been made in 
accordance with the applicable law. It will affirm, vary or set aside the original decision.  
The AAT is not always the first avenue of review of an administrative decision. In some 
cases, such as in the decisions made by Comcare that are subject to review, it may not 
review the decision until there has been an internal review by the agency. (Comcare’s 
internal review procedures are outlined in box F.1.) In other cases, review by the Tribunal 
is only available after an intermediate review by a specialist tribunal, such as in the area of 
social security where matters must first be considered by the Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal.  
The AAT can only review decisions over which it has specifically been given jurisdiction. 
Typically, this is contained in the legislation authorising the original decision. In total, 
however, its jurisdictional coverage is contained in some 400 separate acts, and also arises 
from decisions made by other authorities under the Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1988 and statutory instruments. In addition to review of Comcare’s 
decisions, its coverage includes taxation, social security, veterans’ affairs, Australian 
government employees’ superannuation, civil aviation, customs, freedom of information, 
bankruptcy, security assessments undertaken by the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation, corporations and export market development grants.      
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Box F.1  Comcare’s internal review procedures  
Comcare’s internal review procedures are set up to provide reconsideration of original 
Comcare decisions on workers’ compensation claims by review officers who have had 
no previous involvement in those decisions. Review officers can confirm or amend the 
original decision and must issue a written decision.  
To invoke the review procedures, complainants must request the reviews within 
30 days of the original decision. The requests must be in writing, identify the date of 
the original decision, explain the grounds for disagreeing with the decision and provide 
any new information that supports the request, such as medical reports not previously 
considered by Comcare. Extensions of time may be considered and complainants can, 
at their own expense and irrespective of the outcome, seek the help of solicitors to aid 
them with the review process.  
Employers have the same rights to request reviews of Comcare decisions as do 
employees. Employers are provided with a copy of employee requests for reviews and 
may provide comments on those requests. Likewise, employees are notified if their 
employer requests a review of an original decision on their claim.  
If complainants are not satisfied with the decision of the review officer, they can apply 
for the decision to be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 




At 31  July 2003, the Tribunal had a membership of 75, staff of 130 and a budget of 
$28 million. Members of the Tribunal come from a wide variety of backgrounds including 
lawyers, medical practitioners, aviators, accountants and other professions. Approximately 
30 per cent of applications lodged with the AAT involve compensation matters, with one-
third of these involving decisions made by Comcare (table F.1).  
Table F.1  Administrative Appeals Tribunal, compensation applications 
lodged and finalised, 2002-03 
  Applications lodged  Applications finalised
Australian Postal Commissiona 546  527
Comcare 800  829
Department of Defence   414  415
Seafarers’ compensation  41  43
Telstraa 463  487
Other compensation decision makers  28  23
Total compensation  2292  2324
Compensation proportion of total AAT activity  (30%)  (22%)
a Self-insure under Comcare scheme. 
Source: Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2003).     
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Upon acceptance, the AAT case manages each application to ensure an orderly and 
controlled passage from lodgement to resolution. The process involves pre-hearing 
conferences and, if mutually agreed, may include mediation before cases are listed for 
hearing and determination by Tribunal members. Tribunal hearings are normally open to 
the public. A flow chart of the dispute resolution process is given in figure F.1.  
Figure F.1  Flow chart of Administrative Review Tribunal’s dispute 
resolution process in compensation matters 
 
 
a explore mediation possibility;  b where necessary;  c where the applicant is represented. 
Source: Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2003), Annual Report 2002-2003. 
Applications to the AAT for review of Comcare decisions must be made within 60 days 
after the internal review, and include brief reasons as the why the decision is considered 
wrong. There is no lodgement fee and the parties are free to seek help from lawyers and 
‘professional’ persons to prepare their case. In most Comcare matters, the applicant is 
legally represented.  
As part of its case management, the AAT uses a general practice direction, which sets out 
the procedures to be followed for all applications, to achieve the dual purpose of 
attempting to obtain an agreed resolution where possible and of ensuring that appropriate 
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obvious at the outset that settlement is either inappropriate or unlikely to be achieved, the 
AAT will concentrate on preparing the application for hearing.  
The parties are expected to play an active part in identifying legal and factual issues early 
in the pre-hearing process. After lodgement, the AAT requests Comcare to file, within 
28 days of receipt of the request, copies of specified documents (known as section 37 or 
T documents) with the Tribunal and send a copy to the applicant. The documents are to 
include a statement setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to 
evidence of other material on which the findings were based, and give reasons for the 
decision and a copy of every other document considered relevant to a review of the 
decision. Typically, it is five weeks before the applicant receives a copy of those 
documents.  
The next step in the resolution process is a conference organised by the AAT. It is held in 
private and can either be in person or by telephone. A failure by the applicant to attend a 
conference as agreed and scheduled may result in the case being dismissed. Typically, the 
first conference is held some six to ten weeks after lodgement. Issues in dispute are 
discussed as is the need to gather any further evidence with a view to ascertaining whether 
a new decision, or process for reaching one, can be agreed.  
Generally, only two conferences are held. If agreement is not reached at the first, then the 
second conference is usually held some 12 to 16 weeks after the first. For that conference, 
specific requirements are placed on the parties to produce all relevant material in a timely 
manner. At that conference, all the evidence is placed before the AAT and the merits of the 
case discussed with a view to settlement. If all matters are not settled, then the next steps in 
the resolution process are discussed, including the possibility of mediation and the 
requirements for a Tribunal hearing.  
As disputes with Comcare decisions typically involve compensation issues, a compulsory 
conciliation conference is the next step in the resolution process. Conciliation conferences 
are held on a face-to-face basis, unless geographic or other considerations dictate 
otherwise. Conciliation conferences usually take place some four to six weeks after the 
final pre-hearing conference. During the conciliation conference, the conference convenor 
(a Tribunal member or Conference registrar) takes an active role, setting out options and 
discussing with the parties the merits of their respective cases. If the matter fails to be 
settled at conciliation, then it will proceed to a Tribunal hearing unless both parties and the 
AAT agree that mediation should be held.  
For a Tribunal hearing, if the matter has not been settled, both parties have to lodge and 
serve a hearing certificate within seven days of the final conference. If a hearing certificate 
is not provided, then the application for a Tribunal hearing may be listed without further 
consultation or otherwise as directed. Generally, hearings are listed ten weeks after the last 
conference. Depending on the issues, the case may be heard and determined by one, two or     
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three Tribunal members. It is not unusual for a medically qualified member of the Tribunal 
to be included on the panel to hear Comcare matters. 
Where issues of medical opinion are involved, the AAT will not generally require a doctor 
to give oral evidence where a report has been appropriately lodged and exchanged. 
However, where a party procures the attendance, by summons or otherwise, of a medical 
practitioner, the party must notify all other parties. The medical practitioner does not 
become the party’s witness and may be cross-examined and re-examined. Recently, the 
AAT has experimented with a concurrent evidence procedure by which sworn evidence is 
taken from more than one expert at the same time. The procedure allows expert witnesses 
to listen to, question and critically evaluate each other’s evidence and has the potential to 
reduce hearing time, narrow issues in dispute and reduce partisanship on the part of 
experts.  
Under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 and the Seafarers 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992, the AAT has the power to order or recommend 
that the respondent pay the costs, or part of the costs, of a successful applicant. Unless the 
order determines otherwise, the costs payable may include: witness expenses at the 
prescribed rate; all reasonable and proper disbursement; and 75 per cent of all professional 
costs, including counsel’s fees which would be allowable under the Federal Court scale. 
At the end of a Tribunal hearing, its decision may be provided immediately and the reasons 
for it given orally, or its decision may be provided at a later date with the reasons given in 
writing. Typically, decisions are deferred where the Tribunal member, or members, need to 
give further thought to the law and what has been said and shown to them. AAT decisions 
are conclusive, except on points of law where appeals to the Federal Court are permitted. 
In many cases where the decision of the Tribunal is to set aside or vary the original 
decision this is the result of fresh or additional evidence being presented to the Tribunal 
that was not available to the original decision maker. 
In 2002-03, some 90  per cent of the 2292 applications for review of compensation 
decisions were finalised by consent among the parties without recourse to a formal hearing 
before the AAT. Of total applications, 64 per cent were finalised within 12 months. Also in 
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